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TRUST, TOLERANCE AND THE CHANGING TERMS OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY

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Abstract:

This essay explores the distinction between trust and confidence and its relevance to the terms of social solidarity in contemporary societies. It compares a moral community of trust to communities of confidence and questions the consequences of such distinctions for our ability to abide by and live with difference. It presents the idea of tolerance as a plausible if under-theoretized concept for how to live with ethnic and religious differences in our new multicultural societies.

Key words: Trust, Confidence, Modernity, Tolerance, Difference.

Trust and Confidence

Vladimir Ilych Lenin is famously said to have remarked: "Vertrauen ist gut, Kontrolle noch besser." That is, trust is good, control, however, is much better. In this saying we find a distinction critical to any preliminary understanding of trust--the distinction between trust and confidence (or control, in Lenin's terms). Control or confidence is what we have when we know what to expect in a situation; trust by contrast, is what is needed to maintain interaction in its absence.¹

Confidence, and the knowledge necessary to confidence, can be based on many different things. It can be predicated on the ability to impose sanctions and the knowledge that one's partner to an interaction also knows that sanctions will be imposed if he or she fails to live up to the terms of an agreement. Sanctions may be formal or informal; they may be based on an intricate web of kinship obligations or on the verities of contract law. They may be immediate or inter-generational, symbolic or material. In all cases my confidence is based on knowledge that our interaction and/or exchange is set within a context, within a system that, qua system, will impose

sanctions in the case of an abrogation of agreements. Hence when I say that I "trust" the doctor, that is not quite correct. Rather, I have confidence in her abilities, in the system that awarded her the degree on the wall, as well as in the epistemological assumptions of American medicine. Of course I may also lack such confidence and take my daughter to Lourdes instead or trust, i.e., have faith in, the Lord if, for instance, I am a Christian Scientist. Similarly, when Annette Baier says that she "trusts the plumber to do a non-subversive job of plumbing" that is also not quite true.² For she knows that if he does a "subversive" job, she will not only not hire him again, and tell her neighbors not to hire him, but she will also complain to the local Better Business Bureau. She may even refuse to pay him. In short she can impose sanctions formal and informal. She knows this, he knows this, she knows that he knows this; he knows that she knows that he knows this, and so on. Their interaction and exchange is entered into by mutual interest and maintained by mutual confidence in the system within which the exchange takes place. Now if she were to rush off to meet a colleague and leave her baby with the plumber until her husband came home, that would be a very different story, one involving both parties in a relationship of trust. But I will return to this a bit later.

Confidence, to reiterate, is predicated on knowledge of what will be. And this knowledge may in turn be based on the ability to impose sanctions. It may also be based on what we may term familiarity, or what I like to call "stickball." Because John played stickball on East 13th Street as a boy, he shares with me certain codes of conduct, certain moral evaluations, certain ways of being and acting that bring me to have confidence in him. We are alike, the same, and hence I can predict his actions. Knowledge of what will be, confidence, and prediction are

¹ This contrast between trust and confidence is taken from Adam Seligman, *The Problem of Trust*. Princeton: University Press, 1997.

² Annette Baier, *Trust and AntiTrust*, 96 ETHICS 231, 250 (1986).

here based not on sanctions but on sameness, on familiarity. Mind you the relevant other may not be "the same" at all, but we will often draw certain conclusions (true or false) from modes of dress, speech, school background, neighborhood, religion, and so on, that allow us to construct a story, a narrative if you will, of sameness that will allow us to have confidence. Often, indeed, we combine as many bases of confidence as possible before entering interaction: formal sanctions may be costly and involve too great transaction costs. So we like to know we can impose informal sanctions as well. How often indeed does conversation turn to places of origin, school background, family, or even sports—all icons of familiarity, of ways to demonstrate some underlying sameness to the other as well as to ourselves. We do this all the time, everyday, in situations involving no more than choosing who to sit next to on the bus or what architect to employ in redesigning our house. It is the woof and weave of much of our public life.

Trust is something very different. Trust is what must emerge in an interaction if we have no basis for confidence, when behavior and outcomes cannot be predicted. Trust is what is needed when we interact with strangers. Trust is what is necessary if the other is unknowable. And the other is unknowable when we cannot impute or predict behavior because either a) there is no system within which sanctions can be imposed or b) there is no underlying sense or terms of familiarity or sameness which would allow such prediction.³

Traditional societies organized around kinship bonds are societies with very high levels of prediction, hence high levels of confidence based on a combination of familiarity and sanctions. Hence to say that traditional societies are societies with high levels of trust is, I would argue, a misnomer. They are rather societies with high levels of confidence based on well-known and mutually reinforced kinship obligations, predictability is high, variability low. Systems (of obligations, responsibilities, and mutuality) are clear and visible and hence confidence in behavior is remarkably high. The corollary to this is that whatever is outside of these systems is totally unknown and hence dangerous. Boundaries are clear and relatively well marked, and when situations arise that do not fit into system categories—such as friendship between individuals in a system that can only "think" in terms of ascriptive, primordial categories—these are immediately translated into terms that the systems can accommodate—hence the

phenomena of blood-brotherhood where friendship is symbolically transmuted into a primordial tie.⁴

Modernity – at least as a high 'bourgeoise' nineteenth-century ideal – was precisely the opposite of this. It was life among strangers, among those one does not know and those who do not know you, among those who, if not known, are nevertheless not necessarily dangerous. Interaction is risky, of course, and trust, as Niklas Luhmann noted, mediates risk, not danger.⁵ Unable to assume familiarity (though we constantly attempt to do so) and rooted in a "system" of much greater cognitive lability than one based on kinship, we nevertheless enter into a myriad of interactions with others on the basis of something akin to trust.

True, we do not forfeit the power of sanctions. The power of force, coercion, the buying off of contenders and the intractability of the collective action problem are all aspects of social order (Lenin's control) but one cannot maintain a social order over time based on just these considerations. As Talleyrand is reported to have remarked to Napoleon "You can do anything with bayonets, except sit on them." Social order rests on something else as well. It rests on those pre-contractual elements of solidarity that Durkheim posited as the source of the sacred.⁶ And while this sense of solidarity has often been confused with trust, we must be more subtle in our distinctions. For the basis of solidarity may indeed be different in different systems, and while some minimum degree of solidarity is necessary for a system to work, the terms of its workings will be very different in a system organized by kin exchange, in one organized on the basis of a Christian ecclesia, or in one of the market exchanges of autonomous self-regarding agents. Note that the self-regarding aspect of individuals in modern capitalism is precisely what makes them strangers and hence, in some ineluctable sense, unknowable.

Contract, as the basis of social order, registers this lack of knowledge, and so may well register a lack of trust as well (setting up as it does the terms of confidence and predictability built on sanction), but its very emergence (especially with its gradual freedom from encumbrances in the nineteenth century) registers the triumph of that unknowable and autonomous individual among whom terms of trust may, I repeat, may exist. It registers the emergence of those terms of personhood among which relation-

³ See Adam Seligman, *Role Complexity, Rikt and the Emergence of Trust*, Boston University Law Review vol. 81 no. 3 June 2001, pp.619-634.

⁴ S. N. Eisenstadt, *Ritualized Personal Relations*, Man 56 (1956): 90-95

⁵ Niklas Luhmann, *Trust and Power* (New York: Wiley, 1979).

⁶ Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (London: George Allen, Unwin, 1915).

ships built on trust become, for the first time, possible on a large scale.

Necessary to trust is the free and autonomous, hence the unknowable, individual--the same self-regarding self who stands at the fount of the new terms of civility and of friendship that define the modern age. For it is precisely the terms of friendship and of civility that now mediate between individuals no longer tied by longstanding, traditional, and ascribed sets of obligations and responsibilities. It was, after all, the breakup of local territorial and primordial ties that accompanied Europe's entry into the modern era. It was the destruction of the bonds of local and often primordial attachment to kith and kin, to territorial and local habitus, that forced the establishment of new terms of generalized trust in Western Europe, and which made the very idea of the "promise" so central to early modern political theory and the revival of modern natural law theory with Puffendorf and Grotius, and later to the thought of John Locke, David Hume, and Immanuel Kant.⁷ For what else is a promise but an act of will that invites trust among strangers, that is, among those who share no ties of affinity, kinship, or even shared belief. It is, as has been attested to by many, "a speech act whereby one alters the moral situation" by incurring new obligations.⁸ The social ties predicated on these obligations and the moral force of one's commitment to them thus serve to forge a new model of and for the political community--one based on a shared belief in the very act of promise-keeping.

It is only when agency, in the freedom of promise-keeping, can come to play a major role, when it emerges as a potential for shaping the nature of interaction, that trust must also come to play a part in defining interpersonal relations. This is, of course, the connection between trust and risk. Trust is not only a means of negotiating risk, it implies risk. It implies the risk that is incurred when we cannot expect a return or reciprocal action on another's part. In Luhmann's terms, "trust cannot be demanded,

only offered and accepted."⁹ What it is that cannot be demanded but only offered must then be something existing beyond role-expectations, beyond that which can be "demanded." For example students may demand certain behavior from teachers, commuters from bus-drivers, store-keepers from customers, and so on. Behind the demand lies the possibility of sanctions, formal or informal. But trust is connected to that aspect of personal identity not so circumscribed by roles, which is tied to recognition of another's agency.

Here is the place to return to Annette Baier and her plumber. Their interaction is defined by publicly recognized and legally sanctioned reciprocity, i.e., between plumber and customer, there is little room to speak of trust. It is really confidence in the system, that same system of meanings within which the mutual roles of plumber and client (or householder) are defined, that is meant. However when they step outside those bounds, when she entrusts her baby to him, they leave the restrictions, obligations, and sanctions of the system (at least of the contractual one) and step into that arena of risk that can only be regulated by trust.

Allow me to draw on one further example to illustrate this point: Before the prohibition on smoking in public places, I always asked people in line at the bank or market if my smoking bothered them, and if it did not, light up. However, when smoking began to be banned from public spaces, and before it was banned from all places of work and sociability, I stopped asking the people around me if it bothered them. From my perspective the matter had been taken out of my hands, was no longer something to be negotiated by the partners to the interaction, but was now solely the function of legal and abstract dicta. Where I was legally prevented from smoking, I did not of course smoke, but where it was legally permissible, I stopped thinking to ask people if it bothered them. If I could smoke, I did. I was no longer negotiating the boundaries of acceptable behavior. Freed from the burden of concern, indeed of civility, the field of smoking was henceforth ruled by law rather than by negotiation and trust. Why trust? By voluntarily refraining from smoking and so circumscribing my will in favor of the interests of a stranger, I was establishing in however passing, fleeting, and inconsequential a manner, a social bond. Both of us were granting one another a measure (however infinitesimal) of symbolic credit. However, the increasing inability of people to en-

⁷ On the role of promise-keeping in the modern natural law tradition, especially as it formed the basis for the development of contract law see Attiya, *The Rise and Fall of the Freedom of Contract* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 140-143. This theme is also dealt with in his books, *Promises, Morals and the Law* Oxford: Clarendon, 1981 chapter 2 and *Essays on Contract* Oxford: Clarendon, 1986. See also, A. Melden, *Rights and Persons* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.

⁸ Annette Baier, *Postures of the Mind: Essays on Mind and Morals*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985, pg.174. See also Geoffrey Cupit, *How Requests and Promises Create Obligations*. Philosophical Quarterly 44 no.177 (1994): 439-455.

⁹ N. Luhmann, *Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Perspectives*. In Gambetta (ed.) *Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988).

gage in such negotiation and trust leaves more and more realms of interaction defined solely by system constraints which are, in their very nature, inimical to the development of trust.

Note the twofold significance of the story: a) its very quotidian nature, taken from the type of interaction in which we often engage in the course of the day, nothing special, nothing out of the ordinary, just the type of action and interaction that make up the woof and weave of our daily life--like lining up for a bus; b) the fact that embedded in this simple interaction is a recognition of the actors as individual agents, responsible for their own behavior and capable of negotiating its effects. This negotiation is (in the first instance) mediated by neither law, nor tradition, nor religious obligations--solely by civil recognition of one another as individuals, curbing our desires (or not) in recognition of one another's preferences.

Yet another realm where we may see a similar dynamic at work, also seemingly inconsequential, but one that is critical to the workings of trust and civility in the polity is--not surprisingly--in contemporary rules of etiquette and civility. What, after all, is the difference between asking someone to "Please pass the salt" as opposed to the demand of "Give me the salt"? When asking and prefacing our request with "please," we are, however formally, acknowledging the possibility of the other to refuse. We are, in a sense, recognizing the other's agency and in so doing recognizing the other's selfhood. Any parent who has struggled to teach her or his child manners can attest to just how important that recognition of the other's selfhood is to their relationship (in this case the child's recognition of the parent as a distinct entity and not solely a function of its own interminable needs), how important a request prefaced by a "please" (even an un-meaningful one) is, how easy to acquiesce to demands so phrased, and how one's back goes up when a request is framed as a demand.¹⁰

We have internalized this type of speech over such a long period of time that we have become blind to its essential meaning, which is clear, however, as soon as we take time to think about it. Bracketing a request with the terms "please" and "thank you" is a recognition (however formal and stylized) of the contingent nature of that request's fulfillment, making of even the smallest of matters a sort of symbolic gift. In so doing, it recognizes the fact that the other person can refuse our request, is

not in any way mandated to carry it out, and does so "of his or her own free will," as it were. Recognizing choice we thus recognize agency and in so doing, in essence, recognize the selfhood of our interlocutor. In some sense it may be claimed that our codes of etiquette are a democratization of deference; deference once restricted to those above us in the social hierarchy is transformed into an aspect of all (or almost all) interaction as mutual recognition becomes an aspect of modern social formations. (In Chinese culture, the rules of etiquette remain, to large extent, those of mutual deference.) Those same social formations that place the individual at the center of their conception of moral agency are oriented around the terms of trust.

What I wish to stress here is the strong connection between the growth of civility and the growing potential for trust to play a role in the formation of social relationships. Trust and civility are far from identical social phenomena. Both however do develop in similar circumstances, sometimes in the same historical period and share a common referent. Both recognize individuals and individual agency. However, the rules of civility seek to limit this agency (if through its very recognition) and to distinguish the realm of individual behavior (the private) from that of public manners; trust emerges only within and through a more positive recognition of the workings of agency. The slow progress of the rules of civility and of the civilizing process is thus the gradual establishment of new role expectations that develop concomitantly with the development of new public roles. Inherent to these new roles (or more properly to the different types of behavior expectations that go with them) is recognition of precisely that lability and negotiability in role performance that necessitated the codes of civility and manners.

If the history of manners is the growth of new role expectations, the history of trust, predicated on the self-same recognition of agency, is its mirror image. The same structural conditions are at the root of both developments. The one in essence records the development of new roles and redefinition of existing ones, the other, an emergent potential for interaction that cannot be defined by either. They are then in a sense opposites, and the relation between them does seem intuitively to be of a reverse nature: i.e., the less trust the more careful we are (even today) of maintaining the codes of civility and its mannerisms, the more trust, the more relaxed our observance of these ritualized behavior patterns. Certainly, my manners at home with the family, in private, are very different from when there are guests, and different once again when I dine at the Spanish Embassy in Caracas. Yet they emerge to-

¹⁰ On the role of ritualized acts in the constitution of any social order see; Seligman, Weller, Puet and Simon, *Ritual and its Consequences: An Essay on the Limits of Sincerity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

gether, reflecting the same social transformation and are rooted in the same recognition of human agency—the one as an aspect of the newly developed public roles and the other of that lability of behavior that was invested in them.

The Challenge of Moral Community

The whole of the civil society tradition, of what the eighteenth-century Scottish thinker Adam Ferguson termed polished society, turns on just this sort of interaction, just this sort of mutual recognition: that is, of individuals, no longer embedded in collective groups, no longer viewing the stranger as necessarily dangerous, no longer hostage to traditionally defined terms of membership, group, and participation, who meet in the confines of the nation-state and, paradigmatically, of the city—that urban universe of life among strangers, among those whom one does not know and those who do not know you, among those who if unknown are nevertheless not dangerous. This meeting of self-regarding and autonomous individuals and their mutual recognition formed the basis of that approbation and moral sentiment which for the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment formed the very basis of social-life--indeed, made social life possible at all. Vanity here is crucial. It builds on the social nature of our existence and on our individual validation in and through the eyes of others. The public arena of exchange and interaction, the realm of civil society, is not simply a "neutral" space for market exchange, where already fully-constituted individuals meet to exchange property or to develop commerce, manufacture, or the arts. It is itself an ethical arena, in which the individual is constructed in his individuality through his exchange with others. Vanity is that which links us to the social whole as we become who we are through the other's perception of us.¹¹

As it developed over the nineteenth-century, the terms of collective membership within the nation-state, i.e., citizenship and a shared legal order, provided the baseline of confidence through predictability. It was this baseline, which ideally was seen to provide the conditions through which trust could emerge between strangers sharing a common legal, moral, social and economic order. In fact, to great extent we can understand the prevalence of the "Jewish Question" throughout the nineteenth-century Europe as turning around precisely these issues—with assimilation, understood by all, as the move of this community from relations of confidence to those of trust with others groups sharing

civic space. The failure of assimilation is of course the failure of this move.

Thus, as we saw earlier, modernity, not to say urbanity, is precisely the opposite of a primordially defined life of traditional society. It is life among strangers, among those you do not know and those who do not know you; among those who, if not known, are nevertheless not necessarily dangerous (as they share the same legal order). Interaction is risky, of course, and trust, as we noted following Luhmann, mediates risk, not danger. Unable to assume familiarity (though we constantly attempt to do so) and rooted in a "system" of much greater cognitive lability than one based on kinship, within the contemporary nation-state, we are nevertheless expected to enter into myriad interactions with others on the basis of something akin to trust.

This then was both the ideal model, but also the contemporary problem. For what is emerging in many European and North Atlantic communities today is a bifurcation of the terms of trust and confidence. Whereas once the assumption was that the coalescence of a moral community would see the establishment of such a community on the basis of trust, this is no longer the case. Certain ethnic, linguistic, religious and ethno-religious communities are, rather, turning inward, sharing the terms of trust only within their micro communities (again reminiscent of debates around the nineteenth-century Jewish communities) while invoking a wholly different set of orientations, attitudes and dispositions towards the members of other communities—who are, nevertheless, their fellow citizens. In many cases this is complicated by the fact that the State itself treats certain ethnic, linguistic, religious and ethno-religious communities as trusting partners while, in its interaction with other such communities within its national boundaries, invokes a very different set of moral rules and expectations — predicated on sanctions and so guarantees of confidence. What is emerging is thus a model of trust, human empathy and understanding that is circumscribed and often defined by the terms of religious belonging standing very much in contrast to statist assumptions of abstract legal reasoning, and security concerns oriented not towards the construction of shared public goods, but to the mediation of potentially dangerous actions on the part of the citizenry. Rather than understanding confidence as a propaedeutic of trust, the terms of community are being circumscribed by what is familiar and known and trust as an aspect of community is retreating.

What we are beginning to see more and more in contemporary societies are two very communal models that can be presented as follows:

¹¹ Adam Seligman, *The Idea of Civil Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), esp. chapter one.

Communities of Trust	Communities of Confidence
Shared dispositions	Multicultural values
Moral community	Community of rights bearers
Value of peace	Value of justice
Familiarity	Strangeness
Sameness	Difference
Shared moral dispositions	Disparate moral values
Shared experience	Dissimilar experience
Moral credit granted to communal members	No credit granted, knowledge demanded
Others experienced as risk	Others experienced as dangerous
Risk leaves room for doubt	Danger requires security
Our group	Other group

Increasingly, in the contemporary world, and within the nation-state communities of trust are markedly diverging from communities of confidence. In the latter, the values, principles of social organization, orientations towards the other, self-understandings and fundamental terms of organizing collective experience are very different from those of a community of trust.

What seems to be happening is an increasing divergences between confidence and trust, reason and empathy, justice and mercy, in essence between abstract claims of justice (as guarantors of confidence) and those of a moral community built on trust. It maybe useful to conceptualize this distinction in the terms posited by Robert Cover, as a growing divergence of the worlds of *Nomos* and *Narrative* from those of legal authority. Years ago, Cover's seminal essay showed us how legal orders are positioned within much more extensive narrative frameworks of communal meaning and belonging that make up an embracing *nomos* of which law is but one element. He taught: "No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning. For every constitution there is an epic, for each decalogue a scripture."¹² Yet the *nomos* of moral individualism and a secular public space, the narrative of autonomous moral decisors and of liberal humanism is increasingly alien to many large groups making up civil society within the Western European nation states. Sharing different narrative or nomic universes, the establishment of trusting relations between such groups becomes impossible and social interaction

between them rests solely on the legal order, that is, on the basis of a type of confidence guaranteed by the State. Trust is reserved for those within the communal boundaries who share epics and scriptures that are alien to the legal orders of the State.

The real problem with this bifurcation of our social world, however, is not that we live in two universes. In truth, we live in many more. The real problem is that the increasingly the world of our moral community seems to be predicated on sameness, on familiarity, and on a world of shared assumptions. There seems an increasing inability to move beyond the confines of confidence, knowledge and predictability into the realm of trust as a basis for community. Within such a model, however, sameness is always illusionary, always partial, incomplete and given to disruption. Nothing, after all, in the world is really "the same"—even the snowflakes, we are told, are in small ways each different from one another.

Hence, if we make what is shared and familiar the predicate of our terms of empathy and community—whether of a shared epic, or a shared history—we will always be disappointed. We will always find one group or another existing somewhere on the margins or borders of this 'sameness' who—especially in times of trial and tribulation—are seen to betray this sameness, to violate our shared moral code and to betray their real colors of strangeness and difference. Indeed, over 60 years ago Sigmund Freud wrote of the "narcissism of the small difference"—how we perceive the threats to our identity not in the totally different and far-off other, but in the near-other, he or she who is similar in so many way, but not in this one attribute (whatever it may be) which then achieves an iconic standing as representing all that is different and threatening and so must be destroyed.¹³

As long as the terms of shared moral community are restricted to those who are the same, we will continually be patrolling the borders of this sameness to check for deviations and differences. The boundaries will be points of continual contestation, of fear and of opprobrium. In times of crises (when the next bomb goes off in the London transport, or the next imam is arrested in Leicester, or even perhaps when the economy slumps and I can no longer pay my mortgage) those who are a bit like us but also a bit not like us, will come to take on a new aspect, not at all like us. Rather they will be looked upon suspiciously, as possibly (perhaps even probably) dangerous and as such we will invoke the laws

¹² Robert Cover, *Nomos and Narrative in Narrative Violence and The Law*, pp. 95-96 (Martha Minow, Michael Ryan & Austin Sarat, eds., 1995).

¹³ Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, VOL. XXI, 114.

of justice and the sanctions of the State and its security forces, rather than the moral credit of our shared communal experience. As we know, this was the experience of Jews in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe. In some ways, it is repeating itself, with the Muslim citizens of European societies today.

At the heart of these issues then is the problem of difference and of living and sharing public space with individuals and groups who are, in certain, critical and important ways different and whose difference makes us uncomfortable. How to do this, in a manner that is not simply understood in terms of the privatization or trivialization of all differences (which is, to great extent, the classic liberal solution), must thus be the crux of any new ideal of post-secular constitutionalism.

Tolerance

Critical in this move is the concept of tolerance as a necessary virtue for life together with those who are different and with whom we disagree. It may be well to recall that the concept of tolerance was used in medieval canon law to refer to the status of both Jews and prostitutes.¹⁴ It would have been better, so the thinking went, to rid society of both classes of people but the negative effects of their removal were seen to outweigh the benefits. In the case of prostitutes, their removal was seen to endanger the family and open the way to all sorts of adulteries, infidelities and other sins of the flesh, while the removal of the Jews would have rid society of that group whose recognition of Jesus as Christ was necessary for the second coming. This sense of a be-grudging tolerance as but a second best solution has remained with us and with all who reject such virtues as too insipid for the type of pluralistic multi-ethnic, multi-religious, diverse and global world we are living in.

In spite of this I would make the case for tolerance as a necessary virtue for a democratic citizenry, and a difficult and demanding moral political virtue it is at that. This is because it rests on a sort of epistemological modesty and an eschewal of final explanations and any claims to ultimate knowledge. Faith (or trust) is not knowledge (or certitude) and human reason has to accept its own limits. These limits extend not only to matters of the Deity, but even to our judgment of many matters of this world and our neighbors' affairs. Moreover and to make the point ever so much stronger, one need not accept the principles of philosophic liberalism, revolving around the idea of the self as a morally autonomous decision-maker in order to practice as a liberal. Political

liberalism does not depend on philosophic liberalism. There is a huge difference (as even Rawls was forced to admit) between philosophical liberalism and political (or shall we say, pragmatic) liberalism.¹⁵ Too often we assume that to practice the latter one must have signed on and become a true believer in the former. This is not the case. One can be an orthodox Jew, literalist Muslim, pre-Vatican II Catholic, and so believe in heteronymous commandments (and hence not in the liberal, autonomous moral decision-maker) and still act out a pragmatic liberalism without buying into its philosophical presuppositions. Religious and ethical beliefs of the good life do not stand in any one-to-one correlation with the moral norms of reciprocity and human interaction. One can derive laws of human reciprocity and civic responsibility from the Babylonian Talmud as well as from Thomas Jefferson.

What I am arguing for is the realization that the problem at hand is not theoretical or philosophical, indeed may not even be purely political, but is a problem in the realm of individual behavior and attitude. At the end of the day, tolerance implies living with, abiding, or—in the medieval usage—suffering, the presence of that we find objectionable. If something or someone were not objectionable, there would be no need to tolerate its presence. It is very important to be clear on this point. Tolerance presents us with a double burden. It demands that we accept the presence of that which we find objectionable and in so doing, it demands that we suffer our own discomfort at this presence. It demands of us to live in some form of cognitive dissonance. We need then to reframe our understanding of tolerance and the suffering involved as not simply suffering the presence of which we find objectionable, but as bearing our own discomfort. We must learn that just because something makes us uncomfortable does not mean it is wrong, or evil or barbaric or should be outlawed. We are after all not gods, not even prophets. Simply stated. Yet not so simply practiced—let us try to understand why.

First and foremost, as already stated, tolerance assumes the existence of difference. For tolerance to need to be evoked as a mechanism of social interaction we must find ourselves in the presence of something that is both different and objectionable. If it were just different, but not objectionable there would be no cause for tolerance (someone's rather odd taste in bathroom fixtures say). The objectionable is, moreover, almost always seen as the differ-

¹⁴ Istvan Bejczy, *Tolerantia: A Medieval Concept*, 58 J. Hist. Ideas 365, 370-71 (1997).

¹⁵ See, e.g., John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (1993); but see John Rawls, *Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1971).

ent.

If we make use of Freud's notion of the "narcissism of the small difference," i.e., that he or she who is slightly different from me is, in a sense, a continual threat to my identity and sense of self—constantly calling into question the distinguishing characteristics of my own sense of self, precisely because we are so alike in all other ways—we see how difference is almost always seen as containing some objectionable element. We almost always project a negative valence to the difference, precisely because that difference brings into question our sense of self-worth.

When faced with the "small differend" we thus tend in fact to one of two moves. The first is to turn the small differend into a rather large one—i.e., what is often called today "othering" the other—pushing him or her or this or that group beyond the boundaries of shared humanity (a process which defined to a great extent traditional Christian attitudes towards Jews, many current attitudes towards Muslims in the West, the orientations of some Christian evangelicals in the USA to gays and lesbians, Sunni Muslims to Alevites, and so on). At this stage of course tolerance is ruled out as unnecessary, as the other is so totally other, dangerous and beyond the common pale that there is no cause to tolerate. It is no longer a matter of someone or some behavior being objectionable—but rather, the boundaries between us and them have, in fact, become absolutized into boundaries of good and evil, humane and barbaric and so no tolerance is called for (clearly tolerance has limits, if it is not to fall into total relativism). Tolerance in this case is defined away as the person or persons who are seen as different, not simply as objectionable, but as downright dangerous.

This, as I say, is one common move. The other, equally common, is to obviate the need for tolerance in a different direction. In most cases we tend to elide the problem of tolerance with an appeal to some essential, underlying or overarching similarity with what is different. We tend to trivialize the difference and posit some essential shared characteristic that in effect makes us one. So here too, there is no need to tolerate, for we have done away with what is different and trivialized what we saw as objectionable. Once again, then, we have absolved ourselves of the need for tolerance as we have done away with difference.

There are two problems with this move: first, it is often the case that when we define our common bond with one group of people it is usually through defining a third group as beyond that common bond. A unites with B by defining themselves in opposition to C. To a great extent this seems to be what is happening now in the relations of Jews and Chris-

tians vis-à-vis

the Muslim world. We all did this as children and it is a staple of group psychology.¹⁶ It is of course extremely dangerous, if for no other reason than that it demands that continual production of C group. So that there is a continual impulse to redefine some difference in a sub-group of A or B so different that it can no longer be part of the conjoined group and it is pushed out beyond a common, shared definition of solidarity. To no small extent, this is the history of heresy and sectarianism in the great world religions.¹⁷

There is however yet another reason that this process cannot be stable (leaving aside the normative or ethical aspect) and that is because each and every one of us wants recognition and respect precisely in where we are unique, singular and different. By defining us in terms of an overarching similarity or sameness, we define away what is unique and particular to each. This uniqueness and particularity however is precisely what each of us wishes to be recognized in and through. It is in our difference, or "specialness" that we wish to be recognized, not our sameness. Appeals to sameness, to our shared values or shared humanity as a basis of tolerance thus, in effect, do away with tolerance while leaving us bereft of that sense of unique personal worth that is so critical to our idea of ourselves in the world.

However simple an idea, the reality of tolerance is in fact extremely problematic—devolving itself into either affirmations of sameness, which obviate the need for tolerance by positing the essential identity of all relevant social actors, or by positing the absolute and dangerous nature of alter (or alters) to whom the proper response is not tolerance but some form of extermination (either physical or symbolic). In both cases we are seemingly running away from the extremely difficult demands of tolerance—that double burden noted above.

Given this difficulty, it may be that if we intend to realize our dreams of a pluralistic civil society the specific institutional rules of social organization (freedom of organization, of conscience, universal franchise, rights, etc.) acting as some sort of third party enforcer are insufficient, and what needed is an appreciation of tolerance as a virtue that must be inculcated at the most fundamental levels of socialization. What wanted and needed is precisely a *prac-*

¹⁶See, e.g., Sandor Gilman, *Difference and Pathology: Stereotypes of Sexuality, Race and Madness* 2d ed. (Cornell University Press 1985).

¹⁷Kai Erikson, *Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance* (1966).

tice of tolerance, which can itself be rooted in very different *traditions of practice*. We must take seriously the possibility that other virtues and ways of living—beyond Western constitutionalism—and hence not necessarily equating with the moral autonomy of the individual, may also provide for the ability to tolerate, abide by and even protect difference of a constitutive nature. In fact, they may be more essential to the working of such tolerance than the liberal/individualist model. If there is a way forward into what some have termed a post-Christian as well as post-secular sociopolitical reality, it can only be along these lines.

One component of such an approach, I would argue, is eschewing any final explanation and agreeing to set apart broad, inclusive and generalized explanations—sacred or secular, transcendent or transcendental, subnomos or autonomous—as conditions for sharing civil space with individuals or groups who are strangers to us. We must begin to localize our ideas and circumscribe our explanations towards what is most or more immediate without engaging our own particular collective philosophy of history, man, God and existence. We must learn to live, if not without the latter, but at least without the latter forming the ground of each and every interaction involving the other. By distancing these grand or meta interpretive grids from every environment—which-is-in-need-of-an-explanation, we create a space where alternative and competing practices among members of differing and even mutually exclusive interpretive communities can construct a common life (even while remaining mutually exclusive in their truth claims and all that follows from such). We learn to act (according to our newly formed conjectures and judgments) rather than react (according to our received prejudices and cognitive grids).¹⁸

Therefore, what I am suggesting here is a model of interaction that is predicated on neither trust nor confidence. On one hand we eschew all attempts to reduce the other to the same or the familiar he or she who shares our dispositions (which provides, as we have seen, the basis of trust). On the other hand, we reject the security of confidence which, while maintaining the “otherhood” of alter, reduces our interaction to abstract legal-rational categories and criteria. We may term it “Constitutionalism without nomos.” In their stead, I am suggesting an idea of embodied knowledge, that is, knowledge focused on particularities and hence what is, in essence, experience.

Experience, as the American pragmatist phi-

losopher, John Dewey has taught us, is the central component in thinking. “‘To learn from experience’,” he tells us, “is to make a backward and forward connection between what we do to things and what we enjoy or suffer from things in consequence. Under such conditions, doing becomes a trying; an experiment with the world to find out what it is like.”¹⁹ In this process, the intellect cannot be separated from experience and the attempt to do so leaves us with disembodied, abstract knowledge that all too often emphasizes “things” rather than the “relations or connections” between them.²⁰ In so doing it is of precious little help in our attempt to connect the multitude of disconnected data that the world presents into a framework of meaning. For the meaning rests not on the knowledge of “things,” but on the relations between them. These relations, in turn, as Dewey so brilliantly argues, can only be assessed through experience—because only through experience do we bring the relevant relations between things into any sensible sort of juxtaposition. Thus meaning, emergent from experience can only be supplied by the goals towards which we aspire—as indeed, experience, as opposed our simple passive subjugation to an event—or narrative—is always in pursuit of a practical aim. In Cover’s terms this move can perhaps be conceived as the continual construction of ad hoc, shared narrative frameworks, predicated on the progress of the shared experience.

In a practical sense what this implies is that we must thus eschew the seduction of wishing “full knowledge” of the other (such as provided by either the shared dispositions of trust or the abstract legal-rational order of confidence) before we engage in joint projects and share a civic life with them. There never will be such full knowledge. It is the privilege of God alone. Each and every one of us brings infinite possibilities to our encounters with other human beings. These cannot be circumscribed by the idols of the tribe, or the marketplace or, for that matter, by our grandmothers’ stories. It is neither by expanding the boundaries of trust, nor by transforming them into the security criteria of confidence, but by radically recalibrating them that we can learn to live together differently. The constant search for infinitely calculable degrees of moral sameness is dangerous. Such an exercise will always leave us with a not-too-negligible human remainder whose position outside the boundaries will be a constant threat to all. The challenge of really living with difference demands great moral courage. It demands us to act and to take stands in situations of moral ambiguity

¹⁸ Adam B. Seligman, *Pedagogic Principles and Reflections Developing out of ISSRPL Practice*, ISSRPL Occasional Paper Series, Oct. 2008, at 1, available at <http://issrpl.org/vision/images/issrplpaper.pdf>.

¹⁹ John Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 134 (NY: Dover Publications, 2004).

²⁰ *Ibid.* p. 137.

and in circumstances of less than full knowledge, of strangeness and otherness, and of ignorance. This is the moral courage of tolerance, beyond either trust or confidence.

Conclusion

To some extent, the ideas presented earlier, of trust and confidence resonate with what, in the social thought of the nineteenth century was understood through the categories of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. At that time the assumption was that the course of historical progress necessarily led to the first being replaced with the second. What we are seeing now is rather their coexistence at the same time in the same State. This is the challenge facing so many politicians and policy makers in Western European and North Atlantic countries—and indeed the world over.

To meet this challenge, we must, at one and the same time, be willing to question the ideal qualities of each. We must, on the one hand, redefine the idea of a moral community which must now come to include Jews, Muslims, Shiks, Gays and all sorts of communities of difference within such a moral community. However, we must also do so, by abjuring the constraints of a cold, calculating and instrumental reason—of a claim to an absolute and perforce abstract truth, which tends in turn to militate against the development of feelings of empathy, shared solidarity, trust and the needs of trust, mercy and understanding (which, as we have seen, simply retire “underground” as it were to be expressed in private, in encoded and emic languages that others have no access to and which thus, in turn, make a joke of any notion of shared community).

How to do so is not easy matter. Moreover, it can be accomplished only in practice and not in theory. Here, I dare say, the realm of the law is probably of more help than that of political philosophy or of the social sciences. For it is in the law that the necessarily pragmatic approach can be developed which would allow the slow, piece-meal construction of such new ad hoc, shared, if provisional understandings that may provide a new model of living together differently.

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CHRISTIAN FAITH AS TRUST*

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Abstract:

Thomas Aquinas and the Scholastic tradition have defined the noetic content

of Christian faith, *fide*, as a sort of ungrounded belief — not knowledge — motivated by grace. Calvin and the Reformed tradition, instead, have seen that content as a sort of knowledge made possible by grace. Both theologians agree that faith produces trust in God, but the way they respectively understand the ground of such trust depends upon their respective ways of understanding the noetic content of faith. The aim of the present paper is to explain in what sense Christian faith, as understood by John Calvin, is or involves a certain kind of trust or reliance.

Key words: Aquinas, Calvin, faith and knowledge, trust.

1 Introduction

The main goal of this paper is to explain in what sense Christian faith, as understood by John Calvin, is or involves a certain kind of trust or reliance. This is not to imply that faith is *merely* trust: faith involves also, in a very essential way, noetic structures and propositional attitudes. The paper intends to clarify how these sustain or create trust and what are the objects of such trust. It will be convenient, in order to highlight Calvin's views on faith, to compare them with those of Thomas Aquinas, which are better known. This should clarify the differences between these two great theologians on the issue, hopefully contribute to dispelling some of the misunderstandings that, according to Vos (1985), some Protestants hold regarding Aquinas' conception of faith, but also to make clear which is the actual Calvinian view.

There is no doubt that, even if it has other aspects, faith involves certain noetic acts and propositional attitudes. It is impossible to understand Aquinas' or Calvin's concept of faith without taking into account the noetic structure of the person. Plantinga

(2000, p. 221) defines a person's noetic structure as "the set of propositions he believes, together with certain epistemic relations that hold between him and these propositions". In the next section I will expose the details of this concept, which will be used throughout as a tool to analyze the respective accounts of Aquinas and Calvin of the noetic structure presupposed by faith.

Starting with his theory of knowledge, in the third section I will try to reconstruct Aquinas' conception of faith, as rigorously and clearly as possible, and then explain how he saw the trust involved in faith.¹ In the fourth section I will do something analogous on Calvin, following the relevant passages of his *Institutes of the Christian Religion*.

2 The Concept of a Noetic Structure

Any normal human person harbors beliefs about many things. Usually, these beliefs are not isolated, but are related, connected among themselves by associations, logical connections and the like, so that the person's stream of consciousness consists of these, passing from one to the other, interspersed with images, emotions and feelings.² Thus, these beliefs are somehow "stored" in the body of the person, forming a certain system or structure. And there is no doubt, indeed, that much that is important and interesting can be said about the neurological or psychological aspects of this structure. Nevertheless, I shall not deal with these aspects here, but only with the logical and epistemic ones. This task is feasible because a person can normally provide reasons for

¹ The doctrine of faith is mainly exposed in the Second Part of the Second Part, chapters 1 to 16, of the *Summa Theologica*. I will follow here Redmond's (2000) exposition of Aquinas doctrine on faith, which I find quite accurate. Redmond refers to these chapters as 'F'.

² Perhaps the literary form of interior monologue, used to portray the stream of consciousness of some character, would be a better way of depicting this stream. An example is Molly Bloom's soliloquy in chapter eighteen of James Joyce's *Ulysses*.

* I wish to thank professors Jacob Buganza, Roy Clouser and Darin McNabb for useful comments to a previous version of this paper.

harboring some of his beliefs, and can infer beliefs from other beliefs, even if unconsciously.

It is important to stress that noetic structures are something actual in living human beings. The reason why this is so important is that the notion of a noetic structure usually tends to be somewhat idealized. It tends to portray humans as perfect computers, endowed with perfect information and able to draw all the logical consequences of their beliefs. It is therefore important to remember that a person may have beliefs entailing a proposition A and yet be unable to see that A is a proposition he should also believe. Or he may harbor belief A unconsciously, so that if someone asks him whether he believes that A he might say that he does not, or that he has never thought about it. Also, beliefs that are more or less obvious to someone may be suppressed for some or another motive; for instance, a wife may be unwilling to acknowledge that her husband is a serial murderer, even though she has enough evidence for it.

