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TRUTH AND MODALITIES (II)*

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Abstract:
I contrast two construals of the thesis that truth is independent of verifiability in principle: a modal one and a non modal one. I argue in favor of the modal construal and then, on that basis, that independence holds across the board, i.e., even for statements that are verifiable by us relative to familiar, customary, non-skeptical standards.

Key words: Contingency, Disquotation, Epistemic Necessity, Epistemic Possibility, Logical Necessity, Logical Possibility, Metaphysical Necessity, Metaphysical Possibility, Semantic Realism, Truth, Verifiability *hic et nunc*, Verifiability in Principle ; Bernays (Paul), Dummett (Michael A. E., Sir), Kant (Immanuel), Kripke (Saul), Loar (Brian), Montgomery (Hugh), Routley (Richard).

2. Possibilities

It has been suggested in section 1 that the lack of link, either conceptual or practical, between truth and its recognition by us secures that, for any statement *s* of some disputed class, the modal claim

(1) $\Diamond$ (*s* is true • *s* is unverifiable by us)

holds.

It has also been suggested that the proper formulation of the opposite view also appeals to modality so as to read thus:

(2) $\Box$ (*s* is true → *s* is verifiable by us)

and that the lack of mastery of the verification conditions of either (1) or the non-modal

(3) (*s* is true • *s* is unverifiable by us)

gives us no indication whatsoever that the challenge to achieve and manifest a proper understanding, or indeed a knowledge of (1) cannot be met.[1] It would give us such an indication only if we presupposed that the required understanding or knowledge be understood in terms of a procedure which would enable us to decide either (1) or (3),

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[1]. See Pataut (2022): 106–107.

or to put ourselves in a position to do so, modelled on the procedure we would follow to decide *s* should *s* be decidable. This can't be done with respect to (3) on pain of contradiction since the verification of either conjunct guarantees the falsity of the other. As for (1), a knowledge that its truth conditions obtain or are satisfied can't be equivalent to a knowledge that these very same conditions could obtain or be satisfied unbeknownst to us. Should this be the case, the realist position would turn out to be utterly unfathomable. We would have to argue that (1) itself is possibly true although unverifiable by us. This would lead to an infinite regress and to the prospect of having to argue, at each point of the regress, for a new modal claim having prior nested modal claims in the scope of the indefinitely reiterated possibility operator.

What we are looking for instead is a premise or a set of premises allowing us to conclude that (1), as opposed to formally deciding that (1) by some mechanical or quasi-mechanical procedure. So we now need to unpack what is at stake in the claim that no concept of effective recognition, either *hic et nunc* or in polynomial time, or of recognizability in principle, may be extracted from the notion of truth, either analytically or by way of some manifestability argument à la Dummett *given that the proper formulation of the realist position is a modal one* (i.e., given that it is indeed captured by (1)).

The unpacking requires that particular readings of the modal notions involved — possibility and necessity — be ruled out as irrelevant to the debate, and that the appropriate relations between the relevant ones be secured.

If the modal notion involved in (1) is epistemological, then either (1) isn't ruled out by what we know, or it somehow follows from what we know (a much stronger contention). In either case, the knowledge might be of a general nature, or it may pertain specifically to the particular domain of discourse of the statements of the class *s* belongs to.

If the modal notion involved is logical or metaphysical, then (1) holds independently of what we know or may know (either generally or specifically), i.e., whether or not *s* is either in principle verifiable by us, or actually verified on the basis of that knowledge (under either construal, the general or the specific).

As already noted in section 1, actually verified statements logically could be true beyond all possible verification. So although

(4) s is true $\rightarrow$ s is verifiable by us

is a logical consequence of (2), the advocate of (1) could very well accept it with the caveat that while it holds in the actual world given our cognitive makeup and the recognitional capacities we have at our disposal with respect to the verifiability of *s*, it very well could not hold in some counterfactual situation where the makeup and capacities would on the contrary justify its negation:

(5) $\neg$ (s is true $\rightarrow$ s is verifiable by us).

The fact that, in our world, either (4) or (5), or that either

(6) s is true • s is verifiable by us

or

(7) $\neg$ (s is true • s is verifiable by us)

hold, says nothing, either for or against (1).

In other words, (4)–(7) might be accepted on the basis of an observation of what our cognitive makeup and recognitional abilities tell us about the prospect of the verifiability in principle, or of the prospect of the actual verification *hic et nunc* of *s*.

It has been argued by some philosophers that metaphysical modalities are stronger and more substantive than logical or conceptual ones (see, e.g., *Kripke 1980* and *Lewis 1986*), or that metaphysical modalities should be understood in terms of special metaphysical laws (*Kment 2021*). I shall begin by leaving that issue on the side and use the expressions "logically possible," "metaphysically possible," and "conceptually possible" interchangeably, restricting myself to the nesting model according to which logical, metaphysical, or conceptual possibilities are more inclusive than, say, physical, natural, technical, or practical ones. The latter are taken into account in investigations regarding what may or may not be the case relative to initial conditions *restricting* the scope of what is deemed possible, thereby prohibiting the investigation of different and alternative kinds of states of affairs that turn out to be irrelevant for being beyond the scope of what is physically, or naturally, or technically, or practically possible, as the case may be.

In the kind of argument in favor of (1) we're considering now, we're going from the acknowledgment of the lack of practical or natural link between truth and verification (or verifiability), taken as a premise in favor of epistemic possibility, to the logical, or metaphysical, or conceptual possibility of truth beyond all possible verification (or verifiability). In other words, we're going from the claim that our folk theory of nature entails (1) to the claim that the possibility involved is *also* logical, or metaphysical, or conceptual, in virtue of the fact that everything that is possible according to what we know of the workings of nature is thereby logically, or metaphysically, or conceptually possible.

But does that provide a proper grounding ? Loar, for one, thinks that it does (see *Loar 1987:* 111-112). The claim that "metaphysical realism is entailed by an empirical theory" (*Loar, loc. cit.*), i.e., by our folk theory of nature, is nonetheless moot.

One could complain that the inclusion at play in the nesting model doesn't as it were turn the lack of practical or exhaustively manifestable link into a genuine lack of logical, metaphysical, or conceptual link. Although what is naturally and thereby epistemically possible is by the same token logically, or metaphysically, or conceptually possible, the inference

(8) $\Diamond_{\text{EPIST.}}$ (s is true • s is unverifiable by us)
→ $\Diamond_{\text{META.}}$ (s is true • s is unverifiable by us)

alone cannot justify the consequent in (8). In other words, it might be objected that one *should access* the metaphysical possibility via a *non*-epistemic route, whether or not it would appeal to a folk theory of nature, the idea being that *any* epistemic route would be defective qua epistemic. If the advocate of (1) arguing from contingency replies that nothing can be meant by a "*further* [italics mine] metaphysical or transcendental independence that ha[s] not thereby been secured" (*Loar op. cit.*: 111), two kinds of rejoinders might be proposed.

The first grants that the very same thing is meant so that there is no metaphysical possibility over and above the epistemic one, but insists that the metaphysical one is nevertheless in need of a *non* empirical claim or "theory" to sustain it (either a folk one, or one of a different kind). It isn't so much that some form of transcendency is intrisic to the metaphysical, it's just that the nesting model fails to provide the proper path to it and, therefore, a genuine argument. But this is tantamount to saying that although the content or nature of the possibility in the antecedent of (8) is identical to the one in its consequent, no argument has yet been provided. That rejoinder must surely rest on a mistake. Identity of nature or content guarantees, on the contrary, that the inference or entailment at play provides the proper path. In that case, the inference or entailment is as it were analytic, at least in the sense that *no extra content* need be provided that would turn the epistemic independence into an independence with a genuine metaphysical content, for it is *already* a bearer of that content.

The second line of reply is that the non-empirical claim or "theory" that would provide the required argument must on the contrary secure the additional or "transcendental" character of the metaphysical possibility involved in the consequent.

It is clear at this point that more than the mere consideration of the nesting model is needed (particularly if the second line of reply is chosen). The disagreement with respect to (8) concerns both the route (epistemic *vs.* non-epistemic) and what it leads to (something *over and above* epistemic possibility *vs.* something of exactly the same kind). In other words, we're in the following predicament: under the assumption that a non-epistemic route is needed to ground or justify the consequent in (8), it must be determined whether or not the logical, or metaphysical, or conceptual possibility is transcendent with respect to whatever has already been successfully secured by the appeal to a "theory of nature" that provides a ground for (1) (or for the antecedent in (8)) on the basis that the verifiability or unverifiability of s depends upon contingent circumstances we learn about from the observation that evidential relations between us and (the truth of) *s* may and actually do sometimes break down.

If we are to argue that the contingent connection between our recognitional abilities with respect to the truth of *s simpliciter* provides a ground for a non-epistemic kind of possibility, we'd better distinguish the logically possible from the metaphysically possible and the conceptually possible. As far as the claim that contingency does indeed provide a ground, we may end up with quite different results and it is now up to us to check which results might be obtained.

Let us now introduce these distinctions, keeping in mind that we must judge, for each of the possibilities we are about to consider, whether or not it turns out to more inclusive than the epistemic one under any of its two construals:

(9) The possibility in (1) is epistemic if and only if (1) isn't ruled out by what we know

(9*) The possibility in (1) is epistemic if and only if (1) follows from what we know.

We might think of the logically, the metaphysically, and the conceptually possible, respectively, in the following ways:

(10) The possibility in (1) is logical with respect to a system *S* if and only if (1) is consistent with the rules of inference, relations of logical consequence, and logical laws whose validity hold in *S*;

(11) The possibility in (1) is metaphysical if and only if (1) is true in some metaphysically possible world;

(12) The possibility in (1) is conceptual if and only if (1) isn't ruled out by the set of all conceptual truths, or follows from that set.

Our problem is now to determine what is available to the advocate of (1) with respect to either (10) or (11) or (12) under two distinct provisoes: under the constraint that these possibilities are already reached via an epistemic route (i.e., via either (9) or (9*)), and under the alternative constraint that they must be reached via a non-epistemic one.

Let us begin with (10). Whether (1) is indeed possible is now construed as a question about its compatibility with the rules of inference, relations of logical consequence, and logical laws of a given logical system. (1) is consistent with those of classical logic. But (1) isn't admissible in intuitionistic logic. In that case, excluded middle, dilemma, classical reductio, and double negation elimination are all illegitimate: they all equally forbid the logical possibility involved in (1). Note that to obtain an inductive definition of classical proof, it is sufficient to append any of these four rules or laws as an additional clause to the inductive definition of intuitionistic proof. Moreover, any classical proof resorting to one of these rules or laws may be transformed into a classical proof restorting to any of the other three.

So the claim that

(13) $\Diamond_{\text{EPIST.}}$ (*s* is true $\bullet$ *s* is unverifiable by us) $\rightarrow \Diamond_{\text{LOGIC.}}$ (*s* is true $\bullet$ *s* is unverifiable by us)

would hold just in case the logic restricting or specifying the scope of the possibility operator in the consequent is classical. In other words, the knowledge referred to in the right-hand side of the biconditionals (9) and (9*) provides a genuine support in favor of (13) just in case it is in agreement with the fundamental claims of classical logic, e.g., just in case the law of excluded middle holds.

What about (11)? The possibility that *s* be true beyond all possible verification by us is now construed as the possibility that the state of affairs that makes *s* true does indeed obtain unbeknownst to us in some possible world *W*. This is just *our* world, or so the realist claims. If it is also claimed that the possibility might be realized in *other* worlds, then the possibility that these worlds are accessible from ours must be secured.

Suppose we consider the accessibility relation in the framework of S5. Since the axioms of S5 require the accessibility relation to be an equivalence relation so that every world is accessible from every world, including itself, if the metaphysical possibility is secured in some world, it will thereby be accessible from any other possible world. All possible worlds in S5 collapse into a single equivalence class. But if we consider the accessibility relation in the framework of K, we'll be in a different situation with respect to the prospect of securing the metaphysical possibility that *s* be both true and unverifiable. In that case, we're able to tell whether a world is accessible from some initial world W_0 just in case a statement prefixed with ◊ is true in W_0. Whenever that will turn out to be the case, we'll discharge ◊ by creating a new, previously unreferred to world W_1 accessible from W_0.

As for (12), our question is now construed as being about compatibility with or derivability from *the* set of truths deemed conceptual. There are of course numerous disagreements about what is to count as a conceptual truth. Let us note that since (1) is a claim about the possibility of truth beyond verifiability, either effective or in principle, the concept formation problem gives a Kantian turn to the issue, something we already pointed to in the first section of the article.[2] If there are intuitional properties, i.e., properties that objects must possess insofar as they may be objects of our intuition, or properties of some other non-intuitional kind that objects must possess insofar as we may acquire a knowledge of them, some (alleged) conceptual truths will be ruled out.

In particular, our modal concept of *s* being possibly true independently of our being able to recognize it as true will be ruled out as something we might at best *conceive* — say, from what we know of the workings of nature (see, once again, *Loar loc. cit.*) — but definitely *not* as something we may actually *know*.

Even if, as it were *per impossibile*, the antecedent in

(14) $\Diamond_{\text{EPIST.}}$ (*s* is true • *s* is unverifiable by us) → $\Diamond_{\text{CONCEPT.}}$ (*s* is true • *s* is unverifiable by us)

could be secured on the basis of an argument from contingency, the truth of the consequent, *qua conceptual* would remain intrinsically beyond our kern. If it is argued that the conceptual possibility *follows* from the antecedent in (14), it would have to be explained what extra knowledge of a purely conceptual kind is secured beyond that already at work in the antecedent (if any).

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[2] See Pataut (2022): 105.

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BENJAMIN CONSTANT'S LIBERAL OBJECTIONS TO ROUSSEAU IN THE NAME OF MODERN LIBERTY

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Abstract:

Benjamin Constant and Jean-Jacques Rousseau were both Swiss-French political thinkers who had a significant influence on the subsequent development of political thought. Constant is known not only as a political philosopher but also as an active politician, who today is considered one of the founding fathers of liberalism. Rousseau, in turn, is considered one of the most controversial thinkers of the Enlightenment, who has been accused of laying the foundation for many revolutionary political movements and repressive regimes. The main objective of this work is to illustrate Benjamin Constant's liberal objections to the political philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. First, it is important to focus on Rousseau's main ideas for the full disclosure of the topic. Likewise, it is also crucial to take into account the historical context, which will be useful for understanding the motives for the formation of Constant's liberal views. Thus, in the first part of the work, we will briefly consider the main concepts developed by Rousseau in his book, The Social Contract, such as popular sovereignty, the state of nature, and direct democracy. In the second part, we will analyze the main political concepts of Constant and his critique of Rousseau, based on his books *The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns* and *Principles of Politics Applicable to All Governments*.

Key words: Constant, Rousseau, ancient liberty, modern liberty, popular sovereignty, individual rights.

1. Introduction

Benjamin Constant was one of the prominent Swiss-French political thinkers and an active politician in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. He is considered the founding father of modern liberalism, as he advocated civil liberties, separation of powers, religious tolerance, as well as representative democracy. It is safe to say that Constant's main political ideas stemmed from his own observations and experience, as he witnessed decisive moments in French history, such as the French Revolution, whose leaders are believed to have been inspired by Rousseau's idea of popular sovereignty, which consequently led to the terror and dictatorship of the Jacobins, as well as the despotism of Napoleon, who eventually concentrated all power in his hands after many years of political and social upheaval.

Thus, Constant, as a person who observed and witnessed the abuse of political power and repression of individuals by the state, began to become a zealous supporter of liberal changes in France and promoted the independence of private life from arbitrary state interference. Hence, he advocated a constitutional regime in France with separation of powers and individual freedom, which he regarded as a manifestation of modern liberty. In this regard, Constant criticizes Rousseau's political teaching, especially his idea of popular sovereignty, which implies the unconditional subordination of individuals to the so-called general will.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau was another outstanding Swiss-French philosopher and political thinker, one of the proponents of the contractual tradition, who over the past two centuries, has been periodically condemned for laying the theoretical foundation for various radical political movements and regimes, such as the French Revolution, nineteenth-century nationalism, and twentieth-century totalitarianism. Rousseau develops his central ideas about human nature and the structure of society in his main work, *The Social Contract*, where he puts forward two concepts–the state of nature and civil state–on the basis of which he elaborates his ideas about the origin of the state and the legitimacy of political power.

2. Rousseau's political philosophy

Compared with his forerunners, Rousseau's novelty consisted in the denial of the identification of authority with one individual. Sovereignty was rather based on the will of all those people who made up the political body. Thus, the theory of absolute monarchy has been altered into an alternative democratic version of absolute popular sovereignty. For Rousseau, sovereignty is an inalienable possession of human beings and part of their essence. It is this idea that distinguishes him from his predecessors, who viewed sovereignty as a temporary possession that had to be transferred to the appropriate authority. Consequently, Rousseau ascribes to the people not only the origin but also the exercise of sovereignty (Boucher & Kelly, 2005, pp. 118–119).

He is also considered to be one of the classics of the contractual tradition. He argued that humanity without government would live in the so-called "state of nature", where there would be no law and order. In this sense, he agrees with Hobbes that in the state of nature there are no concepts of law, rights, and morality, which implies that people do not have a natural predisposition to follow the moral law. However, unlike Hobbes and Locke, he believes that people normally try to avoid causing any harm to others, not because they consider it immoral, but because they have a natural aversion to harm, even if it is directed at others. So, people naturally sympathize with others and get upset when they witness suffering (Wolff, 2006, p. 25). Thus, the concept of the social contract is a theoretical attempt to legally substantiate basic human rights as opposed to political power represented by the state. Hence, concepts such as human nature, natural state, and natural rights come to the fore in the ideas of the contractual tradition.

According to Rousseau, even though in the natural state there is the freedom to do whatever one may desire, there is still no satisfactory freedom for everyone, since one is not free from the will of other individuals. As he writes, "man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains" (Rousseau, 1999, p. 45). Therefore, Rousseau argues that only the creation of a government and the establishment of public order can help people overcome these shortcomings, and furthermore, only the state can guarantee the protection of individual freedom and a harmonious life for all. Thus, he writes that the social order is "a sacred right, and provides a foundation for all other rights. Yet it is a right that does not come from nature; therefore it is based on agreed conventions. Our business is to find out what those conventions are" (Rousseau, 1999, p. 46).

Rousseau thus believes that there was no morality in the natural state, everyone was busy with self-preservation and constantly anxious about possible intrusions from other individuals. Consequently, the creation of civil society and government created the appropriate conditions for people to acquire moral liberty. Correspondingly, he asserts that the acquisition of moral liberty is "the only thing that makes man truly the master of himself; for to be driven by our appetites alone is slavery, while to obey a law that we have imposed on ourselves is freedom" (Rousseau, 1999, p. 59).

In this sense, Rousseau believes that people can be truly free only through the exercise of popular sovereignty, which is synonymous with the general will In *The Social Contract*, he vigorously opposes representative sovereignty, since popular sovereignty is a manifestation of the will, and the will cannot be represented, because representation implies alienation. Therefore, he says that the will is "itself or it is something else; there is no other possibility. The people's deputies are not its representatives, therefore, nor can they be, but are only its agents; they cannot make definitive decisions. Any law that the people in person has not ratified is void; it is not a law" (Rousseau, 1999, p. 127).

Accordingly, he claims that citizens living in representative democracies are deprived of their liberty since they transfer their will to other people who do not know the general will. In such circumstances, representatives in many cases act in accordance with the individual will and enact laws based on the values of groups and individuals, and not on the interests of the entire population (Sweeden, 2016, pp. 32–33). Rousseau says, "the moment that a people provides itself with representatives, it is no longer free; it no longer exists" (Rousseau, 1999, p. 129).

As it became clear, for Rousseau, only direct democracy can create conditions under which people could act freely as individuals within the framework of the state. In this case, people can govern themselves by having a direct voice in government decisions. Rousseau describes the general will as collective decision-making, and also as the universal or the most popular will that must be adhered to for the peaceful residence of all citizens (Sweeden, 2016, pp. 30-31). Rousseau writes, "each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will; and we as a body receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole" (Rousseau, 1999, p. 55). Furthermore, the general will is binding on all citizens. Rousseau states, "in order therefore that the social pact should not be an empty formula, it contains an implicit obligation which alone can give force to the others, that if anyone refuses to obey the general will he will be compelled to do so by the whole body; which means nothing else than that he will be forced to be free" (Rousseau, 1999, p. 58).

Besides, Rousseau opposes representative sovereignty because it does not comply with the principle of equality established by the social contract since the covenant negates any natural inequalities and declares the moral and legitimate equality of all citizens. Consequently, thanks to the agreement, all people become equal members of the body politic (Douglass, 2013, pp. 743–744). He writes that the original contract "substitutes moral and legal equality for whatever degree of physical inequality nature has put among men; they may be unequal in strength or intelligence, but all become equal through agreed convention and by right" (Rousseau, 1999, p. 62).

At this point, it is also important to note that Rousseau distinguishes between legislative and executive power, or, in other words, the sovereign and the government. As it became clear, the sovereign is the highest authority, so it cannot be represented, but this power does not extend to the governance of the state. Since every citizen cannot permanently participate in administration, representative government is inevitable. Thus, this implies that the general will refers exclusively to the legislative power and Rousseau's criticism of representation addressed against representative sovereignty, not representative government (Thompson, 2016, p. 327).

3. Constant's liberalism and his critique of Rousseau

Benjamin Constant, in his lecture *On the Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That of the Moderns*, delivered to an audience in 1819, distinguishes between two types of liberty: the "ancient," which implies the active participation of all citizens in the administration of the political community, and the "modern," which requires the maintenance of private rights within a representative political system. Thus, he speaks of two opposite types of liberty in the context of two different historical models of societies. Unlike Rousseau, who was a proponent of absolute sovereignty and criticized modern society, Constant advocated individual rights and limited sovereignty and was a supporter of modern commercial society (Garsten, 2009, p. 401).

According to Constant, the freedom of the ancients was the freedom of participation, which implies direct and collective participation in decision-making on issues of war and peace, legal problems, punishments, and other aspects of civil life. Therefore, Constant calls the freedom of the ancients political liberty and argues that active political life, in turn, required the subordination of private life (Lumowa, 2010, pp. 394-395). He writes that among the ancients "the individual is nearly always sovereign in public affairs but a slave in all his private relations. As a citizen he decides on peace and war; as a private individual he is constrained, watched and repressed in all his movements; as a member of the collective body he interrogates, dismisses, condemns, impoverishes, exiles or sentences to death his magistrates and superiors; as a subject of the collective body he can himself be deprived of his status, stripped of his privileges, banished, put to death, by the free choice of the whole of which he is a part" (Constant, 2010, pp. 2–3).

The ancient communities were relatively small in size, which allowed citizens to participate directly in political life. Furthermore, these small communities were usually located in the same geographical region, which, according to Constant, made them hostile towards each other. Thus, he writes that in such circumstances "each people incessantly attacked its neighbours or was attacked by them. Thus, driven by necessity against one another, they fought or threatened each other constantly. Those who had no desire to be conquerors couldn't lay down their weapons for fear of being conquered" (Constant, 2010, p. 3). Consequently, wars were constant, and this was seen as a way to gain new subordinates, since slave labor was crucial to the ancient type of economy, which, in turn, allowed citizens to take an active part in daily political activities. Accordingly, as a result of this "all these states had slaves. The manual labour and even (in some nations) the business activities were entrusted to people in chains" (Constant, 2010, p. 3).

In modern states, with the increase in territory and population, as well as with the abolition of slavery, direct political participation of citizens has become impossible. Instead, people began to value personal freedom and the rule of law and also started delegating their legislative rights to representatives, permitting them to be free from political commitments and focus more on their personal lives. Moreover, instead of wars, which were inevitable in ancient times, commerce began to predominate in the modern world, which allowed states to peacefully satisfy their needs. Constant states, "commerce is an attempt to get through mutual agreement something that one has given up hope of acquiring through violence" (Constant, 2010, p. 3). Furthermore, he writes that while turning to commerce "we are using a milder and surer means of making it in someone else's interests to agree to what we want. War is impulse, commerce is calculation; and for just that reason a time must come when commerce replaces war. We have reached that time" (Constant, 2010, p. 4).

Constant argues that there was a widespread tendency among eighteenth-century authors to feel nostalgia for ancient times and their values. One of them was Rousseau, whom Constant criticized for his idea of absolute sovereignty. He believed that Rousseau's concept of freedom, described in the Social Contract, is a type of freedom suitable only for ancient societies and inapplicable to modern conditions. According to Constant, Rousseau's ideas are probably the most frightening support for all kinds of despotism, and their implementation in our time would inevitably end in political tyranny (Brint, 1985, p. 324). In his essay on the types of liberties, he writes that Jean-Jacques Rousseau "was a sublime genius, animated by the purest love of liberty; but by transposing into our modern age an amount of social power, of collective sovereignty, that belonged to other centuries, he provided deadly pretexts for more than one kind of tyranny" (Constant, 2010, pp. 6-7). Consequently, it is safe to say that Constant never considered Rousseau a supporter of despotic types of government. Moreover, he believed that Rousseau's intentions were noble and generous, but in the hands of the Revolutionary terror and Napoleon's supporters, his concepts proved to be a useful justification for all kinds of terror (Brint, 1985, p. 325).

Thus, Constant claims that the concept of liberty in the Social Contract has some characteristic features that can be found in the ancient concept of political freedom. In ancient times, the concept of freedom was directly connected with the idea of collective self-determination, and the identity of citizens was connected with the community as a whole. Accordingly, he says that the liberty of the ancients comprised of "carrying out collectively but directly many parts of the overall functions of government, coming together in the public square to discuss and make decisions about war and peace; form alliances with foreign governments; vote on new laws; pronounce judgments; examine the accounts, acts, and stewardship of the magistrates; call the magistrates to appear in front of the assembled people; accuse the magistrates and then condemn or acquit them" (Constant, 2010, p. 2).

In contrast to the ancient liberty of small and homogeneous communities, Constant describes the modern concept of liberty corresponding to modern complex and heterogeneous states. He argues that true modern liberty is individual liberty, which implies that there is an independent and personal part of human life, shielded from any interference from society or the state. Therefore, Constant writes that people in modern times possess "the right to be subjected only to the laws; the right of each person to express his opinion; the right to come and go without permission; the right of each person to associate with other individuals—whether to discuss their interests, or to join in worship, or simply to fill the time in any way that suits his fancy; each person's right to have some influence on the administration of the government" (Constant, 2010, p. 2).

Hence, Constant seeks to point out the danger of applying the ancient concept of liberty to modern states and argues that by replicating ancient liberty, we will sacrifice our personal freedom and eventually find ourselves subject to political tyranny. On top of that, he argues that a common feature of all despotic governments is the use of arbitrary political power characterized by unlimited sovereignty, which does not recognize any fundamental human rights and arbitrarily violates them. Therefore, Constant advocates the limitation of sovereignty through constitutional guarantees of individual rights (Brint, 1985, p. 327).

In this sense, Rousseau's support of absolute political power in the Social Contract, even if it belongs to the whole people, poses a threat to individual liberty since it is, nevertheless, absolute and despotic. Hence, the central question of political authority is not who exercises political power, but rather what its limits are. Accordingly, Constant states that sovereignty should be limited, and its jurisdiction should end where personal life begins. He says that there is "a part of human existence which necessarily remains individual and independent, and by right beyond all political jurisdiction. Sovereignty exists only in a limited and relative way. The jurisdiction of this sovereignty stops where independent, individual existence begins. If society crosses this boundary, it becomes as guilty of tyranny as the despot whose only claim to office is the murderous sword" (Constant, 2003, pp. 145-146). Besides, Constant considers Rousseau's idea of mandatory participation of all members of the state in legislative activity despotic and argues that forcing people to engage in political activity means denying them the freedom to determine their own goals. Therefore, no one can "force them to be politically free" (Brint, 1985, pp. 327-328).

Nevertheless, this does not imply that Constant advocated political apathy. On the contrary, he encouraged people to participate in public life since active civic participation protects and promotes civil liberty, which, in turn, guarantees the protection of individual freedoms. Constant writes, "those who would sacrifice political freedom in order to enjoy civil freedom the more peacefully are no less absurd than those who would sacrifice civil freedom in the hope of further extending political freedom… If political freedom is not one of the individual possessions nature has given man, it is what guarantees them. To declare it worthless is to declare the foundations of the building one lives in superfluous" (Constant, 2003, pp. 386-387). Consequently, it is possible to trace Constant's intention to link modern liberty with the concept of political participation in the context of the representative system as a guarantee of individual enjoyments (Lumowa, 2010, p. 391).

According to Constant, in modern times citizens can exercise political liberty by delegating the legislative right to representatives to act on their behalf. He describes a representative system as "an organization by means of which a nation charges a few individuals to do what it can't or doesn't want to do itself" (Constant, 2010, p. 12). It is "a mandate given to a certain number of men by the mass of the people who want their interests to be defended but don't have the time to defend them constantly themselves" (Constant, 2010, p. 12). Thus, by delegating political tasks, people get more time to enjoy their civil freedom, strive for happiness and engage in self-development (Lumowa, 2010, p. 403).

For Constant, political liberty is not only a means of ensuring individual rights but also a part of human nature. Therefore, the realization of self-development is closely related to political freedom. Here is what he writes about it: "...I bear witness to the better part of our nature, to that noble disquiet that pursues and torments us, that desire to broaden our knowledge and develop our faculties. What our destiny calls us to is not happiness alone but to the improvement of ourselves; and political liberty is the most powerful, the most active means of improvement that heaven has given us" (Constant, 2010, p. 13).

Likewise, Constant was against religious intolerance and criticized any interference by the state in the sphere of religious beliefs, and also stressed the importance of government neutrality in this matter since any interference can cause harm. Therefore, he vigorously attacked the concept of "civil religion" described in the Social Contract, since it can allow the authorities to oppress anyone who does not adhere to the common civil faith (Steven, 2015, pp. 38-39). In this regard, he quotes the statements of Stanislas-Marie de Clermont-Tonnerre, who was the president of the National Assembly. Constant writes "religion and the state are two quite distinct and separate things, whose bringing together can only distort both one and the other. Man has a relationship with his creator. He constructs for himself or is given various ideas about this relationship. This system of ideas is called religion. Each person's religion is therefore his opinion of his relationship to God. Each man's opinion being free, he may take up or not take up such religion. The opinion of the minority cannot be subordinated to that of the majority. No opinion can therefore be commanded by social consensus…The political body must not have dominion over any religion. It must not reject any of them unless the cult in question is a threat to social order" (Constant, 2003, pp. 145–146).

Accordingly, Constant was against any government intervention in the religious sphere and believed that no civil or national religion should be placed higher than other beliefs and backed by the government. He contends that religious sentiments are one of the most natural emotions of people, and religion is essential for the morality and moral health of society (Rosenblatt, 2007, pp. 13-14). The diversity of opinions and beliefs and even the spread of religious sects do not pose any danger to the state. Constant believes that the proliferation of sects would have a positive impact on society since it would promote competition between different kinds of beliefs and lead to moral improvement and intellectual advancement. He asserts that the spread of sects ensures that "religion does not lose its sensibility, to become a mere form, an almost mechanical habit, which combines with all the vices and sometimes with all the crimes" (Constant, 2003, p. 137). As an example, Constant writes about the situation in America and Scotland, where "each new congregation would seek to prove the goodness of its doctrines by the purity of its morals. Each abandoned one would want to defend itself with the same weapons. A blessed struggle would result in which success would be judged by a more austere morality. Morals would improve effortlessly out of a natural impulsion and honourable rivalry" (Constant, 2003, p. 138).

4. Conclusion

As it became apparent, Benjamin Constant's central criticism was directed against Rousseau's idea of absolute sovereignty, since any absolute power, even if it belongs entirely to the people, is dangerous and can become the basis of various types of tyranny and despotism. Therefore, he advocated the separation of political power into several branches in order to prevent the usurpation of power by one person or a group of people.

Moreover, Constant maintained that the kind of liberty that Rousseau describes in *The Social Contract* is no longer applicable in the modern world, and calls it ancient liberty, which was possible in early communities characterized by active political participation in the administration of the state and limited freedom in private life. Constant, in turn, advocated for individual rights, the rule of law, the limitation of political power, and representative democracy, calling such liberty modern. This type of liberty implies greater individual freedom, which gives more opportunities for self-development and enjoyment of life.