The noetic structure of person S , thus, is the set of beliefs maintained by S , even though he might not be conscious of some of them, or of some of their logical consequences. Thus, his noetic structure is a certain system, even if the system may be relatively disconnected and even inconsistent.

The beliefs constituting a noetic structure can be divided into basic and nonbasic. A belief A is *basic* for person S iff S believes it and does not believe it on the basis of other propositions (cf. Plantinga 2000, p. 219). Notice that this is not to say that S is “rational” (whatever this may mean) in believing A , or that A is evident to S : A may be a belief inherited by tradition which may have been rational for S ’s ancestors to believe but that it is no longer rational for S to maintain. Hence, some basic beliefs may be grounded for S (i.e. S has grounds to maintain them), whereas others might not be.

The propositions within the noetic structure of person S may be believed with different degrees of intensity. Plantinga (2000, p. 222) suggests that it is somehow possible to have an index of degree of belief, namely

as a function $B_S(A)$ from the set of propositions a person S believes or disbelieves into the real numbers between 0 and 1. $B_S(A) = n$, then, records something like the degree to which S believes A , or the strength of his belief that A . $B_S(A) = 1$ proclaims S ’s utter and abandoned commitment to A ; $B_S(A) = 0$ records a similar commitment to not A ; $B_S(A) = 5$ means that S , like Buridan’s ass, is suspended in equilibrium between A and not A .

The existence of such an index presupposes that there is a binary relation $\preceq$ among the propositions S believes or disbelieves, such that $A \preceq A'$ if A is more firmly believed than A' by S . It requires also that $\preceq$ be at least connected, reflexive and transitive over such set of propositions. Measures of degree of belief restricted to subsets of beliefs with certain structural characteristics can be defined as measurements of subjective probabilities, as explained by Suppes (1974).

The propositions believed by S may also have different depth of ingression. Comparing the noetic structure of a person with a building, some have explained depth of ingression by means of a metaphor that compares it with closeness to the foundations: the foundations sustaining the building have the greatest depth; the columns supporting superior floors a little less. Perhaps the iron of the balcony has very little. The criterion of depth of ingression for a tenet is usually how much of the building would have to be rebuilt if the tenet were removed. The foundations have the greatest depth of ingression because removing them would be tantamount to removing the whole building. It is hard to imagine an index of depth of ingression, but usually religious beliefs,³ and those constituting the central tenets of the worldview, tend to be in the core of the noetic structure. The closer to the core, the harder for S to abandon a belief. This has an analogue in scientific theories. Lakatos (1970) claimed that scientific theories have a “hard core” which is never rejected in the face of negative evidence: what is modified or rejected is the “protective belt” surrounding the hard core.

In addition, the propositions believed by S may also have different degree of support or confirmation for S . Classical foundationalism has a general doctrine of belief justification. According to it, justified basic beliefs must be selfevident or incorrigible or evident to the senses. Other beliefs are justified if they receive enough support from the foundations, the justified basic beliefs. This leads to the idea of degree of confirmation: the degree of confirmation a proposition P has depends upon how is P related to certain basic justified beliefs. We cannot get into the details here, but any doctrine of confirmation degree must explain how a non-basic proposition P is con-

³ For a precise definition of what I mean by religious belief, see Clouser 2005.

firmed by a set of justified basic propositions $P_1, \dots, P_n$.⁴

3 Aquinas' Conception of Faith

According to Plantinga (2000), Aquinas is correctly seen as a classical foundationalist. Aquinas held that a properly functioning ("rational") noetic structure must harbor as basic beliefs only beliefs that are self-evident, incorrigible or evident to the senses. Any non-basic belief must be believed with a degree of intensity proportional to its degree of confirmation, leading to one of four degrees of propositional commitment:

- (1) *Knowing* (and understanding, *intelligere*) , when the mind firmly "assents" (*assentire, assensio*) to a proposition and "adheres" (*adhaerere, adhaesio*) firmly to its truth-value (*pars*, its truth or falsehood) . Assent means grasping (*capere*) the content and judging it true or false [F9:1; these are the fundamental mental acts of apprehension and judgment] .
- (2) *Opining* (*opinari*) , when the mind, lacking strong assent, adheres to one truth-value not firmly but with misgiving ("fear of error") [Opinion (*opinari, opinio*) , "weak and infirm," sometimes ethically deserving (F2:9:ad2) , characterized by contingency (F1:5:ad4) , misgiving, and even willfulness (F1:4) , may constitute belief. Aquinas also speaks of "(*mente*) tenere, hold in the mind" (F1:5:3, etc.) ; he tends to reserve '*credere*' ('believing') for "holding on faith"; the word may have other connotations such as trust (F2:2)] .
- (3) *Suspecting* (*susplicari*) , when the mind, "guided by a slight clue (*tenetur aliquo levi signo*) ," "inclines (*declinare*)" more to one truth-value than the other.
- (4) *Wavering* (*dubitare*) , when the mind vacillates between the truth and falsehood of the proposition. (Redmond 2000, p. 38)

Aquinas held, moreover, that in describing a properly functioning noetic structure he was describing "natural reason", the natural intellectual powers of any normal human being, in whatever epoch and culture, where 'normal human being' means human person able to speak coherently and make correct inferences.

Aquinas maintained the Scholastic view that there are two classes of propositions: those whose truth-value can be determined in principle by natural reason, and those that cannot. These last concern revealed matters divine (*circa divina*) "but also cer-

tain temporal affairs in their relation to God" (Redmond 2000, p. 39). Aquinas held that certain tenets regarding matters divine could be believed by revelation or reached instead by natural reason. The existence and unicity of God as creator are among these tenets. The claim that the existence of God can be known by natural reason implies that such knowledge is within the reach of any normal human being; i.e., any normal human being making use of his natural intellectual powers can come to know that there is a transcendent God that created the world. This knowledge is not basic for Aquinas, however, since it must be reached by means of inferences from basic propositions.⁵ Since the arguments are involved, these inferences are not "spontaneous"; i.e., not every normal human being actually reaches the conclusion that there is a transcendent unique God which is creator of the universe. In point of fact, Aquinas thought that most human beings come to believe such a proposition not by argument but by faith, which for him implies without knowing it.

This doctrine of the "natural" knowledge of God seems to clash with the teachings of Romans 1:18–25, where it is implied that the knowledge of God is immediate for human beings with a properly functioning noetic structure but not for "normal" humans in general, due to a certain corruption of the intellectual powers:

18 The wrath of God is being revealed from heaven against all the godlessness and wickedness of men who suppress the truth by their wickedness, 19 since what may be known about God is plain to them because God has made it plain to them (διότι τὸ γνωστόν τοῦ Θεοῦ φανερόν ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς). 20 For since the creation of the world God's invisible qualities — his eternal power and divine nature — have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so that men are without excuse. 21 For although they knew God, they neither glorified him as God nor gave thanks to him, but their thinking became futile and their foolish hearts were darkened.

Indeed, since 'φανερόν' means "visible", "manifest", "evident", the scripture is clearly asserting that what can be known about God, namely his eternal power and divine nature, was originally visible, manifest and evident to all men. Now, since

⁴ The literature on confirmation degree usually takes Carnap 1950 as one of the seminal contributions of this field.

⁵ Aquinas' traditional arguments for the existence of God are known as the *viæ*: "ways." A rigorous formal reconstruction and discussion of the same can be found in Bochenski 2000.

some of them no longer are able to know God in such a way, or know him at all, it follows that something must have happened to their intellectual powers. Romans 1 continues explaining the cause of such downfall:

22 Although they claimed to be wise, they became fools 23 and exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images made to look like mortal man and birds and animals and reptiles. . . . 25 They exchanged the truth of God for a lie, and worshiped and served created things rather than the Creator. . . .

Hence, I take this scripture as implying, first,

- (1) The proposition “there is a divine eternal being which is creator of the universe” is self-evident to all human beings with a properly functioning noetic structure.

And, second,

- (2) Not all normal human beings have a properly functioning noetic structure.

Aquinas (and the Scholastic tradition) seem to deny (2). When he describes “natural reason”, Aquinas seems to assume that he is describing a properly functioning noetic structure. Hence, he seems to be implicitly attributing to normal human beings such a structure. Moreover, he also denies (1), that the proposition “there is a divine eternal being which is creator of the universe” is self-evident, since even Christian philosophers — according to him — need sophisticated arguments in order to see its truth. Now, given that this type of knowledge of God can be reached only by people with special training, it cannot be equated with the self-evident knowledge of God mentioned in the former scripture: clearly, a proposition whose truth can be known only by those having a rather sophisticated logical training could hardly be said to be plain to all normal human beings. Thus, there is a dissonance between Aquinas’ account of the natural knowledge of God and the former scripture. Aquinas would be willing to claim that even for human beings with a properly functioning noetic structure (i.e., according to him, all human beings in general) the proposition “there is a divine eternal being which is creator of the universe” is *not* self-evident. For him, the knowledge of God is the privilege of philosophically trained persons who have followed the proper arguments.

In contradistinction to the philosophical knowledge of God,

faith has not that inquiry of natural reason which demonstrates what is believed, but an inquiry into those things whereby a man is induced to believe, for instance, that such things have been uttered by God and confirmed by miracles. (F2:1, Reply Obj. 1)

Now, if *S* really *knew* that there is a divine eternal being which is creator of the universe (God) *and* that the tenets proposed for belief (those in the Scripture) have been uttered by such being *and* that such being never lies, then it would be altogether foolish for *S* not to assent to those tenets. Indeed, a good ground for *S* to *trust* that what *T* says is true is to know that *T* is reliable; i.e., that *T* knows what he is talking about, and that *T* never lies. This holds also for the acts of faith that humans perform regarding very practical temporal matters, like boarding a plane to cross the Atlantic: if person *S* did not know many things about planes, the fact that not many fall down, that they receive proper maintenance, that the pilot is expert, and so on, perhaps *S* would rather not board the plane. The point is that trust and reliance in practical, moral, human matters is usually grounded upon *knowledge* of the relevant facts. When it is not, we say that it is *blind faith*.

Does God require blind faith by those to whom he proposes the fidic tenets? If a normal man *S* *knew* that God exists, that such being never lies, and that the Bible contains his word, and if he felt his conscience accusing him, then *S* would certainly feel rather inclined to assent to the tenets proposed by God in the Gospel. Yet, Aquinas would not admit that this much knowledge about God is possible. He would admit that natural reason can reach at most the knowledge of the existence and unicity of God, perhaps with some intimations of his moral character due to the witness borne by their consciences (Romans 2:15). As a matter of fact, regarding the question whether it is necessary to believe by faith those things which can be proved by natural reason, Aquinas says that

It is necessary for man to accept by faith not only things which are above reason, but also those which can be known by reason: and this for three motives. First, in order that man may arrive more quickly at the knowledge of Divine truth. Because the science to whose province it belongs to prove the existence of God, is the last of all to offer itself to human research, since it presupposes many other sciences: so that it would not be until late in life that man would arrive at the knowledge of God. The second reason is, in order that the knowledge of God may be more general. For many are unable to make progress in the study of science, either through dullness of mind, or through hav-

ing a number of occupations, and temporal needs, or even through laziness in learning, all of whom would be altogether deprived of the knowledge of God, unless Divine things were brought to their knowledge under the guise of faith. The third reason is for the sake of certitude. For human reason is very deficient in things concerning God. A sign of this is that philosophers in their researches, by natural investigation, into human affairs, have fallen into many errors, and have disagreed among themselves. And consequently, in order that men might have knowledge of God, free of doubt and uncertainty, it was necessary for Divine matters to be delivered to them by way of faith, being told to them, as it were, by God Himself Who cannot lie. (F2:4)

The problem of this text is that its use of the term 'knowledge' is incorrect, since no proposition taken by faith, according to Aquinas, can count as knowledge. It is clear that if "Divine matter" *A* is delivered to *S* by way of faith, then *S* does not know that *A*.⁶ If *all* such matters are delivered by faith then *S* cannot *know* that they were delivered by God or that God cannot lie. Hence, in order to have faith *S* must take a leap, so to say, assenting to entirely groundless tenets. Thus, Aquinas is implying that most believers *are* fideist, insofar as they accept the authority of Scripture without evidence. He is also giving three motives why all men *should be* fideist, taking by faith even tenets that can be known by reason. Moreover, if a philosophically trained person wanted to accept the authority of the Scripture by reason, he would not be able, since the proposition "the Scripture is the Word of God, of that same God whose existence you reached by way of rational proof" is not a tenet that for Aquinas can be known, but must be taken by faith. Thus, it is hard to see how, for Aquinas, faith can be said to build upon nature.

Curiously enough, far from taking this groundless assenting as a defect, Aquinas claims that it is meritorious (cf. F9), precisely because there are no reasons to assent to it:

our actions are meritorious in so far as they proceed from the free-will moved with grace by God. Therefore every human act proceeding from the free-will, if it be referred to God, can be meritorious. Now the act of believing is an act of the intellect assenting to the Divine truth at the command of the will moved by the grace of God, so that it is subject to the free-will in relation to God; and consequently the act of faith can be meritorious.

It would be more understandable that if agent *S* *knows* that there is a God, and *S* obeys him by assenting to the propositions he proposes, or to his promises, then *S* has some merit for that reason. But it is hard to understand why a groundless leap of faith to believe an unknown god can be seen as meritorious at all.

4 Calvin's Conception of Faith

We shall see that Calvin's view of faith is entirely different. First of all, Calvin would have accepted sentences (1) and (2), in the first place precisely because they are scripturally grounded, but also because there is empirical evidence in their favor. For Calvin, the only reason why humans do not find evident that there is a divine eternal being which is creator of the universe is that, due to the Fall, their noetic structure is not working properly, since

There is within the human mind, and indeed by natural instinct, an awareness of divinity. This we take to be beyond controversy. To prevent anyone from taking refuge in the pretense of ignorance, God himself has implanted in all men a certain understanding of his divinemajesty. Ever renewing hismemory, he repeatedly drops fresh drops. Since, therefore, men one and all perceive that there is a God and that he is their Maker, they are condemned by their own testimony because they have failed to honor him and to consecrate their lives to his will. If ignorance of God is to be looked for anywhere, surely one is most likely to find an example of it among the more backward folk and those more remote from civilization. Yet there is, as the eminent pagan says, no nation so barbarous, no people so savage, that they have not a deep-seated conviction that there is a God. And they who in other aspects of life seem least to differ from brutes still continue to retain some seed of religion. So deeply does the common conception occupy the minds of all, so tenaciously does it inhere in the hearts of all! Therefore, since from the beginning of the world there has been no region, no city, in short, no household, that could do without religion, there lies in this a tacit confession of a sense of deity [sensus divinitatis] inscribed in the hearts of all.

This awareness, which is called by Calvin *sensus divinitatis* (henceforth SD), can be defined as a sort of innate predisposition to form the belief that God the creator exists, and that he is worthy of obedience and praise. According to Helm (2004, pp. 227–228),

given a properly working SD the natural awareness of the world around us, and of ourselves, activates or

⁶ Cf. Redmond 2000, p. 41.

sustains the belief not simply that God exists, but that he has created and is sustaining all that one is aware of. So the cognitive content of the *sensus* is not merely that God exists, but that God the Creator exists. This awareness, that oneself and all that one sees is the creation of God, in turn triggers beliefs of awe, respect, gratitude, and obligation to the benefactor of the whole, beliefs and feelings which are entirely appropriate given the knowledge of God the creator that men possess, and commitment to a moral principle such as: Benefactors ought to be loved and respected.

Thus, a properly working noetic structure, one in which the SD works properly, finds as evident and basic that God the creator exists and that there is an obligation to love and respect him. Even though Calvin does not despise natural theology,⁷ he would have said that *for a properly working* noetic structure the knowledge of God is immediate, obvious, so that no sophisticated arguments are needed in order to obtain it. This is universally valid for all humans: if, for some *S*, *S* has a properly working SD, “and has the knowledge that there is a God renewed by data $D_1 \dots D_5$ ”, then, for any *S* 0 with a properly working SD, *S*’ will have the knowledge that there is a God renewed by data $D_1, \dots, D_5$ ” (cf. Helm 2004, p. 227).

The restitution of the SD requires a regenerative operation of the heart, whereby the person arrives at a position in which he can receive the Scripture as God’s Word, since the noetic structure cannot be repaired further but through this Word. This operation is what the Scripture calls “washing of rebirth and renewal by the Holy Spirit” (Titus 3:5), and is deemed as sufficient for justification by Reformed theologians, as the seed of faith (*semen fidei*). This operation does not restore completely the noetic structure, to the point that the SD becomes sufficiently repaired. That is why the Scripture is required, which “gathering up the otherwise confused knowledge of God in our minds, having dispersed our dullness, clearly shows us the true God” (*Institutes* I.6.1).

Hence, the reason why some find impossible to admit that the Bible is the Word of God is that their SD is not working properly: All men have a SD, but in many of them it is corrupted. This does not mean it is nonexistent; only that it does not yield the right conclusion. “Calvin is clearly not saying that all those who have a sense of God have a sense of the same God” (Helm 2004, p. 233). What is, then, “the divine” that all men have a sense of? Helm (*ibid.*, p.

234) suggests that it is accurate to suppose that, for Calvin, it “is more like the recognition of a category of things than of some thing or things within a category”. Roy Clouser has found that this category can be encountered in all religious beliefs, namely as the category *unconditionally, non-dependently real*.⁸ All men have a tendency to form judgments as to what falls, or does not fall, within this category, and that explains the enormous diversity of religious beliefs. If a properly working noetic structure puts the God of Abraham in this category, a defective one will put instead some other putative entity or entities in its place, falling thus in some or another form of idolatry.

Idolatry leads to different interpretations of the facts or to the outright denial of facts. According to Helm (2004, p. 238),

Calvin would argue that the Fall has brought about misguided conceptions of self-interest. A person does not now believe that his self-interest is bound up with the knowledge and service of God, but in other ways. And as a result of this, he misinterprets relevant evidence, he suppresses evidence, he accepts common opinion, and so on.

Nevertheless, for those whose noetic structure has been reordered, it is evident that God himself speaks in the Scripture. According to Calvin, asking how can anybody be assured that the Scripture has sprung from God is like asking

Whence will we learn to distinguish light from darkness, white from black, sweet from bitter? Indeed, Scripture exhibits fully as clear evidence of its own truth as white and black things do of their color, or sweet and bitter things do of their taste. (*Institutes* I.7.2)

Calvin also refers to a certain experience common to Christians when he explains why the Scripture bears its own self-authentication:

those whom the Holy Spirit has inwardly taught truly rest upon Scripture, and that Scripture indeed is self-authenticated; hence, it is not right to subject it to proof and reasoning. And the certainty it deserves with us, it attains by the testimony of the Spirit. (*Institutes* I.8.5)

This does not mean that all the tenets of the Scripture become equally clear to the one who has suffered this change in his noetic structure. As Helm suggests, one-step self-authentication applies to

⁷ Cf. *Institutes* I.5.

⁸ Clouser 2005, p. 19.

certain core affirmations of Scripture, whereas a faithful interpreter should interpret the non-core affirmations in a way that is consistent with the core (this is the so-called ‘analogy of faith’). “This implies that understanding the meaning of the core expressions is easy or fairly easy; their meaning is clear and indisputable”. But anything that is self-authentic in this sense is basic in the sense established in §2 above. Hence, in contradistinction to Aquinas’ view, Calvin’s is that the noetic content of faith is *knowledge*; i.e., it consists of true propositions grounded upon self-evident propositions that are accepted as basic. In particular, the belief that the Scripture is the Word of God is one of these basic tenets. The Catholic critics insist that this makes of Calvin a fideist, but that is only because they are assuming, or presupposing, Aquinas’ view on the matter, namely that the tenets of the Scripture cannot be known, but only assented to by the will. Calvin would reply: No, they are known with self-evidence, once grace has restored the fallen noetic structure of the person involved. For Aquinas, grace “inclines” the will to assent unknowingly; for Calvin, grace restores the SD to the point in which the core tenets of the Scripture become self-evident.

Therefore, for Calvin, faith as trust, not as propositional content, can be defined as confidence grounded upon knowledge: there is good reason to trust God’s promises, since we *know* that he is faithful and almighty. His own definition runs thus:

Now we shall possess a right definition of faith if we call it a firm and certain knowledge of God’s benevolence toward us, founded upon the truth of the freely given promise in Christ, both revealed to our mind and sealed upon our hearts through the Holy Spirit. (Institutes III.2.7)

Hence, the emphasis of Hebrews 11:1 is that faith is assurance and certainty of things unseen and of promises given: “faith is being sure of what we hope for and certain of what we do not see”. But certainty implies knowledge.⁹ We can conclude that, for Calvin, trust in God’s promises, in his faithfully maintaining his creation through the laws governing the universe, is grounded in knowledge, not in a mere act of willful assent. It follows that faith cannot be meritorious in any sense since, as Aquinas himself says, “the considerations of science are not meritorious” (F2:9, Obj. 2) and if *S* has a sufficient motive for his belief, “this does not seem to imply any merit on his part, since he is no longer free to

believe or not to believe” (F2:9, Obj. 3). Redmond’s way of putting it is extremely clear:

We are not free toward knowledge, according to Aquinas; once [S] sees the evidence for two plus two equals four, he is not free not to know it. (Redmond 2000, p. 37)

Hence, when *S* is credited by God with righteousness for believing his promises (cf. Genesis 15:6), the reason is not that *S* is assenting without any motive, but that he is *obeying* God’s voice, knowing that it is God who is speaking; but above all that this act of obedience is made possible by the restoration of *S*’s noetic structure and SD, restoration which is the means of justification.

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⁹ Cf. also *Institutes* III.2.14.

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REMARKS ON TRUST

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Abstract:

My remarks on trust follow an anthropological perspective. Referring to an everyday-knowledge of trust in ordinary language, trust is understood as a functional relation, which develops into many varieties, mostly in the social sphere, but also in the religious and subjective sphere. Further remarks relate to an ontogenesis of trust, to the element of cognition in trust, trust in oneself, in God and in nature.

Key words: Emotion, experience of trust, knowledge in trust, hope, value-cognition, virtue, holistic concept of man, finiteness of man, life models, reliability, specialisation of trust in modern civilisation, decay of trust.

Trust is in our society still a widespread, but rather ambiguous phenomenon. We find it in very different, sometimes superficial, sometimes deeply rooted, fundamental experiences. In one or the other kind it can be traced back almost to the first reflections on the civilisation of man.¹ Therefore it is not surprising that nowadays it is studied in many disciplines – in politics, economics, education, sociology, medicine, psychology, philosophy, theology – to mention only the most prominent disciplines. Each of these elaborates its more or less comprehensive view of this complex, ramifying phenomenon – isolation of aspects and perspectivity are essential and necessary features of a scientific approach. Every approach is open for accompanying reflections like: Which are the other aspects which we had to neglect in order to work out our own disciplinary interest, and what kind of interest stands behind them? What is the significance of our own perspective compared with the others? Is a transdisciplinary investigation and an effort for a synthesis of all (in the western tradition) so far elaborated aspects a wise enterprise? Do the scientific approaches have an influence on our own personal experience and practise of trust?

Or vice versa: does our personal experience of trust require a new approach and method of investigation or is it adequately represented in one or the other of the already established theories?

Questions like these loosen the traditional connections between a theory and its object. They prepare the ground for a theoretically more unbiased, but at the same time more unspecified reflection on trust. This is the standpoint I aim at. Therefore I shall look at first at the ordinary language usage of trust in order to get a relatively comprehensive everyday knowledge of it. After that I shall turn to some of the more outstanding problems, trying to integrate them into an anthropologically comprehensive concept.

Trust in ordinary language

The *Wordsworth Dictionary of English Usage* (1995) distinguishes five current usages of the noun "trust": 1) belief or confidence in the power, reality, truth, goodness etc. of a person or thing: "The firm has a great deal of trust in your ability"; "trust in God"; 2) charge or care; responsibility: "The child was placed in my trust"; 3) a task etc. given to a person by someone who believes that they will do it, look after it etc. well: "He holds a position of trust in the firm"; 4) arrangement(s) by which something (e.g. money) is given to a person to use in a particular way, or to keep until a particular time: "The money was to be held in trust for his children"; 5) a group of business firms working together: "The companies formed a trust".

Of these five usages the first is the most comprehensive. Therefore I shall confine my remarks mainly to it, though there is certainly an inner relation between the first and the other usages, especially to "care" and "responsibility". The first usage is of theoretical interest mainly because of three aspects. First, that "trust" as belief or confidence seems not to be affected by whatever object trust is conferred to, may it be a person or thing, or whatever qualities like strength, goodness, truth etc.; second, that there is a wide range of different objects which can get into the focus of trust; third, that

¹ See T. Gloyna, Vertrauen, in: *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, vol. 11, Darmstadt 2001, 986-990. In the German translation of the Old Testament of the Bible "Vertrauen" (trust) is used many times.

among these objects we find also an object of absolute value and power, God, but in all usages no reflection on the person, who practises trust, which, besides that, can also be an object of trust: "trust in oneself".

Since the first usage equals trust with belief or confidence, we have to look for the usages of these words as well. For "belief" two usages are named: 1) faith or trust: "I have no belief in his ability"; 2) something believed: "Christian beliefs". Of the verb "to believe" three different usages are listed: 1) to regard (something) as true: "I believe his story." 2) to trust (a person), accepting what he says as true: "I believe you." 3) to think (that): "I believe he's ill." In "to believe" the relation to truth is dominant, but it shows a smaller range of usage. For "confidence" two usages are distinguished: 1) trust or belief in someone's ability: "I have great confidence in you"; 2) belief or faith in one's own ability: "She shows a great deal of confidence for her age." This meaning clearly refers to "trust in oneself", and this trust refers predominantly to the abilities of a person. Trust, understood as belief, emphasizes a kind of knowledge which is inherent in trust – this kind of knowledge plays a central role in our experience of trust – not less in our experience of distrust.

In order to supplement the list of usages, we shall have a look at another English and afterwords at two German dictionaries. In *Webster's New Encyclopedic Dictionary* (³1994) we find some varying definitions: 1) "assured reliance on the character, ability, strength, or truth of someone or something" and "one in which confidence is placed"; 2) dependence on something future or contingent: hope", and "reliance on future payments for goods delivered: credit"; 3) "a legal right or interest in property that one does not actually own [...]"; 4) "something (as a public office) committed to one to be used or cared for in the interest of another [...]: custody, care." The verb has in the most cases analogous meanings: 1) "to place confidence: depend (trust in God, trust to luck)", and: "to be confident: hope"; 2) "to commit or place in one's care or keeping: entrust"; 3) "to rely on the truthfulness or accuracy of: believe", and "to place confidence in: rely on" and "to hope or expect confidently (trusted to find oil on the land); [...]" These meanings differ from those in *Wordsworth's dictionary* as they underline the aspects of reliance and dependence in trust, and that they state clearly its relation to hope.

For the sake of comparison we take a look at a German dictionary. In G. Wahrig, *Deutsches Wörterbuch (Jubiläumsausgabe)*, (Gütersloh/München 1991) "Vertrauen" differs from the English usage of trust in several, yet minor aspects. The noun has the same meaning of confidence, firm faith

to someone, but in addition the reason of trust is mentioned: trust in someone because of his reliability, firm faith in someone that he will behave in a certain way. Also some typical experiences with trust are noted: that trust can be disappointed or abused; that trust can be honored, that it can be blind or unconditioned. The verb keeps in general to the usage of the noun, but also trust in oneself is noted as well as the hope and assured expectation, for instance that someone will be honest, or trust in my luck, trust in God. So the German usage differs slightly from the English insofar as it refers more to the reasons of trust.

Overlooking these usages, it will not be easy to find a deeper psychological, sociological, philosophical or theological problem in them; they seem to reflect just everyday experiences. This is of course the task of such dictionaries, but it may also be due to the well known theoretical inaccuracy and ambiguity of everyday language, which nevertheless does not impede its practical efficiency. I shall not try here to define the meanings of the different usages semantically. I would rather try to point out something like a comprehensive structure of the experience, feeling, attitude (or whatever it may be) called "trust".

But before I go into that I want to refer to the somewhat disturbing fact, that the usages of "trust" or the German "Vertrauen" seem to have spread widely only in modern times,² that is from the fifteenth, sixteenth century onwards.³ If we assume that trust belongs to the constant elements of human behavior and communication, we have to look for alternative words for them in the times before, as for instance the German "Vertrauen" has its roots in the family of "Treue" (faithfulness, loyalty, fidelity; Latin: *fiducia*). This leads us into the history and origin of emotional states of mind and of virtues, but lessens on the other hand our trust in the reliability of current language usage for systematic purposes. Or we have to assume that trust is a specifically modern phenomenon, which is generated and conditioned by the development of civic society.⁴ This seems to be a widespread consent through all disci-

² Through the German word family of "vertrauen", "trauen" is traced back to the Old German of the eleventh and twelfth century. Cf. *Deutsches Wörterbuch* von Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm, ed. by Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, vol. 12, Leipzig 1956, 1946-1956.

³ Cf. Ute Frevert, *Vertrauen – eine historische Spurensuche*, in U. Frevert (ed.), *Vertrauen. Historische Annäherungen*, Göttingen 2003, 7-66.

⁴ Cf. Jan Philipp Reemtsma, *Vertrauen und Gewalt. Versuch über eine besondere Konstellation der Moderne*, Pantheon-Verlag 2009.

plines concerned with trust. It goes together with a strong apprehension that we live in an age of growing distrust, of the decay and loss of trust. But lamentations like these are not restricted to the twentieth- and our own century. They occur also in much earlier times and seem almost to build the atmosphere in which reflections on trust usually take place. Disappointment of trust and efforts to regenerate and strengthen it seem to be the emotional origin and interest of theories of trust, not only nowadays, but since olden times. Be that as it may, I shall restrict my remarks to the horizon of modern usages and discussions of trust in western societies.

Trust as a functional relation

In another German dictionary trust is defined as "firm expectation of something good from someone", whereby trust expresses a higher degree of expectation than hope, but a lesser degree than confidence.⁵ We will come to the different degrees of reliability later on – here we note that this definition is very similar to the definition of trust given in Zedler's universal dictionary, which was published two hundred years ago.⁶ We see that despite several revolutions, wars, social and cultural upheavals and changes the basic meaning of trust seems not to have changed.

"Expectation" is a certain state of the mind, as are "hope" and "confidence" – all of which belong to the family of affects and emotions, which in the Western tradition are mainly held to be incalculable disturbances of the mind and therefore are suspected to hinder or interfere with rational thinking and willing. Nevertheless trust is understood as a "firm" expectation, and therefore gains an exceptional status among the disturbances. But generally, from the view of a comprehensive theory of mind, trust is rather looked at with a latent distrust and restraint. We will have to come back to this point later on.

Trust is an emotion or affect which is not just an impression, but is directed to two objects which give it a peculiar structure of meaning – trust is an "intentional emotion". One object is "someone" in whom trust is placed, the other object is "something good", which we expect to gain from someone. These two objects are categorically different from one another, they are apprehended in different ways, yet they are bound to one another in a reciprocal, asymmetrical way.

At first sight we can distinguish three elements in trust: First a person, which goes through this experience or holds this special attitude; second the particular character of trusting as a kind of affect, emotion, attitude, habit etc.; third the person to which we confer trust, often only in so far as we expect to gain something good from him.⁷ These three elements are functionally related to one another in constituting the experience we call trust. The relations between the elements differ from one another in their nature, strength, co-operation with other faculties of mind according to the demands of what may be called the inner life of a given trust-relation, which modifies the elements and their inter-relations dynamically. For instance the trusting person can be more or less interested in the expected good, the trust in a person can depend or not depend on his promise to grant something good, the character of a special kind of trust can change in dependence on the development of the character or the world-view of the trusting person, etc. Therefore trust is to be understood as a complex, multi-levelled, dynamic structure, bound into the process of life of a person between birth and death as well as in the customs of the society in which a person lives. Trust takes on many different relationships, forms, and modalities, so much that we have to speak of a "soft" problem that almost doesn't seem to have a structural skeleton. So we better take a look at its varieties.

Trust and its varieties

The overall character of trust is primarily determined by the "object" in which trust is placed. The object in most cases is a person or a personal quality (generosity, goodness, reliability, loyalty, honesty, sense of justice etc. – always something morally good or at least useful). The concept of trust as an interpersonal relation has dominated the current discussions almost entirely. The everyday usage of trust however shows a significantly wider range of trust-relations. Even if we keep to the sphere of relations between persons, ordinary language distinguishes already between three types of person-relations: Trust in other persons like me (social sphere), trust in God (religious sphere), and trust in myself (subjective sphere). The question arises, if on the basis of these three spheres we can distinguish three basic types of trust, or at least if varieties of trust are modified characteristically when they occur in one of these spheres.

Everyday language, however, uses trust also in relation to things (trust in the stability of a building),

⁵ Trübners *Deutsches Wörterbuch*, vol. 7, Berlin 1956, 620.

⁶ Johann Heinrich Zedler, *Grosses, vollständiges Universal-Lexicon aller Wissenschaften und Künste*, vol. 48, Leipzig/Halle 1746, 23-33.

⁷ Whenever I refer to persons, I mean both genders, though grammatically I use only male genus.

institutions (trust in public security), ideals (trust in justice, in democracy), etc. Usages like these offer a multitude of further kinds of trust, but may also raise some doubts if these usages are to be considered as trustworthy and significant, and not only as carelessly extended usages of the person-related types of trust. But we leave the question undecided, if there are more than only three basic types of trust.

There is yet another problem of considerable importance. If we consult dictionaries which have been written many years before, we can see that the public estimation of the three basic spheres has changed considerably. Until the eighteenth century, the religious sphere was the most important, and discussions of trust were mainly discussions of our trust in God, other kinds of trust being based mainly on this. Since then the importance of this sphere has gradually decreased. Nowadays it plays only a marginal role, while the importance of the social sphere has grown very much, it has become the paradigm of trust-relations at all, even if trust in this sphere is generally thought to be dubious and insecure – this may explain the widespread trust in the proverbial sentence "trust is good, control is better".

The third basic type, trust in oneself, has almost always been subordinated to the other two types. Only in relatively recent times it finds an increasing recognition, and authors like R. Schottlaender have maintained that it is trust in oneself which is the presupposition of an adequate understanding of the other two.⁸ So we do not have only to consider the historical and social change of the public and personal estimation of the three spheres, but to bear in mind that a theory of trust is – unavoidably, it seems – penetrated by positive or negative value judgments. Therefore we should reflect also on and justify our own estimation of the phenomenon. In the sense of a general statement I hope that our way of dealing with the problem will show clearly enough that the current discussions overestimate trust in itself and also our trust in theory, when it is expected to get from theory a strengthening effect on the readiness to trust and a therapeuticum against the decay of trust in modern society. A more sober, more matter-of-fact evaluation of trust might be useful. Not man as he should be, but man as he is should provide the conceptual framework of a realistic theory of trust.

In order to get an overview over the varieties of trust, which is not prejudiced by value judgments or a premature estimation of one of the elements of the trust relationship, we hold to a purely formal concept of trust-relations as changing functional relations

between its fundamental elements. Therefore we have to consider the role which each of the structural elements plays in the formation and variation of trust. We confine our remarks to only general aspects, without going into the analysis of a given kind of trust.

"I trust a person" – what does this mean, and why do I trust him? It means that I am in a situation in which I feel the need to trust a person, because I am not able to get what I want to get without the cooperation of that person, and that I am sufficiently certain that he will be able and willing to cooperate with me. There are several points which need some further comments. The "situation" is not only determined by a "here and now" within the process of my life, but additionally by a certain duration, which is characterized by the feeling of a kind of need. The "feeling" is the kind of its awareness by me – it must not necessarily be a feeling, but could be also another kind of being conscious of it, for instance the remembrance of similar situations which I experienced before, or just a perception of the state of affairs here and now. My awareness of the situation is "immediate", it is neither a reflected apprehension nor a judgment. But it is the awareness of a "need" – not a need of my natural life like hunger or sleep, but a "higher" pragmatic need, which arises out of my interest to organize my life in a certain way. Therefore this need is not altogether bound into the constraints of natural life. It shows relevance for my future life, it has something of a chance, which I should seize in order to realize my interests. These "interests" can be very different, principally anything what men strive for, but they are specified by the situation here and now and by what I am interested in under the present conditions. At the same time I am aware that I am not able to realize my interest alone, but that I need the assistance of others. The awareness of this need is something else than the awareness of a situationally conditioned need. Therefore my awareness has a complex character, on one side it is conditioned by the situational need, on the other by the need of assistance. Both sides contribute to the experience of my finiteness as a human being. The experience of my finiteness embodies additionally an affirmative element, namely the awareness of an indetermination by the situation, the awareness of a chance to make something of my present situation, if only I could find someone to cooperate with me. This person must have at least two qualities: that he disposes of the required abilities and means, and that he is willing to cooperate with me. In respect to this second quality the question of morality may come in, but principally the (free?) will to cooperate with me is not necessarily a morally good will. There are only very

⁸ Rudolf Schottlaender, *Theorie des Vertrauens*, Berlin 1957.

few cases in which trust is placed in a person just because of his trustworthiness as such, and not on behalf of some much more concrete reasons. An unselfish love of a person might be a case, in which we confer an unconditioned trust in him. The charisma of a person or his natural authority might be another case.

The feeling of an unconditioned and unlimited trust in a person can be very strong, nevertheless the intensity and liveliness of trust last normally only for a relatively short time, and then give way to other forms of estimation or respect, among them also a habitualisation of our initial trust – we trust a person because we have trusted him before and have no reasons to distrust him now. But generally I do not and cannot know if the person really is trustworthy and is willing to grant the expected good to me. Therefore my trust in him depends also on the character of my trust-experience as well as on my own readiness to trust. If I am a suspicious character, it will be hard for me to trust anybody at all. And if my trust-experience is an enthusiastic feeling for a person, I shall trust him even if he has shown several times not to be trustworthy. So trust varies very much according to the influence which the three elements exert on one another, and in the course of time the inner life of trust, its intensity and degree of strength, can change so much that trust becomes something else, for instance a customary rite of certain forms of communication. We can distinguish a variety of forms of trust which depend on the different characters of trusting persons, another variety according to the psychic powers and faculties involved in the trust-relation, and a variety of trust-forms according to qualities, abilities and the character of the person in which we place our trust.

A great influence on the formation of trust-relations is due to the expectation of something good from a person. Normally it is the decisive motivation to give way to the risk of trust in a person. Trust is necessary because we cannot get hold of that good without the help of others. The expectation of something good directs our search for assistance to a certain person, and at the same time it concentrates our trust on those qualifications of the chosen person which are required for cooperation. This means that we instrumentalize a person in order to get the good we are interested in, but this person has agreed to engage himself in this trust-relation. When the trust-relation is based only on selected abilities of the person in whom we trust, then the question arises how we have to conceive of the relation between the selected abilities which relate to the expected good, and the person from which we expect something good. The person as such is the founding ground of my trust in him, but only especially in relation to the

expected good I am ready to join a trust-relation with him. At the end it doesn't really matter what kind of person it is in whom I place my trust, if only he has the abilities and the will to provide me with that good which I am interested in. A banker might be questionable as a person, if only I can trust his competence as banker.

On the other hand my trust in his trustworthiness lies also in the interest of the banker. The trust-relation is of mutual interest, though the interests have different intentions, even if they meet in the same object, for instance in the object of economic profit. The banker may expect that his trustworthiness be recommended to other persons who then will also entrust him with money and enlarge his clientele, and the person who entrusts his money to the banker wants him to make profit for him. The mutual trust-relation is asymmetrically limited and from the beginning also endangered by the divergence of the interests. It is limited because the trust-relation does not need more of the persons on either side of the trust-relation than a founding ground for the reliability of the activities, which realize their interests. The person who trusts a banker wants to be sure that his economically motivated trust is justified. Therefore he has informed himself about the banker and the reputation of the bank just as much as to get a "founded trust", but he can never get something like a proof of the banker's trustworthiness. Trust is not a case for proofs in a scientific way, it is and will always be a pragmatic venture; it requires only so much ground as is thought to be necessary to take up the venture. Similarly limited is the interest of the banker to get a founded knowledge of the trustworthiness of the person who entrusts him with money, and of the provenance of that money. The person as such is on both sides only of limited interest – the "person" is segmented into those abilities and qualities which are necessary to establish a certain trust-relationship. The reliability of trust-relations remains in a sort of suspense, in a medium sphere between adventure and security.

As the example may illustrate, in most cases we confer trust to a person because we expect something good from him. Instead of "expected good" we can also speak of the "intentional object" of trust in order to relate the objects, which we hope to gain, strictly to the characteristic behavior or act of trusting, as its inner goal. This presupposes that trust is not just a stationary state of mind but has a dynamic intentional structure and depends on the strength of its motivating interests. If we speak of an intentional object or internal goal of trust, we have to distinguish it from the external objects and their properties, which are not intentionally involved in a given kind of trust, but are the borders between the inten-

tional object and the external dimensions of its existence. The intentional object comprises only those qualities of an object, which are really meant and intended when we place trust in a person. In a certain sense we can define the intentional object as the value profile of an object, and this differs of course very much between the truster and the trustee. In German ordinary language the selectivity of the intentional object is generally recognizable, and this may be a reason that the goal of trust is not to be restricted to acts or abilities of persons, not even in the social sphere, but – as everyday language shows – can be expected also from things, institutions, processes in nature etc.

As we have tried to show, the specificity of the intentional object modifies the person in which we trust, and it modifies the trusting person as well. If we want to be healed from a disease, which modifies and reduces our status as person into someone who wants to be healed, we address ourselves not to any person, but only to those whom we think to have the abilities to cure our disease – this is already a simple form of trust, evoked solely by our knowledge of the professional training of a person. Our trust in a doctor will be strengthened when we know that he possesses not only the required professional training but also a good reputation as a competent doctor. He will gain a still higher degree of trust when he heals also my own disease, and still higher, when I have consulted other doctors before who have not been able to heal me. So we can distinguish different factors which not only strengthen our trust, but increase and enhance it.

Such experiences affect also my own disposition to trust. When I have found a trustworthy doctor, I shall not look for other doctors, but keep to "my" doctor, presumably also when I am infected with other diseases. But this will perhaps not be the case in a society as ours, in which doctors don't get an all-round professional training, but are formed to specialists for certain diseases. As much as our society requires specialization of professional training, trust has to become specialized too. This means that generally trust in persons becomes weaker and is estimated less, because our society replaces it more and more by a trust in the highly trained abilities of anonymous specialists. Not the person as such is trustworthy, but only the specialist in it. This affects also me, the trusting person. If I get sick, I might not trust any more my everyday knowledge to find a competent doctor but go to another specialist whose job is to find the right diagnosis and then advise me to go to the right specialist: trust as a spontaneous personal performance is no more trustworthy enough, social institutions with specially trained persons take care of my needs and decide what

seems to be best for me – parts of my life and of my selfdetermination get under the tutelage of different institutions in our society. Perhaps in near future I am nothing but a number in a well organized multiplex configuration of administrative departments, each of them executing their exactly determined obligation on me. Those who deplore the decay of trust in our society don't take into consideration enough that our society undergoes an increasingly accelerated process of specialisation, which requires reliable professionalism more than incalculable forms of trust, or, with other words, which requires trust in professionalism rather than in persons. It is professionalism which connects the intentional object to specified abilities of persons and thus blends out the person as such from the experience of trust. Likewise my existence as person doesn't get involved in the experience of trust but only my special interest in the expected good. The socially conditioned practice of trust functionalizes my personality into activities correlating to the expected services rendered to me by social institutions. Yet even under such conditions we cannot give up trust, i.e. trust in the responsibly rendered services of institutions. But trust in social institutions is characteristically dispersed, because the persons who do their job in institutions, are personally unknown to me, and they are exchangeable by others who render in the same way the services they are asked to – "persons" are needed only as professionally trained enactors of specialized functions. I have to trust that they do their job well – everyday knowledge tells me that this is not always the case. Therefore trust in institutions is much weaker than trust in persons, but institutions have become necessary to master the growing demand for services in modern society. Trust has decreased in the same measure as modern society has built up institutions which are responsible to supply every citizen with a certain amount of social services. Our trust in institutions is another kind of trust than our trust in persons, it is a sort of anonymous trust in a highly specialized apparatus, more or less well controlled, which we have to handle with the help of instructors and counsellors, who on their part have to be trusted as elements of the whole apparatus. Our handling of the apparatus is not so much trust-founded but dependent on our know-how and cleverness. Trust in persons has partly become obsolete. It has been drawn back and replaced by ever more specialized institutions, whose services we have the right to claim, and our need to enhance our expertise in handling the apparatus. It is the development of civilisation itself which causes the decay and the replacement of trust. The call for more trust would mean to call for a reduction of civilisation and bureaucracy. But which modern society would venture

to do this? Modern societies would understand this Rousseauian call for more trust as a call for regression, as a longing for a simplified social life, on the basis of an naïve, nearly illusionary anthropology.

At the beginning we have distinguished in relation to three types of persons three basic types of trust (religious, social, subjective) which seem to be irreducible to one another. We hold that the basic types of trust-relations affect each of the structural elements and their interrelations. Therefore we would have to consider what becomes of the inherent elements and their interrelations under the conditions of the three basic types, that is in the religious, social or subjective sphere, and if these are really basic types or only different functionalizations of the person.

Looking at the first element, the trusting person, we can easily see that he is differently engaged in the religious, social, and subjective sphere, but also that one and the same person can participate in all three spheres. The ability of a person to adjust himself to all three spheres shows a ground which remains outside its different spheric actualisations. When a person identifies itself with one of the basic types, it is at the same time not identical with the two other basic types, and not identical with the pre-identificational ground, out of which possible identifications emerge. The identity of a person is at the same time its non-identity – in other words, a partial, limited identity. In the form of a basic type it is free to abnegate its alternatives as well as the pre-identificational ground of every person, and thus becomes a rigid, enclosed-in-itself form of person. If it accepts the dimensions of its non-identity, it becomes an open, tolerant and humorous or ironical person.

When we look at the basic types under more concrete conditions, we will see that when a person trusts in God, he may understand himself as created and loved by God, and, though being submitted to sin, he hopes to be saved by Jesus, and that he would, perhaps, keep to this life-model even if God would not exist. In the social sphere, the trusting person understands himself, according to all intentional objects in which he is used to place trust, as a member of a highly differentiated society, in which every person plays many different roles with their specific regulations, all of which require to be observed, but to a certain degree can also be adapted to a person's own interests. Everything that a person thinks of himself and whatever him thinks to be good to do, he would concede also to other persons and look at them as if he were them. If we think of the religious sphere as integrated and tolerated in a pluralistic society, we see at the same time that it is isolated from other forms of social life, and vice

versa. Therefore the trusting person in the religious sphere is very different from the trusting person in the social sphere, and we see also that most of these persons of either sphere would not let one sphere interfere with the other. But this doesn't mean that there are no possibilities of reciprocal influence and cooperation on the ground of common interests and values. The representatives of these two spheres and their institutions are able, if they are willing, to develop a trustful attitude towards each other, an attitude of tolerance and respect. However, the trusting attitude in both spheres cannot develop its specific power when it is not supported by related dispositions and forms of behavior. The trust-relationship between the two spheres is generated and upheld only in cooperation with other powers on either side, which are not the same, but formed specifically in their spheres – the inter-spheric trust-relation is not self-supporting, it depends on the support of religious and social institutions and personal authorities who engage themselves on both sides in the building of trust-relations.

As we tried to show, the three spheric modulations of the trusting person cannot strictly be isolated from one another. They are modulations of the human behavior, which after all have to be conceived of as formations of the existence of man between birth and death. Each modulation arises out of an unknown, perhaps inexhaustible source of already practised, principally possible forms of trust, which normally are modelled in the way of former realizations and their social and cultural tradition. The family of trust-behavior is only one kind of behavior out of many other types of behavior. Together with all these types, trust-behavior has to be seen as emerging out of the underground of the existence of man, of what man makes of himself, and what is done or happened to him during his lifetime.

Similarly, also the different intentional objects are not to be isolated from one another, but on the one hand are selected out of an open and undifferentiated horizon of possible objects of trust in the world, on the other hand have more or less narrow relations to one another in those formations which they have adopted in a given society – what we expect to gain from persons in whom we trust, has in general been the intentional object of generations before, and in so far trust-relations are to a high degree conservative. The intentional object has its rank within a system of values and its tradition. The value-systems of the three basic spheres together with all the intentional objects they comprise are at last to be understood as parts of the one world which encompasses the existence of man from the beginning until the end of this world. But there will always be a gap between the intentional objects and the world itself,

out of which they are selected, sometimes created, and the borders of the gap will shift considerably. But the intentional objects tend to conceal the objective world and to evoke the impression that there is nothing else behind them, out of which they have emerged. But the proclaimed identity between intentional object and objective world proves to be an illusion as soon as trust will have been disappointed, and this happens unavoidably in one or the other of the three basic spheres. Without trust, however, man cannot find his place in the world, and cannot find home and shelter in it, for some time at least.

The relationary structure of trust has its basis in those states of mind which are known as affects, feelings, emotions. But trust manifests itself also in certain attitudes, behavior, habits, virtues, acts etc. Ordinary language usages of trust show that trust cannot be reduced to only a single psychic power – there are too many different kinds of trust. Therefore we cannot submit trust to the concept of act, as for instance Sztompka has done,⁹ but hold that trust has roots in several different layers and powers of the existence of man. In trust, in the ability to trust, life stretches out to get hold of something by which it can develop. Trust as this reaching out and drive to get hold of something good is essentially open to the world, essentially incomplete, demanding something complementary to it, whatever the world may offer. Trust is directed towards the world and expects something by which its out-reaching intention will be satisfied or completed, along the whole of man's existence, but the satisfaction or completion themselves lie beyond its reach – they must be granted to it. Trust is a sign that life is ready to accept what it needs for the accomplishment of its abilities and powers.

The essential incompleteness of trust has two sides, which in the three spheres show different qualities: One side in relation to the trusting person, the other side to the intentional object and the person in which trust is conferred. In the subjective sphere I am confident that I have the abilities and the intention which are necessary to realize whatever my self-understanding or self-image ask me to do, on the other side is the open horizon of possible intentional objects with their yet unnoticed demands and their yet unexperienced resistances. In the subjective sphere, the completion of trust seems to depend solely on my own abilities and efforts.

In the social sphere one side is the role which the trusting person plays in the complex field of personal and institutional interrelations, the other

side is the uncertainty if the expected completion will really be granted to me, and what it will be like.

In the religious sphere one side is my life in piety, the other side the humble hope that God will be merciful to me.

So in all basic spheres the question of the completion of trust demands a specified answer, which takes into consideration the whole, complex structure of trust-relations. But in each sphere we experience that we are only a part of the whole, that the relation between part and whole is different in each sphere, and that it is, according to the inner life of trust-relations, unstable. We can do something to stabilize a trust-relation, once it has been built, but we experience also that trust is not entirely at our disposal and that our own relation to trust experiences, our attitude to them changes – in trust-relations we experience also the finiteness and fragility of man's existence.

On an ontogenesis of trust

So far we have conceived of trust as incident in the life of man, an incident which may last for some time and then disappear, sometimes slowly, sometimes suddenly. But if trust really has roots in different layers and powers of the psychic life of man, then we may ask, if and how the development of psychic life affects the occurrence and development of trust-relations in the course of life. We leave aside the phylogenetic question of the development of trust in the development of the human race and in the cultures of mankind, and we leave aside also the so-called biogenetic law of a parallelism of ontogenesis and phylogenesis. Instead we understand trust as a particularly personal experience: neither nature nor animals seem to experience trust, only individual persons. But persons experience trust-relations not from the beginning of their life, and the experience of trust does not remain one and the same till the end of life, but it gets modelled also by the changing life-conditions in the different periods of life (in youth, maturity, old age). The ontogenetic question of trust is dealt with in psychology, sociology, education or other disciplines – the following remarks will deal with it only from an anthropological standpoint. At the outset we give for the sake of orientation a sketch of Max Scheler's hierarchical scheme of the levels of psychic life.¹⁰

Max Scheler (1874-1928) distinguished five levels and connected spheres of the psychic life of organisms. These levels determine the position of

⁹ Cf. his thorough systematic study on *Trust: A sociological theory* (Cambridge University Press, 1999).

¹⁰ Cf. my introduction to his philosophy in *Max Scheler*, München 1998.

man in the world.¹¹ The first level he calls *Gefühlsdrang*, the drive for life, which is carried out by the so-called primary drives to keep man alive. The second is the sphere of "instinctive behavior", by which an organism is embedded in its specific milieu. The third he calls the sphere of "associative memory", by which an organism is able to organize by trial and error its movements and habits in its surrounding environment. The fourth is the level of an organically bound "practical intelligence", which is practised by higher animals, but in a much more elevated degree also by man, and the fifth level is the sphere of the "spirit" ("Geist"), which characterizes the sphere of man alone. The spiritual sphere is entirely separated from the other four spheres of psychic life, but opens the universe for specific acts of reason (intuition of ideas, acts of willing, feeling of values). Unfortunately Scheler has not dealt with the problem of trust, neither in his book on Ethics¹² nor in his book on the sociology of culture and cognition¹³ – a fact which might be interpreted as a sign of the widespread philosophical underestimation of trust or of its replacement by or dissolution into other, more general or more fundamental problems.

When we ask in which one of the five spheres Scheler would have located trust, we should follow the criterion that trust is a genuine human behavior, which is not to be found in animals and simpler organisms, though also not in all men. We can assume that Scheler would have located trust in the highest sphere, that of acts of reason ("Geist"). On the other hand he maintains emphatically that man participates in all the other spheres as well. Therefore we would have to see if trust has to be understood as a human behavior which in itself is not purely spiritual, but anthropologically complex so that it may participate also in some of the other spheres of psychic life. Furthermore Scheler holds that the energy of psychic life on all levels emerges from the very first level, and is transformed and adapted to the higher levels of psychic life in a process of "sublimation" of life-energy. Therefore no psychic or spiritual act or process, including trust, can be carried out without the energy of the drive for life. When we use Scheler's anthropological scheme as an heuristic instrument to interpret the phenomenon of

trust, we come to see that trust is not actually a voluntary behavior or act, by which it would belong to the spheres both of practical intelligence and spiritual acts, but that it can be traced back at least into the sphere of trial and error, since as a kind and organic part of social communication it is open for disappointment and deception. It could be traced back even further into the sphere of instinctive behavior, because it is sometimes a pure and spontaneous, entirely irrational, organic reaction to something or somebody who is felt or apprehended to be trustworthy. From these observations it follows that we have to distinguish between different kinds of trust in respect to its inner qualities which they acquire on the five levels, and at the same time its relation to the milieu, environment, social and universal world, according to the phenomenological law of correlation between acts and their objects. We find that trust can be understood as a functional co-operation of different psychic faculties in relation to corresponding aspects of the world, and which, by the dominating character of a particular kind of trust, operate on different levels in the life of human beings. All kinds of trust seem to belong to one and the same root, the drive for life, which generates the different levels.¹⁴ So all the different kinds of trust seem to form a complex interconnected family of related kinds, which is a functional element in the existence and life of man.

As we have noted above, trust is understood in ordinary language as "belief or confidence in the power, reality, truth, goodness etc. of a person or thing". This definition does not show the situational context in which trust is practised or demanded. The origin of trust is not, as it seems, to be sought in something like an attitude or a moral act alone, but as reaction to a critical situation, when the hitherto experienced security of life and of personal relations has proved to be unreliable and when it demands a more reliable ground for future existence. The underground of trust is a feeling or experience of insecurity and unreliability. Trust, at least in some of its forms, seems to be a reaction to the experience of the feebleness of former life conditions by substituting them by a more cautious attitude, which enables man to diversify his life conditions and bridge the no more deniable and never eliminable unreliabilities and insecurities of life – trust is an existentially mo-

¹¹ Max Scheler, *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos*, Darmstadt 1928, now in his *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. by M. S. Frings, vol. 9, Bern/München 1976, 9–71 (*The Human Place in the Cosmos*, transl. by M. S. Frings, introd. by E. Kelly, Evanston 2009).

¹² Max Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik* (1913/16), Bonn 2000.

¹³ Max Scheler, *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft* (1926), Bern/München 1960.

¹⁴ Rudolf Schottlaender says that trust belongs to the deepest layer of human being, but he doesn't identify this layer. Cf. R. Schottlaender, "Zur ethischen Theorie des Vertrauens", in *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 9, 1955, 348–357: 355; and Schottlaender, *Theorie des Vertrauens*, Berlin 1957, 45; later on he refers to S. Freud's theory of "Es" (p. 57).

tivated reassurance of reliable life conditions in co-operation with others. From the first experiences of the feebleness of habitual securities onward man looks for and tests measures and means to safeguard his future life or his way of living and to avoid further disappointments.

Normally we don't use "trust" to characterize the life-experience before the crisis of reliability and harmony with the surrounding world has happened. The need of trust has its origin in a moderate, healable crisis. Trust will never eliminate entirely the feeling of the insecurity and weakness of man's life conditions and man's nature. And it will never lose a feeling that trust is only a risky experiment with measures which promise to be reliable - but man has already made the experience that promises are not always kept. If disappointments of trust happen repeatedly, our trust in trust decreases. Perhaps not in trust altogether, since trust is indispensable in the life of an adult, but in the kinds of trust in which we have placed our trust before, and which have shown not to be trustworthy enough. Therefore we look for a kind of trust, which can never be disappointed, or we look for measures which promise to make our trust safer and more reliable. In all kinds of trust is a longing for an undestroyable security and assurance of our life in this or another, better world - we may call this the utopian element which is in different degrees active presumably in all kinds of trust.

If we look at our experiences of trust, we may distinguish two periods: first the period of trust without disappointment, second the period of trust under the conditions of occasional, but repeated disappointments. The first period seems to coincide with youth, at least with a part of youth, because disappointments of the originally self-evident expectation that life conditions will continue to be agreeable as before happen quite early in one's life. However, a child would never speak or think of "trust", its language is not differentiated enough, neither its ability to distinguish psychic states of mind which are more refined than just a child's love to its mother, friendliness and unfriendliness, attachment, acceptance and non-acceptance, fear, joy, distress - the emotional life of man develops rather slowly and irregularly, very much dependent on the social milieu around it. Not all experiences of unagreeable conditions generate feelings which later on may develop to feelings of trust. For instance not the experience of hunger or pain, but certainly experiences when unagreeable situations are overcome by the assistance of persons, in the first place by the mother, who is present almost always when the child needs her. Occasional disappointments are unavoidable, when the mother happens not to be present, or when she cannot help in case of a disease, or when

she is angry and doesn't want to help her child. Feelings of trust develop only then, when, though occasional disappointments have happened, help can be expected by the mother or some other persons within the social horizon of a child's life. Therefore trust may develop under at least four conditions: First the natural helplessness of the child, second occasional disappointments in the continuity of agreeable conditions, third the experience of successful assistance by a person like the mother, fourth the expectation that this assistance will be granted also in unagreeable situations to come; that the readiness to help stands the test of continuity in repeated situations of need. Trust is a multiply conditioned state of mind, originating from the fundamental structure of human life: striving to keep alive as a helpless and weak organism in a world to which our organism is not accommodated, so that only with the help of other human beings we can survive and develop the abilities which are necessary to care for oneself and also for others. Trust seems to be a rather late experience, occurring from time to time in changing emotional states of mind and therefore principally liable to be misunderstood or confused with other emotional experiences. Trust needs a lot of care to develop and acquire a certain constancy and stability, but this will scarcely happen before a human being has grown up into an independent person who is able to distinguish between good and bad, good and evil, and who has a feeling for what he can expect or not expect from others. Trust develops a sort of symbiotic cooperation with other faculties of psychic life, and so it develops into one of the essential and necessary abilities to master life - it is embedded in the psychic life of man. But it remains not what it was in the first stages of life, it gets modelled and diversified in the course of life, adapted to the needs of an individual person and the possibilities of the realization of trust-relations in a society.

An early form of such a multifunctional approach to trust has been delineated by the Swiss paedagogue Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi (1746-1827). He described the transition of the first, pre-disappointment stage of life into a second stage, into which a disappointed young person has to be guided to develop an all-round ability to care for himself. Pestalozzi's ideas are founded in a holistic concept of man's existence and its organic development. In the first stage the organic life of a child is determined by instincts and desires. Under the guide and care of motherly love the organic desires and feelings develop slowly into abilities and habits - the "higher nature" of man is awakened. Motherly love motivates and encourages the development of four natural desires and feelings into virtues and abilities, by which man transcends his biological nature into a

higher level of humanity: 1) the child's *love* of the mother and other persons emerge out of the experience that motherly love helped to satisfy vital needs, 2) *gratitude* develops out of the experience that the mother granted shelter, care and benefits, 3) *obedience* out of the experience that motherly love guided the regulation of drives and desires, and 4) *trust* out of the experience that motherly love helped to overcome fear and anxiety.¹⁵ "Trust" is here related especially to master fear and anxiety. We see that Pestalozzi does not treat trust in an isolated manner, but in connection with virtues which arise when a young human being grows up under the care and responsibility of its parents from a stage of natural life to an educated stage of self-responsibility. Trust is understood as a factor in the development of man from nature to culture and humanity as well as a product of the higher, educated nature of man. Furthermore trust is bound to the – organically founded – system of central virtues: love, gratitude, obedience, and trust cooperate, strengthen and stabilize each other – trust is understood as an essential element of the multifunctional whole of human nature. But in Pestalozzi's philosophy human nature is seen all too idealistic; Pestalozzi doesn't account for what Kant, a contemporary of Pestalozzi, called man's natural inclination to evil, i.e. the "fundamentally evil nature of man" (*das radikal Böse*).¹⁶ It would lead to an unbalanced, one-sided estimation of trust if it would be isolated from the functions which it executes within the developed natural, social and cultural life in society, but if the multifunctional approach is restricted to the "good nature" of man, then it is one-sided too. Pestalozzi was mainly interested in the constellation and cooperation of virtues, among which trust has a relatively clearly defined function, as the other virtues have theirs. The virtues cooperate to form a comprehensive harmonious form of humanity which Pestalozzi understands as forming man to an image of God. Therefore all four virtues have a religious background. This mirrors not only the culture of his time; Pestalozzi confesses to have experienced himself a motherly life like the one which forms the fundament of his concept of elementary education. Concepts of trust like his make us sensible not only for the influences of a certain stage of culture, but also for an underlying confessional interest embodied in any theory of trust. When in current discussions of trust the decay or the

loss of trust in modern societies is stated, then this may be also an expression of a particular confessional attitude and education. Under such premises the question of ontogenesis seems to turn into a question of a sociology of education, and the question of the influence of the problematic nature of man and its formation in different life ages on man's ability and inclination to trust is left behind.

But there is some evidence that the ability and readiness to trust increase together with the upward development of life, and they decrease in as much as the expected duration of life becomes smaller. Pestalozzi's theory shows that only when a child has reached the age to come up with its own life and to care itself for its relations to other people, are fruitful conditions given for a development of trust-relations. But at the same time they underlie the test of real life with its unforeseeable chances, drawbacks, changing conditions, the development of one's personal life and character, the prospects for the future or the rest of one's life – all these factors and many others influence the liveliness and duration of trust-relations, and after some time diminish a person's readiness for trust more and more. The inner life of trust-abilities has its own laws: the longer a trust-relation lasts, the more its liveliness gives way to regularities and habits, and at the end it becomes a habitual behavior, an exchange of a rest of mutual services. In old age, the inclination and readiness for differentiated trust-relations is worn out, replaced by the regularities of habits and by a final surrender to the help and care of others – trust reduced to an existential minimum at the end of one's life.

This may be different in the three basic types of trust-relations, in the religious, social and subjective sphere, and then also in the interrelations of these spheres. We cannot go into details here, but we can see rather easily that the religious sphere, once it has developed, exercises a formative and stabilizing effect on the other two spheres, respecting more or less their specific nature, and that trust-relations develop very differently under the dominating influence of either the social or the subjective sphere.

In the religious sphere trust in God may become stronger the nearer the end of life has come, the trust in oneself changes into disappointment and helplessness, when most of the high-flying plans of one's youth have failed or have been given up, the trust in other persons is balanced by caution, control and other forms of safeguard against disappointment and deception. At the end of life trust in persons tends to be substituted by the conscience of being entrusted to the care of relatives or institutions of social welfare, and to their agents.

¹⁵ Cf. J. H. Pestalozzi, *Ansichten und Erfahrungen, die Idee der Elementarbildung betreffend* (1807), in *Ausgewählte Werke*, ed. by Friedrich Mann, vol. 3, Langensalza 1906.

¹⁶ Immanuel Kant, *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft* (1793), A 25.

The ontogenesis of trust is last but certainly not least influenced by the differences of temperament, character, and gender. They constitute an inequality among man which cannot be lead back only to influences of education, social milieu, religious beliefs etc., though all these have also a bearing on the formation of trust behavior, but the differences of temperament and character are given to man by nature, while sentences like "man are inclined to control, woman to trust" have also a clear social background. In ancient Greece the four fundamental temperaments (choleric, sanguine, melancholic, phlegmatic) were thought to depend on the influence of secretions of vital organs on the mental disposition and attitude of man, and also nowadays it is maintained that psychic dispositions depend very much on neuro-physiological processes. So far there is, as it seems, not yet enough expertise on the conditioning of trust behavior by bio-chemical treatment.

On the element of knowledge in trust

Until now we have looked at trust mainly as experience, feeling, attitude, behavior or act, but have not concentrated on that kind of knowledge which is an essential element of trust. We are here not interested in the influence of knowledge or cognition *on* trust, which is generally practised as control or criticism of trust, instead we are interested in the role of cognition *in* trust.

There are at least three kinds of knowledge in trust, relative to its three structural elements: The first may be called "object-directed" or "intentional knowledge", which is of two kinds: "knowledge of the person", in whom we trust, and, connected with the person, "knowledge of the good" we expect to gain from him. The second may be called "functional cognition", which is the conscience of the act of trusting. The third may be called "self-knowledge" – it is the knowledge of myself while experiencing and practising trust. Knowledge in trust is therefore modelled and modified by three different structural elements and accordingly shows a complex and presumably contradictory cognitive character, which is quite different from scientific knowledge.

When Georg Simmel (1858–1918) says in his influential book on sociology that trust is a medium condition between knowledge and non-knowledge about man ("ein mittlerer Zustand zwischen Wissen und Nichtwissen um den Menschen")¹⁷, he doesn't seem to mean a classification of trust-knowledge in relation to other forms of knowledge, but he seems

to mean the knowledge inherent in the experience of trust. This is in the first place a knowledge resp. non-knowledge about the person in whom we trust, and in a second place a knowledge about man's practice of trust and man's nature. Simmel says nothing about the self-knowledge/self-non-knowledge about the man who places trust in a person.

Presumably Simmel did not mean that the "medium condition" is a mixed condition of knowledge and non-knowledge, but that trust is neither (rational) knowledge nor non-knowledge; that its knowledge is of a peculiar kind. When we classify all kinds of knowledge between the poles of highest possible degree of knowledge on one side and lowest possible degree of knowledge on the other side, then trust-knowledge had to be placed somewhere in the middle with a kind of simultaneous knowledge and non-knowledge about man. So the question arises, what do we know of a person and what do we not know about him when we place trust in him? This non-knowledge is not just everything what we don't know of him, but it is all that non-knowledge about him that matters for our trust in him - it affects our attitude towards his trustworthiness.

"Trustworthiness" is the specific intentional content which qualifies the kind of knowledge inherent in trust. How do I become aware of this special quality? And how do I know that my apprehension of trustworthiness contains at the same time something that I don't know, perhaps something that I never shall be able to know?

What I generally know about persons in whom I trust is what I have learned about man during my life. This empirical knowledge is not so much knowledge of biology, psychology or other scientific knowledge which I have acquired in schools, books and universities, but the kind of knowledge I gained in my communication and cooperation with persons, that is: it is the actual presence of my personal experiences with different persons from the time of my first memories until now. This knowledge comprises many positive and negative emotions and many facts of greater or smaller impact on my life and my self-consciousness. I am aware of this empirical-pragmatic knowledge emotionally as well as cognitively. All this has grown together to form my personal experienced knowledge about man. It has become an essential part of my individuality and manifold, multilevelled identity.

The knowledge of the person in whom I place trust is the knowledge of a person which is, as I am naturally inclined to believe, like me. Not exactly like me, we are in this respect not exchangeable, but similar to me as individual, an incomparable embodiment of one and the same nature of a human being. This is a latent and sometimes questionable

¹⁷ Georg Simmel, *Soziologie. Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung* (1908), Frankfurt/Main 1992 (Gesammelte Werke, vol. 11), 393.

kind of knowledge which normally I don't know as such consciously. But I take it for granted spontaneously. It forms a basic cognitive layer of trust. Such a layer of trust, an experienced knowledge about man, is practically acknowledged by all the persons around me – until I experience that it is not always or even not at all present in all these people. From the first deeper disappointments on I feel the need to be more cautious about man than I was before. I try to get a better founded knowledge of the persons with whom I live in trust-relationships or want to build up trust-relations. A "better founded" knowledge is not scientific knowledge but a knowledge that matters in respect to strengthen or destroy the evidence of trustworthiness of the person in whom I place trust. "Better founded" is actually a pragmatic socially acknowledged category: my reasons to trust a person are held to be well founded when I have done what other people would have done to find some reasons which allow them to hold on to the trust-relationship, to reduce its risks or otherwise to give it up. My knowledge will not be better founded by any general knowledge of man, but only by that knowledge which is relevant for my attitude towards a given trust-relation. When I hear something about the trustee, I am of course interested to know if it is true or not, but this is only a premise for my question if that person really is trustworthy, and how far I can trust him here and now, when I have heard things about him which evoke my suspicion. I know that the pragmatic character of trust-related knowledge is open to utilitarian considerations, for instance that trustworthiness may be estimated on how much it would cost to make it work in my interest. But this refers not actually to the quality of trustworthiness but to my attitude towards a trust-relation. My attitude towards trustworthiness in a given situation is something else than my knowledge of what this trustworthiness in the situation here and now is and what it demands.

What, then, is the special quality of trustworthiness? Even if we say that we place our trust in a person, trustworthiness is not a projection of some sort of feeling or estimation on to a person; trustworthiness is understood rather as a quality of the person himself in whom we trust. It is a quality which we cannot apprehend by our senses, it is nothing visible, audible, tastable, etc., but nevertheless it is an objective quality – we can "feel" it as a quality of that person. A feeling bears its credibility primarily in itself. It is also qualified by different degrees of strength or intensity, different degrees of stability and durability, different affinities to other feelings which under certain conditions can interfere with the feeling of trustworthiness which I have, but in the first place I am aware of and feel the special quality

of trustworthiness – I can rely on him, he is honest, he will not cheat me, he is benevolent to me, he is able, ready and willing to fulfill his obligations in our trust-relationship, and altogether deserves my trust.

Normally we relate the quality of trustworthiness to the character of a person. But there are different kinds of trustworthiness, depending on what it is which bears and justifies our trust: Trustworthiness founded in the moral conduct of a person will have a higher degree of worthiness, stability and durability than trustworthiness founded in the cleverness of a person or in his interest in economic profit. Therefore the feeling cognition of trustworthiness has two layers: the feeling cognition of the quality "trustworthy" and the awareness of the founding ground of our trust and its inherent value (moral conduct, cleverness, economic interest etc.). In most cases of trust-relations both layers are connected with one another, but their connection is not stable, it can vary very much, even up to a disconnection: the founding ground of trustworthiness may be given, but some persons just don't feel that the person is trustworthy; and some persons will have a strong feeling of the trustworthiness of a person, but they cannot say why or even know that he doesn't have it.

All cases of a feeling awareness of the quality of trustworthiness are a feeling of a value-quality. Therefore we may call the feeling experience of trustworthiness a value-judgment – "judgment" not in the form of a conclusion, but in the form of an immediate intuitive feeling of a value-quality. Such value-judgments cannot be demonstrated by argumentation or proof, but only by stating that one has the intuitive cognition of the trustworthiness. It is of no use to debate about the existence or non-existence of such an intuitive feeling or about the reasons for such a feeling – we have to trust the person who states that he feels the trustworthiness. If we don't trust him, we cannot but state our distrust, thus being in the same position as the person who states his feeling of trust. The only way of conveying value-judgments interpersonally is to make other people feel the value-qualities for themselves, and this applies to positive as well as to negative value-judgments. In each case we have to trust the persons who state that they feel the trustworthiness of a person.

My feeling cognition of trustworthiness is to a certain degree analyzable. We may find in it ingredients of respect of a person, admiration, some kind of love, perhaps also envy, some elements of distrust etc. – all this contributes to diversify the content and the quality of my feeling cognition and to let me realize that this kind of knowledge is of a complex,

interpersonally ambivalent character. The analysis will never identify all the ingredients which build up my trust, therefore my feeling cognition will comprise also a certain amount of non-cognition, of which however I know that it is present in the background of my knowledge and that it may bother me, perhaps only sometimes.

The most effective kind of non-knowledge in my feeling cognition is my knowledge that I can never be sure that the person in whom I place trust will act as I expect him to act. My feeling knowledge is therefore principally insecure because the trustee is principally free to act as he wants to. His freedom corresponds to my freedom: we are both free to enter into a trust-relation, fulfill its demands, or abuse it. When we have built up a trust-relation, we have decided to reduce our freedom to that free space which is limited by our trust-relation. We trust each other, but we cannot know if the other will stand to our trust-relation, and if he has the necessary abilities and the required readiness to hold on to our relationship also in future. What we call "freedom" in respect to our trust-relation is actually our knowledge that we cannot be sure that the person whom we trust will behave as is wanted for the sake of our relation and for such relations at all. We know also, that the other person may have had motives to engage in our relation which are not at all to the benefit of our relation or of me. It is all too easy and optimistic when for instance Schottlaender, but also others maintain that a trust-relation is a relation between two freedoms, and that freedom evokes freedom – the opposite may also be the case. When Simmel spoke of the knowledge and non-knowledge of man which is inherent in trust-relations, he was right to replace "freedom" by an ambivalent knowledge "of man". This knowledge tells us that of all kinds of freedom it is almost never what Kant calls the freedom of reason (*Vernunftfreiheit*) which is the core of man's dignity, but mostly the freedom of arbitrariness (*Willkürfreiheit*), which is dominated by the drives, desires and selfish interests of our natural individuality. Principally we cannot know what kind of "freedom" is invested in a certain trust-relation. Therefore we have to leave undecided if trust is morally good or only of pragmatic usefulness.

As to the functional cognition it seems to be trivial to point out that trust goes always together with a knowledge that it is trust that we experience just now. But this knowledge is rather diffuse and in most cases unapprehended, since usually we don't have a distinct and clear knowledge of the nature of trust and if it should or could be distinguished from

confidence,¹⁸ belief, faith, hope, expectation, fidelity and other related phenomena; nevertheless we can be sure enough that it is trust we are involved in, when we have made some of the experiences which our fellow-citizens call trust. We have to learn what trust is, but this is not only a case of learning the meaning of words,¹⁹ but of learning to recognize certain types of experience as trust-experience. It is similar with other difficult words, especially with words which express emotions. We may know the meanings which are normally connected with "happiness", but this knowledge doesn't make us feel happiness. Once we have experienced happiness, we have a new and much more lively understanding of the meaning of "happiness", and we can realize that it is different for example from amusement and other experiences which make some persons happy. Everybody gains in the course of his life an empirical knowledge that trust can have different degrees of intensity, assurance, cognitive content, and that I am a person who is sometimes easily ready to trust or who normally is inclined to distrust persons or tries to avoid situations in which trust is demanded. One knows by experience about the steadiness or unsteadiness of one's attitude (between readiness or refusal) towards trust. The functional cognition of trust is embedded in the empirical knowledge and practical know-how of everyday life.

Functional knowledge of trust is modified when it is an element in professional activities which demand a high degree of assurance that everything will come to a good end, as for instance in medical professions, in education, preaching, or politics. Such a kind of professional trust is habitually and strongly proclaimed, though these persons are quite aware of their susceptibility to err. The persons to whom they address themselves are all too ready to believe them, because they prefer being strengthened in their hope than to get a founded knowledge about the reliability

¹⁸ N. Luhmann and others have distinguished trust from confidence, the latter being understood as the assurance that a mechanism or standardized behavior will function properly in the expected and planned way. Cf. N. Luhmann, *Vertrauen. Ein Mechanismus der Reduktion sozialer Komplexität* (1968), Stuttgart 42000. The same distinction between trust (*Vertrauen*) and confidence (*Verlass*) has made by Eugen Diesel in *Die Macht des Vertrauens*, Stuttgart 1948.

¹⁹ Ute Frevert maintains that trust is accessible only through its verbal emanations and not as a psycho-physical condition – she doesn't accept that kind of knowledge which is inherent in trust. Cf. U. Frevert, "Vertrauen in historischer Perspektive", in Rainer Schmalz-Bruns, Reinhard Zint (Eds.), *Politisches Vertrauen. Soziale Grundlagen reflexiver Kooperation*, Baden-Baden 2002, 39–59, esp. 46, 48.

or unreliability of the professional trust. Wishful trust, not to be confused with blind trust, replaces easily the efforts to gain founded trust, because it encourages our longing for a better life so that we are inclined to suppress our suspicions. Wishful trust is likely to take desires and wishes for sufficient reasons to trust. Even if they know about this problematic kind of founding trust in their hope for a better future, they are not worried. They know that distrust diminishes the joy of life, and since trust is also a disposition and desire to overcome present difficulties by joint efforts, the professional preachers of a better life in future activate vital powers which fulfill easily the need for a foundation of trust.

We call trust "founded" when we are aware of enough qualities of the intentional object to motivate our trust – the intentional object embraces all those qualities which promise to satisfy our needs, desires or wishes. We know that we are not able to get them by our own efforts, but that they have to be given or granted to us by others. The intentional object thus makes me conscious of the limits of my own abilities, of my own needs and of my dependence on the assistance of other persons. Since the qualities correlate to my needs, desires etc, they represent values for me – the intentional object is founded in value cognition. The known qualities may either relate directly to my trust, for instance when a doctor is known for his skills to cure such diseases as my own, or they relate indirectly to my knowledge which made me place trust in him, for instance when the doctor is generally known not only as an able doctor but also as a trustworthy and responsible person. Yet all the known qualities and the general recognition of the trustworthiness of a person cannot prove that this knowledge is well-founded, nor that the intended good will really prove to be good for me. The gap between intentional object and the object itself cannot be neglected. The knowledge of the intentional object, however, tends to disapprove any further investigation in the object itself. My knowledge of the intentional object has its own evidence: it is strong enough to evoke my trust. Sometimes it is my strong trust which makes me believe that it is well-founded, even if the evidence may be rather poor, but sometimes even an extensive and differentiated knowledge of the intended good will not convince me that my trust is well founded.

That kind of pragmatic knowledge which is implied in trust has therefore two dimensions: theoretical and value knowledge about the intended good, and knowledge of the person in which our trust is placed. Since I can get the intentional object not by myself, the person is in as much as he seems to be able or promises to grant me the desired good an authority, and therefore we may speak of an author-

ity-knowledge. This knowledge comprises not only the abilities to produce or obtain the intended good, but also the will to transfer it to me. So two kinds of knowledge are involved: a more or less strong assumption that the abilities are really given, and an expectation that the person is willing to behave in the expected way. As long as the transfer of the intended good is not completed, there is no proof that my knowledge is true. And even if the transfer is completed, I don't know without further investigation that the transferred good is not perhaps a fake, or if the person has acted out of good will or out of some hidden motives which sooner or later will prove to be evil. But this non-knowledge doesn't bother me as long as there is no reason for suspicion. Suspicion is the antagonist of trust. But though it may have destroyed my trust eventually, the relation may endure as long as there is hope to get the intended good. Hope proves to be the stronger power of life than trust. Without trust, however, I would not have gone into such a form of communication between persons. The whole sphere of life, which a trust-founded communication opens, would have remained unexplored and unknown to me. While hope is an enduring power of life, trust opens new life dimensions. My engagement in a trust-relation and my non-knowledge about what will happen in the new dimension which has opened on the authority of my partner gives trust a note of mutual adventure.