Another important conclusion is that Constant, in spite of his emphasis on modern liberty, at the same time understood the significance of political freedom and people's participation in public life. He maintained that only by being socially active could people preserve their individual rights. In this sense, it can be argued that Constant sought to combine ancient liberty with modern liberty, seeing their interdependence.

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A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE COMPOSITION OF PROPOSITIONS IP9 AND IP10 IN SPINOZA'S ETHICS

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Abstract:
Spinoza's *Ethics* is one of the most important works in Western philosophy. Unfortunately, aside from the Vatican manuscript, which is very close to the final printed version, no drafts have been preserved. In this article I shed some new light on the composition of the early draft of *Ethics*. I argue that there are significant reasons to believe that propositions Ip9 and Ip10 in Spinoza's *Ethics* were added to the deductive argument later than the other first propositions: Ip1-Ip8 and Ip11.

Key words: *Ethics*, deductive argument, *Short Treatise*, substance, appendix.

1. Introduction[1]

Proposition *E*Ip10—"Each attribute of a substance must be conceived through itself"—is an important proposition in grounding the metaphysical framework of the first part of Spinoza's *Ethics*.[2] However, it is also a problematic proposition: it seems that this proposition supposes that substance has more than one attribute, whereas this claim (along with the much stronger claim that there is only one substance) is proved only in proposition Ip14—"Except God, no substance can be or be conceived."[3] Thus, presumably, *E*Ip10 violates the deductive order that is an essential part of Spinoza's methodology in *Ethics*.[4] Let me now examine this point a bit more closely.

[1] I use the following abbreviations when referring to Spinoza's works: *E* = *Ethics*, Roman numerals refer to parts, d = definition, ax = axiom, p = proposition, dem = demonstration, c = corollary, s = scholium; *Short Treatise* = *Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being*. In Descartes's work *Principles of Philosophy*, p = principle.

[2] "Unumquodaque unius substantiae attributum per se concipi debet." C I.416/G II.51. This proposition is significant in preventing causal flow between body and mind (*E*IIp6dem). Jonathan Bennett, *A Study of Spinoza's Ethics*, 14, 48. In addition, Michael Della Rocca stresses the role of *E*Ip10 in establishing monism. This proposition forms a kind of conceptual barrier that validates the impossibility of substance sharing attributes. He calls that point "the different attributes problem." Michael Della Rocca, "Spinoza's Substance Monism," 11, 18–19.

[3] C I.420.

[4] I have chosen to use "deductive argument" in this article as a synonym for "geometrical exposition," as deductive argument is the main feature of geometrical exposition in *Ethics*. Piet Steenbakkers, *From Manuscript to Print*,

Proposition Ip10 follows the previous conclusions of the deductive argument—that the nature of substance is to exist (Ip7), and every substance is necessarily infinite (Ip8). At this stage of the argument, the possibility that substance can have a single attribute is still valid.[5]

However, proposition Ip10 presupposes that substance has several attributes, and it dismisses a much more obvious option that substance can have a single attribute.[6]

In fact, the point that Spinoza violates deductive order when he describes several attributes of one substance had already been raised at the beginning of his work on *Ethics*. One of the members of Spinoza's circle—Simon de Vries, who had an early draft of *Ethics*—writes in his letter (Letter 8) to Spinoza on February 24, 1663:

Finally, at the beginning of P8S3 you write:

> From these [propositions] it is evident that although two attributes may be conceived to be really distinct (i.e., one may be conceived without the aid of the other), they do not, on that account, constitute two beings or two different substances. The reason is that it is of the nature of a substance that all of its attributes (I mean each of them) should be conceived through themselves, since they have [always] been in it together.[7]

In this way you seem, Sir, to suppose that the nature of substance is so constituted that it can have more than one attribute, which you have not yet demonstrated, unless you depend on the fifth definition of an absolutely infinite substance, *or* God. Otherwise, if I should say that each substance has only one attribute, and if I had the idea of two attributes, I could rightly conclude that, where there are two different attributes, there are two different substances. We ask you for a clearer explanation of this too. (C I.192)

It is also noteworthy that in the same letter, de Vries mentions the scholium to p19.[8] Therefore, we can presume that at this time *Ethics* contained at least nineteen propositions. The next time we learn about any progress in writing *Ethics* is in June 1665, when Spinoza informs Johannes Boumeester that he will send him a draft of part 3 of *Ethics*, having eighty propositions.[9]

Spinoza answers de Vries on March 1663 (Letter 9):

> But you say that I have not demonstrated that a substance (*or* being) can have more attributes than one. Perhaps you have neglected to pay attention to my demonstrations. For I have used two: *first*, that nothing is more evident to us than that we conceive each being under some attribute, and that the more reality or being a being has the more attributes must be attributed to it; so a being absolutely infinite must be defined, etc.; *second*, and the one I judge best, is that the more attributes I attribute to a being the more I am compelled to attribute existence to it; that is, the more I conceive it as true. It would be quite the contrary if I had feigned a Chimaera, or something like that. (C I.195)

The third scholium to proposition 8 that de Vries referred to in his letter is identified now as the scholium to Ip10.[10] In the final version of *Ethics* that we have now, proposition 8 has only two scholia, not three.

139–60. Aaron Garrett, *Meaning in Spinoza's Method*, 97–122.

[5] That substance can have a single attribute is the Cartesian position in *Principles of Philosophy*, CSM I.210–11.

[6] Martial Gueroult divides the first propositions of *Ethics* thus: propositions 1–8 establish the concept of substance having a single attribute; propositions 9–15 construct the concept of God as union of the substances, each with a single attribute. Alexandre Matheron approaches Gueroult's structural analysis without committing to Gueroult's metaphysical position. He recognizes the different structural orientation of *E*Ip9 and *E*Ip10 in comparison to *E*Ip1–*E*Ip8. Whereas the first eight propositions "are devoted to the deduction of the properties of 'substances with one attribute,'" *E*Ip9 and *E*Ip10 establish the "conceivability" of his conception of God. Similarly to Matheron, I draw attention here to a different orientation of the propositions, without commitment to any specific concepts of God, substance, or attribute. Alexandre Matheron, "Essence, Existence and Power in Ethics I," 23–27; Martial Gueroult, *Spinoza I: Dieu*, 109; Bennett, *A Study of Spinoza's Ethics*, 69.

[7] Curley used smaller letters for Spinoza's words.

[8] C I.193.

[9] C I.396.

[10] I will compare the citation of the scholium that de Vries referred to then as the third scholium to p8 to the contemporary *E*Ip10s in the next section.

Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest three main options for the change from the draft that de Vries had to the printed copy of *Ethics*:

The first option implies that propositions Ip9 and Ip10 as we know them in the final version of *Ethics* (or an early version of these propositions) already existed. The third scholium was simply moved from proposition 8 to proposition 10. Thus, in the final version of *Ethics*, proposition 8 has two scholia and proposition 10 has one. The validity of this option is guaranteed by the fact that in 1663, this draft of *Ethics* had at least nineteen propositions.

The second option implies that after corresponding with de Vries, Spinoza formulated propositions Ip9 and Ip10 and added to proposition 10 what was named in de Vries's letter as the third scholium to proposition 8.[11]

The third option implies that the first eight propositions of the deductive argument, at the time of Spinoza's correspondence with de Vries, were different from the final version of *Ethics* that we have now. If this is the case, we cannot in any way reconstruct how the deductive argument was developed, and therefore we cannot know what happened to the "third scholium of proposition 8" mentioned in de Vries's letter.

In the following I will present some significant reasons for believing that the second option is the most likely. My arguments in favor of the second option require first, an inquiry into the textual sources of the scholium to *E*Ip10 in *Short Treatise*, and second, engagement with two early versions of Spinoza's deductive argument—the first appendix to *Short Treatise* and the reconstructed deductive argument from Spinoza's correspondence with Henry Oldenburg (Letters 2–4). Afterward, I will sum up the arguments in favor of the second option.

In this article I will not analyze the shifts in the different aspects of Spinoza's metaphysics, from his early thought to the mature thought in *Ethics*. My aim here is to pursue the specific textual change from the 1663 draft of *Ethics* to the final version of *Ethics*, not to analyze the conceptual changes.

[11] I do not claim here that there is a causal dependency between the correspondence and the change.

2. Traces of *E*Ip9, *E*Ip10, *E*Ip10s in *Short Treatise*

The citation of the scholium called p8s by de Vries is nearly identical to the beginning of p10s in the first part of *Ethics*:

> From these propositions it is evident that although two attributes may be conceived to be really distinct (i.e., one may be conceived without the aid of the other), we still cannot infer from that that they constitute two beings, or two different substances. For it is of the nature of a substance that each of its attributes is conceived through itself, since all the attributes it has have always been in it together. (C I.416)

We should note that the statement in the scholium to p10—"it is of the nature of a substance that each of its attributes is conceived through itself"—is almost identical to proposition 10: "Each attribute of a substance must be conceived through itself."[12]

The second demonstration Spinoza offers in his answer to de Vries is missing from *E*Ip10s, but the first is still presented in the scholium and supports Spinoza's claim that it is possible to attach more than one attribute to a substance:[13]

So it is far from absurd to attribute many attributes to one substance. Indeed, nothing in nature is clearer than that each being must be conceived under some attribute, and the more reality, or being it has, the more it has attributes. (C I.416)

The second premise of this argument is identical to *E*Ip9: "The more reality or being each thing has, the more attributes belong to it."[14] Therefore, propositions *E*Ip9 and *E*Ip10 are exploited in the

[12] *E*Ip10: "Unumquodaque unius substantiae attributum per se concipi debet." *E*Ip10s: "...id enim est de natura substantiae, ut unumquodque ejus attributorum per se concipiatur." G II.51–52.

[13] The modification of the first premise of Spinoza's second demonstration from the letter to de Vries is found in the scholium to *E*Ip11 as the second premise in the ontological argument for the existence of God. The premise from the letter to de Vries is that "the more attributes I attribute to a being the more I am compelled to attribute existence to it." The formulation of the second premise in the ontological argument for the existence of God is that "the more reality belongs to the nature of a thing, the more powers it has, of itself, to exist." C I.195, 418.

[14] G II.51–52.

arguments in the scholium to *E*Ip10 in order to justify the claim that substance may have more than one attribute and each of those attributes must be conceived through itself.

At the end of *E*Ip10s there is a statement saying that absolutely infinite being must have infinite attributes, and there is an explicit promise that in the following propositions it will be shown that there is only one substance:

> And consequently there is also nothing clearer than that a being absolutely infinite must be defined (as we taught in D6) as a being that consists of infinite attributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence.
> But if someone now asks by what sign we shall be able to distinguish the diversity of substances, let him read the following propositions, which show that in Nature there exists only one substance, and that it is absolutely infinite. (C I.416)

Traces of scholium *E*Ip10 already appear in *Short Treatise*, in the second chapter of part one (1.2.17):

> The reasons why we have said that all these attributes which are in Nature are only one, single being, and by no means different ones (though we can clearly and distinctly understand the one without the other), are as follows:
> 1. Because we have already found previously that there must be an infinite and perfect being, by which nothing else can be understood but a being of which all in all must be predicated. For of a being which has some essence, [some] attributes must be predicated, and the more essence one ascribes to it, the more attributes one must also ascribe to it. So if a being is infinite, its attributes must also be infinite, and that is precisely what we call a perfect being. (C I.69–70/G I.23)

The outlines of this argument in *Short Treatise*, even if not identical, are very close to the argument in the third scholium referred to in the correspondence between de Vries and Spinoza and to the argument in *E*Ip10s. Prototypes of propositions 9 and 10 from the first part of *Ethics* are present here as well. The prototype of *E*Ip10 is "all these attributes which are in Nature are only one, single being, and by no means different ones (though we can clearly and distinctly understand the one without the other)."[15] The prototype of *E*Ip9 is "the more essence one ascribes to it, the more attributes one must also ascribe to it."

At this stage of the argument, we can conclude that the source of (at least part of) the argument in *E*Ip10s is located in *Short Treatise* and is also presented in the Spinoza–de Vries correspondence. In addition, the prototypes of *E*Ip10 and *E*Ip9 appear in the argument in *Short Treatise*, in the "third scholium to p8" from the Spinoza–de Vries correspondence, and in *E*Ip10s.

In the next section I will consider the early versions of the deductive argument: one is in the first appendix to *Short Treatise* and the other is reconstructed from the Spinoza–Oldenburg correspondence of 1661. The purpose of this examination is to show the following: (1) The prototypes of the first eight propositions in *Ethics* are already found in the early deductive arguments and stem directly from them. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that in 1663 the first eight prototypes of the propositions in *Ethics* were completely different from the first eight propositions in the final version of *Ethics*. (2) In the early versions of the deductive argument there are no analogies to propositions *E*Ip9 and *E*Ip10.

3. Early Versions of the Deductive Argument

Here I will first examine the deductive argument from the first appendix to *Short Treatise* and then the reconstructed version of the deductive argument that was attached to Spinoza's letter to Oldenburg at the end of 1661.[16]

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[15] There is an apparent difference between those arguments in *Short Treatise* and in *Ethics*. In *Short Treatise* this argument does not employ the term "substance," but "being" (*wezen*). This is one of the main features of the early conception of substance. At this stage in his thinking, Spinoza does not identify substance with God. Melamed, "A Glimpse into Spinoza's Metaphysical Laboratory," 281–85.

[16] While H. G. Hubbeling, Fillipo Mignini, and Yitzhak Melamed propose that the first appendix is older than the enclosure in Letter 2 to Oldenburg, Saccaro del Buffa

The chronology of and the relationship between the first appendix (and the second) and *Short Treatise* are unclear.[17] However, there are undeniable similarities and connections between the deductive arguments in the first appendix, the Spinoza–Oldenburg correspondence, and *Ethics*.

The deductive argument in the appendix has seven axioms, four propositions, and demonstrations with one corollary.[18] As opposed to both the enclosure to Letter 2 and *Ethics*, this argument does not include definitions. Together with the second appendix and *Short Treatise*, this appendix—as it is known to us—is written in Dutch. Some of the components of the deductive argument are formulated in a way that is close to their final form in *Ethics*.

In his recent work, Yitzhak Melamed makes a detailed comparison of the appendix's deductive argument with the deductive argument at the beginning of *Ethics*.[19] Therefore, *I will not analyze the important differences* between the formulations; rather I will point to their similarities.

Axiom 1 of the argument—"Substance is, by its nature, prior to all its modifications"—is close to *E*Ip1: "A substance is prior in nature to its affections."[20]

Axiom 2—"Things that are different are distinguished either really or modally"—is close to *E*Ip4: "Two or more distinct things are distinguished from one another, either by a difference in attributes of the substances or by a difference in their affections."[21]

Axiom 4—"Things that have different attributes, as well as those that belong to different attributes, have nothing in themselves the one from other"—is parallel to *E*Ip2: "Two substances having different attributes have nothing in common with one another."

Axiom 5—"What has nothing in itself from another thing can also not be the cause of the existence of such another thing"—is close to *E*Ip3: "If things have nothing in common with one another, one of them cannot be the cause of the other."

Axiom 7—"That by which things are distinguished is by its nature prior to such things"—is close to the demonstration of *E*Ip5d: "If [two substances were distinguished] by a difference in their affections, *then since a substance is prior in nature to its affections (by P1)*, if the affections are put to one side and [the substance] is considered in itself, i.e. (by D3 and A6), considered truly, one cannot be conceived to be distinguished from another, i.e. (by P4), there cannot be many, but only one."[22]

The first proposition of the appendix and its demonstration are also analogous to *E*Ip5d: "To no substance which really exists can we relate the same attribute that is related to another substance, or (what is the same) in Nature there cannot be two substances unless they are distinguished really."[23] The demonstration of the first proposition of the appendix is: "If the two substances are two, they are different. And consequently (by A2) are distin-

Battisti claims that they were written in the opposite order. Either way, the question regarding the order in which they were written is not essential to my argument here. Steenbakkers, *From Manuscript to Print*, 157–58. Melamed, "The First Draft of Spinoza's Ethics," (forthcoming); H. G. Hubbeling, "The Development of Spinoza's Method," 64.

[17] Two manuscripts of *Short Treatise* were discovered in the 19th century. One (called "codex A") was believed to be earlier than the other ("codex B"). Codex B was transcribed by Johannes Monnikhoff and is therefore sometimes referred to as "Monnikhoff's manuscript." There are some textual differences between the two, and codex B is easier to understand. There is a question in relation to it: when Monnikhoff transcribed this copy, was he relying on a more authentic codex than "codex A," or were those differences his critical corrections? Most researchers accept codex A as being more reliable and closer to the original manuscript. C I.49.