Trust in oneself

For some authors like R. Schottlaender trust in oneself is the necessary premise of a general theory of trust²⁰ - as if an ego could principally be conceived of without the relation to other persons. Scheler, Buber, Binswanger²¹ and others are right to maintain that "we" or "you" are prior to "I", but it is I, who experiences this priority and its development in one's life. Trust is a manifestation of the priority of you or we to I, but it realizes itself only with my cooperation. Other persons and their forms and traditions of communication stand for the range of possibilities to engage in trust-relations, but it depends again on me if trust-relations with me are realized; it depends on me as a concrete individual, who develops himself in trust-relations, which offer

²⁰ Rudolf Schottlaender, "Zur ethischen Theorie des Vertrauens", in *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 9, 1955, 348–357.

²¹ Max Scheler, *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie* (1923), in *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 7, Bern 1973; Martin Buber, *Das dialogische Prinzip* (1954), Darmstadt ⁵1984; Ludwig Binswanger, *Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins* (1942), München/Basel ⁴1964.

his actions a certain free space. The borders of the free space depend not only on the nature of a given trust-relation, but also on what I am ready to invest. My engagement presupposes also a certain amount of trust in myself – trust in being able to fulfill what the trust-relations demand of me; being able and willing to hold up the trust-relation even in difficult situations. Trust in myself develops in proportion to the demands of the trust-relation. But it is principally not fixed into this proportion, though I have decided to engage myself in this special trust-relation and agreed to its form and demands. When I feel not to be able to fulfill the demands, my selftrust becomes weaker. When I feel the restraints of a trust-relation more than its chances, I begin to doubt if this trust-relation is adequate to my nature, or, vice versa, if my nature is fit for a certain trust-relation so that I have to shape it according to the demands. All this shows that my trust in myself depends on the measures of trust-relations in which I am engaged, that it is a dependent factor of trust-relations. But its dependency can never eliminate its fundamental autonomy.

The fundamental autonomy is only the presupposition for a self-determined life. Selfdetermination can be looked at in respect to three general attitudes: an attitude of subordination, an attitude of co-ordination, and an attitude of setting oneself above the others. Trust in oneself can develop in all three dimensions, and in each dimension it can find forms of realization, which will be estimated both by me and by others either as sound or as ill, but our estimations may not always be in accordance with one another. For instance in a position of subordination, I shall trust and serve my master in loyalty, which my master may estimate as sound, though he tries to get rid of me, while others estimate my loyalty as blind, though they would like to have also such an obedient servant as they think I am. Trust in oneself in co-ordinated relations is generally a prerequisite to establish trust relationships out of mutual interest. When one of the partners learns that he is deceived by the other(s), trust in oneself will often become weaker, doubtful, because he knows that he was not able to discover the deception in time; but trust in oneself may increase considerably when he looks for revenge and is convinced to be able to realize it. In most cases, trust in oneself is the internalization of social trust-relationships, but modified by my subjective understanding, and by my estimation of such relationships and my self-estimation. This subjective filter of perception and estimation can lead a person into self-isolation from the social sphere, when at the end a person trusts only himself and his internal imagery. But it can also open the personal view on

to social relationships and to discover ways for their improvement.

However, the paradigmatic case of trust in oneself is the third dimension, setting oneself above others. The personal relationship of trust in this case is complex. I am aware of others as possible partners of interpersonal relationships. But they are for me only objects either of subjugation or of surpassing. Additionally I have to assume that they will have the same attitude to me as I have to them. I see them as if I were they. They are a projection of me, but under the condition that they have an intention opposed to mine. Therefore trust in myself is trust in my abilities and powers to overcome any resistances which might come up against me in the form of my projections of me into them. The fight against personified resistances can never end, because whenever I have overcome some of them, new ones will stand up. I loose myself in my efforts to overcome the projections of me. The loss of myself could only be stopped when I bring back the projection of myself to myself, when I withdraw from my drives to subjugate or overcome my competitors and come back to myself, to the core of my existence, which I have lost sight of. I cannot be sure ever to gain an intimate knowledge of it, but I can be sure that on the way back to the core of my existence I shall find the true trust in myself.

Trust in oneself is often inclined to suppress its interpersonal formation and the social motivation for autonomy and selfresponsibility. Without accounting for its interpersonal genesis, it sets its self-image as a measure for trust at all. The building of trust in oneself is all too easily endangered to lose a sound measure. Of course a sound trust in oneself is a necessary prerequisite to develop one's abilities and also to take risks in realizing them. The central problem is to find the right measure of self-assertion. A great help in exploring one's abilities are models of life which integrate a person into social and cultural life, but these life-models may at the same time be felt as chains to the ambitions of oneself, especially when a person overestimates his powers and abilities, or feels a strong vocation which does not fit to the acknowledged models of life in a society. Trust in oneself can thus induce an alienation and contempt for an immovable, stationary society, and correspondingly it can change into a presumptuous attitude and arrogance. The history of western culture is rich with persons who were adventurous enough in transgressing the models of life which a society in a certain stage of its development offers its members, and any one of these extraordinary persons may give an orientation and a promise for the development of a person's trust in himself. The history of culture however tells us nothing about those who perished

in consequence of their excessive self-assertion. In these cases public opinion speaks of self-deception, if not of a mental disease, when a person identifies himself too much with Napoleon or Jeanne d'Arc – without disposing of the necessary personal qualities, not to speak of the necessary real means, resources, funds etc.

But the models of life are not only chains for my ambitions, but can also be chances for my self-realization. Models of life render my self-realization more calculable, my trust in myself more sound in as much as I feel able to satisfy the requirements inherent in a life model. Is the choice of a life model also a case of trust in oneself? To a certain degree it is, even if I learn later on that I have chosen the wrong model – my former trust in myself actually has deceived me – trust in oneself may show to be sound only for some time, that is only for a part, not for the whole of my existence. But how can I distinguish between short-time life-models and life-models for ever?

When trust in oneself is related to the whole existence of man, then it must be founded in a knowledge about the destiny of a man and of man at all, and this latter knowledge no man will ever be able to gain. Plato referred to an old mythical knowledge: the soul of man chooses a model of life before he is born, that means: thrown into existence, and society, Plato seems to believe, provides the required means for the realization of the chosen life model. But Plato is sceptical about the trustworthiness of the soul's knowledge and disposition to choose the right life model, because the soul is formed by the experiences and affects of its former lives. His mythical idea requires another mythical idea – the myth of metempsychosis and reincarnation. Trust in oneself rests on the unrecognized formation of the soul by its former fates and its prejudiced and typologically limited hope for a new life of some sort of happiness. Trust in oneself may have an inherent dark, but leading knowledge of one's destiny in this life, but this doesn't mean that it is wholesome – it can also make a fool of oneself.

The cognitive element in trusting oneself has an extremely precarious stand, also without the myths of pre-natal choice and reincarnation. It is one and the same person who judges and is the object of judgement; judge and accused in one person. This double-faced person finds on neither side of its self-consciousness a reliable measure, neither on the side of the subject which tries to gain a reliable knowledge of itself, nor on the side of the object, which has no definite objectivity, but changes its status under the influence of inner and outer causes almost from minute to minute, if it is not driven to disguise its nature or to hide behind a mask, without even

knowing that it obstructs and deceives the efforts to gain a reliable self-knowledge.²² The judging subject cannot free itself from all the impulses, drives, experiences, aims which bring about the formation of the person – there is no Archimedian, extra-personal standpoint from which a reliable self-knowledge could be obtained. The self-knowledge itself can hardly be called a knowledge, there is no criterion to distinguish between knowledge, self-deception, dream, mystification etc., and nothing of what a person thinks to know of itself can be recalled unaltered.

Nevertheless there are some notions which a person has obtained of self and which might be called knowledge, but knowledge of a certain kind. First, self-knowledge and self-trust bear the character of subjective evidence. Second, when notions are recalled, we know that they have changed in some respects, but still can be identified as that one notion which only in some parts or modalities has changed. Third, it is by decision of the subject that a notion of itself is in a certain situation accepted as (pragmatic, hypothetical) knowledge, because the person needs a sufficiently stable knowledge of itself for the sake of planning its future behavior and activities. Self-knowledge may therefore be called a "pragmatic self-knowledge", and the success of acts founded on this knowledge are the proof or disproof of its reliability, unfortunately only a posteriori.

In this perspective it does not matter much if some sort of self-knowledge really is well founded. The healing effect of placebos shows sufficiently, that already the conviction alone, that a medicine will cure a disease, can eventuate the cure. Yet nobody can be sure that the intended effect really will happen. If it does not happen, then, and only then, the knowledge shows to be wrong, that instead of presenting a reliable self-knowledge the conception was self-deception, self-suggestion, self-persuasion. Trust in oneself is in a much higher degree an hazardous, destiny challenging enterprise as for instance kinds of trust in the social sphere.

Trust and Time

Augustine leads back the three-dimensional time structure of man's existence to three faculties of mind: *memory* presents us what has been, *perception* what is, and *expectation* what will be.²³ Memory, perception and expectation present us with what occurs in their respective dimensions. This means that the three faculties of constituting time-

²² Cf. my article "Über die Undefinierbarkeit des Menschen und die Grenzen der Weltanschauungen", in: *Idee. Rivista di filosofia* 62/63, 2006, 23–42.

²³ Augustine, *Confessiones* XI, 20.

dimensions are united in the present act of consciousness. Perception, as the act of consciousness which presents what is, ties memory and expectation to the present moment and constitutes the unity and continuity of time experience.

Trust is essentially orientated from the present towards the future, but is not identical with expectation. There are several other acts of our mind which extend perception to future events. *Hope* expects something good, *fear* expects something evil or dangerous, other forms of anticipating future are *promise*, *care*, *anxiety*, and others. There is no reason to concede to trust the most fundamental act of consciousness to constitute the future dimension of time experience.

When Augustine correlates the three dimensions of time to three different acts of the mind which are united by the perception of presence, he doesn't mean a transcendental theory of time but rather an anthropology of forms of experience which extend into the three different time dimensions. Do the three time dimensions exist independently from our experience of them so that they can be identified principally as one and the same whenever we and others have an experience of time, or do they exist only as a form of perception whenever we practice them? Then we should use another word to denote the time-constituting function of an anthropological psychic function, which by the way also should be conceded to some animals. What we really experience in memory, perception and expectation are remembered, perceived and expected things (in a broad sense). They are "my" experiences, but understood as experiences of things which exist independently from my experience. The time-dimensions in my experiences are co-understood, but not as constituting my experience and even less as constituting the things I experience. The time-dimensions in my experiences are different from the time-dimensions of the things²⁴ – this is evident already in everyday-knowledge.

There is yet another aspect of our question of time and trust. It refers to the reliability of trust. Trust as an attitude has a limited duration, much more limited than our lifetime. Man may experience trust relationships which he is convinced will last for ever. Some kinds of trust will only be experienced as authentic when they are penetrated with the conviction of eternal duration. Whenever we remember the experience of such kinds of trust, we tacitly know that eternal duration is impossible, but that it is something like a necessary illusion – trust extends

from here-and-now-reality into illusionary dimensions.

Trust as experience of time dimensions may prove to be fallible, and this applies also to the act of remembering. Augustine's anthropology of time is centered in experience here and now. The dimensions of past and future gain their specific form of participation in existence only through the presence-constituting act of perception. Therefore the existential importance of trust as well as of the other forms of anticipating future depend on the act of perception as the only act of recognizing real, undeniable existence. Augustine's anthropology of time experiences emphasizes the experience of the present moment, but at the same time he concedes that the experience of the present existence continually changes from future existence through a momentary real existence into passed existence. This balances out the forms of existence in relation to the experience of the presence, but this altogether founding experience requires an ontology of existence based on the absolute creative power of God. Here again we are confronted with the finiteness and weakness of human existence.

Trust in God

When we reflect the nature of trust and its conditions, we are confronted with the finiteness of man. We don't know what the future will bring or how long we shall live, we cannot be sure about the real intentions of the persons with whom we live and work together, we don't know what we have to think of ourselves and we cannot really trust our abilities – we should always add the salvational clause "if present conditions will continue". It is actually our finiteness which causes us to trust, which makes trust necessary. Considering this, it appears to be naive when so many philosophers, teachers, social workers, politicians appeal to venture more trust or who try to convince people that trust is a moral duty – all these appeals cannot heal the deficiencies of trust – it is necessary and unavoidable for beings like us to trust, but we have set on civilisation which reduces the need for trust and promises a growing security. But that those appeals are felt to be necessary demonstrates the questionable, ambiguous nature of trust.

Besides the promise of civilisation there is another remedy. Christian religion, and certainly some other religions as well preach an "absolute" and "unconditioned" trust.²⁵ This kind of trust is held to be perfect because it is founded in God, who is believed

²⁴ Cf. Niklas Luhmann, *Vertrauen. Ein Mechanismus der Reduktion sozialer Komplexität* (1968), Stuttgart 2000, 9 squ.

²⁵ For the following remarks I refer to Christian Wolff, *Vernünfftige Gedanken von der Menschen Tun und Lassen zur Beförderung ihrer Glückseligkeit*, Halle 1720.

to be absolutely trustworthy, and the only one. The finiteness of our nature seduces us to doubt. A Christian has the religious duty to protect himself from any doubts in the trustworthiness of God. If he cannot resist the seduction, he loses his absolute trust in God. The best protection against this failure, he is told, is to bear firmly in mind the perfections of God, which convince him of the absolute impossibility that trust in God could ever be betrayed: God is omnipotent, omniscient, infinitely good, and by his unlimited wisdom knows best what is becoming for man in general and for every individual person. Trust in God makes man calm and patient even in greatest distress. Social trust or trust in oneself can only be trustworthy in so far as they are founded in the trust in God. When it is said from many sides that we live in an age of lack of trust, then its cause may not so much be seen in the development of a capitalist mentality or of unbridled egoism, but in the decline of religion. It has always been said that even simple forms of trust cannot be built voluntarily, but are a gift – so much more in the case of an absolute trust. Christians believe that an absolute trust is entirely a grace of God. But modern man doubts that God has granted mankind his grace. The trust in God seems to find no counterpart in something like God's trust in man. Trust in God is absolutely asymmetrical – an image of it may be seen in a mother's trust in her child, which also has no counterpart in a young child's trust in his mother. Modern man may be blind to see God's mercy with man. A Christian however might believe that his absolute blindness is to be taken as a sign of God's wise government of worldly affairs – the belief that we live in the best of all possible worlds is an incredible challenge when one takes into consideration all the innumerable natural catastrophes and cruelties of wars since the time of Adam and Eve, and of course the problematic nature of man. It seems that an absolute trust in God can only be accepted by man in absolute blindness. Only under this condition can it penetrate the whole existence of man. Absolute blindness requires the sacrifice of the intellect, an intellect which on the other hand is believed to be an essential part of man as an image of God. Is absolute blindness or intelligence asked for the possibility of an absolute trust in God? This problem brings man into an unreconcilable conflict in his knowledge of God's perfection and in his belief in God's goodness. A firm religious belief will probably not be affected by such contradictions; an absolutely trusting Christian will rather believe that his awareness of contradictions is induced by the devil. But outside the circles of religious belief the theodicy-problem of an absolute trust in God will find almost no resonance. But since our trust-relationships cannot hide their

fragile nature, we feel compelled to look for something which gives them an undestroyable reliability not beyond but inside this world.

Trust in the constancy of nature ("Seins-" and "Weltvertrauen")

An innerworldly counterpart to "trust in God" has been delineated by Otto Friedrich Bollnow (1903-1991) in his hermeneutic anthropology, by which he tried to repudiate fundamentally the existentialistic oneness of Heidegger's phenomenology of man's "Dasein".²⁶ Bollnow limited his apology of trust to a purely philosophical ground of discussion, though he acknowledges that it is actually a religious problem.²⁷ His limitation of the problem is not in accordance with a philosophical hermeneutic, all the less so because he interprets his fundamental trust as a "believing relation to a fundamental shelter-granting might" which advances man from outside as a gift and seizes man in his deepest core. This might is not conceived of as a person, it is not entirely an interpersonal relationship, but at least from the side of the truster a personal relationship. Against Heidegger's concept of man's being as "Geworfenheit" (thrown into existence) Bollnow sets a deeply felt trust in a bearing ground of existence. Sometimes he relates it to being at all ("Sein") and speaks of a "trust in the constancy of being" ("Seinsvertrauen"), sometimes he relates it to nature as constantly self-regenerating power. The fundamental ground of being bears not only man's existence but everything that exists. Man becomes aware that he is just a small particle in the universe, but a particle that is at the same time an essential part of the universe, in which he fills in a firmly founded position. Man feels himself as a part of the whole, and this feeling of particularity conveys to him a fundamental calmness and all comprising trust by which he can hold his position even in greatest mischief.

This belief in nature is a (one-sided) person-related belief, not a scientific theory. Scientific arguments are kept away from interfering with a belief and with trust. Trust and belief are understood as belonging to another sphere of man's existence. To keep trust and science apart from one another is just one model to balance out the contradictions of man's nature. A person-related belief needs not to account for long-term scientific cognitions, for instance in astronomy, that our planet and our sun-system will inevitably get destroyed in some mil-

²⁶ Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (1927), §§ 9 squ.

²⁷ Otto Friedrich Bollnow, *Zwischen Philosophie und Pädagogik. Vorträge und Aufsätze*, Aachen 1988, 48.

lions and millions of years. We are finite beings of limited lifespan – who cares reasonably for problems which may occur to mankind in such a distant future?

But a personal-related trust in man cannot exclude that our planet will be destroyed by man himself even much earlier. And it is better for our chances to master the difficulties of our nature and existence here and now that we trust in mankind as if it would exist forever by its own efforts, and, of course, by a friendly courtesy of nature, for the time being. Trust is a friendly veil thrown over the unfathomable contingency of man's existence, a veil partly woven by man himself to disguise and to overcome his fragility, and partly found scattered over the place where he lives in the universe, and simply left to his care; if not to his abuse.

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TRUST AS HERMENEUTIC PRINCIPLE

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Abstract:

We can speak of a hermeneutics of “the good faith” or the “confiding mood”, centred on the intention of “sense reconfiguration”, and of another one, “suspicious”, malevolent, unconfident in the author’s sincerity or the plausibility of the message displayed by the “piece of work/creation”. Paul Ricoeur saw Marx, Nietzsche and Freud as “the three masters of suspicion”. Their hermeneutics obviously would have been cut in the pattern of distrust. Another tradition, of Anglo-Saxon inspiration, encourages a rather different direction. Can one count on “trust” as a hermeneutic principle? What are the exigencies to be followed in the practice of an “optimistic” interpretation? Must there be encouraged a certain subjective availability of the interpreter, favourable to either the text, or the author? How efficient are the strategies based on doubt? What about the ones in which the “meaning” is outclassed by insensate or illicit exegetic intervening?

We often oscillate between underbidding the meaning and taking it beyond the “letter” of the text or the intentions of the authors. Which one of the interpreter’s inclinations must be sustained and stimulated? The sceptic one, distrustful of the chances of textual performance or, on the contrary, the optimistic one, based on trust?

Key words: trust, *aequitas*, principle of charity, the hermeneutics of suspicious, the “benevolent” interpretation.

The “benevolent” interpretation

The “soul” of hermeneutics, according to Jean Greisch¹, would be the “principle of equity” – approximate translation of the *principle of charity*, after the pretty recent formula established in the Anglo-Saxon space by N. Wilson, W.O. Quine and D. Davidson. The concept in question expresses precisely the trustful availability of the interpreter in the possibility of a precise rebuilding of a statement. The same principle can be found under other formulas, as well: “benevolent interpretation” (*interprétation bienveillante*) at W. Alexander, W. Künnle, A. Wellmer; “hermeneutic prevention” or forthcoming attention (*prevénance*, *interpretatorisches Ent-*

gegenkommen) at H. Lenk; “anticipation of perfection” (*Vortgriff der Vollkommenheit*, H.-G. Gadamer; “the principle of leniency” (*Nachsichtigkeitsprinzip*) at Günter Abel.

Olivier R. Scholz was preoccupied with rebuilding the chain of notions that led to the formulation of *aequitas* as hermeneutic principle. *Benignitas*, *carietas*, *praesumptio* are, according to Scholz, the concepts that would anticipate its configuration, setting out in some wise the stages of the elaboration of a general hermeneutics².

As an exegetic principle, *benignitas* implied that the interpreter’s action is benevolent related to the text and its author. The idea is prefigured in the allegoric interpretation of myths, meant to “save” them from a “profane” meaning, as requested by, for example, Plato in its *Republic*. Similarly, the *therapeia mythôn* of Philo of Alexander operated an “ethic reduction”, in order to save the moral meaning of the text. The interpretation is conditioned by the ethic censorship of the meaning, so that it integrates into a paideic model agreed by the community.

The exigency of charity (*carietas*) has been invoked first by Paul (1 Corinthians, 13), who indicates love, faith and hope as bases of Christian doctrine and cognition. Philon and Origen also claim it in the allegoric exegesis of the Bible. Augustin turns to the same principle in *De doctrina christiana*, in order to part the “literal” sense from the “figurative” one. The Bishop of Hippo subdivides this exigency into other five principles to apply in the interpretation of Christian scriptures.

According to the first of these, “love limits error in the interpretation of the Scripture”³. The one who lies is beneath the dignity of the cheated one, because “suffering injustice is better than doing it”. The liar is unjust, because he doesn’t put good faith in his lie, caring for the simple deceit of the other and gaining an advantage from hiding the truth. The

¹ Jean Greisch, *Le cogito hermèneutique. L’herméneutique philosophique et l’héritage cartésien*, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Paris, 2000, pp. 80 sq.

² Cf. Olivier R. Scholz, *Verstehen und Rationalität*, Klostermann, Frankfurt, 1999, pp. 13–67

³ A. Augustine, *De doctrina christiana*, I, 86–95, Editura Humanitas, București, 2002

lie is always useless, and who defies good faith is unjust. The Scriptures do not lie, Augustine believes, that is why the interpreter must not think otherwise than the one who wrote. To avoid side-slips, he needs to be corrected; he must be shown the good way, for the custom of deviating not to become a rule.

The second principle invokes “risks of the wrong interpretation”. Among these, he holds the hubris of the interpreter to contradict the author’s intentions. By overbidding his own opinions, he starts to offend the Scripture; his belief becomes faltering, and his love towards the holy will also be unsure.

The next principles invoked by Augustine stipulate that “love is eternal” or that “the man who has faith, hope and love only needs the Scripture to teach the others”, that love must be accompanied by a genuine heart, fair conscience and sincere belief in order to really be effective.

The term *praesumptio* regards the presumption of rationality. It sends to a double tradition: of the Aristotelian ethics and of the judicial hermeneutics. In the latter, the distinction between “presumption” and “prejudice” (*praejudicium*) is decisive; a “presumption of innocence” has nothing in common with the prejudice of believing in the innocence of an accused.

Aequitas, the key-term of general hermeneutics, apparent synonym of the ones previously invoked, has Aristotelian origins. In the sense given by the Stagirite in his *Nicomachean Ethics*, the “equitable” is superior to a certain justice, being a correction to it. Equity intervenes when law does not cover all the situations, becoming a decisive element of “practical wisdom”.

Towards a modern *aequitas*

All these concepts will be reconsidered in the Protestant Christian space by the modern promoters of hermeneutics. Johann Konrad Dannhauer (1603-1666), the one to whom we owe the term “hermeneutics” in a denotation that is familiar to us, was encouraging in *Idea boni interpretis et malitiosi calumniatoris* (1630) the exploration of the main maladies of the interpretation, reduced to two: the obscurity of the text and the malevolence of the interpreter. The sources of misunderstandings are not, therefore, objective only; they hold to the competencies, intentions and dispositions of the interpreter. The idea reappears at Clauberg in *Logica Vetus & Nova* (1652). He phrased the general and fundamen-

tal rules of interpretation. In brief, they claim the following: “in case of doubt, one must choose the most benevolent interpretation, consider all the arguments, accept a multitude of equally plausible meanings, must not damn without a valid reason, must not correct a slight error through a too brutal rejection”⁴.

Also on the tract of the rationalization of the exegetic demarche, Christian August Crusius phrases the general “presumptions” of the hermeneutic plausibility. It appears from presenting them that there are no apodictic truths and that an interpretation can be more or less plausible – the ideal being to enlarge the plausibility of the message and diminish uncertainty. Moreover, one must assume that the author is intelligent, knows what he’s talking about, wants to be understood and expresses himself as clearly as possible, and the interpreter also is willing to honor the author’s desire to be understood: , a symmetric relationship between the desire for communication of the first and the desire of understanding of the latter being established.

Christian Wolff and Georg Friedrich Meier hold attention with formulas meant to crystallize out the principles of good interpretation. Inspired by Thomasius, Wolff, for example, both in his *Deutsche Logik* and *Jus Naturae*, showed that the purpose of interpretation is *investigatio mentis auctoris* (to think the same as the author). *Subtilitas intelligendi*, “the authentic interpretation”, assumes good understanding of the author’s intentions, drawing on the signs exposed by him in the text. There is no better interpretation than the one the author would do to himself. Wolff considers sometimes the “doctrinal interpretation” (in the spirit of the text) superior to the “authentic” one, of the author, if the latter uses concepts lacking clarity and precision. The distinction in question will legitimize attention’s dislodgement to the second text, of the competent interpreter. On this point, Schlegel and Schleiermacher will establish as basic hermeneutic exigency the understanding of the author “better than he understood himself”.

In *Philosophia rationalis*, Wolff distinguishes between *aequitas* and *iniquitas in interpretando*. The philosopher confers *aequitas* the status of hermeneutic principle. An ethics of interpretation ought to be centered on an *interpretatio* of the author and not on an *accomodatio*, that is an illicit use of the text. The minimal condition to be “author” is the faculty to

⁴ Cf. Jean Greisch, *Op. cit.*, p. 82

judge, distinctive sign of any personal thinking. The author is in this way credited with the “authority” that comes from the faculty of judging. “We can name equitable an interpretation that doesn’t give a different significance to the words of the author, only to those that we can prove to be his, or, at least, reducing the margin of error that we can assign to him as being plausible”⁵.

Georg Friedrich Meier contributes decisively to the phrasing of the principle of “charity” as pivot of general hermeneutics. *Versuch einer allgemeinen Auslegungskunst* (1757) is probably, the decisive piece of work in this matter. Like Wolff, Meier believes that no one better than the author can claim certitudes regarding the writings. Each author is the best interpreter of his own signs. This way there is postulated explicitly the hermeneutic primacy of the auctorial instance, towards which no one can claim an “altered” sense through vicious or personal interpretation.

In a similar manner, Meier calls attention in its *Essays* to the risks of an “accommodatrice” reading: “an *accomodatio*” is a fake hermeneutic sense, similar to the real one (...), is a sense projected upon the text”⁶. The “overwrought” interpretation, that solicits the meaning through an excess of benevolence, is just as unequitable as the “suspicious interpretation”, or malevolent, unconfident in the intentions of the author. The golden mean would correspond to hermeneutic “equity” (*hermeneutische Billigkeit*), as it avoids both superficialism and excess.

Hermeneutics must limit abusive interpretations, leading the art of interpretation towards a rational basis. *Aequitas hermeneutica* would be “the interpreter’s tendency of taking as hermeneutic real significances that conform the best to the perfection of the sign’s author, until proven wrong”, idea resumed in its *Aesthetics*, where he requests “interpreting the signs in a manner conforming to their perfection, until proven wrong”⁷. Meier also speaks about the “apparent equity” of the interpreter who blindly trusts the regarded author, conferring him all the possible perfections, and the hermeneutic “inequity”, which brings into competition the perfection of the sign and the perfection of the author, to underline the deficiencies of the latter⁸.

To Meier, as A. G. Baumgarten – his mentor, *equity* is more than a rule, it’s “the first principle of general hermeneutics”, “the principle of hermeneutic principles”. Respect for God needs to be the fundamental rule of sacral hermeneutics, because God is the author of the signs that we interpret. Therefore, Meier’s exigencies approach an “ethics of interpretation” or a “moral hermeneutics”, according to which any interpretation that is an obstacle for virtue or that encourages vice must be rejected.

The “radical” translation (Quine)

In 1959, Neil Wilson re-signifies the expression *principle of charity* and establishes it as a reference point of Anglo-Saxon philosophy from the second half of the last century⁹. In Wilson’s opinion, it’s not enough to ascribe a proper name to a determined individual (Napoleon, for instance) in order to understand the significance of that name inside a statement. The “principle of charity” would chose as referent that proper name the individual who makes true the largest number of statements referring to the subject. Later, Wilson expands the analysis upon predicates as well, so that the principle in question will be interpreted as one of “maximizing the truth” (Olivier R. Scholz).

The principle is re-launched the following year by Willard van Orman Quine in his discussions regarding the “radical translation” from *Word and Object* (1960). The best manner to get rid of “the myth of a museum in which the role of the exposed objects is replaced by significations and the one of tags, by words” would be to attract attention upon the fact that the meaning is inseparable from the linguistic conducts¹⁰. Either we want it or not, we must admit the existence of a concept of signification which associates sensorial stimuli and verbal reactions. The philosophical issue here regards the nature of the “leap” we make, starting from sensorial stimuli, towards a theoretical vision upon the world.

Quine invites us to imagine the situation of an ethnologist making contact with a foreign civilization for the first time, of whose language, forms of life and culture he had been ignorant. In order to communicate and understand each other, there are only two sources: the expression of the indigenous people’s faces and their vocal behavior, connected to other behaviors susceptible of being observed. The interpreter must identify the statements of the indigenous, statements that have the value of assent,

⁵ *Ibid*, p. 88

⁶ *Ibid*, p. 91

⁷ *Ibid*, p. 93

⁸ Cf. Nicolae Râmbu, *Prelegeri de hermeneutică*, Editura Didactică și Pedagogică, București, 1998, p. 75

⁹ Neil Wilson, “Substances without Substrata” în: *Review of Metaphysics*, 12, 1959, pp. 521–539

¹⁰ Cf. Jean Greisch, *Op. cit.*, p. 106

disapproval or indifference, and to “translate” these in a vocabulary that is compatible with the common communicative intentions. The “translation” in the given situation is similar to the effort made by a child to learn the maternal language. The “charity” the ethnologist-translator uses consists in the availability to refuse the idea that the indigenous person is a representative of a “primitive mentality”, marked by “illogicity”.

In Jean Greisch’s opinion, Quine shares a “hermeneutic naivety familiar to empiricism”, as the situation presumed by him is not “radical”, at least as much as the eventuality of human meeting representatives of alien civilizations. There are also, I believe, situations of interpretation derived from man’s communication with animals or, even, the transfer of messages between the other living beings.

The “radical interpretation”

Any comprehension of the other’s language, Donald Davidson believes, implies a “radical interpretation”¹¹. The concept is meant to suggest the tight affinity with the one of “radical translation” met at Quine. The term *interpretation* instead of the one of *translation* assumes a higher accent on what is semantic explicit in the first case.

A couple of “principles” pile its point of view, extensive and holistic, upon *understanding*, among which the one of “charity” (of rational accommodation) plays a decisive role, as it is meant to optimize the interpreter’s assent with what he interprets. The “accommodation” of the two instances solicits, at the same time, the assertion of some logical elements of coherence and correspondence at the level of beliefs, attitudes and statements implied in the acts of communication and “translation”. Davidson equates “interpretation” and “indetermination”, showing that the indetermination of interpretation must be assumed analogue to the imprecision of a measurement with claims of exactitude. Indetermination does not regard the epistemological limitations of interpretations as much as the holistic valences of belief and meaning.

The procedure of “radical interpretation” framed by Davidson therefore consists, for the interpreter, in formulating - regarding the language of the interpreted one - the most possible statements of (T) form. He does it on the basis of three principles: (1)

he starts by locating, inside the sentences streamed by the interpreter, assertory sentences that the latter “takes as true”, or assumes to be true; (2) formulates, in its terms (the interpreter’s), corresponding (T) sentences; starts from the principle that most of the beliefs of the one he interprets are similar to his. To understand a language means to interpret it¹².

The principle of “charity”, in this case, consists in presuming that there is no possible interpretation of a statement unless we are able to identify “the sentential attitudes of a speaker”. A theory of interpretation that puts a tight correlation between belief and significance must bet on the fact that the speaker “knows” what he states, believes that it is true what he states and that most of what he states is true. This triple bet sums up the principle of “charity”. There is no interpretation and comprehension unless the interpreter presumes that there is coherence between his logic and the interlocutor’s. The principle can be understood as a strategy of maximization of the assertion, of consolidation of coherence and diminishment of incoherence, of raise of rationality and diminishment of irrationality.

Quine and Davidson do not equate *équité* (*fairness*) and *charity*. The latter is unavoidable for whoever assumes the task of interpreting other’s words and thinking. It regards the minimal presumption of truth and rationality demanded for the process of comprehension to take place.

What is it that allows us to interpret? How can we know this? How can we carry a cognition of such an extent that it facilitates the production of interpretations? Clearly, the discourses susceptible of being interpreted are nothing else than actions associated to some non-linguistic intentions, such as the ones of warning, controlling, insulting, accusing. The radical interpretation can’t take as proof of the significance of a sentence an analysis of the *intentions* in virtue of which we’re stating it.

The interpreter must be able to understand a certain phrase from an infinity of phrases that the speaker would state. Two exigencies derive from here: if we want to be able to state explicitly what the interpreter should know in order to get to interpretation, it’s necessary to state this in a finite form. If we are to respect this requirement, we must abandon any hope of getting to a universal method of interpretation. The other exigency imposed on a

¹¹ Donald Davidson, *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1984; ed. fr., *Enquête sur la vérité et l’interprétation*, Éditions Jacqueline Chambon, Nîmes, 1993, pp. 187sq.

¹² Pascal Engel, “Herméneutique, langage et vérité”, in *Studia philosophica*, vol. 57, *Annuaire de la Société Suisse de Philosophie*, Verlag Paul Haupt, Bern, Stuttgart, Vienne, 1998, p. 115

theory of interpretation is that it can be sustained or verified through the empiric data that an interpreter has at its disposal. The theory needs a *method of translation* from the language to be interpreted into the one of the interpreter. This way the exigency of a method expressed in a finite form would be satisfied, after the model of a manual, but applicable to any phrase, from no matter what language.

Davidson exhorts the theses according to which we can apply a theory of interpretation as theory of truth, modifying the latter so that it can apply to a natural language. A formal theory of truth imposes a complex structure of phrases, containing the primitive notions of *truth* and *satisfaction*. We give an explanation to these notions through the *form of theory* and the *nature of the proof*. The advantage of this method consists not only in the free appeal to a notion of empiric confirmation, but also in the idea of a strong theory, interpreted in the most advantageous point. By only knowing the *conditions* under which the speakers judge the phrases as true, we can get to the interpretation of each statement. If we know that a theory of truth satisfies the formal and empiric criteria described, we can use it to produce interpretations.

To Davidson, “the methodology of interpretation is nothing else than epistemology seen in the mirror of significance”. Wherever there is language, there already is interpretation. The term “interpretation” must be taken in two ways: as synonym of *understanding*, but not as “subjective” operation of the interpreter. What is expected from a theory of interpretation is for it to facilitate us to understand any statement given in a determined *L* language. Interpretation could be “radical”, if it appeals to empiric data, instead of tacitly presuming the cognition of one element or another from the language *L*. Quine and Davidson’s common presumption is that, in order to understand some other, the translator or the interpreter must presume that they appeal to the same “logic”. But instead of telling us what we must do in order to understand (Gadamer), Davidson rather helps us to understand what is it that we are doing when we understand¹³.

Davidson’s understanding of a theory of significance as a theory of truth is available to already understood language, and isn’t applicable to the situation in which someone would want to learn what the phrases from a new language mean. Uninterested with the historic dimension or tradition, Quine and

Davidson are interested in how, in a situation of “radical interpretation”, an interpreter could understand a language that he doesn’t understand and how to attribute mental states to the ones implied. Gadamer, in exchange, does not regard beliefs and mental states, but the “historic” sense in non-natural conditions, in which there already is a sense, in order to attribute it to the texts to be interpreted¹⁴.

We have reasons to believe that “most beliefs inside a global network of beliefs are true”, Davidson thinks. But we must not put into competition notions of cognition and beliefs, as cognition itself is nothing but “justified true belief”. The moment of belief cannot be eliminated from the analysis of the process of cognition and, in general, of comprehension. “We always believe more than we are entitled to”. Significances and beliefs are inseparable like Siamese Twins; the overdetermination of beliefs in proportion to sensations and observations is not necessarily a defect.

Truth must be compared to a spider web. It is passed from the correspondence-truth to the idea of a coherence-truth, regarding the compatibility with the global system of sentences that we take as true. We will never understand the meaning of a statement if we look for a term-to-term relation between words and reality. We can say that the shortest way from language to reality goes through “prepositional attitudes”. Passing from “taking as true” to the “conditions of truth” assumes a leap. There is no possible interpretation and comprehension unless the interpreter thinks that what he says is true, and that most things he says are true.

Interpretationism

Undoubtedly, some practical aptitudes, common to the interpreter and the interpreted one, must serve as basis for comprehension. Davidson’s theses are not received without objections. To understand a language, some say, cannot be just interpretation. “Davidson’s *interpretationism* must be given up to”, Pascal Engel asks, and also the thesis according to which there are no linguistic sense and mental contents unless relative to an interpretation¹⁵.

To Günter Abel, the Davidsonian concept has two limits: it’s not completely “fundamental”, as the bet upon immediacy occults the elementary processes of interpretation which intervene in the construction of experience itself; it’s not general enough, as it doesn’t measure up to a general semi-

¹³ *Ibid*, p. 118

¹⁴ *Ibid*, p. 115

¹⁵ *Ibid*, p. 127

otics, such as the Peircean one, who also considers the non-linguistic systems.

Abel asks either to admit that our language articulates straight on the objects and events of the real world, without appealing to the mediator force of causal relations and, in this case, we must bet on the fact that our beliefs are globally true, or to accept that what we take as true has its roots in the process of interpretation. According to Abel, the hypothesis that any conflict of interpretation, any divergence of opinions would be done on the basis of a prior assent, impossible to put to the issue, is a myth. This assent itself is a result of interpretation. In order to have reciprocal understanding, it's not enough for the speaker and the interlocutor to have common beliefs and opinions; they must prove common experiences and have already given the judgments. The fact that two interlocutors don't have divergences of opinions doesn't immediately mean that they "understand" each other.

We have, as can be seen, on one hand, a philosophy of language centered on the concept of interpretation (Davidson), on the other hand, philosophic "interpretationism" in Abel's manner. The latter doesn't put at issue the legitimacy of any hermeneutic principle or the necessity to appeal in some situations to the exigency of "charity". He challenges, instead, rash generalizations and extrapolations, and also the assumption of a restrictive concept of interpretation, only plied on the mutual comprehension of languages. The suspicion can sometimes be as

profitable as trust. At other times, trust itself is sufficient, under the condition of being tied to an honorable purpose.

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A TWO-LEVEL THEORY OF TRUST

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Abstract:

The chief aim of the paper is to argue for a two-level theory of trust consisting of basic and intentional trust. The paper sets out by comparing the concepts of trust and justice to highlight the double meaning of trust as a descriptive social phenomenon and an evaluative normative term. It is subsequently argued that the conceptions of trust known from political science and recent philosophical debates of trust do not capture this double meaning of trust as the former focuses on trust as a social phenomenon while the latter focuses on the normative aspect. As an alternative I develop a two-level theory of trust where basic trust, understood in accordance with sociologist Harold Garfinkel's conception of trust, is combined with a conception of intentional trust as a willed response to breaches in the social expectancies. Finally, the social philosophical consequences of the two-level theory of trust are indicated in a brief recapitulation of the comparison of trust and justice.

Key words: philosophy of trust, basic trust, intentional trust, hermeneutics of trust, social philosophy, justice.

Trust and Justice – a prologue

As John Rawls noticed with regard to theories of justice we might have different conceptions of justice but they are all attempts to cash out the meaning of *the concept* of justice (Rawls 1971, 5). In the same vein we find a myriad of conceptions of trust that all try to explicate the concept of trust. The analogy between justice and trust holds in so far as the different conceptions all endeavour to explain what we are to understand by either justice or trust. But where justice is a strictly evaluative term trust entails equally evaluative and descriptive aspects. The concept of trust points to a phenomenon in the social world that seems to be a descriptive fact in a different sense than could be said about justice. Trust is a descriptive term that reveals something about social interaction. We employ the language of trust to describe social behaviour. The description of social life through the lens of trust allows us to look at social interaction as a web of mutual dependencies and expectations. Seen from this perspective trust is a social phenomenon that exists in larger or smaller degrees independent of any evaluations of it.

Trust entails engagement in social interaction. When we employ the concept of trust in a descriptive manner we highlight the efficiency of social interaction¹. We thus describe the behaviour of other people as either trusting or distrusting. It is the way a community of people handle mutual dependency that is described through the descriptive use of the concept of trust. Justice, on the other hand, is not a social phenomenon which we are forced to act out in the same way as every person is embedded in either well-functioning or dysfunctional relations of trust to her fellow human beings.

The concept of trust is evaluative in the sense that most would say that a social environment of mutual trust is *prima facie* better than one either without trust or with distrust. Just as the concept of justice only makes sense on the background of an understanding and experience of injustice so the concept of trust also gets its flavour through its opposite. But trust is not mirrored through distrust in the same way as just actions are mirrored through unjust actions. That we trusted is most often noticed through the experience of breaches of trust. The reaction to a breach in trust might be an attitude of distrust but it could also be a willed trusting that something like that will never occur again. To trust and distrust are attitudes of expectancy towards other people and their actions. Both stem from evaluations of past experiences and expectations for future occurrences.

An important difference between the concepts of justice and trust attains to the delimitation of the scope of the concepts. Where justice is a purely evaluative and normative concept belonging to the realm of ethical theory trust is a much fuzzier concept. It likens justice in its normative aspects. The concept of trust contains clear evaluative and normative elements regardless of its use in practical or theoretical philosophy. Trust between people, trust-

¹ This is part of the reason why political scientists are so highly interested in trust. For this kind of approach to trust see Putnam 2000.

ing behaviour and trustworthiness all entail flourishing and harmony. As long as trust is well-founded it is normatively better to trust than distrust. But the concept of trust entails different sort of discretionary powers than the concept of justice. Where just actions traditionally are understood as actions that rise out of human autonomy to be trustful always implies to give up a part of our autonomy. Therefore we might very well evaluate a just action performed under unjust circumstances as laudable whereas we would not praise somebody for trusting the notoriously untrustworthy. The opposite situation might also be the case, namely that a social group shows reciprocal trust but the actions enabled by the trusting relationships between its members would not be judged to be demonstrations of just actions.² Furthermore, mutual dependency between humans is underscored through the concept of trust and therefore the skills of social discernment come to the fore in a different manner than is the case with justice. Trust and distrust are never contradictory terms. They are not even proper contrary terms. It depends on the social setting whether it is appropriate to react with trust or distrust. Thus the evaluation of individuals' display of trust and distrust is closely linked to the social situation and the discretionary powers of all involved. It might be most appropriate to react with distrust under certain circumstances whereas we would be reluctant to say that under some circumstances an unjust action is most appropriate. Justice and injustice are proper contrary terms because only justice entails positive values. But with trust and distrust the picture is fuzzier. The normative value connected to trust is dependent upon the circumstances to an extent that makes it difficult to talk of trust as a positive value in the same sense as we highlight the positive value of justice. This is so because distrust in some situations may be a normatively laudable reaction.

The concept of trust entails both descriptive and normative elements because it depicts both a social phenomenon – a way of human interaction – and a normative stance to this interaction. In the following I will offer a conception of trust that tries to encom-

pass the perplexing double meanings of trust as both a description of human behaviour and a normative evaluation of that same behaviour. To highlight the difference between the conception of trust which I defend here and more established conceptions of trust I start with a brief overview over two principal theoretical approaches to the phenomenon of trust.

Political Science's and Philosophy's Approaches to Trust

In his highly influential book *Trust. The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* Francis Fukuyama offers this definition of trust: "Trust is the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and cooperative behaviour, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of that community" (Fukuyama 1995, 26). Fukuyama's interest in trust is clearly as a social phenomenon, as a way of interaction. To him trust implies healthy cooperation between individuals that allows for flourishing of the society. Fukuyama understands the question of trust within a descriptive framework. He does not ask about the value of the shared norms but focuses on their results; on the one side, cooperative behaviour, and on the other side, prosperity of the nation where such norms persist. This approach allows him to compare different societies with regard to the levels of trust. A high-trust society is characterized by the willingness of individuals to cooperate with each other beyond ties of family and friendship. A low-trust society, on the other hand, is described as one where individuals only reluctantly cooperate with each other and mostly within the closed circles of family and friendship. Fukuyama describes overall trust in societies with an evaluative objective that emerges out of the evidence he collects to justify the claim that high-trust societies prosper economically. Given that prosperity is desirable, trust is to be sought after and cultivated in societies. But trust is not something that can be willed; it transpires out of the national culture. Fukuyama characterizes culture as "*inherited ethical habit*" (Fukuyama 1995, 34) and on the basis of the slow transformation of the ethical habits of a society high or low levels of trust emerge.

From the vantage point of Fukuyama's theory trust is a culturally and historically rooted phenomenon. Such a conception of trust highlights the social embeddedness of trust but at the cost of understanding how the individuals actually meet each other with either trust or distrust. The generality of the descriptions does not allow for the questions of

² This could be the case within secret societies as noted by Georg Simmel (see Simmel 1922, 284 f.). It would, though, be a too hasty conclusion to assume that any secret or criminal group within any society displays relations of internal trust. Diego Gambetta has in his work on the Italian mafia and trust argued convincingly that the mafia thrives on "the segmentary and patchily organized exploitation of distrust" (Gambetta 1988, 166).

when and on what grounds individuals trust. In opposition to the political science approach³ the philosophical discussions of trust have centred on the question of individuals' warrant for trusting each other. The focus is thus shifted from the general vista on society to the justification of conditions for trust.

The question of justified trust is framed as one of how A can trust B with regard to C⁴. Even if this approach clearly takes the individual as its starting point it only views the individual from a third person perspective. It offers an examination of the conditions that we would agree should be fulfilled for A's trust in B to be well-founded. The question evolves around the trustworthiness of B and whether A needs to depend on the good-will of B (Baier 1986, Jones 1996) or simply on the incentives that B has for complying with A's trust (Hardin 1993). Trust is fundamentally viewed as taking a risk or opening oneself to be vulnerable because it might turn out that the other betrays the trust. Trust is delimited from mere reliance to show that in trusting we willingly and intentionally make ourselves dependent upon and vulnerable to the other: "Trusting thus opens one up to harm, for it gives rise to selective interpretation, which means that one can be fooled, that the truth might lie, as it were, outside one's

gaze" (Jones 1996, 12). Thus to trust is to give another person the opportunity to care for or hurt that which you have given the other in trust. If we simply rely on somebody to do something we might be disappointed when she does not do it. But if we trusted her to do it we will feel betrayed if she does not act in accordance with our trust. Thus the predominant philosophical approach focuses on trust as either risk-assessment (Hardin, 1996) or dependency on the good will of others (Baier 1986, Jones 1996).

These types of theories about trust merit attention and can be said to have opened the philosophical debate on trust. But in my opinion they also represent trust in a manner that leaves out important aspects. Firstly, because they take as their point of departure the detached and abstract relation between A and B concerning C these theories have to build the social world into their conception by way of further conditions. Jones, for example, adds that the justification of trust is always conditional to the social setting in which it takes place. She argues that the social role, the domain of trust (is it my suitcase or my life that I trust you will take care of), the climate of trust (safe neighbourhood or war zone), and the psychological setup of the truster all influence how we would claim that for A to trust B with C is well-founded (see Jones 1996, 21)⁵. The theory is thus moulded to be an abstract relation that can accommodate for differences in the social and psychological setting. But the social setting is not viewed as primary. Rather it is relegated to a secondary role as additional conditions to be looked into. Secondly, the focus on risk taking and vulnerability that takes up so much space within these theories tends to distort the phenomenon of trust. We seldom run through all possible ways that somebody might hurt us to decide to trust the person. It is the other way around, experiencing how somebody has hurt us we become aware of our trust in that other person and our vulnerability.

Against the limits of the political science approach that handles trust on such a general basis that it cannot give credit to the question of why and on what basis individuals trust each other, I propose a

³ There is an important discussion of trust and social capital within political science that examines levels of trust and means of securing trust in modern societies. For the perhaps most influential exponent hereof see Putnam (2000). It should also be noticed that *The World Value Survey* (www.worldvaluessurvey.org) has been conducting measurements of the levels of trust with regard to different social actors and institutions within national populations since 1990. This global coordination of national investigations only underscores the importance given to investigations, characterizations and descriptions of trust as a social phenomenon within the empirical social sciences.

⁴ Annette Baier has developed an entrusting model: "A trusts B with valued item C" (Baier 1986, 236) whereas Russell Hardin among others argues for a more general model: "trust is generally a three-part relation: A trusts B to do X" (Hardin 2002, 9). Karen Jones expands the understanding of trust to entail affective elements. Thus her basic definition of trust runs: "to trust someone is to have an attitude of optimism about her goodwill and to have the confident expectation that, when the need arises, the one trusted will be directly and favorably moved by the thought that you are counting on her" (Jones 1996, 5-6). For sake of simplicity in argumentation I only refer to these three positions in the following characterization of the philosophical debate on trust.

⁵ Hardin offers another way of fitting the theory to a social setting. His game theoretical account assumes that the social conditions are a part of the model of the human agent as a Bayesian inductivist that gathers experiences: "my level of trust is defined, either fairly accurately from experience with that person or vaguely by Bayesian generalization from my, perhaps very limited, experience of others" (Hardin 1993, 516).

conception of trust that agrees with the recent philosophical discussions about conditions for warranted trust. But in opposition to these approaches I want to advance a conception of trust that takes its point of departure in the social setting of everyday life and gives attention to the first-person perspective in acting out trust. My conception of trust restructures the theoretical take on trust in offering a two-level theory which negates the delimitation of trust from reliance.

Basic trust and Social Expectancies

Basic trust can be compared to reliance or confidence. It consists of the expectancy that social interaction is concerted and runs smoothly. The basic trust underlies social interaction in a way that is implicit and unnoticed. Annette Baier, who singles out trust and reliance, writes: "Most of us notice a given form of trust most easily after its sudden demise or severe injury. We inhabit a climate of trust as we inhabit an atmosphere and notice it as we notice air, only when it becomes scarce or polluted" (Baier 1986, 234). According to her trust and reliance are set apart by the fact that "we can still rely where we no longer trust" (Baier 1986, 234). Thus reliance is seen as a way of continuing cooperation where we have stopped trusting. From my point of view there are two problems here. Firstly, to rely upon somebody because of lost trust seems to imply that the person relying on the other does this distrustfully and thus it would be more appropriate to talk of tattered trust or distrust. Secondly, Baier employs the language of reliance to point to the fact that the initial trust has been let down. It is in the situation where somebody has experienced a breach in trust that the person continues to rely on the other without the attitude of trust. Thus what Baier captures with her differentiation between trust and reliance is, seen from my perspective, more accurately the experience of a breach in the basic trust and an accommodating reaction to this breach. When Baier takes up the metaphor of inhabiting a climate of trust she points to the fact that at least some kinds of trusting behaviour do not stem from an intentional will to trust the other. In contrast a lot of trust between humans appears to take place without any discernment or deliberation. Therefore Baier also notices that we often only become aware of our trust in the other when the trust is broken.

I would like to bring the concept of basic trust into play to designate the implicit and unintentional trust between humans that Baier points to through

her metaphor of climates of trust. This kind of trust, I take it, also accounts for a major part of the political sciences' characterizations of trust as a social phenomenon. Basic trust should not be understood as some kind of pre-given and primordial set-up but as the implicit social conditions which all of us have incorporated to be able to interact in our everyday life. If the concept of trust only denoted intentional and explicit trust, where the truster has gone through a procedure of justification as to how and why to trust some specific other with regard to some specific feature then relationships of trust between people seems to be a rare phenomenon. In its place I would argue for basic trust as a first level in a theory of trust. This kind of trust is it that sociologist Harold Garfinkel picks out in his illustrious experiments with trust in the early 1960s.

Garfinkel argues that social interaction builds on an implicit and unacknowledged social structure that makes up the tacit conditions for any explicit social action – a world known in common and taken for granted. Actions in this social world of everyday life he labels "trust": "To say that one person 'trusts' another means that the person seeks to act in such a fashion as to produce through his action ... events that accord with normative orders of events ..." (Garfinkel 1963, 193). Thus his conception of trust seems to lie very close to what many philosophers denote as simple reliance. Trust is compliance with the normative order of the social world and thus to display trust is to act as other members of the social world would expect you to act at the same time as you competently know what to expect as competent behaviour of other members. The important point is that the social order of everyday life shapes the conditions that socially competent members use to fine-tune the web of social interaction. Garfinkel's experiments show firstly, that without this shared background knowledge of social behaviour and warranted expectations to actions, the social interaction of everyday life would be extremely difficult.⁶ Sec-

⁶ That compliance to shared norms of behaviour and regular cooperation should be viewed as the heart of the conception of trust is a widely shared notion within the political sciences and economic writings on trust. Fukuyama points to distrust between individuals as "transaction costs" (Fukuyama 1995, 27). The economist Kenneth Arrow notes: "Trust is an important lubricant of a social system. It is extremely efficient; it saves a lot of trouble to have a fair degree of reliance on other people's word" (Arrow 1974, 23). The important difference between Garfinkel, on the one side, and Fukuyama and Arrow on

ondly, these background expectations seldom become explicit in the practice: “For these background expectancies to come into view one must either be a stranger to the ‘life as usual’ character of everyday scenes, or become estranged from them” (Garfinkel 1964, 226). The background expectations are not situated in the individual members as explicit knowledge of how to play by the rule of social life. They transpire from the common implicit understanding of a social situation as a situation that calls for this kind of action rather than another. Thus it would be a misrepresentation of the background expectations to root them primarily in the individual consciousness. They are rather framed by the social situation and the “bona fide member” of a social group is able to discern the appropriateness of different actions and reactions in a variety of situations. Garfinkel explains this feature as follows: “In everyday situations, what he [the practitioner] knows is an integral feature of his social competence. He assumes that what he knows in the way he knows it personifies himself as a social object to himself as well as to others as a bona fide member of the group. He sanctions his competence as a bona fide member of the group (i.e. he and other members take his competences for granted) as a condition for his being assured that his grasp of his everyday affairs is a realistic grasp” (Garfinkel 1963, 210-11).

To make the implicit background expectations and assumptions visible Garfinkel turns familiar methods of investigation in sociology upside down by intervening with stable social interaction in unforeseen and unexpected ways. He “start[s] with a system with stable features and ask[s] what can be done to make for trouble” (Garfinkel 1963, 187). His interventions are rather harmless and are employed to “produce reflections through which the strangeness of an obstinately familiar world can be detected” (Garfinkel 1964, 227). I shall only give one example. Garfinkel has set as an experimental task to ask for further clarification about the “plain talk” in everyday life conversation. One report describes the effects as follows:

“(Student friend) Hi, Ray. How is your girlfriend feeling?

(Experimenter) What do you mean, how is she feeling? Do you mean physical or mental?

(S) I mean how is she feeling? What is the matter with you? (He looked peeved.)

the other, is that Garfinkel seeks to bring these background expectations to the fore, where Arrow and Fukuyama merely take them for granted.

(E) Nothing. Just explain a little clearer what do you mean?

(S) Skip it. How are your Med School applications coming?

(E) What do you mean, ‘How they are?’

(S) You know what I mean.

(E) I really don’t.

(S) What is the matter with you? Are you sick?” (Garfinkel 1964, 230).

The lessons taught by such an experiment are the following. Firstly, we meet each other with expectancies to the right way of behaving which are not spelled out. In this example the normative order of the implicit expectancies is carried over by the structure of language. A socially competent speaker knows what range of possible answers are appropriate responses to idiomatically informed common-sense questions. Secondly, when these expectancies are let down we search for an explanation as to why the other behaves strangely – in the quoted example the friend writes off the abnormal questions of the experimenter as signs of physical discomfort or illness. According to Garfinkel we can typify the reactions to breaches in the expected normative order of events in three broad groups (see Garfinkel 1963, 202–06).

The first typical reaction consists in non-reaction. This sounds paradoxical but the point is that the person confronted with a breach in her expectancies to the normative order of events in social interaction might question the soundness of her own expectations instead of confronting the other with the fact that his behaviour represents a breach in her expectations. Thereby the person subordinates herself to the authority of the other person to determine how to identify the constitutive order of this social situation. The second typical reaction is exemplified in Garfinkel’s experiment quoted above. The person experiencing a breach in her expectancies to the other tries to set the breach aside as a matter of bad conditions. Thus the breach in expectancies is noticed but excused as caused (in this case) by illness. This type of reaction struggles to reaffirm the constitutive normative order of normal events in normal social life by writing off the breaches of the order as somehow explicable and sensible mistakes. The potential threat to the constitutive normative order of events is reinterpreted as a mistake whereby neither the one experiencing the breach nor the one breaching the expectancies in the situation end up as faulty. This is an important difference to the first type of

reaction where the one experiencing the breach actually take the fault upon herself. The third typical reaction is the unmistakable identification of a breach in your expectancies in the situation. The breach is ascribed to the other as voluntary and thereby the action is recognized as a breach in social expectancies to the situation. The reaction to such an acknowledged breach in the ordinary order of events may be playfully to go along this new way of understanding the situation or it may be to pull out of the interaction with a feeling that your trust in the other is betrayed. Interestingly in these two kinds of reactions to an acknowledged breach in the social expectations, the first reaction mirrors the belittlement of the breach in an affirmative way. Both reactions give authority to the other to determine legitimate behaviour. Playfully going along with a new set of expectations, of course, gives more room to actually respond in the situation as simply questioning your own competences in reading the situation.

It can be said that the genuine question of trust only comes to the fore in the second kind of reaction to the acknowledged breach. Garfinkel himself does not draw this conclusion because his interest in the phenomenon of trust is confined to the question of background assumptions that guide social interaction. Investigation into this type of breach in social expectancies denotes the dividing line between the political sciences' and the philosophical interest in the phenomenon of trust. Whereas Fukuyama's definition of trust fits the picture of social expectancy (see Fukuyama 1995, 26) the philosophical question of warranted trust revolves around how well-founded it is to trust somebody. This type of question only arises on the background of possible betrayals of trust. Thus the philosophical debate on trust takes as its point of departure the apprehension of possible breaches in the trust relationships. In light of Garfinkel's experiments with arousing disruption in the expectancies of everyday social life the philosophers' question of justification of trust attains a new dimension.

Garfinkel's experiments provide evidence that human beings (to a much lesser degree than the philosophical theories) suggest follow conscious and determined deliberations in their social interactions. Our interactions are concerted in a stable manner by the background expectations and assumptions that make up the social setting of our actions. Without noticing, we conform it to social and cultural standards that create a practical space for action where some actions and reactions are appropriate while

others are not. Thus we implicitly meet normative claims for social behaviour. This normative order of social events which we only notice either through the theoretical gaze on social actions or as a practitioner who has become estranged to her practical everyday life is equivalent to common sense knowledge. It is hardly possible to avoid some kind of reference to such basic assumptions as we can see in Baier's reference to the constitutive normative order of things in everyday life: "When we are trusted, we are relied upon to realize what it is for whose care we have some discretionary responsibility, and *normal people can pick up the cues* that indicate the limits of what is entrusted", (Baier 1986, 236 – my italics). To be able to "pick up the cue" is to be a socially competent actor who relies on basic trust in the shared norms for stable concerted actions.

In the light of Garfinkel's work the question of warranted trust has to be recast. I propose that this can be done by noticing two levels of trust. The initial level is basic trust consisting in the implicit framework for interpreting social action which each member of a social group thinks himself and others competent in employing. This kind of trust can be compared to the practical interest in everyday life interaction. A person relating to somebody on the level of basic trust takes the social competences and shared understanding of the constitutive normative order of events in the situation for granted. Therefore she may react to breaches in her expectancies to the behaviour of the other in the three ways described by Garfinkel. The second level of trust, on the other hand, moves beyond this implicit interaction to ask for reasons for trust. Thereby it only has to do with the type of reaction to a breach in the social order where the breach is acknowledged and interpreted as a betrayal of trust. In this situation the question of warranted trust posed in the philosophical debates on trust comes to the fore.

The Hermeneutics of Trust

As finite but intelligent creatures human beings develop within the limits of omnipotence-impotence and omniscience-ignorance.⁷ The reality created by

⁷ This philosophical insight dates back to Immanuel Kant in his explanation of the difference between humans and God. Kant developed the term *intellectus ectypus* to underline that humans have a discursive intellect that is dependent on images. Accordingly, the human capacity to grasp the world unfolds itself within the limits of godly intellectual comprehension (*intellectus archetypus*) and

this particular human space of action is characterized by the need of interpretation. Interpreting the human world through the hermeneutics of trust focuses on social cooperation. The social phenomenon of trust displays our human condition as one of mutual dependency coupled with the ongoing uncertainty as to the success of social actions. My worry with many of the political sciences' and philosophical conceptions of trust consists in the unilateral perspective of interpretation. Whether describing norm-guided and flourishing social groups as communities with a high level of trust or clarifying conditions of warranted trust these theories stick exclusively to the theoretical and distanced perspective of the observer. The interpretation of trust, I would argue, ought to encompass the great difference between a first person experience of trust, breaches in trust, and distrust on the one hand, and the various evaluative and descriptive approaches to the social phenomenon of trust on the other hand. The hermeneutics of trust has to draw attention to the complex ability to switch between the immediacy of the first person engagement in trust relations and a more or less dissociated third person perspective on the social phenomenon of trust which we all employ in our everyday life.

Garfinkel's experiments with trust give important evidence to how the engaged actor reacts to minor breaches in her expectancies to social interaction. What Garfinkel has shown in his experiments with trust is, firstly, the perplexity aroused by non-expected events, and secondly, our willingness to excuse or subdue strange behaviour. In my two-level theory of trust this depicts aspects of the level of basic trust. Basic trust consists in the implicit assumption that I am a competent social actor meeting other competent social actors and that we acknowledge the mutual social competences and thus "play by the rule." Acting in basic trust implies responding spontaneously to events even when these turn out to differ from the implicitly expected. It is important to state that the expectations are only implicit. We do not have check lists that inform us about the appropriate behaviour of different social roles. Rather, we improvise as we go along, be it in developing friendships or interacting with each other in mundane situations of everyday life such as walking the streets of our home town.

The second level of trust, where I ask myself for reasons to trust somebody, initially comes to the fore

when I acknowledge a breach in my expectations to the other person as a betrayal of my trust. Acknowledging the breach as a breach, I place myself in a situation where I have to interpret what to do. This kind of hermeneutics demands that I distance myself and throw a conjectural gaze on the situation. If acting on the level of basic trust implies an engaged first person perspective with a hermeneutic reading of the practice, then the acknowledgement of a betrayal of trust entails a third person perspective on my own life. I ask myself whether I can continue trusting the other person and under what conditions. The recent philosophical literature on trust consists in an abstract version of this kind of deliberation. But allowing for a two-level theory of trust we are able to see how the social phenomenon of trust from the first-person perspective involves the double movement of shifting from engaged interaction to reflective and evaluative discernment of that interaction. The two roles of engaged actor and the distanced observer play out in the lives of all of us. We are all confronted with situations where we have to use our discretionary powers of social judgement to decide how to continue the social interaction. But this reflective stance towards our self and others does not originate from an abstract question of whether to trust somebody. It is called to the fore by the breach. I become aware of my implicit expectancies and myself as a social actor in the instance that these are so severely broken that I have to ask myself how and whether I can carry on. It is exactly this experience of a breach that gives meaning to trust as openness towards vulnerability or risk. But in my opinion it is not the fact that we trust each other that makes us vulnerable and opens us up to risk. It is the other way around; the frailties of human action make living a human life a vulnerable and risky event. A decision not to trust anybody is impossible, firstly, because of the mutual interdependence of humans, and secondly, if it was possible to achieve it would not be an alternative which would exclude neither personal vulnerability nor risks.

The language of trust points to the reflective movement from the absorbed engagement to the distanced questioning of the warrant of this engagement. The simple question: Do you trust X? requires that you replace yourself in the perspective of an observer on your own life. You disentangle yourself from the immediacy of actions to reflect upon the reasons you could have for these actions. The hermeneutics of trust concerns the bridging of breaches in trust by evaluation of actions, let them be sponta-

animalistic spontaneous reactions to sense perceptions. See Kant 1790, § 77.

neous in basic trust or intentional displays of either trust or distrust. We apply this hermeneutics to our own life privately or in conversation with others just as we utilize it to discuss and evaluate the actions of third persons. All theories develop out of this distanced view on human life. But if they are not to distort the object depicted they have to be able to re-establish a connection back to the embedded first-person perspective.

The genesis of the hermeneutics of trust should be recognized. The capacity for intentional trust as well as for exhibiting intentional distrust towards the other is acquired in the process of growing up. The child is confined to depend on the immediacy of basic trust. Without the necessary physical and mental competences the child is surrendered to its social environment to which it adjusts in a manner that makes its particular social world seem the only natural order. In this manner the child cannot and does not choose to display trust. The hermeneutics of trust as an interpretation of breaches in the basic trust is an acquired competence. The transition from the unreflective act of basic trust to the intentional and endorsed display of trust (or distrust) passes over the interpretation of a given event as a breach of trust. To be able to carry this transition out you have to experience some event *as a breach*. As evidenced by the experiments of Garfinkel, this is not always the case. Most of us employ the 'principle of charity' when engaged in social interaction and thus tend to excuse many breaches in our basic trust in others and this, of course, makes social interaction possible. Yet there can be a more deep-rooted reason for not acknowledging a breach as a breach. If a child grows up in a social environment where betrayals of trust and negligence is the order of the social world the child will not expect others to act predictable or considerate. Thus experiences which for others would be apparent breaches of their basic trust in the social competences of themselves and others would be taken as merely a new instance of the normal practice. In this sense the basic trust that a person enjoys is a result of that person's past experience and its social environment. Basic trust can be tattered and thin or substantial and thick.

A person who enjoys a substantial basic trust in her own social competences and the social competences of others will be more inclined to acknowledge a breach in her basic trust as a breach than a person with a tattered basic trust in the social world; she will, all other things being equal, more easily take up the distanced gaze upon her social relations

and her own role in these. Thus she will apply the hermeneutics of trust to her own situation. But the picture is more complicated. The hermeneutics of trust is not only a one-person job. It is also a communal narrative endeavour that takes place in small talk gossip about other people as well as in earnest discussions between close associates. Discussing whether somebody was naïve in trusting another or whether a certain person behaved treacherous in some situation is a manner of playing out the content of conventional roles and limits to socially acceptable behaviour and thus on the background of positive and negative evaluations of relations of trust envisioning ideals for acting out trust. In this manner as well trust is socially embedded. We envision valuable relations of trust as visions of good social communities. The envisioning of trust functions in the temporality of becoming individually and collectively which underlies the human life as one played out on the continuum out between omnipotence-impotence and omniscience-ignorance.

Intentional Trust and Just Social Order

Whereas basic trust from the perspective of the participant only becomes apparent when it is broken, intentional trust is always something willed. It originates from the experience of breaches and it always involves a transition from the engaged first person perspective to the reflective third person gaze on your own life. But although the formation of this reflective capacity has its origin in the experience of a breach in the basic trust, it is not restricted to have to do with experiences of breaches. The ability to trust can be a creative power that enables and expands trust relations within a community. It can be the willed surplus of interaction with other people. Luhmann calls this the supererogatory aspect of trust (Luhmann 1968, 55). In this form intentional trust is the reaching out beyond the expected. It is the trust in the new and it is the invitation to develop and expand communal cooperation. Because trust is a social phenomenon the deliberative enactment of trust is dependent upon a positive response from the ones engaged. In this sense the expansion of trust relations is a mutual enterprise. As a single individual we might want to change, enlarge or develop new trust relations to others. But without their positive commitment to the displayed trust it cannot develop. The mutual commitment to deepen social actions and interdependency can bring about social change. In this sense the mutual trust in communities is related to ideals for better societies and social

justice. Thus, to take up the comparison with the concept of justice, the social phenomenon of mutual trust is a prerequisite for a just social order.

The two-level theory of trust that I have outlined here offers a social philosophical framework for understanding some of the difficulties associated with building justice in unstable social environments. Firstly, it gives credence to the difference between the concepts of justice and trust. While from the viewpoint of a conception of justice it could be put forward that political justice could be obtained by implementing procedural just institutions, from the viewpoint of my conception of trust this will not suffice. For just institutions to function a minimum of basic trust has to be present throughout the society whereas basic trust is not dependent upon political justice.⁸ Secondly, the crude injustice of violent political conflicts is highlighted once we examine what effects such conflicts have on the robustness of basic trust.

The struggle for political conversions of a society is played out in mundane everyday life by social groups in disagreement over the interpretation of the constitutive normative order of social life. In such situations we find many people who refuse to trust because they do not accept the social roles of the other. This kind of reluctance to trust is intentional. It is a negation of the other person's interpretation of the normative order of things. And as such it only has a chance of success if it becomes a dominant interpretation. A single person cannot change the social order but a major group within society can put severe pressure on the established order. For those challenging the social order to connect as a group they have to develop group identity and this is done by intentional trust between the group members.

⁸ I do not argue that theories of justice are oblivious to the need of social coherence. Taking Rawls as an example we can notice that he, on the one hand, argues that a just arrangement of social life will promote social stability (Rawls 1971, 6) and, on the other hand, assumes that society is well-ordered as a precondition to set off the argument for distributive justice (Rawls 1971, 8). Thereby he indicates that the implementation of a conception of justice in actual societies is dependent upon a kind of social coherence that we find in the social phenomenon of trust. However, he also argues that a just society will further social stability thereby implicitly pointing to a virtuous circle of the abilities of well-ordered societies to promote justice and thus promote stability and thereby become even more well-ordered, just and stable. The question we are left with, of course, is what to do with societies that are not well-ordered to begin with?

Thus it can be argued that unstable social environments are a combination of breaches in the structure of basic trust and additional creations of intentional trust to accomplish exactly these breaches. The ones who suffer the most under such circumstances are those who are not involved in the conflict but only experience its effects; they are influenced because their expectancies to the order of things are let down. Their frame of possibilities shrinks with the corrosion of the stable social order. They are left in a social world that is unpredictable and unjust. We can observe how people living in communities where social conflict is their everyday life place less trust in their fellow human beings and as a consequence their field of action becomes extremely limited. It is, in my opinion, an empirical question as to when the stable order has suffered so severely that basic trust becomes impossible. A theoretical hypothesis would be to say that a complete breakdown of basic trust implies a collapse of human communal life.

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TRUST IN EXPERTS: CONTEXTUAL PATTERNS OF WARRANTED EPISTEMIC DEPENDENCE*

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Abstract:

Recent work in social and cultural studies of science and technology has shown that the 'epistemic dependence' of laypeople on experts is not a relation of blind trust, but typically and necessarily involves critical assessment of expert testimonies. Normative epistemologists have suggested a number of criteria, mostly of contextual nature since expert knowledge means restricted cognitive access to some epistemic domain, according to which non-experts can reliably evaluate expert claims; while science studies scholars have concentrated on how laypeople can come to warranted decisions about technical matters on non-technical grounds. Instead of addressing the problem transcendently (how such decisions are possible) or normatively (how such decisions should be reached), this paper contrasts the recommendations available in the literature with the empirical findings of a rough case study concerning the public reaction to the H1N1 vaccine issue. Awareness of how lay people do come to such decisions may inform and refine normative philosophical investigations.

Key words: epistemic dependence; expertise; h1n1; public understanding of science; social epistemology; testimony.

1. From Expertise to Meta-Expertise

The problem of expertise has been present in the history of Western thought at least since Socrates of the early dialogues of Plato, who sought to find what knowledge is by asking and then confronting some of the most renowned experts of his day. Recently the concept has received an intensified attention. "A significant milestone is reached when a field of scientific research matures to a point warranting publication of its first handbook", claims the beginning sentence of the first handbook of expertise (Ericsson *et al.* 2006) that summarizes mainly the relevant psychological research of the past few decades in 900 dense pages. The topic has also been addressed in philosophy (Selinger and Crease 2006),

or in the social studies of science where the initiative paper by Collins and Evans (2002) has become one of the most frequent points of reference in the field. Other forms of an 'expertise-hype' can be seen in the theory of management, in risk assessment, in artificial intelligence research, in didactics, and in a number of other fields having to do with the concept of 'expert'.

Despite this rapidly unfolding attention, there is neither a widespread conceptual framework nor a set of shared commitments acknowledged by the various trends in expertise research. What is most commonly taken for granted is the recognition that, in present cultures, the epistemic division of labor has reached a degree where trust in expert opinions is not only indispensable in many walks of life, but also ubiquitous and constitutive of social existence. While remaining ignorant of what the term 'expert' exactly means in an essentialist sense, it is often sufficient to realize that it is an elementary experience (and at the same time presupposition) of our culture that in many areas there are such people as experts to whom we turn with our problems and questions. Experts are held to have privileged and restricted cognitive access to a specific domain, often as a result of training and experience, and in this sense expertise is an important form of cultural capital (Bourdieu 1986), in case it offers skill or knowledge that is worthy and valuable for the society (Fuller 1994).

One kind of expertise is what we can call epistemic expertise: laypeople depend on epistemic experts for their knowledge of 'how the world is' in a certain area, and not so much for their ability to solve practical problems. This implies that expert knowledge should be, in some sense, communicable to be shared with laypeople, but the possibility of complete communication is ruled out since it would erase the demarcation between experts (with restricted cognitive access) and non-experts. This could mean several things, e.g. that experts need to be able to answer questions belonging to their field of expertise but without being able to share the

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reasons and arguments for their answers (since they are based on tacit skills); or it could mean that even if experts can share their reasons laypeople could not fully understand them (because of their technical ignorance); or that even if laypeople can understand these reasons they could not be able to ascertain the same reasons by themselves (because of their lack of relevant skills), etc. The essential question is whether it suffices for laypeople to rely on their blind trust in expert testimonies, or they need to be able to assess expert claims.

In recent literature, two approaches are contrasted to frame the expert-layperson relationship for the case of science: the deficit model and the contextual model (Gross 1994, Gregory and Miller 2001). In the deficit model the layperson is viewed as someone yet ignorant of science but capable of having their head 'filled' with knowledge diffusing from science. Such a 'filling process' increases, first, laypeople's scientific literacy (and their ability to solve related technical problems), second, their degree of rationality (following the rules of scientific method), and third, their trust in and respect for science. Recently, this model has been criticized as outdated and suggested to be replaced by the contextual model, according to which members of the public do not need scientific knowledge for solving their problems, nor do they have 'empty memory slots' to receive scientific knowledge at all. Instead, the public's mind is fully stuffed with intellectual strategies to cope with problems they encounter during their lives, and some of these problems are related to science. So the public turns to science actively (instead of passive reception), more precisely to scientific experts, with questions framed in the context of their everyday lives.

Now the questions the public is interested in can rarely be answered by 'ready made science' deposited in textbooks, but they belong to 'science in the making' (Latour 1987). Instead of asking precisely how planets or pendulums move, to which there are answers that are consensual and yet mostly irrelevant to the public, they want to know e.g. what materials or activities are healthy, and these questions are (still) controversial in science. So people are faced with a plethora of different and partly contradicting expert opinions, from which they have to build their system of beliefs.¹ And this

means that laypeople essentially need to assess expert claims instead of blindly relying on them.

Taking these circumstances as fundamental facts of contemporary societies, this paper addresses the questions how the public *can* and *do* evaluate expert opinions. In regard to the 'can' question, section 2 summarizes several normative solutions available in the theoretical literature: what constitute the group of skills that is called in section 2.4 'meta-expertise', i.e. skills to assess the reliability of expert claims. The corresponding 'do' question is harder to formulate explicitly, but section 3 will attempt to illuminate the case with a rough empirical investigation based on analysis of blog comments regarding the H1N1 vaccination issue. Section 4 briefly summarizes the main conclusion and its implications

2. Warranting Epistemic dependence

2.1 Hardwig

A central problem in recent epistemology is the problem of indirect or testimonial knowledge. Much of what we take to be known is indirect for us in the sense that it is based on our trust in other people's direct knowledge, in contrast with the idea of direct knowledge related to first-person empirical evidence and its rational assessment. In the past decades, the problem has been intensely investigated in the field of social epistemology, emerging from a thematic issue of the journal *Synthese* (October 1987) in which groundbreaking positions were outlined, e.g., by Steve Fuller (1987)² and Alvin Goldman (1987)³. Similar problems have been discussed in socialized versions of the philosophy of science⁴, or reflecting specifically to the problem of testimony⁵, especially in the history of science⁶.

A perhaps decisive inspiration to this emerging tradition was the eloquent characterization of the fundamental epistemological problem given by John

directly relevant here is the idea of 'post-normal science' (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993), according to which decisions in the science and technology of our age are achieved under the circumstances of high risk and uncertainty.

² Fuller is the founder of the journal *Social Epistemology* in 1987, and also author of a pioneering book with the same title (Fuller 1988).

³ He was later founder of the journal *Episteme: a journal of social epistemology* in 2004, and author of (Goldman 1999) and (Goldman 2002).

⁴ E.g. Kitcher (1993), or Solomon (2001); and also feminist epistemologies such as Longino (1990).

⁵ E.g. Coady (1992), Kusch (2002), Lackey and Sosa (2006).

⁶ E.g. Shapin (1994); or see the June 2002 issue of the journal *Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science*.

¹ Such a conceptual shift in the public understanding of science is linked with recent fundamental changes in both the structure of science and the social image of the role of science. These processes are related to the concepts of post-academic science (Ziman 1996) or mode-2 science (Gibbons *et al.* 1994), both re-describing science as transforming into a market-minded social structure. More

Hardwig (1985), who coined the term *epistemic dependence*. He sets off by claiming, as an explication of a basic and common experience, that the source of a good deal (or even vast majority) of what we know is deference to epistemic authorities, and the greater the cultural complexity is, the more it is so. In the dominantly empiricist epistemological tradition, however, these elements of belief are not considered rational inasmuch as their acceptance is not based on rational evidence (since the testimony of others does not seem to be a rational evidence). So if we want to avoid the seemingly absurd conclusion that the majority of our knowledge is irrational, proportionally to social complexity, then we are faced with a dilemma: 1. Either we have to say that “someone can know “vicariously”—i.e., without possessing the evidence for the truth of what he knows, perhaps without even fully understanding what he knows” (p. 348) 2. Or we have to accept that “the *community* of inquirers is the primary knower and that individual knowledge is derivative” (p. 349), and then we give up the fancy idea of intellectual autonomy (Hardwig opts for this second solution).

Note that already the term ‘dependence’ suggests a strongly asymmetrical relation between experts (people with direct knowledge) and laypeople (those with indirect knowledge only). Hardwig takes a pessimistic position regarding the possibility of laypeople’s assessment of expert opinions: since laypeople are, by definition, those who fall back on the testimony of experts, they have hardly any means of rationally evaluating expert claims. Of course, laypeople can ponder on the reliability of certain experts, or rank the relative reliability of several experts, but it can only be rationally done by asking further experts and relying on their assessments—in which case we only lengthened our chain of epistemic dependence, instead of getting rid of it (p. 341). So, according to Hardwig, we have to fully accept our epistemic inferiority to experts, and either rely uncritically on expert claims or, even when criticizing these claims, we have to rely uncritically on experts’ replies to our critical remarks (p. 342).