[18] C I.150–52.

[19] This comparison is certainly made more concrete by the fact that the appendix is known to us in Dutch, whereas *Ethics* was written in Latin, despite its being translated into Dutch in *De nagelate schriften van B.d.S.*, which is the Dutch version of *Opera Posthuma*. Steenbakkers, *From Manuscript to Print*, 6–7; Fokke Akkerman, "Studies in the Posthumous Works of Spinoza," 77.

[20] The translations are from Curley; however in some cases I adopt Melamed's changes in the text.

[21] Melamed claims that axiom 3 bridges the gap between axiom 2 and *E*Ip4.

[22] I follow Melamed's use of italics and brackets.

[23] Monnikhoff's manuscript adds the following words to the first proposition: "or (what is the same) in nature, no two substances of one and the same nature can be posited." This formulation approaches the formulation of *E*Ip5: "In nature there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature *or* attribute." C I.151n5; Melamed, "The First Draft of Spinoza's Ethics," (forthcoming).

guished, either really or modally. Not modally, for then (by A7) the modifications by their nature would be prior to the substance (contrary to A1). Therefore, really. Hence what can be said of the one cannot (by A4) be said of the other."

The second proposition of the appendix: "One substance cannot be the cause of the existence of another substance." This proposition is close to *E*Ip6: "One substance cannot be produced by another substance." The demonstrations of the second proposition in the appendix and *E*Ip6 have the same justification, which employs the absence of causal relation between things that do not have the same attribute.

The third proposition of the appendix: "Every attribute, or substance, is by its nature infinite, and supremely perfect in its kind." Proposition *E*Ip8 also considers the infinity of substance: "Every substance is necessarily infinite."[24]

The fourth proposition of the appendix: "Existence belongs, by nature, to the essence of every substance, so much so that it is impossible to posit in an infinite intellect the idea of the essence of a substance which does not exist in Nature." *E*Ip7 also considers the necessary existence of substance: "It pertains to the nature of a substance to exist."[25]

The corollary of the fourth proposition of the appendix: "Nature is known through itself, and not through any other thing. It consists of infinite attributes, each of which is infinite and perfect in its kind. Existence belongs to its essence, so that outside it there is no essence or being. Hence it agrees exactly with the essence of God, who alone is magnificent and blessed."[26] This corollary contains elements that are parallel to *E*Ip11, "God, or a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists," and *E*Ip15, "Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God."

Now, if we sum up roughly, in the appendix's deductive argument there appear next (according to the order of their appearance), a series of propositions that are similar to those in *Ethics*: *E*Ip1, *E*Ip4, *E*Ip2, *E*Ip3, *E*Ip5d (and *E*Ip5 in Johannes Monnikhoff's manuscript), *E*Ip6, *E*Ip8, *E*Ip7, *E*Ip11, *E*Ip15. The prototypes of the propositions in *Ethics* that we do not find in this version of the deductive argument are as follows: *E*Ip5 (if we do not rely on Monnikhoff's manuscript), *E*Ip9, *E*Ip10, *E*Ip12, *E*Ip13, and *E*Ip14.[27]

The additional deductive argument was enclosed with Spinoza's letter to Henry Oldenburg, as he testifies in Letter 2 in September 1661.[28] This attachment has been lost; however, the discourse in Letters 2, 3, and 4 between Spinoza and Oldenburg on definitions, axioms, and propositions of the deductive argument makes it possible to reconstruct an early draft of *Ethics*.[29] Here again I will not supply critical explanations of the differences between the formulations, which also mark developments in Spinoza's metaphysics, but will point to the similarities between them.

Definition 1 of the correspondence, "God, whom I define as a Being consisting of infinite attributes, each of which is infinite, or supremely perfect in its kind," is a version of definition 6 in *Ethics*: "By God I understand a being absolutely infinite, i.e., a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence."[30] It seems that Spinoza considered definition 1 of the correspondence as equivalent to the other formulation in the same

[24] As was already noted above, in his early thought Spinoza identifies substance with attribute. The third proposition of the appendix is probably the place we most clearly encounter this identification, providing proof of Gueroult's and Matheron's assertion that the first eight propositions of *Ethics* "are devoted to the deduction of the properties of 'substances with one attribute.'" Matheron, "Essence, Existence and Power in Ethics I," 23.

[25] In addition, Melamed argues that the demonstration of the fourth proposition of the appendix "seems to rely on considerations very similar to E1p7d and E1p8s2." Melamed, "The First Draft of Spinoza's Ethics," (forthcoming).

[26] C I.152.

[27] Melamed arrives at the conclusion that the content of the appendix is a close match (approximately 80 to 90 percent) to that of *Ethics* and about a 10 to 20 percent match to the content of *Short Treatise*. Melamed, "The First Draft of Spinoza's Ethics" (forthcoming).

[28] Henry Oldenburg was a secretary of the Royal Society in England and was an important correspondent of Spinoza's throughout his mature intellectual life, until Spinoza's death. C I.166.

[29] German Spinoza scholars Abraham Wolf and Carl Gebhardt and later Dutch scholar Hubertus Hubbeling reconstructed this version. Hubbeling, "The Development of Spinoza's Method," 53–68.

[30] C I.165, 409.

letter: "By God we understand a Being supremely perfect and absolutely infinite."[31]

Definition 2 of the correspondence: "By substance or attribute I understand whatever is conceived through itself and in itself, so that its concept does not involve the concept of another thing."[32] In *Ethics* this definition is split into two separate definitions: substance (*E*Id3) and attribute (*E*Id4). *E*Id3: "By substance I understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, i.e., that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed." *E*Id4: "By attribute I understand what the intellect perceives of a substance, as constituting its essence."[33]

Definition 3: "By modification, *or* Accident, I understand what is in another and is conceived through what it is in."[34] In *Ethics* the definition of mode (*E*Id5) is next: "By mode I understand the affections of a substance, or that which is in another through which it is also conceived."[35]

Axiom 1 of the correspondence: "Substance is by nature prior to its Accidents, for without it, they can neither be nor be conceived." In *Ethics* the analogy is in *E*Ip1: "A substance is prior in nature to its affections."

Axiom 2 of the correspondence: "Except for Substances and Accidents, nothing exists in reality, *or* outside the intellect."[36] In *Ethics* the closest content to this is present in *E*Ip4dem: "Whatever is, is either in itself or in another (by A1), i.e. (by D3 and D5), outside the intellect there is nothing except substances and their affections."[37]

Axiom 3 of the correspondence, "Things which have different attributes have nothing in common with one another," is close to *E*Ip2: "Two substances having different attributes have nothing in common with one another."

Axiom 4 of the correspondence, "If two things have nothing in common with one another, one cannot be the cause of the other," is close to *E*Ip3: "If things have nothing in common with one another, one of them cannot be the cause of the other."[38]

Proposition 1 of the correspondence, "That two substances cannot exist in nature unless they differ in their whole essence," is close to *E*Ip5: "In nature there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature *or* attribute."[39]

Proposition 2 of the correspondence is: "That a substance cannot be produced, but that it is of its essence to exist." In *Ethics* it seems to be a combination of both the corollary to *E*Ip6 and proposition *E*Ip7. *E*Ip6c: "From this it follows that a substance cannot be produced by anything else. For in nature there is nothing except substances and their affections, as is evident from A1, D3, and D5. But it cannot be produced by a substance (by P6)." *E*Ip7: "It pertains to the nature of a substance to exist."

Proposition 3 of the correspondence, "That every substance must be infinite, *or* supremely perfect in its kind," is close to *E*Ip8: "Every substance is necessarily infinite."

The scholium that was attached to those propositions probably (according to Hubbeling) contained this sentence: "The existence of [every substance or] some attribute follows from the definition or ideas"[40] It seems that the full text of the scholium had some explication of the reason for a distinction between a fiction and a true idea or definition.[41] In the case of the scholium, it is more

[31] C I.165.

[32] In Letter 2 Spinoza defines attribute in this way, and in Letter 4 he supplies almost the same definition for substance. Therefore, the complete reconstructed definition here is: "Substance (or [sive] Attribute) I understand . . ." Thus, without reading Letter 4 we can be misled by thinking that in 1661 the definition of attribute was identical to the definition of substance in *Ethics*, and substance in 1663 was defined by one of the characteristics that appears in Letter 2. For example, "Every substance must be infinite, or supremely perfect of its kind." For more, see Melamed, "A Glimpse into Spinoza's Metaphysical Laboratory," 274–76.

[33] The transition of the formulations of substance and attribute seems to have been developed further in 1663. In his response to de Vries (Letter 9), Spinoza had already been much closer to the final *Ethics*'s formulation of attribute. He asserts there: "By substance I understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, i.e., whose concept does not involve the concept of another thing. I understand the same by attribute, except that it is called attribute in relation to the intellect, which attributes such and such a definite nature to substance." C I.195, 408.

[34] C I.171. Letter 4.

[35] C I.409.

[36] C I.171.

[37] C I.411.

[38] C I.171, 410.

[39] C I.411.

[40] C I.170/G IV.13. Letter 4. Hubbeling, "The Development of Spinoza's Method," 64.

[41] "It follows only (as I demonstrated in the Scholium I attached to the three Propositions) from the definition, *or*

difficult to point to a possible counterpart in *Ethics*, as in the correspondence there is no exact formulation of it. However, there is some similarity between the assumed content of the scholium in the correspondence and the first part of the second scholium to *E*Ip8, where the Spinoza explains the differences between substance and modes, as well as the differences between true ideas and fiction.[42]

If we sum up roughly (as in the case of the appendix's argument), the order of appearance of the prototypes of *Ethics*'s propositions in the enclosure to Letter 2 is as follows: *E*Ip1, *E*Ip4dem, *E*Ip2, *E*Ip3, *E*Ip5, *E*Ip6c, *E*Ip7, *E*Ip8. From the enclosure in Letter 2 are missing the following propositions of the deductive argument of *Ethics*: *E*Ip4 (instead of the existing *E*Ip4dem), *E*Ip6 (instead of the existing *E*Ip6c), and *E*Ip9–*E*Ip15.

Now, if we compare the presence of the prototypes of the *Ethics* propositions from the appendix (*E*Ip1, *E*Ip4, *E*Ip2, *E*Ip3, *E*Ip5dem [and *E*Ip5 in Monnikhoff's manuscript], *E*Ip6, *E*Ip8, *E*Ip7, *E*Ip11, *E*Ip15) to the prototypes of the *Ethics* propositions from Spinoza's correspondence in 1661 (*E*Ip1, *E*Ip4dem, *E*Ip2, *E*Ip3, *E*Ip5, *E*Ip6c, *E*Ip7, *E*Ip8), we can identify that what is common to these two cases is only the presence of the prototypes of the first eight propositions (or their elements that are close to the propositions in terms of their content, whether demonstrations or corollaries). In addition, we cannot find any traces of *E*Ip9 or *E*Ip10 in the two early deductive arguments.

We can see that there are apparent connections between the versions and that the deductive argument found in *Ethics* develops from the two earlier versions. In the two early versions, the prototypes of the first eight propositions of the deductive argument in *Ethics* exist, and they largely maintain the same order, although with some internal changes between the axioms and propositions, and some modifications of them. It seems extremely unlikely that at the time of the Spinoza–Oldenburg correspondence at the end 1661 there would be similarities between the outlines of the first eight propositions in the first appendix (written toward the end of 1661—or, according to Battisti, sometime thereafter) and the final version of *Ethics* (albeit with some internal changes and differences in formulations), yet in 1663 some new propositions would appear among the first eight, replacing some already existing propositions. Or in other words: if the outlines of the deductive argument before 1663 and after 1663 were similar, it is unreasonable to suggest that in 1663 it was different. Therefore, option three—that at the time of the correspondence with de Vries (1663), the outline of the first eight prototypes of the propositions in the draft of *Ethics* differed from what appears in the final version—would be nonsense.[43]

Before I approach the final line of my argument, I would like to refer briefly to the following issue.

The discourse between Spinoza and Oldenburg on the deductive argument reveals a series of misunderstandings between them. This misunderstanding is particularly visible in Oldenburg's objections to the deductive argument provided by Spinoza. In the fourth letter of their correspondence, Spinoza even expresses some kind of dissatisfaction with Oldenburg's abilities as a philosopher.[44]

> In the Scholium just mentioned, I have also, unless I am mistaken, stated clearly enough the reason for this difference—especially for a Philosopher, who is supposed to know the difference between a fiction and a clear and distinct concept. (C I.170)

Oldenburg's desperation resulting from his attempt to understand Spinoza's metaphysics is expressed in the fifth letter (which completes the discourse on the deductive argument):

> Your last letter illuminated much for me, but not so much as to dispel all the darkness, a result which I believe will happily come to pass when you instruct me clearly and dis-

idea, or some attribute, i.e. (as I explained clearly in relation to the definition of God), of a thing which is conceived through itself and in itself. In the Scholium just mentioned, I have also, unless I am mistaken, stated clearly enough the reason for this difference—especially for a Philosopher, who is supposed to know the difference between a fiction and a clear and distinct concept, and the truth of the Axiom that every definition, *or* clear and distinct idea, is true." C I.170.

[42] C I. 415–16/G II.49–50.

[43] Hubbeling agrees with the view that the first eight propositions of *Ethics* are relevant to the consideration of the two early versions of the deductive argument. Hubbeling, "The Development of Spinoza's Method," 53.

[44] C I.170.

> tinctly regarding the true and first origin of things. For so long as it is not clear to me by what cause and how things have begun to be, and by what connection they depend on the first cause (if there is any first cause), everything I hear and read seems to be thrown into confusion. (C I.172)

One of the more important issues raised during this correspondence was the discourse on the nature of axioms. Oldenburg expressed doubt regarding whether three of Spinoza's four axioms were self-evident: "Third, do you regard the axioms you communicated to me as indemonstrable Principles, known by the light of Nature and requiring no proof?"[45] In his response Spinoza does not try to defend his axioms as being "known by the light of Nature and requiring no proof"; rather, he shows how these axioms derive from the combination of his definitions of substance and accidents:

> Your third objection against the things I proposed is that the Axioms ought not to be counted as common Notions. I have no quarrel with that. But you also doubt their truth; indeed you seem to want to show that their contrary is more likely. So please attend to the definitions I gave of Substance and of Accident, from which all these [axioms] are derived. (C I.171/G IV.13)

In *Ethics* we meet a different set of axioms. The axioms that Oldenburg expressed doubts about in the correspondence appear in *Ethics* as propositions that are derived from a new, more basic set of axioms and elaborated definitions.[46] Hence, this discourse on the nature of axioms provides a firm explanation for the conversion of the axioms from the deductive argument at the end of 1661 to the propositions in *Ethics*.[47] In this sense Oldenburg, who was one of the central figures in the Republic of Letters (*Respublica literaria*), probably was used by Spinoza, intentionally or unintentionally, as a kind of nonprofessional intellectual reader.[48] If this line of thought makes sense, Spinoza is characterized here as highly responsive to criticism and flexible enough to elaborate the presentation of his philosophy to readers in an accessible form.

4. Addition of Propositions *E*Ip9 and *E*Ip10 to the Deductive Argument after 1663

I would like now to summarize the results of my exposition up to this point: (1) The scholium to *E*Ip10 is identical (or nearly so) to the third scholium to the 1663 version of p8. (2) In the 1663 version, the arguments present in the scholium to *E*Ip10 and in the third scholium to p8 all derive from *Short Treatise* (1.2.17). (3) The scholium to *E*Ip10, the third scholium to the 1663 version of p8, and the argument in *Short Treatise* (1.2.17) have as their premises prototypes of propositions *E*Ip9 and *E*Ip10. (4) The first eight components that were transformed into the first eight propositions in *Ethics* appear in two early versions of the deductive argument we have now. (5) In two early versions of the deductive argument there are no components of the propositions *E*Ip9 and *E*Ip10.

On the basis of this knowledge, I assume that it is highly unlikely that in 1663, at the time of the correspondence between Spinoza and de Vries, *E*Ip9 and *E*Ip10 were among first eight propositions of the deductive argument found in the early draft of *Ethics*.