However, at one point even Hardwig admits that laypeople’s otherwise necessary inferiority can be suspended in a certain type of situations that he calls *ad hominem* (p. 342):

The layman can assert that the expert is not a disinterested, neutral witness; that his interest in the outcome of the discussion prejudices his testimony. Or that he is not operating in good faith—that he is lying, for example, or refusing to acknowledge a

mistake in his views because to do so would tend to undermine his claim to special competence. Or that he is covering for his peers or knuckling under to social pressure from others in his field, etc., etc.

But before we get too optimistic and try to generalize, Hardwig warns us that these *ad hominem*s “seem and perhaps are much more admissible, important, and damning in a layman’s discussions with experts than they are in dialogues among peers”, since *ad hominem*s are easy to find out in science via testing and evaluating claims (p. 343). And apart from these rare and obvious cases, laypeople have no other choice left than blindly relying on expert testimonies.

Let us have a closer look at *ad hominem*s (Walton 1998, Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984). The target of *ad hominem* arguments is not the content of claims but rather the circumstances of the interlocutor making these claims. Such an attitude is usually seen as fallacious or abusive, on the supposition that the truth of a claim has nothing to do with how, by whom, and in what circumstances the claim is made. This supposition, however, is far from unproblematic, but even without addressing it theoretically we may simply observe that—in some cases, like the ones above—*ad hominem*s seem to give obvious and rational justification for the rejection of claims. Similarly, the plausibility of some claims made by politicians, diplomats, or salesmen is clearly effected by the knowledge of the circumstances in which the claims were made. What is important here is that epistemic access to the *context* is markedly different from epistemic access to the *content*, and this provides the layperson with at least a slight possibility of evaluating specialist claims.

In order to investigate the scope of this possibility, we now turn to some further solutions, suggested in the literature on scientific expertise, to the problem of how laypeople can evaluate expert claims. It is not only the precise suggestions themselves that are relevant here but also the situations in which, according to the authors, laypeople’s assessment of expert claims seems necessary and unavoidable.

2.2 Brewer

Scott Brewer, a philosopher of law, considers the situation of court trials where non-expert judges and juries are entitled to evaluate expert testimonies, including scientific ones (Brewer 1998). In these cases simple epistemic deference is obviously out of question, so instead, Brewer lists what he identifies as possible routes to ‘warranted epistemic

deference', i.e. means of non-expert evaluation of expert claims. These are: substantive second guessing, using general canons of rational evidentiary support, evaluating demeanor, and evaluating credentials.

Substantive second guessing means that the layperson has, at least to some degree, epistemic access to the content of expert argument and she can understand and assess the evidences supporting the expert claim. Of course, as Brewer admits, such situations are rare since scientific arguments are usually highly technical. But the main problem here is theoretical rather than practical: the possibility of substantive second guessing blurs the distinction between experts and laypeople. Expertise means restricted epistemic access, as expressed by the concept of epistemic dependence. What I suggest is that if there is second guessing in work here then it is circumstantial or contextual rather than substantive. The three other routes offered by Brewer may serve as examples.

The second route is using general canons of rational evidentiary support. If an expert argument is incoherent (e.g. self-contradicting) or unable to make or follow basic distinctions (in his example, between causing and not preventing) then, even for the layperson, it becomes evident that such an argument is unreliable. From the practical point of view, this possibility is available only when the argument is simple and non-technical enough for the layperson to follow, just like in the case of substantive second guessing, and it is rarely the case. But theoretically, this option is dissimilar from the previous one in that it is not the content of the argument non-experts need to have access to but rather the form, and this requires on their side skills and competences different from those of the expert.

Evaluating the demeanor is similar in this respect: the criteria used to evaluate demeanor are clearly different from those used to evaluate the content of claims. Laypeople may try to weigh up how sincere, confident, unbiased, committed etc. the expert is, and this obviously influences to what degree non-experts tend to rely on expert claims. In traditional rhetorical terms, all this belongs to the *ethos* of the speaker which has been held, especially in the past century, in high suspicion because of its capacity to contribute to persuasion (of any kind) as opposed to rational conviction. Brewer shares this suspicion and emphasizes the abusive potential in demeanor often exploited by the American legal system where there is a market for persuasive and competent-looking expert witnesses, and he concludes that demeanor is an untrustworthy guide. But for us it suffices to note here that however

untrustworthy it may be, in some situations demeanor may be found to be informative (rather than simply persuasive) with respect to the plausibility of expert claims, and thus it serves as a means of evaluating experts.

The most reliable route, according to Brewer, is the evaluation of the expert's credentials, including scientific reputation. He adopts the credentialist position⁷ even while acknowledging that it is laden with serious theoretical difficulties, such as the regress problem (ranking similar credentials requires asking additional experts), or the underdetermination problem (similar credentials underdetermine our choice between rivaling experts). In order to be able to evaluate scientific credentials, one needs to have some degree of familiarity with the institutional structure of science (rankings, positions, organizations, etc.), which is another, quite specialized, type of contextual knowledge needed to assess claims made by scientific experts.

2.3 Goldman

Another feature of legal court trials, in addition to the inherent necessity of the situation to evaluate experts by non-experts, is that in the typical case laypeople are confronted with two, usually contradicting, expert testimonies. Such circumstances are not restricted to the courtroom, of course, but the significance one attributes to them clearly depends on how widespread or general they are seen. Hardwig, for instance, is aware that simple epistemic deference is inapplicable in cases of divided expert opinion, but in his seminal paper he devotes only one paragraph to the problem (Hardwig 1985: 343), perhaps because he thinks that such cases are exceptions rather than the rule. He suggests that laypeople should refrain from forming their opinion when faced with rivaling expert claims (i.e. incompatible claims about the same issue), or if they do form an opinion they have to keep in mind that they did it on irrational grounds. So the more frequent and typical these situations are, the less plausible Hardwig's solution of simple epistemic deference becomes.

Alvin Goldman, a central figure in social epistemology, tries to identify those sources of evidence that laypeople can call upon when choosing from rivaling expert opinions—in situations where epistemic solutions of 'blind reliance' break down (Goldman 2001). According to him, these are: argument-based evidence, agreement from other experts, appraisals by meta-experts, consideration of interests and biases, and evidence of track-records.

⁷ Similarly e.g. to Kenny (1983).

Goldman distinguishes between two types of argumentative justification. ‘Direct’ justification means that the non-expert understands the expert argument and is able to evaluate it, similarly to what Brewer means by substantive second guessing. Goldman tries to maintain the gap between experts and laypeople by saying that some expert arguments can be formulated in an exoteric language that is accessible to the layperson, and this is where direct justification is possible. But when arguments are formulated in an unavoidably esoteric language, non-experts still have the possibility to give ‘indirect’ justification by evaluating what Goldman calls argumentative performance: certain features of the arguer’s behavior in controversies (quickness of replies, handling counter-arguments, etc.) indicate the degree of competence, without requiring from the non-expert to share the competences of the expert.

Additional experts can be used in two ways in Goldman’s classification: either by asking which of the rivaling opinions is agreed upon by a greater number of experts, or by asking meta-experts (i.e. experts evaluating other experts) for judgment on the expert making the claims. For Goldman, this type includes the credentialist solution as well, for credentials are issued by meta-experts and represent their evaluation of the expert in question. He deals with these cases simultaneously and claims that they are basically the same, since meta-experts use decision criteria that are as inaccessible to non-experts as the ones used by the subject level experts, so eventually all these cases boil down to comparing mere numbers. And that, as he argues at length, is unreliable.

Similarly to Hardwig’s *ad hominem* cases, Goldman also considers the possibility of identifying interests and biases in the arguer’s position. As interests and biases are usually easier to measure than arguments or credentials, he attributes considerable significance to these cases, even with the qualification that far too often both of the rivaling experts are interested and biased to the same degree which, as in Brewer’s analysis of credentials, underdetermines the decision.

What Goldman sees as the most reliable source of evidence is track-record. He argues that even highly esoteric domains can produce exoteric results or performances (e.g. predictions) on the basis of which the non-expert becomes able to evaluate the cognitive success of the expert. While using this criterion requires from the laypeople to pay significant effort to examining and comparing different track records, in situations where the choice between experts leads to serious

consequences (e.g. a courtroom situation surely belongs here) such an effort seems justified.

2.4 *Studies of expertise and experience*

Despite their different answers to the question of most reliable decision criteria, Brewer and Goldman agree that sounder evaluation needs special attention, either by studying the institutional structure of science or by examining specialists’ track-records. But why should laypeople take the effort of improving their contextual knowledge of science? If we turn from philosophical epistemology to the social studies of science and technology, we find an answer at the core of the discipline: because laypeople’s lives are embedded in a world in which both science and experts play a crucial role, but where not all experts represent science and even those who do, represent various, often incompatible, claims from which laypeople have to choose what to believe.

The program called ‘studies of expertise and experience’ (SEE) evolved in a framework shaped by these presuppositions. It was initiated by science studies guru Harry Collins and Robert Evans (2002, later expanded to 2007) when they advertised and urged the ‘third wave’ of science studies. Their initial problem is that “the speed of politics exceeds the speed of scientific consensus formation” (Collins and Evans 2007: 8), meaning that decision making processes outside science (politics, economy, the public sphere, etc.) are usually faster than similar processes in science. This gives rise to what they call ‘the problem of legitimacy’ (Collins and Evans 2002: 237): how is technological decision making possible given the growing social uncertainty? They claim that solutions are already achieved, or pointed to, in the field of ‘public participation in science’. However, a related but yet unsolved problem is ‘the problem of extension’, i.e. to what degree should the public be engaged in technical decision making? The program of SEE is meant to provide normative answers to this question.

In this framework the term ‘expert’ has a wide range of applications, since experts are defined as those “who know what they are talking about” (Collins and Evans 2007: 2), which is based on immersion in communicative life forms.⁸ Forms of expertise range from ubiquitous skills (such as native language usage) to the highest degree of scientific specialization, as summarized in ‘the periodic table of expertises’ (p. 14). What is relevant here is that this table includes, in addition to types of

⁸ This conception is criticized e.g. by Selinger and Mix (2006), or in Selinger, Deryfus and Collins (2007).

specialist expertise, those forms of ‘meta-expertise’ that can be used to judge and evaluate specialist expertise.

As the theory distinguishes between, on the one hand, those kinds of specialist expertise that are based on esoterically available tacit knowledge and, on the other hand, those that are supported by exoteric information only, a similar distinction is introduced for meta-expertise. There are meta-experts who evaluate other experts as formal equals (scientists on other scientists), or as representatives of meta-sciences (political scientists on politicians, literary critics on writers, etc.)—i.e., professionally. But apart from that, a widespread deference to experts is a basic necessity in modern societies, and laypeople are thus forced to acquire skills and ‘social intelligence’ needed to cope in an expert culture. So non-experts are able to come to decisions regarding technical questions on non-technical grounds, either when they have personal access to part of the social relations (‘local discrimination’), or when they as complete outsiders come to decisions based on their social experiences (‘global discrimination’).

Also in this ‘periodic table’ one can find ‘meta-criteria’ for evaluating experts. One of these is credentials and, as opposed to Brewer, Collins and Evans find this source as the least reliable of all—especially in fields outside science where there are no credentials at all. They consider track-records to be somewhat more trustworthy, but the practical problem here is also that in many areas of expertise track-records are nonexistent. So what they find most reliable is the past experience of experts, but unfortunately it is not elaborated how an expert’s experience could become accessible and measurable from the non-expert perspective. However, all these meta-criteria are such that they need special focus on the layperson’s side to assess, while in most cases the public would want to come to decisions based on less local details.

In order to form technical judgments based on non-technical and relatively general warrants, laypeople need some kind of social intelligence to rely upon. As Collins and Evans claim (p. 45), the

judgment turns on whether the author of a scientific claim appears to have the appropriate scientific demeanor and/or the appropriate location within the social networks of scientists and/or not too much in the way of a political and financial interest in the claim.

They illustrate the point with three examples: astrology, manned moon landings and cold fusion.

In all cases they claim that people (or at least sufficiently informed people) in Western societies have enough social skills to arrive at the correct conclusion—that astrology is not a science (since astrologists are not contained by the social networks of science), that moon landings are not faked (since such a huge conspiracy is not conceivable in our societies), and that cold fusion experiments did not succeed (and do not belong to the network of science anymore).⁹

To sum up the main points of this section: It seems clear that despite all the possible theoretical difficulties, laypeople can and do make evaluations of expert claims, and since laypeople are not experts in terms of their cognitive domains, these evaluations are based on criteria external to the specialist domain. Also, such external evaluations are not only frequent but generally unavoidable in a world of rivaling experts and consensus-lacking controversial issues. But while these philosophical analyses give rise to different while partly overlapping normative solutions, it remains unclear whether these solutions are really functional in real-life situations. The next section attempts to examine this question.

3. A Case Study: the H1N1 Vaccine

3.1 The method

The recent worldwide public interest in the H1N1 influenza pandemic potential, and in the corresponding issues concerning vaccination, provides a highly suitable test study for the above theoretical approaches. First, the case clearly represents a technical topic about which various and often contradicting testimonies were, and still are, available. Second, despite the lack of scientific consensus, decisions had to be made under uncertain circumstances, both at the level of medical policy and at the level of individual citizens who eagerly wanted to decide whether vaccination is desirable. Huge numbers of non-experts were thus forced to assess expert claims, and come to decisions concerning technical matters lacking the sufficient testimonial support.

Luckily, the internet documented an overwhelming amount of lay opinions, mostly available in the form of blog comments. In order to see how laypeople *do* assess expert claims, I looked at several Hungarian blog discussions of the issue, and browsed through well over a thousand blog comments (which is, nonetheless, a really minor proportion of the

⁹ I cannot resist noting here that these examples seem convincing, in my opinion, only insofar the non-experts we are talking about are really informed, which is closer to an idealistic society the actual ones I know.

actual relevant web content). From about a dozen blog discussions I chose four for closer analysis.¹⁰ These blogs are somewhat different in style, orientation, thematic policy and commenting habits, but my choices were basically random and I had no conscious methodological decisions about the issue. The number of comments I considered is around 600, and the number of comments in which I found identifiable indications of what criteria the author used to form her opinion is 110.

I approached the material with a ready-made typology of warrants abstracted from the theoretical literature (see next section), and I counted the number of instances of the abstract types. I disregarded those comments which did not contain any clear opinion, or where arguments (reasons, warrants) were not given in favor of (or against) the standpoint, or which were redundant with respect to earlier comments by the same user. Some comments contained more than one type of argument or warrant, where all different instances were considered. Naturally, deciding which argument belongs to which category includes highly intuitive judgments, and I did not apply any formal rules or procedures in sorting. Often it was already difficult to decide whether something is meant as an argument (depending on the interpretation of pragmatic function), and if the answer was yes, it was sometimes ambiguous to which category it belonged among more than one possibilities. Others analyzing the same material might get significantly different results, but I have no means of testing the extent of interpretative flexibility at this point.

The results I gained are by no means representative in a number of respects. First, the H1N1 vaccine problem may be regarded as a special issue with quite specific characteristics, dissimilar from most public technical problems. Such a claim might be tested by comparative analysis taking other issues into account, which is far from the ambitions of this paper. Second, the Hungarian case may be unlike other national cases due to different political, economic and cultural environments. While this claim is certainly plausible, neither the scope nor the intensity nor the significance of the possible dissimilarities will be investigated here. Finally, the selected source material may be exceedingly small and badly (i.e. non-systematically) chosen. However, the

purpose of this ‘sample’ was to gain a rough impression from a philosophical perspective, rather than establishing well-founded empirical findings.

3.2 The tested categories

In order to classify the constituents of contextual knowledge relevant to meta-expertise, a slightly systematic expansion of the suggestions cited in section 2 is given here. The purpose is to test whether, and to what extent, some of the suggested kinds of contextual knowledge are actually efficient in judging experts. Since no fully-fledged theory of contextual knowledge is aimed here, the following list is definitely not meant as a comprehensive collection of all the elements or even the types of elements. The types are illustrated with examples from the source material.¹¹

(1) The first group is argument *evaluation by the content*, i.e. Brewer’s ‘substantive second guessing’ or Goldman’s ‘direct argument justification’. While normative theories question the efficiency of such assessment, the possibility is still open (and seems probable) that laypeople try to understand, and become committed to, expert arguments. In practical considerations, basically everything belongs here where technical arguments are stated without giving references.

Example 1. “I won’t take the vaccine, even if it’s for free in the first round. The reason is simple: the vaccine needs some weeks before it takes effect, and the virus has a two week latency. And the epidemic has already begun...” (cotcot 2009, at 10.06.13:06)

Example 2. “It is probably harmful to take flu vaccine every year... Because mercury does not deplete, but it cumulates in the body...” (reakcio 2009, at 11.04.16:00)

(2) The second group contains those *contextual discursive factors* that are indirectly tied up with the epistemic virtue of arguments.

(2a) Such is the consistency (and also coherence) of arguments, clarity of *argument structure*, supporting relations between premises and conclusions, etc. Of course, the more esoteric a domain’s cognitive toolkit is, the harder it is for an outsider to differentiate between form and content, and to detect inconsistency or circularity and similar faults—still in many cases these factors are easier to judge than the soundness of substance.

Example 3. “Official claims, in approximately temporal order: No vaccine for the pregnant, since it is harmful to babies. It is most important for the

¹⁰ These blogs belong to different sites: cotcot (2009) – an online fashion and health magazine (mostly for and by women); szanalmas (2009) – an elitist community blog site, often highly esteemed for intellectual autonomy; vastagbor (2009) – a political blog with marked right-wing preferences; reakcio (2009) – a cultural/political blog with right-wing tendencies.

¹¹ Naturally, in my translation. The translations are context-sensitive rather than strictly literal.

pregnant to take the vaccine, primarily for the sake of the baby. Children up to 3 years should not get the vaccine. Children can surely get it after 6 or 12 month of age. Children can get it only after the age of 3 or 4 years.—Now, would you want to get the vaccine for your wife or small baby after all these? (vastagbor 2009, at 11.04.14:34)

Example 4. “Many of those who go for this david icke type humbug are afraid of the crusade against overpopulation, so they’re against inoculation, which is a contradiction again” (cotcot 2009, at 10.05.22:43)

(2b) A similar matter is the degree of reliability of *argument scheme* used by the expert (Walton 2008). Arguments can be weakened¹², albeit at the same time increased in persuasive potential, by different appeals to emotions and sentiments, or by abusive applications of ad hominem, or by irrelevant or misleading appeals to authority, etc. Also, dialectical attitude (instead of dialectical performance) can be highly informative, i.e. moves and strategies in controversies, including conscious or unnoticed fallacies such as straw man, red herring, question begging, shifting the burden of proof, and more generally, breaking implicit rules of rational discussion.¹³

Example 5. “It is a bad argument that something is a good business. Safety belt is also a good business for someone, and I still use it.” (vastagbor 2009, at 11.04.14:52)

(3) Both Hardwig and the SEE emphasize the role of detecting *interests and biases*. Considering these factors belong to the field of ‘social intelligence’, and precisely because these are ubiquitous they do not need focused effort and training to improve (as opposed to the argumentative factors mentioned above).

Example 6. “I’d be stupid to take the vaccine. All this mess is but a huge medicine business.” (vastagbor 2009, at 11.04.12:26)

Example 7. “The Omnivest [producer of the vaccine] is an offshore company in Cyprus and it is nothing else but the purse of comrades [socialists]...” (reakcio 2009, at 11.04.14:35)

¹² It must be noted that all the factors mentioned here provide reasons for doubting opinions and withholding doubt, rather than enhancing agreement. Nevertheless, negative evaluation can also give essential support to choices between expert claims. Moreover, fallacies can also be given a more context-sensitive analysis, and seen as moves in the process of ‘strategic maneuvering’ negotiating between the persuasiveness and reasonableness, see Eemeren (2009).

¹³ For a set of these rules, see Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004: 190–196).

(4) Social intelligence covers the ability to evaluate the reliability of *experts*, instead of judging the arguments.

(4a) The simplest case is *unreflected deference* or blind trust. While the paper has argued that, in contrast with Hardwig’s original idea, such a solution is unsatisfactory in the context of multiple expert opinions, in actual discourse laypeople can certainly defer to certain expert claims, without taking into account any other testimony.

Example 8. “I’m not taking it, for sure. My doctor says it is unwise, since if there’s already some illness in you then taking the flu vaccine in addition will result in some really bad shit” (cotcot 2009, at 10.03.10:45)

Example 9. “My aunt is a virologist and microbiologist. She never wants to persuade me to take any vaccination against seasonal flu, but this time it is different...” (reakcio 2009, at 11.14.15:21)

(4b) As the credentialist solution suggests, laypeople can estimate the *formal authority* of different experts by judging their ranks or positions.

Example 10. “So, when according to the Minister of Healthcare, and also to Czeizel [often referred to as “the doctor of nation”, well known geneticist], and also to Mikola [ex-Minister of Healthcare during the previous government], Hungarian vaccine is good, then whom the hell would I believe when he says that it isn’t?” (szanalmas 2009, at 11.04.12:22)

Example 11. “One must be really paranoid to suppose that the WHO and the ÁNTSZ [Hungarian public health service] and the MTA [Hungarian Academy of Science] collaborate and risk their credibility for the sake of a small medical company” (reakcio 2009, at 11.04.14:52)

(4c) Also, quite similarly, one may discredit testimonies by claiming that the expert is a wrong or *illegitimate authority*.

Example 12. “David Icke is a British journalist, “writer”, he’s interested in politics, and has nothing to do with biology” (cotcot 2009, at 10.03.00:28)

Example 13. “Why should I want to believe the doctor who tried to convince my wife not to take the vaccine a few days ago, and then tried to rope her in Forever Living Products? Or the doctor who does not even know that this vaccine contains dead virus, not live? [...] So these are the experts? These are the doctors to protect our health?” (szanalmas 2009, at 11.04.12:22)

(5) Finally, there are various forms of *commonsensical social judgments* not explicitly dealing with interests or authorities.

Example 14. “The vaccine comes from an unknown producer, and the formula is classified for 20 years...” (szanalmas 2009, at 11.03.16:01)

Example 15. “Had the medicine lobby really been successful, it is not them who would have got the assignment but some large producer (even for smaller price)” (szanalmas 2009, at 11.04.14:39)

Example 16. “Let us not forget that first there wasn’t even a date of expiry on the vaccine” (vastagbor 2009, at 11.04.12:00)

Example 17. “This huge panic and hype surrounding it makes things very suspicious” (vastagbor 2009, at 11.04.12:02)

3.3 Results

Table 1. Number of argument type instances in blog comments

	“cot-cot”	“szanalmas”	“vastagbor”	“reakcio”	in total
number of comments	87	140	224	150*	601
Type 1 (judgment by content)	5	4	4	2	15
Type 2a (argument structure)	2	0	1	0	3
Type 2b (argument scheme)	0	0	0	1	1
Type 3 (interests, biases)	10	6	6	4	26
Type 4a (unreflected deference)	6	0	4	7	17
Type 4b (formal authority)	1	2	0	1	4
Type 4c (illegitimate authority)	3	2	0	0	5
Type 5 (other social judgments)	6	8	11	14	39

* The number of comments in total here is 553, but I considered the first 150 only.

Table 1 shows the qualitative results. Although the poll is quite small for proper statistical analysis, some tendencies may be identified. For the purposes of the paper, analysis by source seems both unnecessary and problematic, since it is neither relevant nor clearly informative how certain comment types distribute according to the different blogs. What is informative and relevant is the relative frequency of argument types in total.

Judgment by content (type 1) is quite frequent, contrary to the recommendation of normative approaches emphasizing that the demarcation between experts and laypeople correlates with the distinction between those who have the ability of understand technical arguments and those who do not. There are several possible reasons for this. One is that laypeople do not like to regard themselves as epistemically inferior, and try to weigh up expert arguments by content even if they lack the relevant competences. Another is that the publicly relevant technical aspects of the H1N1 vaccine issue are far less esoteric than many other scientific issues, and there is a lot to understand here even for non-virologists and non-epidemiologists. Another is that while people form their opinions on testimonial grounds, they often refrain from referring explicitly to their expert sources (especially in blog comments resembling everyday conversations), and state their opinion as if they themselves were the genuine source. Of course, the above data and the applied method do not facilitate any hypothesis concerning the relative weight and accuracy of these possible reasons (and probably others). The simple empirical claim is that laypeople quite often do try to judge expert claims by approaching the content.

In contrast, assessment informed by argument structure and form (types 2a and 2b) is pretty rare, even when it seems plausible to assume that, in some respect, judgments on general argumentative merits require different competences from the specialist judgments based on content, and thus can contribute to ‘meta-expertise’. But let us note that, just as most people are not virologists, they are very rarely argumentation theorists, so they are usually not aware of the formal structure or type of arguments they face, or the relevant fallacies. On the other hand, one may claim that cultivated focus on argumentative and discursive factors in decision making can increase the reliability of lay evaluations of expert testimonies, which underlines the case for an emphasis on argument analysis and critical thinking in education and public discussions.

Moving now from arguments to circumstantial social intelligence, the identification of interests and biases (type 3) is a really popular attitude in the

examined material. While part of the reason for this might be that the studied case is untypical in that very clear interests were at play (the vaccine producer company seemed to have some connections with certain politicians), this popularity is nevertheless in line with the expectation shared by all the cited authors about the relative importance of such considerations. It seems that identifying such factors is an important part of the social skills we all acquire during our socialization process.

Also, simple deference (type 4a) is still a relatively widespread attitude, despite the fact that it seems obvious to all that contradicting expert testimonies are available in this specific case. While Brewer and Goldman suggest ranking and comparing expert authorities, it seems that such ranking is pretty rare in actual arguments. Neither considering formal or institutional indicators of authority (type 4b) nor questioning the legitimacy of putative experts (type 4c) seem frequent. Perhaps this is partly because people like to base their trust in experts on personal acquaintances ('my doctor', see the concept of 'local discrimination' in section 2.4). But in my opinion, another important part of the explanation is not the lack of commonsense skepticism or laypeople's exceeding gullibility, but their relative ignorance in the field of scientific culture. Meta-scientific knowledge informing meta-expert evaluations involves an understanding of the social dimension of the workings of science. But unlike other important cultural spheres like that of politics, economy, or sports, about which laypeople are more likely to make reliable social evaluations, science as a social system is hardly known by the public. For instance, in order to make the credentialist solution plausible, one needs to know about the social network of credentials, hierarchies of statuses and institutions, types and functions of qualifications and ranks, etc. A similar knowledge is needed to detect more subtle interests and biases. It is also useful to understand patterns of communication in science, the role of different publications and citations, mechanisms of consensus formation, the nature of interdisciplinary epistemic dependence and resulting forms of cooperation, etc. Besides, transparency of sites and practices in science may also prove useful, including forms of local cooperation, the instrumental dependence of research, roles of uncertainty and skepticism, and so on. Being ignorant of these, laypeople have small chances to evaluate rankings, positions, or misplaced appeals to authority.

What I found to feature most often in laypeople's decisions is 'commonsensical' forms of social judgments, practically those that consider

factors other than interests or expert authorities. Of course, the relatively high frequency of such judgments is surely due, at least in part, to the wide scope of such argument patterns. But apart from that, social intelligence clearly plays a vital role in the evaluations we study here, as the SEE program expected, but social intelligence about science seems to be in need of improvement. While understanding all phenomena listed above may be too strong an expectation from the public, it seems likely that becoming familiar with these requires less effort than learning substantial claims of the different sciences, partly because social structures and mechanisms are easier to understand (based on our fundamental experience with them) than abstract facts.¹⁴

4. Conclusions

A rough empirical test of the normative theories of meta-expertise (i.e. concerning lay evaluations of expert claims) has shown that while laypeople do use the argument types recommended by epistemologists, the relative frequency of the type instances is not in agreement with the relative reliability attributed by the theorists. If one maintains that the argument tools recommended by philosophers are efficient in increasing the reliability of such evaluations, it follows that public awareness is in need of improvement both with respect to argumentative discourse in general, and with respect to the institutional and cultural details of the workings of science. This conclusion has important implications for science education, science communication and the media, the public engagement with science, and various other fields that lay outside the scope of this paper.

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¹⁴ Classical works in the social studies of science were often written with the explicit purpose of informing the public about how science actually works, e.g., the Golem-series (Collins and Pinch 1993; 1998; 2005). While the aim was improving the public's social intelligence regarding science, and thus informing their relevant decisions, *in vivo* descriptions of scientific research often triggered heated attacks for opening the way to science criticism. See the 'science wars', e.g. Gross and Levitt (1994), Sokal and Bricmont (1998).

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TRUST, SOCIAL CAPITAL, AND SOCIAL WELL-BEING (VALUES AND POWER RELATIONS IN THE LATE MODERNITY)

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Abstract:

The aim of this paper is to analyze Robert Putnam's and Francis Fukuyama's theses and the views of many other their adherents about trust and social capital. At the beginning, basic concepts are defined, and a brief characterization of the arguments is offered. But in its major part, the article is critical. Firstly, a series of empirical research results are presented, which do not go together with and are even in direct contradiction to the points of the ideas under discussion. Secondly, an analysis is offered, presenting their theoretical setbacks: exaggeration of the role of trust and "free associations" in economic and political life, which in its turn leads to reversing causal relationships and concealing real problems; incorrect use of the idea of culture and the values linked to it where major parameters of power relationships remain concealed.

Key words: trust, social capital, culture, power, capitalism, democracy, modernity.

In the last two decades the subject of trust has acquired great popularity. Particularly influential have been the arguments of Robert Putnam (1993, 2000) and Francis Fukuyama (1995), postulating a relationship between the level of trust and good functioning of society. The present article is critical. It aims to reveal the shortcomings of these views and other beliefs similar to them: 1) by juxtaposing them to a great number of empirical research results; 2) by disclosing their theoretical drawbacks.

Basic Concepts

Social experience of individuals usually generates unmistakable intuition about what trust is. Difficulties and troubles appear when we attempt to theorize on the topic.

"It is generally agreed that trust becomes relevant when social interaction is based on uncertain knowledge about the likely action of another and one depends on their response for a beneficial outcome" (Smith, 2005, 300). Trust is a psychological state in a situation of uncertainty and risk. This con-

dition, however, could be interpreted in the framework of two completely different approaches. The first assumes action, based on self-interest and maximization of utility. "Granting trust is essentially a calculation of risk... My decision of trust is an anticipation of what someone else will do, under assumptions that each of us wants to maximize our own pay-off" (Ruscio, 1997, 455; cf. Smith, 2005, 301). Within the framework of the second approach trust is not a question of rational strategy but "an ethical relationship better explained in terms of shared values. We trust others not because of the benefits it will bring to us. Quite the contrary. Trust is a suspension of the self-interest axiom... We trust others because we share their ideals and values, not because we want to satisfy our desires" (Ruscio, 1997, 455; cf. Smith, 2005, 301–302).

In order to distinguish between the two paradigms, a number of authors introduce two terms: confidence and trust. The first one is related to instrumental, and the second one to value rationality. (Smith, 2005, 307). According to Das and Teng "the key difference is that whereas trust refers to expectations about positive motives, confidence refers to certainty about cooperative behaviors" (Das and Teng, 1998, 494). However, they do not totally separate trust and confidence; in their opinion, the latter concept contains trust as one of its components, the second being control. Even in economic relations, for every important association, minimum trust is necessary (*ibid.*, 491, 493–494).

Quite often trust and confidence are used as synonyms, sometimes with the qualification that purely instrumental and purely value motivated aspects of behavior are only extreme positions of a continuum, with all possible kinds of combinations of both types located in between. Adhering to Georg Simmel and distancing himself from the rational choice model, Moellering "proceeds to conceptualise trust as a mental process of three elements... expectation, interpretation and suspension. Expecta-

tion is the state (outcome) at the end of the process. It is preceded by the combination of interpretation and suspension. The former concerns the experiencing of reality that provides 'good reasons'... However, any form of interpretation is limited and does not inevitably enable expectation". An additional element is necessary: suspension. "This is a mechanism of bracketing the unknowable, thus making interpretative knowledge momentarily certain. Suspension enables the leap of trust" (Moellering, 2001, 403). In my opinion, trust contains both rational instrumental and value components.

In contemporary research 'trust' is closely related to the concept of social capital. Very often social capital is understood as comprising two components: trust and social networks. Some authors attribute priority to the first, others to the second component (Letki and Evans, 2005, 516; Park and Shin, 2005, 66). As I will try to show, in the argument I am going to examine in particular later on, trust and the values related to it play rather a leading role.

Trust is both a psychological state and a value, as old as the human kind itself. On the contrary, 'social capital' is a relatively new idea, the introduction of which dates back to scholars of the late eighteenth and nineteenth century (James Madison, Alexis de Tocqueville, etc.). At the outset the term itself is missing, it appears later on, as in John Dewey's work *The School and Society* (1899) or in the article by L. J. Hanifan (1916) on schools in the rural area and local support for them. Systematic interest in the idea of social capital, however, dates back to the 1960s. It plays an important role in the research of significant contemporary authors like Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman, Robert Putnam, Francis Fukuyama and many others (Hotta and Inoguchi, 2009, 126-128). Literature has been multiplying quite intensively since the end of the 1990s, when the World Bank launched a special research program to deal with social capital (World Bank, 1998).

There is a great number of definitions on "social capital". Eight among the most popular, one can find in a commentary by Paul Francis (2002, 4). To me the most felicitous seems to be that of Elinor Ostrom: "Social capital is the shared knowledge, understanding, norms, rules and expectations about patterns of interactions that groups or individuals bring to a recurrent activity" (Ostrom, 2000, 176). Here the concept is defined quite specifically and at

the same time remains sufficiently general to cover different conceptual perspectives.

These perspectives, however, are often completely different, which does not always become apparent in brief definitions. Bourdieu outlines three forms of capital: economic capital, cultural capital and social capital (Bourdieu, 1983). His argument has been defined as instrumental since it emphasizes the benefits for the owners of social capital. Coleman (1988) offers a functional interpretation: social capital is something that relieves collective or individual action. It is "a normal resource that facilitates any manner of action, but whether society is better off as a result depends entirely on the individual uses to which it is put" (Hotta and Inoguchi, 2009, 126-127).

Robert Putnam's thesis is probably the most influential. He defines the concept as "features of social organization, such as trust, norms and networks, which can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action" (Putnam, 1993, 167). This is, to a maximum extent, a normative view: it does not just emphasize the role of norms and values in the functioning of society, but looks for "improving the effectiveness". Therefore, the assumption is that the author knows what "a good society" is and what should be done for more effective functioning of the existing not so good society. Moreover, he does not just know, this is not only his conviction; he strives to enforce it as a landmark for research in social sciences. At first sight, Fukuyama proceeds from a normatively neutral definition: "Social capital is an instantiated informal norm that promotes co-operation between individuals" (Fukuyama, 2001, 7). Right after that, however, he goes on: "In the economic sphere it [social capital] reduces transaction costs and in the political sphere it promotes the kind of associational life which is necessary for the success of limited government and modern democracy" (*ibid.*). Thus, Fukuyama also sets as a prerequisite his ideal for "good society". Putnam predominantly cares for the health of liberal democracy, whereas Fukuyama for the unimpeded functioning of the market, minimally limited by a liberal government.

Further I will consider only Putnam's, Fukuyama's and other authors' arguments similar to theirs. The common thing about them is that they offer a strongly normative interpretation, which is not confined to separate communities, organizations and systems, but spreads over entire societies and countries. Besides that, despite the differences be-

tween them, the two arguments are rather complementary to each other.

2. The problems and the solutions

A great number of surveys record a drastic decline of trust on the part of the public in Western democracies in the leaders, organizations and institutions of their countries. For example, in the USA “between 1966 and 1981, the Harris polls found that the public’s expression of a ‘great deal of confidence’ in leaders of major companies fell from 55 percent to 15 percent; in organized labor from 22 to 12 percent; in the executive branch of the federal government from 41 to 24 percent; and in Congress from 42 to 16 percent. An overall index of confidence in ten institutions was halved, from 48 percent to 23 percent” (Knoke, 1984, 275). Twelve years later an “opinion poll... shows the steady decline of public’s trust in government”: In 1964, 76 percent of respondents ‘trust government to do the right thing’. Later the level of trust shows a steady decline, increases slightly in the early 1980s, but quickly falls to the characteristic 25 percent. A Harvard University Survey reaches the conclusion that mistrust permeates our society, affecting personal as well as political relationships. As reported in *The Washington Post*, “America is becoming a nation of suspicious strangers, and this mistrust in each other is a major reason Americans have lost confidence in their federal government and virtually every other major national institution” (Ruscio, 1997, 454). Book titles are characteristic as well: *The Malevolent Leaders* (Craig, 1993), or *Congress is Public Enemy* (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 1995) or *Why Americans Hate Politics* (Dionne, 1991) (Cook and Gronke, 2005, 784). In 2008 Julian Le Grand states that in Britain there exists not only “the decline in the public’s trust of government and of public service institutions such as BBC”, but also in “the trust placed by government policy makers in those who provide these services, such as doctors, nurses and teachers” (Le Gran, 2008, 314). Carole Smith sums up: “Opinion polls suggest that trust is a diminishing resource in social relations and in the public’s perception of important social institutions such as government, medicine and science” (Smith, 2005, 299). Certain authors try to dissolve these painful impressions: Cook and Gronke for example, claim that the decreased trust of Americans in the government should not be interpreted as mistrust and cynicism but rather as skepticism (Cook and Gronke, 285, 286).

Robert Putnam also notes crisis of trust in institutions, organizations and leaders of west democracies, especially in the United States. According to him the primary reason for that crisis is the weakening of civil society, which, in turn, is a key factor for the effective functioning of democracy. This weakening is manifested in the exhaustion of social capital, increasing of alienation in society, distancing on the part of citizens from voluntary organizations, general increase of distrust (Putnam, 1993). And this is far from being only Putnam’s conviction: “It is now widely believed that the existence of a vibrant civil society is an important factor, if not the single most important one, in the transition to and the consolidation of democracy” (Park and Shin, 2005, 64).

According to Putnam, it is vitally important for the process leading to degradation of social capital to be stopped, and accordingly he calls for a value oriented social science (Putnam, 2003). He takes up the revival of social capital in American society as his civil duty as well. Putnam has organized the Saguaro Seminar, within the framework of which a series of meetings have been carried out between academics, civil society leaders, commentators and politicians to discuss strategies for encouraging voluntary associations and increasing trust. A specially designed website has been devoted to that same task (<http://www.bettertogether.org>), which urges: “Connect with others, build trust, get involved”.

Fukuyama also notes the alarming tendency of diminishing social trust in the United States in the years after the World War II. He sees signs for that not only in the declining interest in participation in voluntary organizations, but also in the family crisis, the increasing number of court trials, the growing number of criminal acts and prison population, in strengthening the feeling of insecurity and suspiciousness and alienation from fellow citizens (Fukuyama, 1993, Chap. XXVI). An important point in his argument is the link between trust and economic prosperity. Fukuyama identifies three major forms of association: family, voluntary organizations and the state. According to him strong family and kin ties prevent the development of the economic potential of society: the conditions are lacking for the emergence of big corporations. Such corporations could be set up through economic engagement on the part of the state, but Fukuyama finds this option economically ineffective. Prospering societies are those where voluntary associations have been flourishing, a necessary prerequisite for the emergence and functioning of big corporations. In that context, a strong

civil society with its voluntary associations and civic activity, alien to familism and etatism, is a major precondition for economic prosperity. Fukuyama distinguishes between two categories of societies – low-trust and high-trust societies. In the first category the familist and etatist tendencies predominate (Italy, France, Korea, Taiwan), whereas the second category is characterized by priority of free associations (Germany, Japan, the United States) (Fukuyama, 1995).

It is impossible to make equal Putnam and Fukuyama's ideas. However, the differences between them are complementary to a large extent. In both versions, advanced civil society and voluntary associations are a vitally important precondition for liberal democracy as well as for effective market economy generating prosperity. High levels of social capital are seen as "crucial for such measures of collective well-being as economic development, effective political institutions, low-crime rates, and lower incidences of other social problems such as teen pregnancy, and delinquency" (Brehm and Rahn, 1997, 1000). In both arguments, not every kind of association is favorable to society and not every way of overcoming alienation generates trust, constructive and beneficial for society. Putnam draws a distinction between bonding social capital and bridging social capital. The first is typical of associations of individuals within homogeneous groups (especially ethnic and religious), the latter integrates individuals from heterogeneous background. Binding social capital can negatively influence the functioning of civil society and democracy (Putnam and Goss, 2000). Fukuyama makes use of the concept of a "radius of trust": "the circle of people among whom co-operative norms are operative". There are small united groups with a minor radius (family, ethnic, sectarian), which are strongly united but also closed and excluding. They reduce chances for democratic development and economic prosperity (Fukuyama, 2001, 8-9). In general, Putnam and Fukuyama, together with a great number of their adherents, share the same concept of "the good society". Finally, each of them "has had his fifteen minutes of fame in Washington policy circles" (Quigley, 1996). A later commentator would say "not just fifteen minutes".

Putnam and Fukuyama's theories have so many drawbacks that their critical analysis requires a much more detailed consideration than the one I can afford here. I am compelled to restrict myself to the main points.

3. Empirical verification

There are a great number of empirical studies attempting to measure social capital and trust in various societies, communities and associations and also to establish the true correlation between social capital and trust, on the one hand, and democracy and prosperity on the other. As Steven Durlauf points out, "empirical efforts to demonstrate the importance of social capital have largely been failures" (cited in Francis, 2002, 2). Michael Foley and Bob Edwards review 45 articles "reporting empirical research employing the concept of 'social capital'". They arrive at the following conclusion: "The literature is roughly equally divided between those who treat social capital as an independent variable and those who consider it as a dependent variable, and between those who operationalize the concept principally in terms of norms, values and attitudes and those who chose a more social structural operationalizations... Work on social capital as a mainly normative variable is dominated by political scientists and economists, while sociologists and a wide range of applied social scientists utilize more social structural understandings of the term" (Foley and Edwards, 1999, 141).

In relation to Canada Schellenberg establishes "a link between strong feelings of belonging, trust in others, confidence in public institutions and higher levels of happiness and life satisfaction" (Schellenberg, 2004, 16). Many empirical investigations, however, come to different or even opposite conclusions compared to those of Putnam, Fukuyama and others close to them. "Established democracies, such as Belgium, France and Italy, have levels of trust that were significantly lower than in Guatemala or Panama. Besides this, it could be claimed with greater likelihood that trust is rather the "effect, not the determinant, of a political system" (Letky and Evans 2005, 523). According to another survey, "a civil community with high levels of interpersonal trust and civic participation that values formal political participation, yet expresses high levels of alienation from and low levels of confidence in its governments" (Pickup et al., 2004, 617) is found in the Canadian province Alberta. Therefore, high level of civic activity, adherence to democratic values and great mutual trust between persons do not by any means necessarily go together with support for the government.

The South Korean case is also very interesting. Park and Shin's survey reveals the following: "First... the Korean people as a whole tend to be

involved in small informal groups. Most of them stay away from formal associations. Second... a majority of the people display competence based trust, if neither generalized nor particularized trust. Third, associational membership has no role in promoting support for democratic institutions and principles; it merely leads to more political activism. Fourth, social trust plays a role in promoting support for democracy. Yet it has little to do with political activism" (Park and Shin, 2005, 63; also 84-85). Therefore, active participation in associations and political activism do not serve as an incentive for liberal democracy. On the contrary, trust on the part of a population that prefers small informal groups is positively associated with democratic values and institutions but is not an incentive for associating and political activity. These empirically proved facts contradict the basic statements of Putnam, Fukuyama and many of their adherents.

Studies of post-communist Eastern Europe introduce a characteristic dissonance as well. Pamela Sapsford offers evidence about eight post-communist societies which demonstrate "greatest trust in relatives and friends, less in people in general and least in politicians and institutions of social control. Levels of trust are not high, and here are interesting differences between the countries, giving support to the view that trust and confidence are eroded by sudden and dramatic negatively perceived change" (Sapsford, 2006, 59). These results rather support intuitive expectations, than the argument presented by Putnam, Fukuyama and the multitude of their adherents. Far more categorical are the conclusions resulting from another survey on trust in countries in East Central Europe (ECE). Letki and Evans establish a correlation between trust and democracy that is rather the reverse of the theory under discussion. "Levels of trust reflect rather than influence the effectiveness of political and economic institutions" (Letki and Evans, 2005, 515). And more specifically, "the process of democratization in ECE appears to have negatively influenced levels of trust in the region, while the level of trust was irrelevant for the success of democratization". Besides that, toward the middle of the 1990s, levels of trust "were higher in countries where the process of democratization was less advanced... we detected a strong negative impact of democratization between 1989 and 1993 on trust measured in 1993, but no relationship between trust and subsequent democratization" (ibid. 523).

Certain scholars disprove a very often occurring simplified understanding of the link between trust in one's own ethnic group and trust in other groups. For example, Bahry et al. ascertain that "high in-group or particularistic trust is no barrier to faith in other ethnic groups" (Bahry et al., 2005, 521). It is emphasized that trust in interethnic relationships depends on quite a number of specific circumstances (situations of inter-ethnic contacts or lack of such, nature of relationships with the other group, different status of groups, etc.) (ibid., 522-523). The same authors characterize Russia in the 1990s with "a low reported level of generalized faith in others and widespread particularized trust", which according to the predominant view should be seen as "fertile ground for exclusionary ethnic trust – especially where ethnic differences have been so highly politicized" (ibid., 523). The last assumption however was not confirmed in the interethnic trust survey in Tatarstan and Sakha-Yakutia, that experienced substantial ethnonational mobilization in the late 1980s and 1990s. Just 1/5 of the respondents "displays generalized faith in others; but roughly 4/5 trust the major outgroup in their republic. Trust is also higher for some less proximate ethnic groups than it is for people in general" (ibid., 530).

4. Theoretical drawbacks

4.1. Discredited Civic Initiative

It is difficult to find people who would not agree that shared values, adherence and trust between persons contribute to the success of their common endeavors. This is one of the trivial truths which do not seem to deserve being a subject of scientific discussion. Problems start when the question is posed about the relative importance of this factor and its role in various social contexts. Putnam, Fukuyama and many others attribute so much relative weight to it in the entire functioning of the social mechanism that their ideas come into serious contradiction with people's intuitive ideas and expectations. We usually think that trust in leaders, organizations and institutions depends on their proper functioning and not the reverse. The most popular theorists of trust nowadays turn it into a leading cause. As we saw, their understanding contradicts not only everyday intuitions, but also many empirical research results. However, this is not a question of purely academic debate. Overstressing the trust factor inevitably overshadows a multitude of tangible problems and questions the efforts to reach genuine decisions. It is often remarked that

trust is transformed into a cure-all for social failures, and this has been an inevitable consequence following from overstress on trust. Noting the haphazard use of the concept Carole Smith adds: “those who refer to trust in explaining the basis for social relations are likely to find themselves in murky waters” (Smith, 2005, 299).

The role that has been allotted to the second component of social capital, free associations, also gives rise to doubts and objections. Firstly, a great number of associations have practically nothing to do with the functioning of the political system or with economic rationality. Such kind of associations are non-professional sports organizations, amateur drama groups, choirs, etc. In the modern age, these activities could be considered as neutral to the type of social system. Let us remember that similar kinds of associations were strongly supported by fascist and communist regimes. They were, so to speak, an alternative of political participation and engagement, a compensation for the denied possibility for autonomous political action, and with state socialism, for economic initiative as well. In that capacity they served to support rather than to undermine radically non-democratic regimes.

Secondly, in the framework of liberal democracy (in complete conformity with its functioning) there exist overtly anti-democratic associations (racist, pro-fascist, etc.).

Thirdly, a great number of voluntary organizations proclaim the democratic values and/or principles of the market economy and at the same time influence, more or less, the operation of the political and economic system. Some of them are established in order to exercise such an influence (political parties and other political associations, entrepreneur and hired labor organizations, etc.), others set themselves various purposes having no direct influence on economy and politics (a great number of NGOs). Some associations reproduce to some extent democratic mechanisms and procedures in the state (elections, hierarchical structures), others rather imitate the running of a private company. All organizations in this third group declare their loyalty to the order of market democracy and take part in its practical realization. Some of them exert influence by trying to promote their programs, others their particular interests, and most of them both. The big question is the one concerning the legitimacy of that influence and more generally the legitimacy of the existing order. This question has at least two sides which here I would define as the problem of democratic

representation and the problem of the autonomy of voluntary associations.

The first of them I would like to formulate in terms of a brilliant early work of Putnam. As with other political systems, in liberal democracy “positions of political prominence are held disproportionately by people of exceptional political motivation and sophistication who have unusually abundant access to socioeconomic and political resources... only a few proportions of the citizens has more than an infinitesimal chance of directly influencing national politics” (Putnam, 1976, 9). Further, Putnam formulates the Law of increasing disproportion: “...no matter how we measure political and social status, the higher the level of political authority, the greater the representation for high status social groups” (ibid., 33). Putnam shares Gaetano Mosca’s belief that the role of elections is greatly exaggerated. Even though there could be historically significant elections, in most cases important matters in politics depend not on electorates but on selectorates, those individuals or small groups that are in position to select and nominate candidates for one or another career level (ibid., 156-157). To that immanent oligarchic structural trend during the last decades one can add others: the increasing of professionalization and bureaucratization of the political game, the considerable increase in the costs of the political process, the absence of political will for deep reforms that would limit the influence of privileged groups and corruption, the rising ineffectiveness of the state in the fight against crime (see for example *The Political Class*, 2005). In this situation, is not the withdrawal of people from civic participation an absolutely predictable reaction and entirely rational behavior?

Not less important is the question concerning autonomy of the organizations of “civil society”. Some of them have been designed to defend openly certain private interests, those of business, of the hired labor, of various occupations and so on. But it is not only them that are dependent on certain private interests. Non-governmental organizations have at their disposal extremely limited possibilities to finance their activity themselves, and their existence depends mainly on the good-will of corporations and other wealthy sponsors. Apparently “social capital” is doomed to grow as much as the other capital (the existence and nature of which is indisputable) allows that. Nowadays, large business and civic associations are in quite good “control” of the weakening

state. The question remains however: who is the one who controls the other main player, big business?

Similarly to “trust”, the idea of social capital is convenient, first of all, for ideological use. Through it, for instance, the unlucky development of a given society could be attributed to a moral deficit within that society. As if the problem lies in the fact that people do not believe each other and do not communicate freely with each other. Moral cure-all is offered as a remedy. But as Schafft and Brown note, “social capital” to a greater extent conceals rather than reveals social reality. They also disclose the total failure of the idea when it is transformed into projects for solving real problems of particular, even small local human communities (Schafft and Brown, 2003).

4.2. Culture of association and power relations

In Putnam’s, Fukuyama’s and their adherents’ views, quite a great role has been allotted to the concept of “culture”. Unfortunately, too much evidence could be found regarding its insufficiently correct use. In this respect Fukuyama’s rather lighthearted writing is particularly indicative. He talks about American, Japanese, Chinese, etc. “culture of trust”. Occasionally a distinction is drawn between the ethos of parts of a nation (north and south Italy, the north and the south of the United States) or between particular ethnic or religious groups within a nation. But, in any case, one single ethos of the country, region or group under discussion is assumed. There is considerable inaccuracy behind that.

Only notorious dogmatists would question today the influence of culture on economic activity. If Fukuyama had wanted to show us this role, we have to admit that others have done it much better than he did. The trouble is that he assigns one single moral code to millions, tenths of millions, and even hundreds of millions. However, from first-hand experience, it is clear to everybody that even within small groups people are quite different concerning their attitude towards labor, wealth, free time, etc. Fukuyama does not pay close attention to that utterly trivial fact. This is very important since carriers of changes in society, and especially in economic life, are neither all, nor the most, nor even a greater part of a nation or a smaller group. New models of activity and organization make their way through moderately sized minorities. They usually come into a moral conflict with the remaining part of the society. Their success does not depend on the moral approval of the majority but on the institutional environment,

which could either give them a chance or make their mission impossible. In particular, a range of factors, for example, weakening of old institutions and discrediting of the old elite, temptation of aristocratic circles by capitalist elements, military and political imperatives, raising status of the bourgeoisie and so on, could make an aristocratic society become fairly tolerant of the small bourgeois elite. Morality is an important social factor as long as it corresponds to the interests of its carriers, but is usually abandoned when it contradicts them. It is not just epoch-making changes but also all smaller variations in social organization that result from constellations of interests, always linked to one or another ethos and to different chances for success of separate agents.

A precondition for incorrect use of “culture” is also the fact that in the operation of economic organizations Fukuyama distinguishes between just two principles: control based on formal mechanisms (laws, regulations, contracts) and ethical norms. An essential group of power instruments, which are not based on formal rules but predominantly on economic dependence of persons and firms (controlling shares in the stock of other enterprises, dependence of the weaker on the stronger, interlocking directorship, hired labor relationships), has been overlooked. The proportion of formal and informal power mechanisms is specific in different cultures. In Japan, for example, informal power structures are much stronger than in the United States or in Western Europe. To various types of power correspond as much varying types of morality in economic relationships. Can one, for example, claim that the motivation of a worker with a guaranteed work place for the rest of his working life in a *kieretsu* in Japan is absolutely or predominantly moral? In total contrast with the situation of the Western worker, quitting or being dismissed would be a real catastrophe to him. Because of that he is pressed to accept much more burdensome duties in comparison with his colleague in a Western corporation. Fukuyama overrates the “trust” and the “mutual responsibilities”. In this way, however, real power relationships in economy and society are disguised. This does not mean that these relationships totally exclude the moral element. Japanese “culture of trust and mutual responsibilities” could be much more correctly defined as a culture of submission, leaving one’s life and interests in the hands of a supreme authority. Some of Fukuyama’s deliberations also make us think that way: his reflections on fidelity to the feudal master, the state and the company (see for example Fuku-

yama, 1995, Chap. XV). Western societies develop the culture of autonomous personality which is critical to authorities. This type of culture corresponds to the markedly formalized mechanisms of power and control in these societies.

Fukuyama's texts are full of casual and insufficiently supported assertions. His thesis that 80 percent of human behavior is explained by rational self-interest motives and the remaining 20 percent by ethical norms and values, is notorious. The author does not consider it necessary to describe why the components are these and why the correlation between them is exactly that. Considerable efforts go into proving that the United States are both an exceptionally well developed economy and a high trust society. On the one hand, striking facts are presented about the erosion of trust in American society after World War II and on the other hand, it is claimed that it had not just been but also continues to be a high trust society. In this respect, Putnam is much more consistent in his critical attitude towards American society. Fukuyama is not less fervent in his attempts to convince the reader that concerning trust Japan and the United States are rather close and not antipodes. He finds-- strangely in my view-- proximity between strictly authoritarian organizations in Japan (the family, yemoto associations, companies) and voluntary associations in the United States (Fukuyama, 1995, 208). If we assume that there exist structural similarities, the kind of relationships in each country, however, is completely different. When discussing the role of the state in economic development of different countries, Fukuyama finds close proximity in the development of the United States, Germany and Japan, and at the same time opposes Japan and France. Presenting such a classification is an act of outstanding courage. A lot of "details" which I do not have the possibility to discuss here, are disputable as well: the assertion, for example, that dozoku are not a kin organization (compare Bhappu, 2000, 411–412)

Finally, how heuristic and reliable Fukuyama's thesis is, becomes obvious from the fact that societies which, in his opinion, are examples of low trust (China, Korea and alike) demonstrate unprecedented and rather steady rates of economic growth.

4.3. Can the space of trust be extended?

Troubled by the crisis of trust in modern "developed" societies, Putnam, Fukuyama and many others offer the following formula for the future: the machine of liberal democracy and capitalism should

be lubricated with higher amount of trust, warmth, sympathy, solidarity. To what extent is this project feasible? Ruscio reasonably raises the question: "Isn't mistrust the guiding principle behind the architecture of our political system?" (Ruscio, 1997, 457). Sharing in general terms the view on trust criticized in the present article, Mark Warren admits: "Liberalism, and then liberal democracy, emerged from the distrust of traditional political and clerical authorities. Liberal innovations were aimed at checking the discretionary powers implied in trust relations... More democracy has meant more oversight of and less trust in authorities" (Warren, 1999, 1). Piotr Sztopka regards "the decay of moral space as an inevitable cost of modernity"—a process which in late modernity appears as "violent crime, distrust and cynicism, and the vanishing of social capital" (Sztopka, 2002, 63). Organizations introduce more and more legalist instruments to restore the trust lost by them but in this way government becomes more and more expensive and trust is increasingly ruined: when relationships are procedurally settled, the moral choice of agents and the moral reasoning of trust recede (Smith, 2005, 305–306; cf. Das and Teng, 1998, 501–502). The discrepancy between trust and formal organization increases in the voluntary organizations themselves: "while resources of trust are linked to their core values, voluntary organizations are increasingly governed by formal measures..." (Tonkiss and Passey, 1999, 257).

Some (for example Sztopka, 2002) see chances for recovery in late modernity itself (the reflexivity and globalization typical of it). Such expectations seem illusionary to me. It is well-known for example (emphasized by Fukuyama as well) that contemporary liberalization and globalization of economy made the Japanese economic system, in which many people usually see a great deal of trust, go through a severe trial. As it was shown in the case of post-communist societies, the triumph of global capitalism rather induces erosion of trust.

Global tendencies in the world in the last quarter of the century reveal redistributions of power. The position of the state weakens and that of private capital and corporations becomes stronger. Bureaucratic systems weaken to some extent but the role of mechanisms of economic compulsion strengthens. This transferring of power does not create conditions for extension of the area of trust in society, whatever the case may be. It gets the chance to increase only where the field of domination (authoritarian, bureau-

cratic and economic) is reduced as a whole. However, it is clear that this is not included in the calculations of theorists discussing social capital and trust. Not a few among them rather feel nostalgic about that world of the past when people “trusted” each other or, to put it more precisely, accepted humbly and left themselves in the hands of those blessed with power.

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DEGREE OF TRUST IN THE WESTERN BALKANS AND BULGARIA

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Abstract:

This article depicts empirical research conducted in the Western Balkans and Bulgaria (project Balkan Monitor 2006 conducted by the Gallup Europe) that is geared towards the trust that citizens have in national and international institutions, as well as people in general. Empirical research provides a realistic picture of trust as seen from the inside. According to the data collected, within the general population, the strongest percentage was given to neighbors, followed by the police and European Union. A considerable degree of attention was given to interreligious confidence and focus was placed on the number of adepts of a particular faith and the degree of confidence. From Islam, Orthodoxy and Catholicism to Protestantism, the degree of confidence diminishes, as well as the number of adherents, which points out to the relationship between minority and majority. The findings suggest that the degree of trust towards religious communities comes as a dominant attitude which means that these are the institutions that merit the greatest degree of trust. The exceptions are Albania and Kosovo where NATO comes first, whereas in Serbia NATO comes last. Ex-communists enjoy trust from 4% of the respondents whereas 24% completely rejects them. 8% of the respondents have a lot trust in people in general whereas 9% have no trust in people at all. For the purposes of this paper we will depict only a number of questions related to the degree of trust in various countries.

Key words: Western Balkans, trust, religion, minority, majority.

Introduction

*Trust begets trust; fear escalates fear.
Trust and fear are keys to understanding
persons and social systems
(Gibb 1978: 16).*

Is the world a dangerous place for living? Can we trust people? How much do we trust each other? When do we start to learn of distrust? Is there any place where we can be safe? How is it with the Balkans states? How do we prepare ourselves to live a whole fulfilling life where there are so many dangerous possibilities?

“Trust (derived from the German word *Trost*, meaning “comfort”) implies instinctive, unquestion-

ing belief in and reliance upon something. Confidence implies conscious trust *because* of good reasons, definite evidence, or past experience. Confidence is more cerebral, more calculated and based more on expectations than trust is. Trust can be, and often is, instinctive; it is unstrategized and freely given. It is something very much like love, and its presence or absence can make a powerful difference in our lives.” (Gibb 1978: 14)

The psychosocial theory by Erik Erikson (1963) emphasizes lifelong emotional development and focuses on instinctive drives as they relate to society. Human development consists of the progressive resolution of conflicts between needs and social demands. During each stage, the person resolves specific crisis before progressing to the next set of problems. “These eight stages begin with the stage of *trust versus mistrust* during infancy. For ego identity to emerge, the infant must develop a sense of trust in herself and in the world. Such trust is predicated on the sense that there are people in the infant’s world who can be counted on to provide comfort and care... If the infant’s needs are not attended to, she will not develop a sense of trust and the feeling that the world is a safe place.” (Zigler, Stevenson 1993: 50)

Trust is something that is learned. Basic trust, gained through the first year of living, is the basis for the development of personality and its relation to the broader societal affairs. At that stage, experience is the only method of study, and precisely the experience with parents and their ability to respond to the needs of the child. That trust develops a whole set of the characteristics of personality, which are shaped by experience and mentally ingrained. It shapes the personality as well as cognizance of the experience, its rethinking and the transfer of emotional into rational, and sometimes even verbal expression (Kuburic 2009).

The Balkans is the context where we examine mutual trust, and the research potential is backed up by the Faculty of Philosophy in Novi Sad where we nourish the culture of tolerance and dialogue. From numerous workshops with students of diverse national and religious orientations as well as the atheist

slant of the magazine *Religion and Tolerance* (www.ceir.co.rs) where sociologists of religion, philosophers, historians, psychologists, lawyers, experts in the field of theology give their contribution to the study of religion. The basis of the journal is the editorial "Dialog and Dogma" as an embodiment of our efforts to surmount the paradigm of conflict between religion and non-religion as well as conflicts between religions and their mutual distancing. The path conducive towards tolerance was outlined in the books that depict an era where dialog is essential (Simonović-Kuburić et al, 2001a; 2001b, Kuburić 2002; Kuburić, Moe 2006; 2008; 2009).

Religious freedom came at the beginning of 1990s. Confessional education/catechism returned to the educational system, first in Croatia in 1991, followed by Bosnia in 1994, and Serbia followed in 2001. The Freedom of speech became reality. These developments were followed by questions such as: Whose religion and where should it be taught? Which criteria mark the correct description of a religion? Did the freedom of speech on one's own affairs imply the freedom of speech against the others? What should we do with religious minorities? Sociologists of religion tried to maintain a balance and avoid the biased position "for and against religion, but about the religion itself", and the science witnessed a shift from methodological atheism to methodological agnosticism (Hamilton 2003; Vukomanović 2004; Đorđević 2007; Kuburić 2007a).

A necessary condition of the freedom of speech is mutual trust. The atmosphere where we can balance and conduct a free conversation is the atmosphere of trust; What is more, empirical research points to the exact nature of this atmosphere. Trust in God constitutes the essence of every religion, and this trust can only be built through interpersonal relationships, or it shapes relationships between people. Trust is built gradually, it can be annihilated, and it is difficult to re-gain it. The Balkans is an area where the history of rich social upheavals has been written for centuries, involving victories and defeats, memory and vengeance. How can we depict the beginning of the new century in the Balkans with regard to the mutual trust of the peoples? Is the picture uniform or do we have variations? Who is in the centre and where is the centre of events in the Balkans? According to pertinent research done after 1990s, it is clear that religion regained credibility, and that the degree of religiosity increased, being perceived mainly as confessional belonging (Đorđević 1990, 1994; Kuburić, Vukomanović 1999; 2005; Blagojević 1995, 2005; Bolčić, Milić 2002; Radisavljević-Čiparizović 2002; Kuburić, Stojković 2005; Tripković 2005).

The book *Images of religious other, discourse and distance in the Western Balkans*, contains the fruits of a 2006 joint research project of the Kotor Network on Religion in Plural Societies (Christian Moe 2008: 9). The "others" refers for the most part, to people who belong to a religion other than the dominant religion in their society, the latter being the religion with which the dominant ethnic nation more or less strongly identifies. Religion is a significant aspect of the ethnic identities of the Catholic Croats, the Orthodox Serbs, and the Muslim Bosnians, who are all South Slavs speaking roughly the same language. Albanian ethnicity, on the other hand, is marked by the wholly different Albanian language, whereas religion is neither unifying nor distinctive for the multi-religious Albanian nation.

This study about religious others was done at the same time when *Balkan Monitor* started. We can compare discourse about distance and discourse about trust. Is there any connection between images of religious others and trust in others? "The images of the religious other have been formed for centuries and transmitted from generation to generation, based on a historical legacy but interpreted in the light of current events. The Balkans have been in a ferment of constant conflicts, migrations, divisions, mutual distance and distrust." (Kuburic 2008: 194)

How much do we trust each other?

Generally speaking, we can have an impression about mutual trust in our countries. With regard to the present date and the Western Balkans, empirical research points to the degree of trust that individuals have in people in general as well as some institutions of the social system. We can say with certainty that our individual experiences came together and formed the basis of the belief in God. Research findings show that religious communities top the group of the institutions with regard to the degree of trust in most of the countries of Western Balkans. Although they are imperfect, their power witnessed a renaissance partly because of the intrinsic inefficiency of other institutions.

The *Balkan Monitor* has measured the level of confidence that the people of the Balkans have in national and international institutions. "The churches/religious organizations of the region remained the institution in the region that inspired most confidence. It was the most trusted organization among all major ethnic groups except for Albanians in Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo (who had more trust in NATO) and people in Croatia (who had more confidence in the military). People in Montenegro and Kosovo Albanians showed the strongest confidence in their national government.


Government confidence was lowest in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. Across all countries, political parties were the least trusted of all the institutions that the survey covered.“ (Gallup Balkan Monitor 2009: 8).

Survey in 2009 shows that the greatest degree of confidence in church and religious organizations is in Kosovo 88%, Montenegro 82% and then in Macedonia 75%, Serbia 66%, Bosnia and Herzegovina 64%, Croatia 61%, whereas the smallest percentage is in Albania. In Kosovo, the institutions that merit the greatest degree of trust are: NATO 87%, police 82%, military 91%, religious organizations 88%, the EU and United Nations 77%. If we look at the degree of distrust, NATO is on the bottom in Serbia because only 2% have firm trust in it whereas 14%

have only partial trust. If we are not talking about extreme positions, then we can mention briefly other institutions as well. A detailed account of tables introduces us to interconnections of the relations based on trust that is formed through assumptions and experience (Gallup Balkan Monitor 2009).

Looking for the variables according to which Serbia differs from the other Balkan states, we have found that the only such variable is the one which answers the question "Did you smile enough yesterday?" Greatest number of those questioned said that they have not which manifests a level of satisfaction. This is another way to show that Serbia is a loser in this transition and that Srbs as a nation and as citizens are less satisfied.

Chart 1



From Chart 1, we conclude that the most positive answers on trust come from Montenegrins, with all together ten categories were above 50% of them manifest trust. Bosna follows closely. Serbia is

the country which has expressed the highest level in trusting *people* (69%), but in relation to the other categories, it is at fourth place, after Macedonia.

Chart 2





Chart 3



Kosovo is a special case. People there are inclined to take extreme positions. We notice a gap of 16% between the categories in which people have a solid trust, and those in which they do not. If we could judge only on the basis of trust manifested in the nine categories and ignore the existence of groups in which they don't have trust, Kosovo would be on the second place in relation to trust, after Montenegro. It is unusual to notice that in their conception of propensity, trust in people comes as the eighth category, 56% of respondents have trust in people generally, 41% Kosovars don't trust the ex communists at all, 35% don't trust foreigners, and 29% don't trust Protestants.

In Bulgaria, the people questioned have been polarized according to categories in which people have substantial trust, and those who invoke an extreme distrust. The lowest level of trust in the whole study is shown by the Bulgarians towards foreigners. Altogether only 17% have some trust, and 46% none at all. The following groups earned less than 30% of trust: foreigners, immigrants, Protestants, ex-communists and Roman Catholics.

Albania has to be treated specially and in the following explanations we have to have in mind that people have estimated the level of their trust to be generally low in all categories. Neighbours are the ones who deserve the most trust, but even this is not higher than 57%. The average level of trust in neighbours in the other countries included in the study is 70%. Trust in all other groups in Albania is under 50%, even in people generally (46%). The general trust in people has been taken by us as a middle value from which the examples of big trust deviate, and in all countries except Kosovo and Albania these positive deviations are for the dominant religion and neighbours. In the study from 2009 Albanians have expressed their confidence in foreign institutions as 75% (EU) and 80% (NATO) (Balkan Monitor 2009:22).

At the present time, power lies in the hands of churches and religious communities. If we pose a question as to who merits the greatest degree of trust within religious communities, we find out that these are persons devoted to the hermit way of life (Kuburić 2002). Among these the patriarch has the greatest level of trust because he is the genuine symbol of national identity, morality, spirituality, devotion to God and people. He offers hope in an era of difficulties. His simplicity and longevity, as well as wisdom in delivering succinct messages to the people have solidified this overall picture.

After these general considerations we will depict the degree of trust of the citizens in various states in the Balkans as well as try to determine in-

tensity. We find possibilities for analyzing this phenomenon at the level of comparison of state and indicators. We use the results from the first waves of the survey when research was conducted on the sample of 9.464 respondents in 2006. This research has been conducted repeatedly each year and in 2009 detailed research was published with the scheme of change across the years. The survey is representative of the adult population (15 years and older) in the Western Balkan countries. It was gathered through face-to-face interviews. The margin of error for the survey is +/- 3%. The data and methodology can be found at website www.balkan-monitor.eu (Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2007; 2008; 2009).

The Balkan Monitor subjects were the standard of living, migration, expectation and perspectives, criminal and security, business climate, perception of the future (family, community, country and region), mentality/rethinking of history, identity/identities, religion and spirituality, war, perception of the others, trust in institutions. For the purposes of this piece we will depict only a number of questions related to the degree of trust in various countries. On a personal note, the most interesting topic for us is to look at the degree of trust in various states. But before we talk more about the 2006 survey we would like to show samples, country by country.

Sample	Frequency	Percent
Serbia	1556	16.4
Montenegro	834	8.8
Macedonia	1042	11.0
Albania	981	10.4
Kosovo	1046	11.1
B&H	2002	21.2
Bulgaria	1003	10.6
Croatia	1000	10.6
Total	9464	100.0

How much trust do you have in international institutions?

Table 1. The United Nations - how much would you say that you trust?***percentage**

Country	Serbia	Montenegro	Macedonia	Albania	Kosovo	BIH	Croatia	Bulgaria	Total
A lot	4	5	7	10	20	5	4	6	7
Some	35	36	42	26	41	38	32	37	36
Only a little	29	22	29	28	23	28	28	16	26
Not at all	24	23	17	10	9	18	20	13	17
Don't know	3	4	1	9	2	5	14	27	7
Refused	6	10	4	17	5	7	2	2	6
N=	1556	834	1042	981	1046	2002	1000	1003	9464

Looking at all countries together, for 7% of the population the United Nations merit a great degree of trust, for 36% partial trust and for the rest scarcely any. The UN has different connotations and the ex-

perience with them are different for various nations in the Balkans. So Kosovo expects a lot of support from this organization, it is international, strong, and merits a great deal of trust

Table 2. The European Union - how much would you say that you trust?***percentage**

Country	Serbia	Montenegro	Macedonia	Albania	Kosovo	BIH	Croatia	Bulgaria	Total
A lot	7	10	12	12	26	8	5	17	11
Some	44	44	45	33	39	43	35	50	42
Only a little	25	18	26	22	21	27	29	16	24
Not at all	17	16	13	8	9	13	20	8	13
Don't know	3	5	1	10	2	4	10	8	5
Refused	5	8	3	14	3	6	1	2	5
N=	1556	834	1042	981	1046	2002	1000	1003	9464

The European Union is in a better position than the United Nations in Western Balkans. How close the EU is to a number of states can best be seen from this table. On average 11% of the inhabitants of the Balkans have a very high level of trust towards this institution, 42% have partial trust, 24% only a small degree, whereas 13% have none at all. The greatest degree of trust in the European Union is in Kosovo

whereas the lowest level of trust is in Croatia. It is quite reasonable to ask: why does Kosovo have such a high degree of trust and Croatia such a low degree?

How much trust do you have in institutions of the state system?

Table 3. Your country - how much would you say that you trust?***percentage**

Country	Serbia	Montenegro	Macedonia	Albania	Kosovo	BIH	Croatia	Bulgaria	Total
A lot	7	13	10	6	20	5	7	7	9
Some	41	43	44	31	45	41	40	27	39
Only a little	27	18	26	25	20	29	26	23	25
Not at all	17	14	18	22	11	16	17	31	18
Don't know	3	5	1	7	2	4	8	9	5
Refused	4	8	2	10	2	5	1	3	4
N=	1556	834	1042	981	1046	2002	1000	1003	9464


What is the degree of trust people have in the state? Sometimes we have a dilemma whether we should place trust in our own state or another. Ser-

bia, BiH and Croatia have a similar distribution curve and degree of trust – 46–48% a lot and some whereas 43–45% only a little and not at all. About

17% of their inhabitants have no trust in the state at all. A better situation is found in Montenegro (56%) and especially in Kosovo where 65% have trust in their country. Albania with 37% of trust and 22% no trust at all shows the lowest degree. Bulgaria is a

special case where 31% do not trust at all in their own country, while at the same time while 67% of Bulgarians trust in the EU with 17% of those trusting unconditionally.

Chart 4



One's own country has disappointingly lost the confidence of the 18% of the inhabitants on average. 9% give full trust to this institution. There is a significant degree of those who trust as opposed to those that don't. Looking across the states we can see that the newly formed countries are those whose inhabitants have a greater degree of trust in the state. Media, as a part of the state politics are not in a favorable position. 15% of the population does not have trust in this institution whereas 7% have trust. Here, the distribution is slanted towards distrust.

Table 4. The media - how much would you say that you trust?

*percentage

Country	Serbia	Montenegro	Macedonia	Albania	Kosovo	BIH	Croatia	Bulgaria	Total
A lot	4	4	8	7	18	8	4	7	7
Some	41	42	45	40	45	44	33	45	42
Only a little	35	28	30	27	23	27	32	25	29
Not at all	16	18	15	12	12	13	23	15	15
Don't know	2	4	1	6	2	5	7	6	4
Refused	2	4	2	9	1	3	1	1	3
N=	1556	834	1042	981	1046	2002	1000	1003	9464

Table 5. The police - how much would you say that you trust?

*percentage

Country	Serbia	Montenegro	Macedonia	Albania	Kosovo	BIH	Croatia	Bulgaria	Total
A lot	8	8	13	9	36	16	9	11	14
Some	44	46	46	41	38	45	48	45	44
Only a little	29	22	24	24	16	22	23	22	23
Not at all	14	15	15	10	8	11	14	15	13
Don't know	3	5	1	8	2	4	5	6	4
Refused	3	5	2	9	1	3	1	1	3
N=	1556	834	1042	981	1046	2002	1000	1003	9464

It is interesting to note the impact of the media and the degree of trust across regions. In Kosovo, there is a high level of trust in the media. In Croatia and Montenegro it is meager. In order to comment on these developments it would be necessary to conduct a content analysis of the media and determine whether it is a matter of distrust towards the accuracy of the information or the critical consciousness

of the people and their education as well as the ability to accept information from various sources.

How can we understand degree of trust in police? If people have a lessened trust in media and in the police then they feel bad, as they are insecure and feel cheated. When talking about trust, this is an important issue which relates to institutions of the state system. This certainly has correlations with

political government and societal trends, but it is also reflected on the private level by citizen's feelings of being betrayed and feeling insecure in their own environment. In other works we have cited cases when police didn't want to protect religious minorities. Surely, there were cases where the police were unable to protect them. In the case of Serbia we can remember numerous clashes between people and the police, demonstrations and long peaceful protests, but also those who attacked their own people with tanks. The Serbian case is also unique in

relation to bombardments by NATO forces which left a number of consequences, one of which is a reduced trust in the state institutions as well as international ones. Whatever rationalizations were behind those attacks, such experience can never create trust but only more depression which can be recognized in this study. In comparison to the neighbouring countries, trust in the police is lowest in Serbia.

Are people worthy of your trust?

Table 6. People in general - how much would you say that you trust?

*percentage

Country	Serbia	Montenegro	Macedonia	Albania	Kosovo	BIH	Croatia	Bulgaria	Total
A lot	9	6	5	2	7	11	10	6	8
Some	59	59	56	43	49	56	56	57	55
Only a little	21	21	30	34	28	22	23	25	25
Not at all	7	9	8	13	15	6	7	8	9
Don't know	2	3	1	4	1	3	3	4	3
Refused	1	2	0	3	0	2	1	1	1
N=	1556	834	1042	981	1046	2002	1000	1003	9464

Chart 5




Table 7. Your neighbors - how much would you say that you trust?

*percentage

Country	Serbia	Montenegro	Macedonia	Albania	Kosovo	BIH	Croatia	Bulgaria	Total
A lot	13	11	9	6	17	16	16	15	13
Some	61	59	60	51	55	60	55	57	58
Only a little	19	18	24	27	19	16	20	17	20
Not at all	5	6	6	10	8	3	5	8	6
Don't know	2	3	1	4	1	3	4	3	3
Refused	1	3	1	3	1	2	1	1	1
N=	1556	834	1042	981	1046	2002	1000	1003	9464

Table 8. Your coworkers - how much would you say that you trust?***percentage**

Country	Serbia	Montenegro	Macedonia	Albania	Kosovo	BIH	Croatia	Bulgaria	Total
A lot	8	7	7	4	10	10	14	12	9
Some	50	48	44	38	40	45	43	50	45
Only a little	18	14	22	17	16	16	13	13	16
Not at all	6	6	6	6	11	5	5	5	6
Don't know	9	13	10	21	10	11	12	17	12
Refused	9	13	11	15	13	13	14	3	12
N=	1556	834	1042	981	1046	2002	1000	1003	9464

Table 9. Strangers - how much would you say that you trust?***percentage**

Country	Serbia	Montenegro	Macedonia	Albania	Kosovo	BIH	Croatia	Bulgaria	Total
A lot	1	2	3	4	5	3	3	1	3
Some	35	37	32	20	24	34	32	17	30
Only a little	31	27	35	28	32	33	31	30	31
Not at all	24	25	25	28	35	20	23	46	27
Don't know	3	3	2	8	2	4	9	6	5
Refused	5	7	4	11	3	7	1	1	5
N=	1556	834	1042	981	1046	2002	1000	1003	9464

Table 10. Immigrants - how much would you say that you trust?***percentage**

Country	Serbia	Montenegro	Macedonia	Albania	Kosovo	BIH	Croatia	Bulgaria	Total
A lot	1	2	3	7	4	4	2	1	3
Some	31	36	30	35	30	33	23	19	30
Only a little	30	23	35	26	35	26	28	19	28
Not at all	23	20	26	9	21	21	25	19	21
Don't know	3	6	1	9	3	5	22	39	10
Refused	13	14	6	14	7	11	2	2	9
N=	1556	834	1042	981	1046	2002	1000	1003	9464

From the close people with whom we are in a communication, besides the family, which as the relation is not entered in the questionnaire, neighbors and working associates are those to be trusted and are expected to provide help. Still, unconditional trust has only 13% and 9% of the population, whereas distrust towards these groups has a small percentage of the people which is 6%. Hence we can conclude that neighbors merit the most trust from all research relations.

On the other hand, groups that give incentive to distrust and towards which people tend to keep their distance are strangers and immigrants. 27% and 21% of the general population do not have trust in these groups at all. Being a foreigner in the Balkans means being a target for rejection and observation. This

seems to be the destiny of all closed societies. If we look at the Balkans through these lenses it is clear that those who are unfamiliar and are not traditionally present are not welcome. Except that, this diversity is not approached from the perspective of tolerance, which developed in the Occidental world, but from the perspective of keeping one's own home, because fear is present as a defense mechanism against the Balkan wars and migrations.

Do we have trust in believers more than in others?