Now I would like to present several reasons for dismissing option one—that at time of the correspondence between Spinoza and de Vries, *E*Ip9 and *E*Ip10 already existed, and that after the correspondence, the third scholium to proposition 8 was removed and then added to proposition *E*Ip10.

(1) The strongest reason against option one is that had *E*Ip9 and *E*Ip10 already existed, it would mean that the argumentation in the scholium including those two propositions as premises would have preceded the propositions of the deductive argument. We can hardly expect that Spinoza would make such an apparent violation of the de-

[45] C I.169/G IV.10. Oldenburg's question suggests that his understanding of the nature of axioms was similar to that of Descartes. For example, in principles 11, 49, and 50 in *Principles of Philosophy*. AT VIII.8, 23–24/CSM I.196, 209.

[46] Nadler calls the axioms in *Ethics* the "fundamental and abstract statements" that "express common ontological and epistemological truth." Steven Nadler, *Spinoza's Ethics: An Introduction*, 48–50.

[47] This may be used as additional evidence in favor of the position that the correspondence's deductive argument was created later than that of the appendix.

[48] Jonathan Israel, *Radical Enlightenment*, 242–46.

ductive argument. It would be more reasonable to suppose that at the time of the correspondence between Spinoza and de Vries, those premises of the scholium did not yet exist as propositions of the deductive argument (as *E*Ip9 and *E*Ip10).

(2) When de Vries, in his letter to Spinoza, criticizes him for proposing that a substance has more than one attribute, he refers not to the proposition related to the scholium, but to the scholium itself. De Vries accuses Spinoza of violating the deductive order of his exposition, but he appeals to the scholium to the proposition, not to the proposition of the deductive argument. This explanation is connected to the previous explanation: if it had been an apparent violation of deductive order (i.e. *E*Ip9 and *E*Ip10 existed), de Vries would have cited them in his letter to Spinoza.

(3) The only use of *E*Ip9 in *Ethics* is in the scholium to *E*Ip10.[49] This means that *E*Ip9 was formulated as a proposition with only one intention—to justify the use of this assertion in the argument in *E*Ip10s.

One possible objection to this explanation is the undirected use of this proposition in the ontological argument for the existence of God—*E*Ip11s. The premise in the ontological argument in *E*Ip11s is that "the more reality belongs to the nature of a thing, the more powers it has, of itself, to exist," conjoined with *E*Ip9, "The more reality or being each thing has, the more attributes belong to it," enables us to conclude that the more attributes a substance has, the more power it has to exist. This conclusion is crucial for ruling out the option that God does not exist. If God (who has infinite attributes) and substance "x" having attribute "y" share the same attribute (i.e., y), then, because of the premise that two substances cannot share the same attribute, God and substance "x" are both in the position of not existing. Instead, God has more power to exist than substance "x" because he has infinite attributes.[50] Thus the correlation between attributes and power supports the ontological argument for the existence of God.

However, this objection fails mainly because there is no need to formulate *E*Ip9 as a proposition in order to justify its later indirect and non-explicated use. We can employ the premise in *E*Ip10s in making the ontological argument in *E*Ip11s; proposition 9 is not necessary here. And, vice versa, the explicated appearance of this premise—"The more reality or being each thing has, the more attributes belong to it"—in *E*Ip10s justifies (according to the deductive order) the need for the previous formulation and justification (by demonstration) of proposition *E*Ip9.

(4) Another reason for dismissing option one is the exceptional structure of the demonstrations in *E*Ip9 and *E*Ip10 in relation to the framework surrounding those propositions. The demonstrations of the first four propositions of *Ethics* rely on definitions and axioms only (and we saw above the process of conversion of the first axioms to propositions that rest on more basic elements). The demonstrations of the next four propositions (*E*Ip5–*E*Ip8) rely not only on definitions and axioms but also on the previous propositions. The demonstrations of *E*Ip9 and *E*Ip10 rely on definitions 3 and 4. The next five demonstrations, of *E*Ip11–*E*Ip15, again rely not only on the definitions and axioms but also on the previous propositions. Thus, it seems that *E*Ip9 and *E*Ip10 were inserted in an already existing deductive argument and tied to the deductive flow of the argument by their connection to the opening components of the deductive argument: the definitions.[51]

5. Conclusions

On the basis of the argument presented above, we can conclude that there are strong reasons to believe that in February 1663, the time when the first nineteen propositions of *Ethics* were written, propositions *E*Ip9 and *E*Ip10 were still absent from the deductive argument as propositions and appeared only as premises in the argument in the scholium to *E*Ip10.

In addition, I have drawn attention to the different textual sources for propositions *E*Ip1–*E*Ip8 and for propositions *E*Ip9 and *E*Ip10, a fact that is relevant to the discussion on the difficulties in the transmission of the deductive argument from the

[49] Charles Jarrett, "Logical Structure," 40–41. Bennett, *A Study of Spinoza's Ethics*, 76–77.
[50] Della Rocca, "Spinoza's Substance Monism," 22–24.

[51] Moreover, proposition *E*Ip9 seems not to be justified by its demonstration and is therefore axiomatic. Jarrett, "Logical Structure," 41.

single-attribute language to the multiple-attribute language.

In this paper I have not addressed the question of *why* Spinoza inserted propositions *E*Ip9 and *E*Ip10 later. It would probably be a complex question with a complex answer, explained partly by Spinoza's direct reaction to criticism from readers such as de Vries, who claimed that it is not obvious (not only for Cartesian readers) that substance can have multiple attributes, or probably by the need to establish a "conceptual barrier" that makes it impossible for a substance to share the same attributes with another substance but to differ from it in other attributes.[52] In any case, it is important to realize that the later insertion of propositions *E*Ip9 and *E*Ip10 into the deductive argument was not just a technical operation; it was also a step toward the development of the mature metaphysical framework of Spinoza's philosophy. The present study proposes to contribute to an approach that combines examination of the historical background of *Ethics* and Spinoza's metaphysical concepts with explication and analysis of the tensions and fundamental difficulties in the formation of the metaphysical foundations of Spinozistic monism.

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[52] Della Rocca, "Spinoza's Substance Monism," 18–22.

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WRITING AND DEATH: AN OVERVIEW OF THE CONCEPT OF DEATH IN ALBANIAN LITERATURE

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Abstract:

From Antiquity to the Postmodern world, the approaches of philosophical and literary thought to death have changed but also remained similar from philosopher to philosopher and from writer to writer. Many of these approaches emphasize the dualities of life/death and soul/body, relying on the argument that everything arises from its opposite through the continuous process of reproduction, just as everything dies. This paper will deal with the concept of death in the work of three authors, Ndre Mjedja, Lasgush Poradeci, and Mitrush Kuteli, who are the main writers and cultural personalities in Albanian literature of the 20th century. The selected authors conceive, create, and promote a plurality of discourses and themes, highlighting the theme of death, through which they reveal the philosophical power of the literary text and the possibilities implicit to literature itself. Their views provide a poetic and cultural background for a theoretical discussion of literary and cultural facets of death. A prelude exploring the concept of death generally will be followed by a discussion of the authors' works, and finally, a theoretical analysis of these works will round off the investigation of death as a literary and philosophical theme in Albanian letters.

Key words: literature, death, concept, spirit, immortality, afterlife.

Prelude

Death, the fundamental concern of human beings, the subject that has inspired the fine arts, religion, and philosophy, "the true inspiring genius, the 'muse of philosophy'" as Schopenhauer states (1958, p. 337), has become a muse for the literary creations of writers of all literary eras, movements, or genres.

European literature and world literature are permeated with the topic of death and immortality from the very beginning. Both heroes of the oldest literary works, Gilgamesh and Achilles, strive for immortality, and both of these desires lead to murder and death. Gilgamesh kills the sacred bull of the goddess Ishtar and Achilles subdues the Trojans and kills Hector. The Epic of Gilgamesh and The Iliad portray the hero's journey in search of immortality, the confrontation with death, and the attitude of the ancient human toward death, while the Homeric songs recount the heroic death and the deaths of heroes in Greek mythology in which the hero's existence is paradoxically defined by his death.

Diverse literary heroes remind us of the end of life and often teach us how to die. Some literary deaths are more complex and more unique than others, and some literary heroes have passed away more painfully and dramatically than others. Literature thus opens the way to approach death and imagine it from a different perspective.

Death as one of the fundamental phenomena of human life has its place in Albanian literature, whose presentations of the theme include: death according to the biblical code in its beginnings, in the period of Philo-biblical literature; heroic death and death as a sacrifice during the period of Albanian Romanticism; death of the self, as a sign of literary modernity; and death of the villain and death of hero as an emancipatory sacrifice in the time of socialist literature in Albania.

Albanian literature comprises many literary works in which the theme of death is present. The various ways in which the theme of death is treated reflect aspects of the authors' cultural background and individual personality as well as the social and political context in which their works were written and/or published. In particular, the development of characters and plot arcs informed by the concept of death express their values, views, and intentions, e.g., when the protagonist dies a hero, dies for a moral cause, claims death as salvation, or dies while still lost.

In most cases,the relationship of Albanian authors with death is largely conditioned by the social and historical context in which they were writing. Historians of Albanian literature (Çabej, 1929; Hamiti, 2002, 2005; Krasniqi, 2009) claim that Albanian literature, in general, has played a principally ideological role, expressing a popular-national, religious, or social message, and note that the work of many authors reveal the strong influence of continuous national changes throughout Albania's history. It was not until the inauguration of literary Modernism at the beginning of the 20th century that Albanian authors truly began to focus on expressing their individuality. Given this newfound appreciation for unique and non-traditional forms of discourse, Modern writers started exploring death from a more personal and philosophical perspective. Philosophizing about death generally, the death of literary characters, or the death of the poetic Subject "always marks the authorial eidos of life and death" (Krasniqi, p. 277), and this practice above all characterizes writers of this period.

I will analyze this practice in greater depth by examining the deaths of literary characters in the works of Modern Albanian writers, including Ndre Mjedja, Lasgush Poradeci, and Mitrush Kuteli.The main question I ask in this paper is: based on their representative works in poetry and prose, how do these authors view their own death? From here, the motivation is to discover the relationship between writing and death, noting the perception of death by these writers and the role of dying in fine letters.

Starting with Ndre Mjedja, an author who in the periodical division of Albanian literature (Hamiti, 2002; Çabej, 1936) spans Romanticism to Modernism, moving on to Lasgush Poradeci, a representative of modern Albanian poetry, and finally arriving at Mitrush Kuteli, one of the most remarkable prosaists of Albanian literature, I aim to explore one of the most debated philosophical topics in the field of literature.Research on this topic is motivated by the recognition that death is something that is often ignored in real life. By raising questions about death, literature asks about the very essence of being, its existence or non-existence; it opens the way for us to approach the phenomenon and imagine it from different perspectives (Freud, 1957; Bauman, 1992). The symbiosis of life and death as well as that of the soul and the body, as opposite but inseparable phenomena, has become the focus around which I raise the following questions: How do these authors conceive of death? How do they envision the relationship between two antithetical phenomena–life and death? How do they represent human duality–life/death, body/soul, and the truth that everything is born from its opposite, just as it dies?

Literary models of death: Concepts of death

The cosmology of the motif from which the theme of death originates in the literature of Mjedja, Poradeci, and Kuteli, should be seen as the basic foundation of the artistic imagination, poetic sensitivity, and identification with the divine instance in these works.The images, the words, and the ideas with which verse and prose are created and dressed function to reveal the authors' views on death, the process by which we come to recognize and accept its inevitability, and the possibilities that lie behind the black veil. They communicate the power of death, teaching us that dying is as earthly as it is divine.

Mjedja, Poradeci, and Kuteli are prominent figures of early 20th-century Albanian literature whose work, despite the high praise it received in the first half of the century, was partially banned or censored during the time of the communist dictatorship in Albania from 1945–1990. The reasons for this are entirely ideological, and it is precisely the courage to create authentic and original fiction that led to the denial or censorship of their work.

These authors conceive, create, and promote a plurality of discourses and themes, including the topic of death, and thereby reveal the philosophical power of the literary text and the possibilities implicit to literature itself. But how do they illuminate the relationship between life and death? What are the differences between the representations of death from one work to another? What underpins these differences?

In the work of our authors, death presents a means of examining life. At times, the authors discuss death to highlight the meaning and value of life; at other times, they reflect on the significance of the transition from life to death in the act of dying. And finally, death may function as the basic act in the text, to be realized in pure intimate and metaphysical essences as an eternal expression of poetry.Mjedja, Poradeci, and Kuteli are writers of life as much as they are writers of death. Each of them approaches the topic of death with a unique sensitivity and each offers poetry and prose that illustrate a key and universal truth: that death is not only the greatest and most mysterious event of our existence but also the most intriguing. These works, which reflect on death in a completely authentic and open way, ultimately communicate the gravity, import, and 'charm' of death in each instance.

Ndre Mjedja: The religious view of death

Ndre Mjedja (1866–1937) was a priest, poet, and linguist. As a student of the Shkodra religious school, following the Jesuit order, he was cultivated in “lessons and readings…and developed into an outstanding literary individuality” (Koliqi, 2003, p. 33). He remains one of the fine lyrical voices of Albanian literature of the end of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century.

The lyrics of Mjedja construe the theme of death from a unique perspective. The poem “The Dream of Life” (Andrra e jetës, 1928), known as the author's masterpiece, has been qualified as "the first Albanian poem that presents the common human being toward the common death" (Shehri, 2013, p. 98), which imparts a “strong presence of the mystery of death…always to recall the dream of life” (Krasniqi, 2016, p. 136).

In “The Dream of Life,” we find the human being facing death alone; we feel the rhythmic beating of the heart when death approaches, an inevitable part of life. The tone of the poem recalls a sad symphony and the condition of being alone in life and fearing life’s solitude more than death. Thus, the meaning of death is parsed first as the symbolic, spiritual death that comes from loneliness, disappointment, or boredom, and second as physical death, an ineluctable human finality.

That the author has chosen death rather than life as the path of the characters indicates an intention of raising existential questions. In this prism, the presence of death, and specifically, the death of the protagonists, serves to introduce the author's philosophy based on Christian doctrine.

In placing the protagonists before death, as beings alone with themselves, the author raises the question of an afterlife, implicitly affirming its existence as it is not denied, nor dismissed. We read about the spiritual and psychological condition of a mother and the way she accepts the death of her young daughter, Trina: “Don't touch her / because she is already talking to the Virgin Mary” (Mjedja, 1990 p. 46). Lokja, the mother of the dead child, accepts her death by turning to her faith, consoled by the belief that Trina's soul is starting the journey towards the new life, the heavenly one, in the lap of the Virgin Mary:

> Tonight, my daughter
> Trinka is going to visit Our Lady
> Take these flowers and send them to her.
>
> (ibid. My translation)

Lokja’s words rely upon the concept of the afterlife, and it is clear that she interprets her daughter's death as a journey to eternity. Protagonists live, narrate life, and they are gone. But their death, as the author suggests, is only a passing, it is the soul that always wins out even when the body fails. Here, Mjedja introduces a key concept of Christian theology–that of “soul redemption / spiritual salvation” as we find it in the Bible,[1] and which frames death as spiritual salvation from earthly life. While the theological concept indicates : the salvation of Christians from sin” (Morris, 1962, pp. 1078–1079), for Mjedja, salvation is not related to sin, but to the spiritual and psychic state of his poetic being, which who feels captured by life's difficulties and the strong emotions of pain and suffering. As such, the soul finds reprieve from these and finds its salvation in death. Crucially, to have faith, to believe, allows one to accept death with less pain. The protagonists of the poem “The Dream of Life” demonstrate this salva-

[1] Old Testament: Book of Matthew 20:28, Book of Mark 10:45, Book of Numbers 35:31, Book of Exodus 21:30, Book of Isaiah 45:13, Proverbs 6:35; New Testament: Book of Revelation 5:9, Corinthians 6:19, Book of Hebrews 9:12.

tion, this practice of softening death, through religious consolation.

Death in Mjedja's work is represented by different images, from solitude to sleep, lying down, silence, escaping in sleep to the other world, the grave, twilight, dead nature, autumn, winter, yellow grass, ice, frost. This is the case both when he writes about another's and when he imagines the death of the poetic Subject. Thus, the poet's communion with death is realized through the figuration of nature, as a signifier of permanence, in the ethereal constructions of his poetry.

Mjedja was transfixed by the image of a hermit world. From this image, he created his human being, in his solitude, in his world. This human being is the model of physically and spiritually distanced protagonists. The theme of solitude that runs throughout Mjedja's poetry is embodied by characters that are physically and spiritually alone, reminding us that people in this world don't just die of physical hunger, but of emotional deprivation: of loneliness, abandonment, and not having someone close to talk to, someone who loves them. And yet, by portraying the self-sufficient human in his loneliness, "Mjedja makes the most sublime gesture in Albanian literature, reconciles human with himself, makes the character an individual and the individual a human not lonely, but self-sufficient" (Shehri, 2013, p. 99). As such, Mjedja demonstrates that both spiritual death–loneliness–and physical death can be softened through faith.

As a missionary,priest, and poet, Mjedja's writing communicates his religious background and ideas: he knows and feels the tradition of religious doctrine and incorporates it as much as he needs in fiction. As an author, he also has the sensitivity and knowledge to transform religious principles into fine literature, and this skill, awareness, and attunement are evident in his masterpiece, "The Dream of Life."

Lasgush Poradeci: Death as Freedom

Lasgush Poradeci (1899-1987) is considered the most lyrical and profound poets of Albanian literature (Çabej, 1929). He is the poet of metaphysical solitude, but also physical solitude–in the sense of sociality. Considered one of the poets of "the solitude of writing" (Shala, 2005; Krasniqi 2009, p. 149-191), in "the sole act of writing" he generates what Blanchot (1989) calls *death in verses,* because "whoever delves into verse dies; he encounters his death as an abyss" (p. 38). Death in poetic words assembles the artistic modernity of the author who lives for "the happy passion of beings" (ibid, p. 55) because that is what they prefer.

Poradeci wrote to the soul. His poetry was rare and difficult to understand in his time. "But their preferences are not taken into account, and they are themselves dismissed, propelled into the essential solitude from which they do not emerge except by writing a little" (ibid. p. 55). He was not understood at first and remained misunderstood until after the change of systems in Albania and until independent studies were carried out by different researchers.

Poradeci's philosophy on death is embodied poetically in the cycle, "The Heart of Death" (Zemra e vdekjes) from the book, *Star of the Heart* (Ylli i zemrës, 1937). The triptych of poems, "The Genius of the Ship," "The Boat and the Flag," and "The Death of Nosit," represent the essence of the author's concept of death. These songs offer a unique construal of the human being, showing and performing the poetic being faced with the phenomenon of death. These poetic creations present death as a force equal to life, profess the spiritual as immortal, and represent the act of death as an act that enables flight to highness. In his metaphorical world, death is interpreted as the freedom of the soul which paves the way to eternity, raising the glory of immortality and ultimately connecting the poetic subject with eternity/poetry.

Poradeci's most famous poem about death is, "The Death of Nosit." The pelican of Pogradec Lake, the white-feathered bird carved into the image, becomes a symbol of poetry and the poet at the same time. This is the song of the death of the poetic subject, perhaps the most intentional, with which the poet is completely identified. Nosit is a symbol of the Poet himself, his sacrifice is a sacrifice for love, creation, and permanence. The passion with which he goes towards death is enviable, and thus the poem begins:

> I speak to you with fire..., with my fire...
> I have opened a grave in my chest...
> To give them hope- to take it...
>
> (Poradeci, 1990, p. 161, my translation)

"I speak to you with fire…"–the first verse is the essential figure of the poem. Nosit speaks/sings with the fire of his soul the song of his end in words that seem to extend endlessly from one world to another. This line, at the beginning and end of the poem, conveys the drama of his extinction.

With self-sacrifice, Nosit fulfills the high human ideal: giving, providing, feeding others with life itself, with blood. The poet elaborates on death as an individual fate and as a universal phenomenon–as an individual fate that shows the way to the end and a universal phenomenon that marks the sacrifice for an ideal:

> I start! I start to hit my chest...
> I open it! – I open my chest for a moment...
> I feed them! And I die with grace!...
>
> (ibid)

But why a pelican? The mythical bird, a maternal symbol that leads to the existence of the gene–Poradeci uses this figure to project self-sacrifice. Thus, in the text describing Nosit's death, the authorial death is projected. The poem"lets us read the creator carried and melted into the text, where the figure and the whole text comes out as a cry of pain and his [the author's] mind" (Hamiti, 2002, p.4 91). Within the poem, "The Death of Nosit" lies "the most intentional authorial symbolization, the connection of the poetic subject (the author) with the Poetry; The connection of the poetic subject (the author) with Eternity" (Krasniqi, 2009, p. 189). It is the poet's kingdom of death. But what does he die for?

The concept of death as an ideal is essential to Poradeci's poetry. According to the author's creative philosophy, death is a mission, and this mission takes shape within an authorial universe in which death represents *the freedom of the soul*.Therefore, the figuration of what cannot be understood, but only imagined in the poet's world creates the hero who goes toward death with a strong motive of self-sacrifice. A hero like this chooses his destiny to speak his word, to carry out his mission. Death is beautiful and sweet as long as it is an act of sacrifice for life, poetry, legacy, and permanence. The poet muses that death is not conquered by running away, but by facing it: "The fight against death in the sublime poetic act is done through the creation and this creation brings immortality" (Hamiti, 2002, p. 441). The lyrical hero of the "Heart of Death" cycle loves and desires death, and the most beautiful thing is that he knows how to die extraordinarily, seeking and finding through death the essence of his truth: freedom.

Mitrush Kuteli: Death as liberation from life

Mitrush Kuteli (1907–1967) is a prose author of extraordinary power and fantasy as well as a poet, literary critic, and translator. Kuteli represents a special model of narration in Albanian letters. He is the modern Albanian storyteller, who combines folklore fantasy and its narrative scheme with biblical literary culture. From his first book, *Albanian Nights* (1938) to the work left in the manuscript of, *Great is the Horror of Sin:Tat Tanushi from Bubutima, Kuteli* (1947) has revealed the pains and individual passions that arise when "dramatically confronted with the norm and with death" (Hamiti, 2005, p. 41).

Kuteli's prose holds that life, love, and death are equally important and divine and cannot exist without one another. As such, they are in many ways facets of the same essential phenomenon.

In his work more than that of any other prose writer in Albanian literature, we find the presence of the theme of death. Kuteli's work fully confirms Freud's (1957) opinion on fiction and death: "It is an inevitable result…that we should seek in the world of fiction, in the literature and theatre, compensation for what has been lost in life" (p. 291). The literature of Kuteli thus makes it possible for us to approach death and to understand this phenomenon not only as a physical act and finality but also in all its symbolism, because "there we still find people who know how to die–who, indeed, even manage to kill someone else" (ibid, p. 291).

The obvious presence of the mystery of death in Kutelian prose has opened a very special path for this topic in Albanian literature. His kingdom of death is one with the kingdom of life. He teaches the reader to die, to be resurrected, and to go from here to the afterlife, providing a different perspective on human truths. In this spirit, the author created the characters Ago Jakupi from the story, *How Ago Jakupi found God's way* (Qysh e gjeti Ago Jakupi rrugën e Zotit, 1968), Tat Tanushi from the novel, *Great is the Horror of Sin: Tat Tanushi from Bubutima* (E madhe është gjëma e mëkatit - Tat Tanushi i Bubutimës, 2006) and Xheladin Beu from the story, *Autumn of Xheladin Beu* (2015).

The character Xheladin Beut presents a protagonist destined to go not only to the physical but also to the spiritual end. He is a superficial, authoritarian character, a man of vices and wickedness, for whom there is no place left in this world, but he is killed, condemned to await spiritual punishment in the afterlife. The story of Ago Jakupi also focuses on questions related to morals and spirituality. It is the story of a man who in his old age seeks God's way and reports that death is not guaranteed and that to win it one must transform from oneself to another.

Ago Jakupi's metamorphosis requires his transformation from materialist to spiritualist subject, *imposing* upon him the task of knowing the human *lumen* and finding the divine *numen*. The divine voice shows Ago Jakupi what the path of goodness is, which proves to be the key that opens the doors to the afterlife. As such, he is able to become a good man, winning his death and dying peacefully.

Kuteli's masterpiece,, *Great is the Horror of Sin: Tat Tanushi of Bubutima*, written in 1947 and published postmortem about 50 years later in 1993, deals with the theme of death and immortality from beginning to end. In the book, Kuteli introduces us to a preacher of the holy word who violates religious rules and orders and walks in the ways of sin, abandoning the path of God for a woman’s love. As a result, he is punished with immortality, lives for centuries, and finally returns, through repentance and spiritual redemption, to the arms of God, a return that frees him from life and blesses him with death.

Of all of Kuteli’s characters, the protagonist of Tat Tanushi best represents the theme of death as liberation from life.. For contradicting God's word, he is condemned to live for centuries: "From the moment of the collapse, days became weeks, weeks became months, months became years. And the years gathered and became centuries” (Kuteli, 2006, p. 40). One of the most stunning aspects of the novel is the way that its narration T plays with the concept of time. The story unfolds through at least two scales of timet: linear time and eternal time. The protagonist is not subject to linearity, and so neither to death. "The mixture of times defies the universal biblical time intertextualized as a desire for repentance and death..." (Krasniqi, 2009, p. 174), as we read in the passage below:

> He had only one wish: death. Because it has been said: sweeter than honey and then everything is death. But death, which struck all men on the day marked for each, left him untouched.
>
> He now began a strange life: he fell into the waters and did not drown, entered the fire and did not burn, went through the war and was not killed... And neither the earthquake, nor the knife, nor the wild beasts, nor the diseases could take his life. Death left him untouched...
>
> (Kuteli, 2006, p. 41, my translation)

God has punished him by keeping him firmly attached to this world, to suffer in the earthly prison and experience *catharsis*. Figuratively, the soul of Tat Tanushi must suffer the earthly prison for centuries, until he repents and pays for all of his sins, and only then will the doors of death be opened.

The description of the protagonist's death at the end is presented in a fairy-tale and fantastic spirit, echoing elements that are present throughout the novel:

> The one who had been Tat Tanushi of Bubutima stood straight at the altar. His beard suddenly dropped like water, his eyebrows falling on the book he held in his hand as they should have been in the centuries he spent on earth. And his beard was so long that he could circle the altar table three times. Then Tat Tanushi slowly dissolved, in the eyes of everyone, only a handful of ashes remained on the threshold of the holy door.
>
> (ibid, p. 61)

In Kuteli's stories we recognize the power of the great literary themes of life and death, and thus the messages they convey express the depth of human nature and humanity’s relation with death. Kuteli portrays the human psyche faced with death, weaving a narrative discourse animated with dark images and epic views on the meaning of the world beyond. Death in this work is represented as a temptation and as a desire to distinguish what is true about life and humanity, thus presenting an authorial concept that we can call *life as death*. In Kuteli's discussion of mortality and immortality, the dominance of death is as powerful as the dominance of life: death is not foreign, but rather an essential part of life, the spellbinding final destination of the human being.

From this point of view, Kuteli puts his protagonists to the test between life and death, offering three stories about three heroes in the eternal struggle between soul and body. Through the biblical, oral, and prophetic word, these characters show us the effects of sin and the clash between spirituality and the material world that may result in spiritual perfection or total spiritual ruin.

The heroes of these narratives desire death and seek the grace of God to be freed and saved from life, a path that subjects them to great psychological trials. Death tantalizes them, existing everywhere and nowhere, and the punishment of immortality is torturous, leading to narratives that are at times full of drama and vehemence. . These are stories about

Being, about the soul, about the meaning of life and death. They astonish and amuse the reader, because in them "the characters desire death and oppose or openly ignore it, [and] as such they 'deserve attention'" (Strubel, 2014, p. 4).

Conclusions

Mjedja, Poradeci, and Kuteli bring light to the topic of death in literature, treating it from new and different perspectives. In their work, the mysterious and essential phenomenon of death is as divine as life and love, and the authors display great courage in designing an extraordinary literary world that is placed between the opposing poles of life and death and often destroys the boundaries between them.

Mjedjas' concept of death is faithful to his philosophy, which acknowledges how fleeting life on earth is and regards death as spiritual salvation. In exploring death as a poetic theme, Mjedja consistently challenged its negative connotations, reconceptualizing life as suffering and as a passage to death, that is, to eternal bliss.

Kuteli introduces a variety of concepts to examine the subject of death, including elements from oriental, folk, and religious discourses. Like Mjedja, his motivations for writing are tied principally to ethical concerns and rooted in conceptions of life and death that are fundamentally religious in nature. The dialogue with the Bible, as a cultural and textual reference, thus marks the fundamental intratextual axis of Kuteli's novels with the Holy Scripture, especially the Tat Tanushi novel.

In Poradeci's work, the poetic cycle of death is paramount, and the juxtaposition of life and death becomes a theme that gives identity to his poetry. The reflexive poems express poetic philosophizing about death, closely tracing the meaning of being and alluding to its permanence.

The poems and prose examined in this article speak to the views of their creators on death, life, meditation, confrontation, and inspiration, but also to the ways in which Mjedja, Poradeci, and Kuteli interpret the fundamental mystery of existence.. The manner in which these authors engage with the theme of death inspires the reader to ponder this concept, but also to enjoy the sheer beauty of their artistry. In their original form, the poems and prose sound like songs, creating an artistic polyphony with a variety of captivating literary voices. Artistic imagination takes the reader on a spiritual journey through the labyrinths of the human soul. It is an aesthetic delight and a prelude to a deeper recognition of human phenomena and self-knowledge.

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THE GRAND ECONOMY: NIETZSCHE AND THE VIRTUAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LIFE

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Abstract:
Tracing the themes of political economy in Nietzsche's thought, this article has two main purposes. The first of these is to problematize some narratives such as eternal return, will to power, and revaluation of values, which are the crucial concepts of Nietzsche's thought, in the critique of political economy. The second is to re-read Nietzsche's themes of political economy in conjunction with the concept of the virtual political economy of life, to link Nietzsche's 'grand politics' with the overshadowed concept of 'grand economy' by making the move that put Nietzsche's hammer on the idols of the established grammar of political economy. All of these themes are part of an economy of power that goes against the grasp of economics and political economy by grammatical thought. I call this political economy the virtual political economy of life.

Key words: Grand economy, contest, excess, expenditure, accumulation, power.

A. Limits of Grammar

Our loyalty to established grammar still prevents us from seeing reality with countless eyes; so that, as Nietzsche noted in *Beyond Good and Evil*, we do not dare to "rise above faith" (Nietzsche, 1966, p. 47) in grammar. This is one reason why Nietzsche's call for a break with grammar in his genealogy remains relevant and another one is, of course, that today we have more idols and more "conceptual mummies" (Nietzsche, 1998, p. 68). But that's not bad news for an iconoclast; the time has come now, the hammer seeks stronger objects and the arrow seeks farther targets, perhaps the peak moment of tension for its bow before it is broken is even further away from its furthest target. Together with Nietzsche, do we dare to put the hammer on the idols and icons of economy and political economy today?

Faith in grammar and morality of the people distinguish "lightning from its flash and takes the latter for an *action*" (Nietzsche, 1989, p. 45), as Nietzsche puts it in *The Genealogy of Morals*; that is, they transform it into an effect of the subject called lightning. However, according to Nietzsche, "there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind doing, effecting, becoming; The 'doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed – the deed is everything" (Nietzsche, 1989, p. 45). In fact, if there is a grammar of morality, it can neither be analyzed through the free will of the subjects behind the actions nor by some universal principles. The main axis of analysis is the "debtor-creditor relationship" (Nietzsche, 1989, p. 63) in which the obligatory relationship with another person is established for the first time and one surrenders to the dialectic of valuation in this relationship. The basic relationships between the political economy of guilt and indebtedness and the genealogy of morality are inscribed in the relationship between debtor and creditor. This moment of taking the first steps in establishing the value relationship provides the constitutive context of the logic of valuation. Here, economics and morality are intertwined, and grammar, which forms the basic forms of evaluation, is common to them. One of the most important functions of this grammar is to obscure the "grand economy of power" (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 124).