Bearing in mind that we started this research with a story on the trust in religious organizations, we want to finish it with the analysis of various religious groupings in the Balkans and the degree of trust in the members of these communities. Is this

Table 11. Protestants - how much would you say that you trust?***percentage**

Country	Serbia	Montenegro	Macedonia	Albania	Kosovo	BIH	Croatia	Bulgaria	Total
A lot	4	3	3	3	4	4	4	1	3
Some	36	42	31	21	22	39	37	22	32
Only a little	21	17	29	21	26	22	23	12	22
Not at all	19	15	29	20	29	15	15	14	19
Don't know	4	5	1	12	5	7	21	47	12
Refused	17	17	6	24	15	14	2	4	13
N=	1556	834	1042	981	1046	2002	1000	1003	9464

Table 12. Catholics - how much would you say that you trust?***percentage**

Country	Serbia	Montenegro	Macedonia	Albania	Kosovo	BIH	Croatia	Bulgaria	Total
A lot	4	5	4	6	4	9	10	1	6
Some	42	49	43	28	28	43	54	26	40
Only a little	23	20	32	22	27	21	19	11	22
Not at all	15	9	15	12	22	10	6	12	13
Don't know	3	5	2	11	4	6	10	46	10
Refused	12	12	5	22	14	9	1	4	10
N=	1556	834	1042	981	1046	2002	1000	1003	9464

Table 13. Orthodox - how much would you say that you trust?***percentage**

Country	Serbia	Montenegro	Macedonia	Albania	Kosovo	BIH	Croatia	Bulgaria	Total
A lot	12	15	14	7	4	12	4	11	10
Some	58	58	47	30	26	49	39	50	46
Only a little	16	11	24	22	26	17	24	11	19
Not at all	5	4	11	11	24	9	15	5	10
Don't know	3	5	2	11	5	6	17	21	8
Refused	6	8	3	20	14	7	2	3	8
N=	1556	834	1042	981	1046	2002	1000	1003	9464

trust founded on the trust towards believers or religious leaders? Perhaps God is the only being worthy of trust. Still perhaps the power of a community is in the number of believers and their influence in the community. In the Balkans Protestantism is alien to the culture of the Balkans and not only that it is in the minority, it is distanced from the dominant community (Kuburić 2001; Kuburić 2004; Kuburić 2008).

We can talk about a better position for Protestants in Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia where there is more trust for Protestants. In Macedonia it is average for all countries (34%). We find that Albania, Bulgaria and Kosovo have under-average trust toward Protestants.

In general the ones that attract most adherents have also the greatest degree of trust. Hence, in the Balkans the Orthodox (56%) and Islamic (52%) faith prevail, so that people trust these churches and religious communities. Full trust in Muslims is 12% whereas in Orthodox it is 10%. On the other hand, distrust towards Muslims is expressed by 12%, whereas the Orthodox have 10%. If we circle the numbers we will see that the normal distribution curve becomes apparent, and we can see that the greatest number of respondents are reserved. So we notice that the relationship towards orthodoxy becomes balanced and there are both positive and negative attitudes (normal distribution).

Table 14. Muslims - how much would you say that you trust?***percentage**

Country	Serbia	Montenegro	Macedonia	Albania	Kosovo	BIH	Croatia	Bulgaria	Total
A lot	5	8	18	9	29	15	4	5	12
Some	38	52	38	32	38	46	38	32	40
Only a little	25	16	24	23	17	19	24	14	21
Not at all	18	11	15	9	8	8	15	15	12
Don't know	4	5	1	11	4	5	18	31	9
Refused	11	9	4	16	6	7	2	4	7
N=	1556	834	1042	981	1046	2002	1000	1003	9464

Table 15. Former Communists - how much would you say that you trust?***percentage**

Country	Serbia	Montenegro	Macedonia	Albania	Kosovo	BIH	Croatia	Bulgaria	Total
A lot	4	6	5	3	1	6	3	2	4
Some	37	45	32	15	20	40	35	24	32
Only a little	25	17	23	19	24	22	22	15	21
Not at all	20	13	34	30	41	17	20	27	24
Don't know	4	5	2	11	3	6	18	28	9
Refused	11	14	5	21	11	9	2	4	10
N=	1556	834	1042	981	1046	2002	1000	1003	9464

There is a lot of trust for Muslims in Kosovo. As we see on table 14, there are 29% with extreme acceptance. Islam in Croatia is not much in trust because we can see that just 4% of population say that they have a lot trust in Muslims and 38% have some, 24% only a little and 15% not at all. Numbers not much better are given for Orthodox in Croatia (4% a lot and 39% some). In Bulgaria there are most people (31%) who do not know answer. We can conclude that in Muslim countries there is more trust in Muslims.

Ex communists are in an unfavorable position and can be likened to the position of a foreigner. 4% of the respondents have confidence whereas 24% reject them as persons who are not to be trusted. Individuals who belong to the old regime do not merit trust. This newly formed cohort of the marginalized during the transition has upset the social structure that became divided across other lines. The best position of ex-communists is in Montenegro, but in Kosovo and in Albania there is less trust in them.

Differences between religious adherents and degree of trust (mutual trust in Western Balkans and in Bulgaria)

Confessional structure of sample

Orthodox	4.288	45%
Muslim	3.216	34%
Catholic	1.430	15%
Protestant	37	0%
Other Christian	28	0%
Other	49	1%
No religion	276	3%
Don't know	96	1%
Refused	44	1%
Total	9464	100%

What is your religion?***percentage**

Country	Serbia	Montenegro	Macedonia	Albania	Kosovo	BIH	Croatia	Bulgaria	Total
Catholic	5	4	0	13	2	14	87	1	15
Orthodox	84	71	65	14	8	38	4	69	45
Protestant (Historical)	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Other Christian	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Muslim	6	20	34	67	88	44	1	14	34
Other	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1
No religion	2	2	0	2	0	1	6	12	3
Don't know	1	2	0	2	1	1	0	1	1
Refused	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	1	1
N=	1556	834	1042	981	1046	2002	1000	1003	9464

Table 16. Protestants - how much would you say that you trusts?***percentage**

What is your religion?	Catholic	Orthodox	Protestant (Historical)	Other Christian	Muslim	Other	No religion	DK	Refused	Total
A lot	4	3	27	16	3	0	6	1	1	3
Some	35	35	42	30	27	54	32	7	29	32
Only a little	25	21	29	24	22	8	15	9	19	22
Not at all	15	19	0	0	23	15	12	13	13	19
Don't know	16	11	0	20	9	6	26	53	13	12
Refused	6	13	1	10	15	17	9	17	25	13
N=	1430	4288	37	28	3216	49	276	96	44	9464

Table 17. Catholics - how much would you say that you trust?***percentage**

What is your religion?	Catholic	Orthodox	Protestant (Historical)	Other Christian	Muslim	Other	No religion	DK	Refused	Total
A lot	16	4	17	9	4	3	5	1	1	6
Some	50	41	62	37	34	61	34	9	31	40
Only a little	18	23	19	24	24	6	16	13	19	22
Not at all	5	13	1	0	17	5	13	9	11	13
Don't know	8	10	0	20	8	7	26	54	14	10
Refused	3	9	1	10	14	19	7	14	25	10
N=	1430	4288	37	28	3216	49	276	96	44	9464

Chart 6





Chart 7



In Chart 6 and Chart 7 we can recognize that mutual trust in Western Balkans and in Bulgaria between Orthodox and Muslims are so much similar. The mutual relationship are the same. The main question is whether they trust each other more than other religions. In tables 18 and 19 we can see de-

tails about trust and answers on question: *How much would you say that you trust?*

How it is with former communists today? It looks like the trust in the communist system is disappearing. Another stranger in one's own territory. Is there always a conflict between science and religion?

Table 18. Orthodox - how much would you say that you trust?

What is your religion?	*percentage									Total
	Catholic	Orthodox	Protestant (Historical)	Other Christian	Muslim	Other	No religion	DK	Refused	
A lot	6	17	12	18	4	3	5	8	1	10
Some	41	55	62	53	36	57	41	9	37	46
Only a little	23	14	23	14	23	13	17	11	21	19
Not at all	12	4	1	0	18	6	11	10	8	10
Don't know	13	6	0	9	7	7	20	52	14	8
Refused	4	5	2	7	13	15	7	11	20	8
N=	1430	4288	37	28	3216	49	276	96	44	9464

Table 19. Muslims - how much would you say that you trust?

What is your religion?	*percentage									Total
	Catholic	Orthodox	Protestant (Historical)	Other Christian	Muslim	Other	No religion	DK	Refused	
A lot	5	4	5	7	26	11	5	9	12	12
Some	39	39	56	30	42	60	33	11	38	40
Only a little	24	24	26	22	16	4	18	10	14	21
Not at all	13	18	9	22	5	6	15	6	4	12
Don't know	14	8	0	9	5	9	23	53	16	9
Refused	5	8	4	10	8	11	7	12	16	7
N=	1430	4288	37	28	3216	49	276	96	44	9464

Table 20. Former Communists - how much would you say that you trust?

What is your religion?	*percentage									Total
	Catholic	Orthodox	Protestant (Historical)	Other Christian	Muslim	Other	No religion	DK	Refused	
A lot	4	4	17	0	3	1	8	1	1	4
Some	32	36	47	32	27	35	27	9	30	32
Only a little	21	22	28	15	20	27	18	6	16	21
Not at all	23	21	7	21	31	19	23	20	19	24
Don't know	14	8	0	21	6	8	19	50	12	9
Refused	5	9	1	11	12	10	6	15	22	10
N=	1430	4288	37	28	3216	49	276	96	44	9464

In the end we can agree with the conclusions from the Gallup Balkan Monitor (2009: 34) that the Western Balkans, despite often being discussed as a bloc with a common set of traits and policy issues, are in fact a highly diverse region. The results of the *Balkan Monitor* reflect this diversity – they show that not only the countries but also ethnic groups within the countries have distinct views. But we would like to add that religion is the key word of this diversity. Differences between the countries are influenced by religious affiliation.

Discouraged categories of population per countries

Measuring trust in people in relation to age and gender, we come to a conclusion that women and girls in BiH that are younger than 25 have lower levels of trust. 14% express a complete lack of trust in people, and 31% say they have only a little. On the other hand, men in the same age group in BiH do not stand out as having lack of trust. However, girls of the same age from Kosovo are considerably less trusting, with 20% claiming they have no trust in people and 40% saying they have only a little.

In Albania, 21% of young men under 25 do not have any trust in people, 30% have only a little, and 45% have trust in people. The most disillusioned are men over 40 years of age who grew up during the previous regime. 19% of them have no trust in people at all, 35% only a little, while 32% have trust in other people.

The only country where the middle generation (25 to 39 year-olds) has lowered trust in people is Montenegro, where among men of this age group 15% have no trust at all, 23% only a little, but this does not designate an overall crisis because 85% have trust in people.

Serbia and Bulgaria do not demonstrate the critical groups, although one can conclude that girls (and women) have somewhat less trust in people than men. A similar situation prevails in Croatia, where the interesting result is that among men above 40 years of age, 13% do not have trust in people at

all, 32% only a little, while 35% have some or a lot. Women of the same age group have the most trust in people: 73% have at least some trust in people and 16% of these have a lot of trust.

In Macedonia, people who live in the rural areas have less trust than those living in the cities – 11%. While in Serbia and Croatia we see a somewhat lower trust in young women than in young men, in Macedonia the situation is reverse: young men have somewhat less trust in people than women.

Conclusion

How much would you say that you trust – the following people or groups?	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error
People in general	9464	2.60	1.388	.014
Your neighbors	9464	2.43	1.431	.015
Your coworkers	9464	3.69	2.740	.028
Strangers	9464	3.46	1.841	.019
The United Nations	9464	3.40	2.197	.023
The European Union	9464	3.03	2.021	.021
Your country	9464	3.15	1.910	.020
The media	9464	2.98	1.697	.017
The police	9464	2.80	1.767	.018
Immigrants	9464	3.90	2.349	.024
Protestants	9464	4.12	2.591	.027
Catholics	9464	3.69	2.504	.026
Orthodox	9464	3.28	2.357	.024
Muslims	9464	3.37	2.392	.025
Former Communist	9464	3.84	2.365	.024

Looking particularly at the 15 options to give voice to trust, on the whole sample we can see who are these people, groups and institutions that merit the most trust. A degree of confidence in the Balkans has its own hierarchy. People in general have a great degree of trust in their neighbors. If somebody is to be believed these are neighbors (72%) and this

is the highest percentage in the category. In second place of those who have a high degree of trust are the police with 58%. Third place is reserved for the European Union. We can say that these are the three medals for victors that are expected to contribute to the well being of the society, on the level of state departments that have the responsibility of protecting on the broader level where the EU is the hope of all states in the Balkans.

On the other hand, groups that attract distrust are foreigners and immigrants. Being a foreigner in the Balkans means being rejected and observed. Ex communists are also in a non-enviable position and can be likened to foreigners. This position started during the period of transition and did upset the social order that split across other lines.

At the present date power is on the side of the national churches. From all of the religions, Orthodoxy is the most salient in the Balkans and merits the greatest degree of trust not because of the essence of the religion but because of close relations towards it in the Balkans. Second religion according to the number of adherents is Islam. Catholicism comes third in trust levels but the distribution is slanted towards mistrust because there are twice as many of those who mistrust as opposed to those who trust (13% do not have trust, whereas 6% have trust). Protestants in the Balkans are a group that is rejected from 19% of the respondents whereas it is accepted from 3%.

Two close relations with regard to the degree of trust are directed towards those with whom people live in the same place and towards working associates. These are mutual friendships that are based on personal experience and trust. The second category is religious belonging where we also accept close and familiar people as our own. The third category includes political institutions whose aim is to keep law and order so that a certain degree of trust is interlinked with them.

In conclusion, from an anthropological perspective, we can point to trust in people in general. Being a human is a sufficient reason for trust and distrust depending on the personal experience of the individual. Do people have an idea if people are to be trusted? Unconditional trust have 8%, whereas the percentage of those who distrust is around 9%. We can say that this averages all other attitudes and that these people will be in different roles from neighbor and colleagues to policeman and journalist, priest and imam, and they present themselves differently in these roles. Extreme positions used to point out to the hierarchy of power that is found in the trust obtained. Extreme trust and distrust is expressed dependent upon the sureness which makes them ready to take an attitude. This is why in the analysis of the answers we have given greater priority to extremes.

Trust in people was most salient in Croatia and Serbia whereas it was least salient in Albania. Looking across the states, we can notice that there are differences, but that they are insignificant. In Kosovo and Albania there is the greatest distance towards communists. The greatest distance towards the Orthodox was in Kosovo and Croatia.

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Book reviews

Alexandru Boboc, Cultură modernă și “tradiție de cultură”

[Modern Culture and "Cultural Tradition"],

Grinta Publishing House, Cluj Napoca, 2008

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Alexandru Boboc is one of the best known historians of modern and contemporary philosophy from Romania. His editorial and academic activity covers more than four decades. From his works we can mention here some: *Kant și neokantianismul* (Kant and the Neo-Kantianism) 1968, *Filosofia contemporană* (Contemporary Philosophy) 1995, *Limba și ontologie* (Language and Ontology) 1997; *Cunoaștere și comprehensiune* (Knowledge and Comprehension) 2001; *Formă și valoare* (Form and Value) 2005. Just like the other works, which cannot be mentioned here because of their great number, these works are a real contribution to the contemporary dialogue in philosophy and to the modern reconstruction of the domains of theoretical and philosophical creation. The philosophical and cultural comparative theory is an essential characteristic of his activity.

The book *Cultură modernă și “tradiție de cultură”* (“Modern Culture and ‘Cultural Tradition’”) aims to determine a necessary relationship between these two expressions which are so much used at present. From this point of view, undoubtedly the undertaking of A. Boboc is also a hermeneutical one, if we accept that one of the aims of the interpretation is also to discover the original meanings of our terms. But because the author’s intention is also to highlight the real characteristics of culture and their interweaving, this attempt takes the shape of a true “phenomenology of culture”, in the Hegelian meaning of the word “phenomenology”. One observes the massive presence of the German bibliography (that does not abolish the acknowledgment and the approach at the right moment of noteworthy contributions from other geographical horizons), as well of the themes belonging to German Philosophy,

a fact which reflects the author’s affinity with German culture. This work is thus not only a research into the fundamental traits of culture, but also an opportunity for the author to reaffirm his value options associated with that what is called “German Thoroughness” (*Deutsche Gründlichkeit*). One can remark that A. Boboc proceeds in the manner of Ernst Cassirer, who permanently exposed his own ideas in connection with various conceptions belonging to other thinkers, conceptions which are associated with the discussed issue. Such a proceeding, as Cassirer confesses, has not the intention to show the author’s erudition, but to express the gratefulness for those who in the past contributed to the understanding of that problem.

The introduction of this volume is dedicated to the issue of “difference”, namely the “ontological difference” between Being and Entity (*Sein und Seiendes*). By presenting the conceptions of several thinkers, such as M. Heidegger, Hegel, N. Hartmann, the author stresses that this difference must not be understood in the sense of a metaphysical and dogmatic tradition, which separates Being from Entity, by putting them on different sides of the world, but Being must be thought of in connection with the occurrence of Entity and Entity, on the other hand, must be conceived starting from the way it lightens the Being. In this context, Jean Beaufret is mentioned, who proved that the ancient Greeks have thought of the past participle both as if it were a name (noun) and a verb. Through this identity, in Antiquity the Greeks could grasp as a unity what later was transformed into a difference. In this context, writes A. Boboc, the main interest for contemporary research remains the relationship between human thinking and Being, because access to this

Being is given to us only through the Entities which we encounter in our experience. "In any way," says A. Boboc, "the questions 'Was ist es, das uns ins Denken ruft?' (Heidegger) and 'What do Entities say about Being?' (C. Noica) announce the ontological 'place' where – through a functionalization of the difference in the dialogue with the tradition and in the reconstruction of ontology – the true issue is that of the relationship between Thought and Being" (p. 19). The author remarks that the veritable understanding of the ontological difference must surpass the identity which may appear in the moment when every Entity is thought from the point of view of Being, and that in this surpassing modern thought has discovered that this difference comprises not only the entire material reality, but is also deepened by human thought. "The ontological projects discussed before (Heidegger, N. Hartmann, C. Noica) prove that we cannot anymore advance into the ontology of the difference in a traditional way, but we must accept the horizon of the plurality and diversity of constructive perspectives" (p. 19). Thus the introduction of the book can be seen as a true program, its aim being actually to prove the legitimacy of the cultural plurality as the legitimacy of different perspectives on reality, in the sense of the words of the Romanian mathematician Grigore Moisil, who once said that "axiomatic liberty represents the fundamental trait of the human thinking" (p. 19).

Cultural difference is not only a mode of the "ontological difference", but also a plurality of totalities of meanings. Culture itself is seen by A. Boboc as such a totality. Then a next question may arise, namely concerning the form in which such a totality can develop. An answer is given by the theory of Ernst Cassirer and his *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*. The author shows that for Cassirer, the symbol, as a symbol, is not only an instrument which allows us to reflect upon the outer reality, but is especially a way of materialization of the human spirit. Through its activity, this spirit exteriorizes itself always as a system of signs, a system that is not independent of the contents which it transmits, but is identical with them. Therefore, sign and symbol are analysed by Cassirer not starting from their relationship with an outer reality, but in the context of the way they emerge through an integrated activity of signifying and functionalising of the human spirit. The culture is thus also for A. Boboc a prod-

uct of a particular law of generation, which expresses itself in every creation of that culture.

The same idea is discussed in relation with the esthetical conception of N. Hartman. This German philosopher affirms that the artistic image, in opposition with the natural image, forces us to stop before it due to its contents and due to the configuration of this contents. The "dis-realisation" proper to the artistic proceeding represents for Hartman the way through which the artist leaves the reality in order to express himself through the artistic work. The reality represents in this context not so much a reference point, but a pretext. For A. Boboc, "this new meaning of the subject had positive consequences in the modern understanding and construction of science and art theories, of cultural forms in general" (p. 33).

This approach of several philosophical conception aims to draw the attention on the main feature of cultural activity as an autonomous activity in rapport to reality. We have seen the symbolism as being one of such characteristics and then the "dis-realisation". Another main aspect of the culture is the role "form" plays in it. But creative activity means not only the organic development of a form: it comprises also the act of elimination of all irrelevant excess. Through this elimination the form is brought into unity with the idea that lies at its basis. In this sense, writes A. Boboc, the formal principle acquires its meaning only in rapport with the ideal principle: "Form (as essential, as a unification centre), realises itself only through a context (language, work, action, etc.) as an Idea" (p. 37). Because of this unity between idea and form, one can distinguish between form and figure: the form is a result of the human creative act, founded in an idea, whereas the figure, as a simple reproduction of an outward configuration, has rather a mechanical character. This difference between form and figure is rendered best in abstract art. In this sense one reads: "The expression *Idee und Gestalt* highlights with precision (and nuance) the meaning of 'form' as form of the universality, beyond of the particular forms in art, science, culture in general" (p. 40).

Since the author intends to show the main aspects of the cultural act in its medium of realisation, i.e. to explain it in an immanent perspective, the next level of discussion aims to explain the inward orien-

tation of this act, namely its centring on a value. Therefore, the following chapter of the book is dedicated to the phenomenology of value and to Max Scheler. This philosopher was the first who founded the values in the emotional sphere, but without explaining them through a psychological approach. Such a founding was possible because Scheler discovered the existence of an *ordo amoris*, of a logic of emotions which separates the sensibility from the simple psychological approach. On the other hand, Scheler denies the existence of objective norms, which disregard the concreteness of the human life. The logic of emotions, “la logique du coeur”, as Pascal once said, exists not only at the individual level, but also at the social and historical level. In this sense, writes A. Boboc in this context, because the cultural creation is oriented by values, and values, on the other hand, are emotionally founded in a *sui generis* logic, this creation is historically oriented not only by the ideas belonging to a particular era, but at the same time by certain emotional configurations, which determine the materializations of the corresponding ideas. In this way, adds the author, “in essence, the ‘emotional side’ (actually the affective sphere) builds an autonomous domain, with proper forms and laws, but it functions within the emotional life as such and in the complex mode of the being of the human individual as a person who belongs to a community of persons” (p. 51).

By discussing the issue of value, and continuing his general comparativist approach, A. Boboc also presents the original contribution of the Romanian philosopher Petre Andrei (1891-1940) to the understanding of this subject. Like Scheler, Petre Andrei maintains that there is a logic of value, a logic which allows us to approach the value question independently of the psychological approach. The Romanian philosopher says that in the centre of a logic of values must lie the idea of “understanding the value as a logical element of our knowledge” (p. 57). The investigation of value must take into account the difference between the knowledge of the value and the acknowledgement of the value (i.e. the practical adhering to a value or to another) (p. 60). The last characteristic connects the conception of Petre Andrei with the sociological interpretation of values, as we can find in M. Scheler (*Wissenssoziologie*).

The formal analysis of the culture is further completed with a historical perspective, where the

concrete cultural fact is related to its milieu, to the era and the historical moment to which it belongs. This new frame of interpretation allows A. Boboc to expose the conception about the artistic work pertaining to another Romanian philosopher: Tudor Vianu (1898-1964). The author appreciates that: “actually, in the majority of T. Vianu’s studies (even if not always obviously) the principles of the comparative method are at work (and those of the historical method, in the sense of the genetic approach of the cultural phenomena). This principles are applied both to the study of literatures and to the study of the interactions between various cultures of the world” (p. 76). A. Boboc appreciates that the main intention of the Romanian thinker was “to secure from a philosophical point of view the cultural tradition of humanism” (p. 79) in an era of great social upheaval, as the years after the First World War were. This purpose meant actually the regaining of the unity with the past, a unity which had to take into account also the specificity of new cultural creations. T. Vianu considered that this unity could be given only through the “active conception of culture”, a conception which was imposed in modernity in Germany (especially by Goethe). We may see this active conception of culture even in the way Vianu understands the ethnic specificity of a Nation in general, in this case the Romanian Nation. Rejecting the preconceived idea of an unhistorical specificity, of a substance which is always present in all the different stages of the development of a Nation, Vianu says that “‘The question of who we are, what represents our originality?’ clarifies itself for every Nation only through its numerous works, in a long period of cultural creatio.” (p. 87). We see thus that by exposing the ideas of Tudor Vianu, A. Boboc obtains a new feature of culture: namely that culture is always the result of an activity, that the cultural contents does not generally exist, as an atmosphere that surrounds a Nation, but the entire being of that Nation is built only by its activity. And the culture belongs to this activity.

Modern thought, which abandoned antique and medieval substantialism, which no longer builds up reality as a passive participation in ideal substances and eternal essences, tries to find new ways to understand that what forms the inward unity of a culture. In this sense, A. Boboc examines anew the issue of “style”, as a necessary aspect of every cul-

tural act: "Apparently a classical one, the debate concerning style did not lose its actuality. We must understand style first of all as a medium through which human condition realises itself as a value condition in manifold ways, which are forms of the cultural creations (language, myth, art, science, philosophy etc.). Therefore in all of these forms we may observe a diversity of styles, which are comprised in a possible unity, named 'cultural style'. This general style suppresses neither the specificity ("the styles"), nor the oppositions between the active styles in a cultural era, but places them in a meaningful interaction necessary for the understanding of the meaning of the culture." (p. 95). The author pregnantly expresses the presence of a stylistic determinism inside the culture as follow: "Human creations (especially the arts) are not aligned as in a numerical series, but are connected in a form of a circle of circles, so that what was once established as a true value, does not remain 'beyond' (in the era of its genesis), but is always present" (p. 101).

The stylistic unity of culture leads the author to the identification of a new characteristic of it: the temporal unity of culture. Culture is not only the multitude of the cultural works which were created in the course of time, as a sort of mass of individuals which was built through addition, but appears as a totality where the past continues into the present and into the future, a totality that allows us to talk about a "perennial presence" of values: "On this background, writes A. Boboc, we may consider culture as the exemplary unity of this interweaving between present and past, the 'prolongation' being evident due to the co-presence of the value creations of the former products of the human spirit with its new achievements, more 'actual' ones" (p. 107).

A special chapter is dedicated to the Romanian poet Mihai Eminescu (1850-1889), whose work is considered from a universal point of view. We discover in these pages a very interesting relation between the Romanian poet and ... Leibniz. That is all the more interesting because one accepts usually as main "sources" for Eminescu's thought Kant and especially Schopenhauer. The fact that Eminescu is considered "the last great romantic", allows A. Boboc to enlarge his interpretative horizon and to highlight the affinity between the Romanticism and the monadological perspective of Leibniz. Romanticism, through its deepening into the worlds of past,

of dream, of night, avoids the domination of an absolute realism and opens itself to the idea of a pluralistic universe, that is to say to the idea of a multitude of possible parallel worlds. Thus the Romanticism discovers the legitimacy of cultural creation (the genius, who imposes the own laws and rules) as the creation of several autonomous worlds. "More than through Kantian space and time, the Romantic space of poetry may be understood in the horizon of the Leibnizian monadology. As a space of value creation in the form of poetical work, poetical space is a closed space, in relation to its sense, and an open one through its meaning" (p. 129). Thus from the point of view of A. Boboc, Romanticism is that era when modern culture becomes conscious of its specificity as culture, of the fact that it has an autonomous condition and that it is much more than only an "adaptation to the outer world". If Goethe, as one said, still saw in the "healthy culture" a presence of the nature in the sphere of human existence, the romantics became aware of the irreducible character of human culture. The investigation of Eminescu's work, as exponent of the romantic spirit, allows the author to show the manner in which this awareness emerged. Therefore the discussion concerning Eminescu's creation also generates the possibility of new generalizations concerning the ontology of culture.

The poetic work is seen as an absolute unity, a unity which, alike the Leibnizian monad, reflects in a unique mode the entire Universe. This unity is not a product, a temporal product, but is the result of a true *creatio ex nihilo*. Leibniz says about monads that "they can come into being only through a creation and can disappear only through an annihilation". In the same sense, writes A. Boboc, poetical spaces and cultures in general begin at once to be, in the form of a poetical creation. They do not develop, do not die, and are like Platonic Ideas (p. 133).

Because cultural creation resembles the creation of a new world, as how this creation is conceived by the myths and religions, the next frame of analysis is represented by its interpretation from the point of view of myth and metaphor. The myth is not an anachronistic stage of human thought, stresses A. Boboc, but is an atmosphere which embraces permanently, in different forms, the human being. Through myth, man has tried to explain the apparition of the world and his own condition. The myth is

not a tale, but a true instrument of understanding the world. In it we can see for the very first time the implication of human subjectivity, actually of imagination. The objective character and the subjective character build in myth a unity of action, which forms the “profile” of the mythical world. This unity is expressed through a metaphor. This is the proceeding through which, a word that means a given, “objective” reality, acquires through an “implicit comparison” a meaning which it never had before. In this way, man, since he is permanently surrounded by a mythical atmosphere, is also a being which permanently uses metaphors. His culture is grounded necessarily on the metaphor. We may say that the metaphor allows actually the configuration of all the worlds of culture. Therefore, admits the author, quoting from the Romanian philosopher Lucian Blaga (1895-1961): “The metaphorical mode is not something which may be or may be not..... The genesis of metaphor coincides with the genesis of man and belongs to the groups of the permanent symptoms of the phenomenon ‘human being’. Therefore metaphors cannot be only the research object of ‘poetry’ or ‘stylistics’” (p. 147).

The necessity of metaphor consists not in its plastic character, in the comparison, but in the fact that it allows the first “objectivation” of the subject, that is to say it allows the first manifestation of this subject, because every comparison made by a human being brings with it his entire universe of meanings. From this point of view, one may admit that metaphor has a “revealing” character. The object of this revelation is not an external truth, but the human being itself. This revealing emerges as an articulating and shaping of the outer world as a world of man, and not as a world in general, wherein the man could exist or not. The conclusion is the following: “The word, the ‘mythical image’ and the thought – a meaningful triad for the action power and dignity of the human spirit, which comes into being through metaphor” (p. 153).

The reflections regarding the meaning of the metaphor are continued with an inquiry concerning the role of the language in the ontology of the human being. The language is here not conceived only as a communication mean (what it certainly is), but especially as a mean of “humanization”, i.e. a mean through which a human being can be brought into existence as a dialogical being, a mean which builds

actually our *Mitsein*. The fact that language is more than mere communication is highlighted by the possibility that it may hide the veritable message. Therefore a hermeneutical effort is needed. The language is thus also a medium through which the human spirit can express its inexhaustible and incommensurable character. Every concretization of this spirit (in language, in science, in arts or in myths) is only one of the innumerable possible perspectives on reality and on itself. Through language and dialogue (as through other forms of culture), a human being is permanently able to perpetuate and to transform itself.

The recognition of this structural perspectivism, inherent to human culture, is not only an opportunity for a deepened self-understanding, but also a motive of confusion for the postmodern consciousness. A. Boboc rejects the pessimism and relativism that emerge thus for this consciousness. The present sketch of an “ontology of culture” ends with a vigorous optimism, which may be considered as a Goethean optimism, with an apology for humanistic values and of the truth of human being. But this optimism also means to assume an endless creativity: “The veritable way to obtain an equilibrium (between universal and specific character, between universal and national character),” says the author, “always remains the truth, the endeavour to place oneself into the truth, an endeavour which brings together predecessors from the past, the ‘unleashed’ world (the present) and the horizon (the future), by maintaining the consciousness of an inexhaustible character of the possibility of participation of all the individuals to the elaboration of this truth and of the limited character of every contribution to the progress of human knowledge” (p. 174).

The last part of the book contains several interviews given by A. Boboc during the last years. From these interviews emerges the image of a personality who succeeded, during the communism era, to remain a true researcher and a professor of philosophy. We are told that since his youth he had a passion for music and literature. This passion is abundantly reflected also in this book. After becoming a university professor of philosophy his interest was oriented especially towards modern German philosophy. One of the performances of Professor Boboc, was that, in spite of the very strong ideological pressure from that time, he succeeded in transforming an obliga-

tory lecture on the Critique of the Contemporary Capitalist Philosophy into a lecture on Contemporary Philosophy. After the falling of the communist regime, A. Boboc continued his academic activity –

we may say with much success, which is reflected both in a great number of students, who learned from him the main philosophical perspectives, and also in his many books.

Dimitri Ginev: Steps in the Hermeneutic Critique of Scientism. (Idea Publishing House, Sofia - Telematica College, Stara Zagora - Institute for Axiological Research, Vienna, 2007)

Studia Culturologica Monographs vol. 3.

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Dimitri Ginev's book is an intellectually exciting and philosophically significant endeavor to re-think the possibilities of the hermeneutic philosophy of scientific research in the task of understanding science's distinctiveness' and their epistemological background. The author of the book prefers a ready-to-hand context for this analysis: the Heideggerian hermeneutic phenomenology, especially Heidegger's conception of science.

However, speaking about a hermeneutic philosophy of science and emphasizing the significance of Heidegger's ideas on science is not a really well-known approach, so perhaps it would be useful to indicate a context of it. On another hand in prevalent interpretations of Heideggerian philosophy the question of science traditionally has little significance, so it is not really obvious what role the sciences play within his philosophical views, or what are the Heideggerian contributions to the philosophy of science.

Let's start with a short characterization of the philosophy of science. In contrast with the received view, philosophy of science is not a homogeneous field. There are many, fundamentally different versions of it, with essentially different views of science (and of the world). Frankly speaking, philosophy of science can be considered as a special kind of philosophy. Its peculiarity consists in the fact that world-views are built up in the process of characterizing of science. In this process philosophers try to focus on the following three central questions: What is science? How does it work? How does it change?

The typical variants of philosophy of science can be basically characterized by their views of what science is. Regarding this question three main contexts have been applied in the philosophy of science: a logical-linguistic, a social, and a life-world context. According to the logical-linguistic context, science can be considered as a specific set of sentences; in the social context, science is a kind of social product, while in the context of life-world science is a result of special human efforts. These

contexts are dominantly applied in the so-called analytic, social constructivist and hermeneutic versions of the philosophy of science. An additional possibility of the classification of philosophies of science can be based on the further characterization of the contexts. According to some views the above mentioned contexts (logical, social and life-world systems) are given as stable entities, but in some other views these contexts can be changed during scientific activity. This means that based on these meta-methodological principles we can distinguish six typical variants of philosophy of science: analytic, social constructivist and hermeneutic approaches, but each of them can use its relevant "passive" or "active" context, too. And, of course, we can reject any relevant established context for identification of the sciences – applying an anarchist epistemology and showing up a seventh tradition in philosophy of science.

Decisions about the application of the above contexts can be based on accepted or rejected cultural positions, on philosophical ideas, theories on society and human nature, and so on. Some philosophers of science accept existing (e.g. epistemological) positions while others try to build up their own systems.

These seven typical versions of philosophy of science represent the recent styles of thinking on science. The classification is based on general principles, so it is not representative as to the individual views of philosophers, but it is a useful tool for comparative analyses. The additional two central questions—How does science work? How does it change?—have also an important role in the characterization of the individual philosophers of science and contribute to the proper classification of their views.

The "birth" of hermeneutic (or hermeneutic phenomenological) versions of philosophy of science was a result of the so-called "hermeneutic turn" of philosophy of science in the 1960s. (Arriving at

different consequences of the critique of the traditionally positivist philosophy of science was the so-called social or sociological turn.) In these years Hanson, Kockelmans, Heelan, Kisiel, Apel, Føllesdal and others started to apply ideas of Heidegger (and Gadamer) to describe the sciences from a non-positivist position. As a consequence of these attempts, in the 1980s-90s a relatively well-identified trend was established in the philosophy of science—the hermeneutics of science, or hermeneutic philosophy of science. Of course, this process is not separable from the increasing popularity of the philosophy of Heidegger, Husserl, and their followers in the last decades all over the world.

But how is it possible to consider Heideggerian views as philosophy of science? Contrary to initial impressions, Heidegger's work has many relevant ideas here. Moreover, these are perhaps not really far away from the genuine Heideggerian intentions. A recent study on Heidegger's philosophy of science cites his own view in the following way: "In 1966, in a letter [...] Heidegger suggests three sets of questions to the participants of a symposium on the influence of his thinking. The first is the question posed in *Being and Time* of the meaning of being, whether that question has been taken up, if it is possible to do so, and how it characterizes his relation to the western tradition of thinking. The second is the question of the limits of *Being and Time*, what an account of the epoch of being accomplishes as an interpretation of the age of technology. The third raises the issue of the relation of being to modern science. Heidegger hopes the symposium will work out one of these questions." In this way it does not seem to be ridiculous to elaborate a philosophy of science based on Heidegger's philosophy.

Dimitri Ginev's studies collected in this book do not simply accept and recapitulate the Heideggerian conception on science, but evaluate critically, reformulate, and extend it, and based on this critique present a much more relevant, systematic "existential" philosophy of science. His main criticisms of the shortcomings of Heidegger's views are clear, essential and significant. Additionally, he takes into account contemporary contributions to the topic and its related fields, so it is almost obvious that these collected essays represent one of the most significant works in the hermeneutic philosophy of science.

Taking the problems of hermeneutic philosophy of science into a broader philosophical context some fundamental epistemological problems can be identified. How can we avoid a kind of epistemological

centrism in the processes of characterization of knowledge production? These dilemmas reveal the unjustified dominance of so-called scientism in culture, and provide the basis for its critique. As he writes: "In a narrow sense, scientism is the doctrine that science is the sole legitimate source of empirical knowledge", or scientism is a science's self-imposed "metaphysical ideology".

At this point we can realize the three aspects of the analyses included into the book. A hermeneutic philosophy of science and at the same time a critique of scientism is presented in the pages of the book – and behind of these proceedings can be found a building activity, developing a specific philosophical position. In brief: based on a so-called "cognitive existentialism" a specific hermeneutic philosophy of science (that is relevant to recent scientific research) and an effective critique of scientism are reachable in a parallel process.

There is no room to show the details of the argument, but some important elements can be mentioned. Instead of traditional scientific realism, a hermeneutic realism is proposed. Reality is not "out there" with respect to the consciousness. All mind's activities are "always already" involved in reality. The basic assumption of a hermeneutic realism is not that there are minds representing the world but that all minds are "always already" within-the-world. Hermeneutic realism provides the ontological tenets of cognitive existentialism.

In the Heideggerian conception of science, science's theoretical attitude arises out of the everyday-concernful mode of existence within-the-world. This is a rather complex process, but Ginev presents it as a transformation of what is practically and instrumentally ready-to-hand into what becomes objectified as a presence-at hand. His critical evaluation of this transformation is very helpful.

The book contains nine chapters, an introduction and an appendix. In Chapter One the relevance of hermeneutic concepts to the philosophical reading of normal scientific research is considered. A comparison between Kuhn's conception of normal science and Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics provides an opportunity for developing a hermeneutic alternative to the analytic philosophy of science. In Chapter Two and Three as a consequence of the basic deficiencies of Heidegger's existential conception of science and some conceptual distinctions made by Heelan, the idea of a "constitutional analysis" of science emerges. It analyses why the approach to the "hermeneutic fore-structure of scien-

tific research” requires transcending the distinction between the context of justification and the context of discovery; moreover it suggests a solution to science-nonscience opposition without appealing to the uniqueness of epistemological features like a special method, or a special relation to reality. In Chapter Four arguments are presented against Rouse’s philosophy of science which is based on a postmodern position. (The appendix contains some additional arguments concerning the radical feminist philosophy of science.) In Chapter Five and Six science’s cognitive distinctiveness is putting into a broader philosophical context and the standpoint of cognitive existentialism is developed. Chapter Seven and Eight addresses the metaphysical meaning of mathematical projects and the constitution of biological objects. Finally Chapter Nine elaborates on

the links between the hermeneutics of science and rhetoric of science.

Comparing this book to some another works of the author (*A Passage to the Idea for a Hermeneutic Philosophy of Science*, *Essays in the Hermeneutics of Science*, *Critique of Epistemological Reason: Perspectives to Philosophy of Science*, *Art Criticism and Multiculturalism*) at least two minor comments can be made. There can be seen in these books an admirable dedication to developing a valid, original, and coherent version of a hermeneutic philosophy of science. Nowadays this intellectual adventure has significant outcomes, such as the elaboration of the context of constitution, which has already appeared in this book and will play a central role in the next book of the author, entitled *The Context of Constitution: Beyond the Edge of Justification*.