The question, then, must be asked: why did we wait so long to mobilize Nietzsche's genealogy for a critique of political economy? Why was the move that put the hammer on the idols of political economy not made? In fact, it is enough to take a close look at Nietzsche's texts to see that he made this move himself, that he outlined the political economy of life, and that he meticulously inserted it into both the theory of the will to power and the narration of eternal return. Nietzsche sometimes speaks as an economist: he describes the self-transcendence movement of life on the axes of accumulation and expenditure of power, focuses on the concept of energy that nature expends on creative genius, examines the symptoms caused by excess of power, celebrates Zarathustra who expends and bestows himself, and finally, he even puts forward an economic interpretation of the eternal return as well as a mechanical one.

All these themes are part of an economy of power that goes against the grasp of economics and political economy by grammatical thought. I call this political economy the virtual political economy of life and use the concept of virtual here in the sense that Gilles Deleuze uses (Deleuze, 2001, p. 208), that is, in terms of multiplicities that are forming and de-forming in intensity of reality, although they are not actualized. The reason why political economy is virtual is precisely because it is part of a reality that contains the surfaces of events that have not yet been actualized, that is, virtual political economy analyzes the self-production and reproduction of life. This is a view that contradicts the common grammar of morality and economics. The perspective that I want to open now in order to see reality with countless eyes will consist of the joining of this concept of virtuality and the political economy immanent in Nietzsche's philosophy. So, first of all, instead of assigning subjects such as morality, economy, and politics, we should start with the power relations that constitute the forms of interpretation and evaluation. These relations are virtual multiplicities that nestle behind all our interpretation and evaluation styles.

A1. The Tragic Floods of Dionysian Life

It is possible to find the first traces of the virtual economy of power in Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy* and *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*. The thematic outline of the virtual political economy of life is drawn around the phenomenon of contest, which was particularly emphasized in *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks* and established as the eternal life principle of ancient culture, as Nietzsche writes: "it is Hesiod's good *Eris* transformed into the cosmic principle" (Nietzsche, 1998, p. 55). The phenomenon of contest in Greek culture is analyzed by Nietzsche in many aspects, "from the gymnasium and the palaestra, from the artist's *agon*, from the contest between political parties and between cities" (Nietzsche, 1998, p. 55) to Plato's dialogues. In fact, according to Nietzsche, Socrates mobilized the agonistic substance of Greek culture in order to instill his idealist consciousness into Greek society. That is, the phenomenon of contest mentioned here is considered as a virtual productivity from which culture, life, and art derive power and energy. But at this very moment, Nietzsche tells us about two concepts of contest. The former is a finite or purposive contest set up to beat and defeat one another, while the latter, or good *Eris* is an endless contest that constantly pushes the competitors beyond their own limits so that "the contest endures in all eternity" (Nietzsche, 1998, p. 56).

The agonistic characteristic of Greek culture is based on the idea of an endless contest and offers a clue to understand the real content of "excess," perhaps one of the most important categories of the virtual political economy of life. The endless contest is a form of relationship in which the excess is brought into being. The main purpose of the players or competitors is not to finish the contest by beating the other, but to expend the productive excess of life by pushing their own limits in an endless contest. This contest is not finite or final, such that the players start the contest in an equal position and are tied again when the contest is over; instead for the Greeks, the meaning of contest is to present a dramatization of the dynamic forces of life, and for this to occur, the contest must be modeled on the productivity of life, as Nietzsche empasizes: "Everything that happens, happens in accordance with this strife, and it is just in the strife that eternal justice is revealed" (Nietzsche, 1998, p. 55). This idea of contest points to a dynamism that does not allow fictional understandings of equality, shakes even one's own equality with oneself, and therefore brings everyone who enters the contest into contact with those who are superior to them. It will take sufficiently prodigal players to expend the excess from the productivity of life. The virtual political economy of life, then, is not an economy of prudence based on the exchange of powers or the withholding of powers, but a transformational economy of how power is accumulated and expended; and extravagance is one of the most essential relations to excess in this economy.

The Hellenic instinct, according to Nietzsche, relates to the force of life in a Dionysian way. Nietzsche, who was the first to take the phenomenon of Dionysus seriously, introduces the term "excess of power" (Nietzsche, 1999, p. 149) to explain this phenomenon. So what is excess of power? In fact, excess of power is the only proof of power, and life establishes its own virtual economy in the way that excess power is expended. The main reason for the virtuality of political economy lies here in plain sight. The excess of power, on the one hand, indicates the reality of the forms of movement, becoming, and expression that have not yet been actualized. On the other hand, it settles at the heart of Nietzsche's concept of life as an expression of an endless source. The energetic art and multiple forms of expression of the Greeks, in parallel with the phenomenon of endless contest, feed on the Dionysian flood of life and reproduce themselves by expending this excess. The Dionysian relationship established with life is predicated upon the aforementioned endless source and became one of the biggest weapons of the Greeks in their struggle against pessimism. So the excess of power is the Dionysian tragic flood of life, and this excess gives the deepest content to the myths as it takes in the tragic elements: "Through tragedy, myth achieves its deepest content, its most expressive form; it rises once again, like a wounded hero and the whole excess of its force" (Nietzsche, 2000, p. 61).

As a pure form of accumulation of the forces that will be expended, the Apollonian phenomenon, which calms the Dionysian tragic flood of life and keeps individual beings within its borders, cannot be considered a negative force in itself. Apollonian forces, on the one hand, determine the limits of actualization in the virtual political economy of life, and on the other hand, they prevent the self-destruction of culture and experience. According to Nietzsche:

> … Apollo wants to bring individual beings to rest precisely by drawing boundaries between them, boundaries which his demands for self-knowledge and moderation impress upon us again and again as the most sacred laws of the world (Nietzsche, 2000, p. 58).

The virtual political economy of life, then, is the economy of metamorphoses of power expended and accumulated in a contest between the two phenomena in question, allowing no exchange and dialectical determination, and as such, it forms the first pages of Nietzsche's political economy.

A2. The Life Transcending Itself

Yet the distortion of the Apollonian phenomenon by Socrates and Greek idealism reveals a scene in which a negative outlook not only curbs expenditure but cripples it. A world constructed in thought, the accumulation of power sacrificed to ideals, and the process that leads to the slave's memory full of *ressentiment* are triggered by the mutilation of this power of expenditure. In the world of representation, in an idealized fictional life in which subjects swarm, Apollo can no longer establish the actual fields where excess power is spatialized, nor can the Dionysian flood enter into the transformational patterns of the virtual political economy of life. Dionysus is suppressed and explodes; Apollo abstracts and limits. The idealistic culture that cripples life's self-competitive power imposes exchange, establishing a dialectical exchange economy by limiting active forces to reactive forces. But this leads to a phenomenon that, as a result of the limitation of active forces that expend excess power by entering into an agonistic relationship with themselves, disconnects culture from the energy necessary for self-production, leading to corrosion, decay, and in short, decadence.

However, Nietzsche has often tried to see life as the will to power in the form of an unslackened growth and abundance, and we can clearly see this in one of his statements in The *Antichrist*: "I consider life itself to be an instinct for growth, for endurance, for the accumulation of force, for power: when there is no will to power, there is decline" (Nietzsche, 2005, p. 48). The endless contest of life with itself, the fact that it always continues to be different from itself and growing, shows where the excess of power is registered in terms of virtual political economy. It is here that life constantly violates grammar, excess of power makes itself felt all the time, every particle of energy that cannot be spent sediments and collapses, and eventually culture loses its agonistic relationship with life. But even something decadent still has to expend. Well, can it really be content with just living its life?

B. Anti-Darwinism

In the virtual political economy of life, Apollo preserves the act of expending, not the objects of the act that expends the excess of power. In short, it ensures the preservation and transformation of expending power, but if we interpret it in terms of Darwinism, Apollo again becomes a purely limiting phenomenon.

We know that Nietzsche was discontented with the idea that the will to power could be confused with Darwinism, and the way we approach what he writes about it may give us a chance to open up the affirmative perspective behind this discontent. In an interesting passage from *The Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche deals with how Darwinism has drawn the general picture of life and offers another view that stands out from this point of view. The principle of "struggle for life" (Nietzsche, 1999, p. 113) may come across as an exception, but the essential character of life is abundance and excess, even an absurd waste, according to Nietzsche. A perspective that overshadows the expending power has permeated Darwinism, and the concept of a crippled life cannot even be traced back to the excess of power. Life is reduced to the phenomenon of scarcity, and so far from understanding the metamorphoses of the virtual political economy of life from this perspective, it moves in the opposite direction and surrenders to the dogmas created by the classical definition of liberal economy established between finite resources and infinite needs. At the end of the passage in question, Nietzsche witnesses how the political-economic model of Darwinism has been used by liberal economics when he says "Malthus should not be confused with nature" (Nietzsche, 1999, p. 113). This is perhaps the only passage in which Nietzsche mentions Malthus, who drives the self-producing transformations of nature from the confines of political economy and wastes it by asserting that "subsistence only increases in an arithmetical ratio" (Malthus, 1926, p. 7) against the geometrical ratio of population. Just like him, Darwin, while proposing the instinct of survival and the principle of survival of the fittest, fails to see how the flows of power created by life's self-transcendence are wasted. As such, the theory of evolution casts the shadow of an image of a life colored by scarcity.

So, what constitutes the transformational logic of virtual political economy, if not survival? A cycle consisting of an uninterrupted accumulation of power and the expenditure of power, in short, the patterns formed by the flow and metamorphoses of power, are the constituent elements of this logic. As we can clearly see in *The Will to Power*, Nietzsche states in a fragment he called "Against Darwinism" that the usefulness of an organ cannot explain its origin, and even the opposite may be the case. Nietzsche writes:

> What, after all, is 'useful'? One must ask 'useful in relation to what?' E.g., that which is useful for the long life of the individual might be unfavorable to its strength and splendor; that which preserves the individual might at the same time arrest and halt its evolution (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 343).

Why does Nietzsche think that whatever protects the individual might stop its evolution? We claim that we can find the answer in his virtual political economy. What protects the individual belongs to a field of abstraction that causes him to be unable to enter the patterns created by the accumulation and consumption of power, whereas the organism is in pursuit of an ongoing and endless increase in power beyond self-preservation. Nature wastes, organisms are wasteful. Whoever sees power as something worth preserving has already lost it, in contrast to those who seek to establish a virtual contact with the endless source of power, who know from the very beginning that power is something that cannot be possessed. In Nietzsche's concept of power, there is an image of such an elusive, impossible to possess, fluid existence that moves in continuous cycles of accumulation and expenditure. This existence recognizes evolution but reinterprets its logic of best adapting and preserving by placing it in the infinite power cycles of life. This reinterpretation makes possible a transition from the line of survival at all costs to the power economy of organisms that expend more than they have by maintaining an agonistic relationship with themselves. This transition is linked to a concern at the heart of Nietzsche's philosophy, called the revaluation of all values. Eventually, as Keith Ansell Pearson emphasizes, "it is through the affirmation of the general economy of life that an individual attains a perspective on life which is 'beyond good and evil'" (Ansell-Pearson, 1994, p. 49).

B1. Abundance or Lack?

The two-fold movement of Nietzsche's genealogy in the axes of origin and value shows that the effort to break down grammar is not content with only getting to the source of values; as Deleuze emphasizes, it investigates the "origin of value" on the one hand and the "value of origin" (Deleuze, 1983, p. 2) on the other. As Nietzsche clearly states in *The Will To Power*, it is essential for a revaluation of the values project to see whether a mode of valuation stems from abundance or lack, which give its own color to assessment styles and perspectives. Nietzsche says:

> Points of view for my values: whether out of abundance or out of want? –whether one looks on or lends a hand or looks away and walks off? —whether out of stored-up energy, 'spontaneously,' or merely stimulated reactively, and provoked? (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 522).

Here arises a two-fold critical perspective on the origin of value and the value of origin: within this framework, both abundance and lack can be considered in terms of the origin of value and the value of origin. So, the main context in which the discussion of abundance and lack sits should be the relationship of active forces and reactive forces that acquire determinations on the axis of negation and negation. Does an evaluative style arise and develop reactively, provoked, and externally, or by establishing an active, expending relationship with life's accumulation of virtual power? In short, does a value exist by being depleted from the beginning, dependent on another source, and determined from outside, or by allowing the inexhaustible power cycle of life to pass over itself and expending it in the field of becoming?

From here we can proceed by determining the relationship between active forces and reactive forces. What is an active force? Undoubtedly, it is stimulating to think that a "method of dramatisation" (Deleuze, 1983, p. 79) discovered by Deleuze is in operation in Nietzsche's texts. We can come across many presentations of active forces, but from the point of view of the virtual political economy of life, the definition of an active force is inscribed in its expenditure relationship with another force. So what is it expending? Actually, a strange logic is at work here; according to it, what is expended is inexhaustible, that is, the spender does not negate with this action, on the contrary, she affirms the infinity of the virtual power cycles of life; whereas withholding and refusal to expend fosters the image of life exhausted and dead at birth on the horizon of reactive forces. According to our interpretation, the most important feature of a reactive force is that it isolates itself without expending while relating to another force; reactive force cannot dissipate itself and therefore does not produce itself. In this case, what the active force expends is itself, and this creates its mode of self-production and reproduction. The active force sees itself as an inexhaustible abundance, and therefore, as Deleuze puts it, it goes towards its own limit, where it is flooded by someone else. However, the reactive force grasps itself and life on the axis of deficiency; it is the one that is constantly decreasing by standing in opposition to the active forces which are constantly increasing.

B2. Beyond the Equation of Sources and Needs

We can no longer be content with any perception of economy on the basis of a rationality between limited resources and unlimited needs. From this moment on, all the trappings of liberal political economies have failed, the images of life presented to us are no longer acceptable as they are mutilated by capitalist modernity. If there is an economy, it can only be considered in terms of the endless power cycles of life and cannot be interpreted on a rational basis at all. Yet we must be careful not to confuse Malthus with nature; the grammar of economics that he and others instilled in our minds is so ingrained that, in modern times, we need to do some radical subversion in order to see beyond this liberal economic paradigm today.

First of all, it is necessary to subject the following classical economic judgment, which states that resources are limited and needs unlimited, to Nietzsche's criticism. Perhaps the first condition for such a critique is to begin by showing the effective aspects of expending, just as George Bataille later developed variations on the concept of expending over a distinction between the restricted economy and the general economy. Expending cannot be seen as a negating act, and indeed, as Karl Marx showed in the *Grundrisse* and later in *Capital*, consumption is not simply the opposite of production. We can look at consumption from within the production process, and when we look at it from this perspective, we can find a concept such as "productive consumption" (Marx, 1973, p. 318). After all, in every production process, certain things are consumed, raw materials are used and transformed. Similarly, we must consider expending as the productive expending in terms of the virtual political economy of life; economy of power implicitly assumes that power is tied to an inexhaustible infinity.

The whole issue is now focused on getting rid of the point of view that says "No!" to the metamorphoses of power by exchanging forces within these endless layers of power. Indeed, who says that resources are limited and needs are unlimited? From which perspective is the power relation so conceived? It is the one who says "No!" to life and has found no other way to protect itself against the endless metamorphoses of power, has made a habit of taking action only with some external reactions, and can neither produce by expending itself nor find any effective and productive substitute for expending. By contrast, active forces invent new forms of effective expending, and in Nietzsche's texts one such form is waste. In *Schopenhauer as Educator*, Nietzsche considers Nature's wasteful actions:

> Nature is a bad economist: its expenditure is much larger than the income it procures; all its wealth notwithstanding, it is bound sooner or later to ruin itself. It would have ordered its affairs more rationally if its house-rule were: small expenses and hundredfold profit; if, for example, there were only a few artists, and these of weaker powers, but on the other hand numerous recipients of art of a stronger and more mighty species than the species of the artist (Nietzsche, 1997, p. 178).

How can nature go bankrupt, really? How can something that expends more than it wants to survive? Here we have again touched upon a strange virtual layer; in fact, only something that constantly transcends itself and maintains its agonistic relationship with itself can be affirmative of free expending. In this case, it becomes possible to think of Nature as a field of becoming that is always "more" than itself. Nature can expend more on genius than it wants to achieve, provided it is constantly overflowing and in excess.

On one hand, for Nietzsche, Nature is not at all egalitarian in the accumulation and expenditure of power; speaking of genius, especially in *The Twilight of the Idols*, he places this notion in the historical plot of a great accumulation of power:

> My Idea of Genius.—Great men, like periods of greatness, are explosives storing up immense energy; historically and physiologically speaking, their precondition is always that they be collected, accumulated, saved, and preserved for over a long period—that there be a long period without explosions (Nietzsche, 1999, 136).

As can be seen in this passage, expending and accumulating are no longer opposing viewpoints. Ultimately, Nietzsche will say: "In the last resort no one can expend more than he has" (Nietzsche, 1999, p. 99). For the formation of genius, a power quantity that has accumulated over generations is necessary. This quantity will find its quality in the position it stands in terms of will to power, that is, according to the level at which it can achieve affirmation. For those who can say the highest pitched "Yes!" to life, accumulated power triggers endless expending and expending triggers accumulation; it is an enormous economy in terms of metamorphoses of power, and at this point we can no longer confuse Nature with Malthus.

Now we have come to the point where we can combine all this thematic material into one concept and explore this hidden aspect of Nietzsche's philosophy, namely the expansions of the virtual political economy of life. The name of this in Nietzsche terminology is no other than "grand economy."

C. Grand Economy

What is the so-called "grand economy"? The term grand economy appears in one of Nietzsche's fragments collected under the title *The Will to Power*, where Nietzsche refers to the utilitarians as he writes "they have no conception of the grand economy, which cannot do without evil" (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 164). So what is really meant by the grand economy?

Until now, all economies have identified value with something, say, land, wealth, money, work, gold, or something else; whereas the grand economy discovers that all this is subject to a logic of exchange and takes action to change the logic of value. As a result of this move, all economies that assume that there is a substance in the source of value are eliminated. Just as subject-dependent grammar is caught red-handed while looking for a subject who does this action behind every action, trying to find a subject behind the value that creates this value should be determined in the same way. Value is movement, it arises from metamorphoses of power. The great economy is simply the political economy of the infinity of these metamorphoses consisting of phases of accumulation and expenditure of power.

C1. Powers of Accumulation and Expenditure

The first sketches of the concept of grand economy, as the short title of Nietzsche's virtual political economy, appear in *Human, All Too Human*. In a passage on the state, politics, and war, Nietzsche writes, as if writing a foreword to George Bataille's *Accursed Share*, how excess energies can be generated through war. It depicts how much energy is spent in the absence of war, through the discovery of new continents and scientific developments (Nietzsche, 1986, p. 170). So where does this expending obligation come from? Nietzsche says: "*Excess*. - The mother of excess is not joy but joylessness" (Nietzsche, 1986, p. 230). Just as the grand economy cannot do without evil, so in the grand economy of affects the source of excess is not joy but joylessness, because the tragic flood of life that creates this excess seeks cavities to place it in reality, and in fact, accumulating the excess and then trying to establish an agonistic relationship with it will never bring joy alone, but having the courage to expend the excess may bring and reproduce tragic joy. Indeed, there is a pressure of abundance created by excess; because nature's accumulations of power are in a tension that concentrates on the virtual plane and is actually discharged: Nietzsche's emphasis on this tension and on the pressure of abundance created by the forces in a passage in *The Will to Power* is extremely remarkable:

> From the pressure of plenitude, from the tension of forces that continually increase in us and do not yet know how to discharge themselves, there arises a condition like that preceding a storm: the nature we constitute becomes dark. This, too, is 'pessimism' (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 529).

Pessimism, then, is part of the grand economy so that life's accumulation of power, as the rise of the pressure created by the excess, cannot be expended, and it is in this sense that the mother of the excess is not joy, but joylessness. It is futile to expect utilitarians to understand this.

Now, if we look at the issue through the concept of value from the perspective we have created, we encounter an interesting view in which value is being traversed by two movements. One is accumulating and the other is expending. For Nietzsche, accumulating as well as expending presents an essential set of events for understanding the logic of this great economy. Accumulation of power is the affirmative movement that enables it to concentrate in the virtual plane, to be compressed in space and finally to be actualized by detonation; because just as how power is spent affects how it is accumulated, how it is accumulated affects how it is spent. For example, accumulating just for the sake of accumulating is a negative action; so is expending just to expend. Here, again, we are faced with a staging in the sense that Deleuze emphasized within the thought of Nietzsche. In this staging, we find a portrait of Nietzsche, who says that nature is wasteful and will definitely go bankrupt one day, and Nietzsche, who apparently establishes the logic of growing up. Nietzsche says:

> That which constitutes growth in life is an ever more thrifty and more far-seeing economy, which achieves more and more with less and less force–As an ideal, the principle of the smallest expenditure (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 341).

It is at this point that Nietzsche sketches out a political economy of the conditions for growth and makes the concentration and transformation of a power through minimal expenditure part of the larger economy. For societies and species, even in a brief state of existence, higher and exalted values can be produced and a higher degree of power attained. Here Nietzsche clearly says, "We stand before a problem of economics" (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 463). How will the accumulated power be spent? This is an inevitable question for societies, cultures, individuals, and species. It has been seen that powerful cultures and societies in Dionysian exuberance, after a period of participating in the wasteful movement of nature, break away from the affirmative accumulation movement and surrender to "expending to expend" by establishing a paralogical relationship with the excess of the grand economy. This separates them from a deeper concentration and stronger accumulation on the virtual plane. The point is to understand the difference "between an economy of civilization, oriented toward conservation, and an economy of culture, oriented toward free expenditure" (Lemm, 2009, p. 55) in the transformational movements of the forces of life.. This is where we will discover the eternal agonistic connection between the accumulation and dissipation of force in the history of civilization. That's why the draft of the grand economy concept has been drawn on a historical background and in its historical meanings everything that happens has already been paid for. Nietzsche writes:

> It is because the great man has cost so much, and not because he appears as a miracle and gift of heaven and 'chance,' that he has become great: 'heredity' a false concept. One's forebears have paid the price for what one is" (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 508).

However, neither the price paid nor the account is clear in the virtual becoming plan. The topology of the two movements that make up the value has not yet been formed. Paralogical uses have yet to emerge, whereas all historically actualized societies, cultures, and individuals settle into the contradictory landscape of the economy of civilization. We can now see how the contradictory landscape of the grand economy appears in Nietzsche's typology.

C2. Typology

Nietzsche's rich typologies, which permeate many of his works, contain many clues for understanding the virtual political economy of life. In the section of *The Genealogy of Morals*, which focuses on the thematic of *ressentiment*, one way to understand the distinction between noble people and the herd is to analyze how they relate to *ressentiment*. *Ressentiment* does not only determine the psychology of the herd, it can also be manifested in the noble, but when Nietzsche distinguishes the relationship between the noble person and the herd, he again resorts to the context of expenditure:

> *Ressentiment* itself, if it should appear in the noble man, consummates and exhausts itself in an immediate reaction, and therefore does not poison: on the other hand, it fails to appear at on countless occasions on which it inevitably appears in the weak and impotent" (Nietzsche, 1989, p. 39).

In that case, while the *ressentiment* that arises in the noble person is spent, among the herd ressentiment turns into a form of affectation and accumulates. So what are the typological consequences of this accumulation?

The inability to expend the accumulated *ressentiment* causes the herd man to adopt a reactive approach to all active expending actions, and this paves the way for him to have a memory marked by pain. The herd man turns into a man of *ressentiment* because *ressentiment* accumulates in him and cannot be spent. The movement that establishes his memory arises from this act of accumulation, such that this memory becomes a *memento mori* instead of actively participating in the metamorphoses of power; this is a memory that is contrary to the structure of life that expends and re-accumulates itself by intensifying its agonistic movement. Herd people who acquire their own value by negating their opposite are now living to die; they die every moment because they characterize themselves with an act of accumulation that turns every action into a memory. The inability to expend deprives the herd man of the power to forget. The noble man, on the other hand, is one who accumulates and expends and re-accumulates, so he is open to metamorphoses of power. It has no memory, and even if it does, this memory is nothing but a *memento vivere* as the forgetful memory of life. Of course, it is possible for this person who takes risks, who is put in danger, to go to his own limits and create new values, to expend himself. Beyond this account, Zarathustra will give us more distinct images of the portrait of the man who expends and bestows himself.

Encountering the metamorphoses of the spirit in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*'s section "On The Three Metamorphoses," the reader can now interpret this variant of Nietzsche's symbolism in terms of the political economy of metamorphoses of power. When the soul becomes a Camel, it is accumulation that characterizes it. Like the humps of the camel, its shape has become an instrument of accumulation. The soul, crushed under its burdens, can neither lighten nor dance; it cannot expend, because life appears to it as lack and weakness. The camel-like soul, which has drowned life in the image of scarcity, is weary of hoarding until its responsibilities and duties render it inactive. Even if it expends something, it does so to accumulate and tries to keep itself out of the metamorphoses of power, to protect itself from wasting by withholding. However, this is a futile effort: the more it spares, the more it is consumed, and finally, when its burdens become larger than itself, the camel dies with what it has accumulated. The lion, on the other hand, is the spender to expend, its roar expresses and expends the accumulated energy in a pen. The Spirit has shed its burdens and no longer recognizes any external barriers to its predatory nature; thus, it initiates the necessary destruction processes in order to be able to say Yes to life. But in a way, the lion is also condemned to consume itself; because the acts of accumulating and expending are still embodied in it in the form of a qualitative distinction. Space is its outer barrier; it has to traverse the world before it can conquer it. The distinction between accumulating and expending is finally dissolved by the child-like soul; because for it the eternal form of life is play, which is characterized by the act of forgetting (Nietzsche, 1985, p. 25). The child can be identified by a quality of neither accumulating to accumulate, nor expending to expend, nor accumulating to expend. It is the real actor of becoming, and therefore inherent in the transformation plan of the forces, the child will never face the world because it can never have a memory that turns the earth into the world. Its job is to affirm the innocence of being, and in doing so, it does not place itself on any plane transcendent to the metamorphoses of power. It neither expends nor accumulates and while expending the assets in the act of forgetting, it provides the accumulation of becoming and therefore experiences the becoming and the field of existence in the closest possible relationship. All the crimes and morals, slanders and fictional consciousnesses that are thrown on life in the child disappear, and the virtual political economy of life facilitates the transformation of forces in a way that resembles a game that is discovered while playing.

So what is Zarathustra's role in this scene? He is the teacher of eternal return, of course, and thus participates as a gift in the metamorphoses of power for the virtual political economy of life. He praises "the creating friend who always has a completed world to give away" (Nietzsche, 1985, p. 62) and finally honors the soul that expends itself. It is Zarathustra who grasps the Dionysian excess as a gift. Perhaps for Zarathustra, as the first person to establish the economy of oppositions, the reward for initiating history that produced the exchange of power could be nothing but offering himself as a gift to the metamorphoses of power. In fact, Zarathustra tells us about the destiny that requires the expenditure of man in order for the *übermensch* to be born. While giving the gospel of the overman, he will tell us his deepest story, namely that of the eternal return.

C3. Eternal Return

How can the narrative of the eternal return be interpreted in terms of the political economy of metamorphoses of power? In fact, in one of his fragments collected under the title *The Will to Power,* Nietzsche himself makes an interesting comparison between a mechanistic interpretation of the eternal return and an economic interpretation of it. Nietzsche writes: "Regarded mechanistically, the energy of the totality of becoming remains constant; regarded economically, it rises to a high point and sinks down again in an eternal circle" (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 340). This comparison opens up the possibility for us to rethink the narrative of the eternal return of the virtual political economy.

First, if it is interpreted from a mechanistic perspective, eternal return is the limit of expending; because the energy of becoming does not change and this world stands as a closed energy cluster in the middle of a huge chaotic universe. But the economy of eternal recurrence cannot be defined in a restricted model of economy, which is "not merely conservation of energy, but maximal economy in use, so the only reality is the will to grow stronger of every centre of force - not self-preservation" (Klossowski, 1997, p. 111), as clearly shown by Pierre Klossowski.

In a way, a critical proposition emphasized by Nietzsche makes itself felt strongly here: "If becoming is a great ring, then everything is equally valuable, eternal, necessary" (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 165) for it can be consumed neither by being nor by nothingness. Therefore, the grammar we produce to assume an existence behind the becoming is the most contradictory to the eternal return narrative. We belong to an unbridled world of becoming, and this world can be said to have neither a beginning nor an end. If we are in a field of pre-emergency and the number of elements that are formed is not infinite, then it can be thought that everything that has happened in this state may have happened in this eternity and countless times up to now. The elements of becoming repeat themselves innumerable times at countless times in lived time. If an initial boundary for becoming could be drawn, this thought would be said to be impossible; whereas the idea of a beginningless and endless being must have repeated itself endlessly, otherwise neither change nor movement would have any meaning. So, when considered from a mechanistic point of view, the emphasis is on limitation. However, in a statement that resembles the conservation of energy, Nietzsche says "I seek an eternity for everything" (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 548), and this conception of eternity is overshadowed in a mechanistic style of interpretation.

From an economic point of view, we cannot be content with only dealing with the quantitative limit of power; there is a concentration of power in degrees and a transformation of its qualities. It is not just that everything that has happened has happened endlessly that will bring this moment as a bridge and open one to the higher human being. We now encounter an idea of selection. This idea of selection on which Deleuze insists is neither a Darwinian natural selection nor its combination with another conception. This logic of selection is characterized by the search for a certain "climax" as Nietzsche emphasizes; that is, selection concentrates the energy of becoming in each individual, opening them up, breaking their identities, and throwing them into the wonderful mix of the universe. Now, we are faced with a narrative of reversal, cosmic destruction, and flood, in which those who cannot hold onto the web of chaos, who cannot stand to be themselves, who cannot affirm life within their own borders, are positioned against themselves. Everything is compressed at the highest degree of density in the smallest possible spatial unit and from there falls back into eternal return. This is the moment when determinations are dissolved, resources and needs form a complex in a different assemblage, a mixture in the Stoic sense of the word, "a total mixture (*krasis,* or *di'holōn antiparektasis*), in which bodies occupy each other's place, while preserving their quality and individuality" (Coccia, 2019, p. 63). All beings fall back to becoming at the highest level of concentration possible, and those who can say Yes to life in an endless and unbearable repetition activity are blessed with the name of Dionysus at the level of concentration that will produce new values. Nietzsche writes that he seeks an eternity for everything–his virtual political economy opens to infinity by expending everything, and this is nothing but a way of accumulating power. Yes, a person can only expend herself on life! As far as she can say, she can affirm life itself from the highest pitch within the metamorphoses of power, which means *amor fati* is the credo of the virtual political economy of life. *Amor fati*, which ties together the necessity of accumulating and the randomness of expending, affirms the necessity of chance.

Finally, it should be noted that from the point of view that we are trying to develop here, and which we call the virtual political economy of life, the *übermensch* itself is waste. If Nietzsche is constantly calling upon us to be tough, the necessity of this human expenditure must be understood: only then can the idea of another life, now suppressed by the decadent culture that tries to preserve human beings with their present values, sprout. But the übermensch also represents a form of accumulating, that is, greater concentrations are required to create higher values, and the conservation of energy is not sufficient. Not every culture, every accumulation of power, which suppresses the self-transcendent agonistic structure of life, has been able to touch the Dionysian excess, and in fact, it can only be hoped that the *übermensch* will arise from the political economy of this excess.

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THINKING AS A FORM OF POLITICAL LIFE, OR "HOW CAN ONE THINK POLITICALLY IN A POST-POLITICAL WORLD"?

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Abstract:

What makes the paper relevant is modern strategies of neoliberal politics, according to which the political life of citizens is replaced by everyday politics of individuals. It has been established that the modern concepts of everyday politics of *homo sacer* and *homo sucker* contain the limit of ideas about the political life of citizens. The paper considers an ontological model of the political life of citizens built on the basis of thinking as form-of-life (Agamben). The return to the ontological level of research can be explained by the fact that in modern conditions, the survival of a person depends directly on the person's ability to think. Thinking as the form-of-life of a community is seen as a force that allows citizens to resist not only the inertia of social existence, but also the life watched carefully by the authorities. The paper presents two interpretations of political life based on the following statements: 'I think, therefore I resist' (Badiou) and 'I resist, therefore I think' (Arendt).

Key words: political life, everyday politics, homo sacer, homo sucker, panopticon, synopticon, speculation, thinking.

Introduction

In social philosophy, interest in political thinking (Badiou, 2005) and the importance of thinking for the political life of society (Agamben, 2000, p. 4; Arendt, 2005, p. 65) are attributed to main trends in modern neoliberal politics focused on the process of depoliticizing the life of society and replacing politics with public administration technologies (Žižek, 2008, p. 40). Depoliticizing the life of society results in the disappearance of Politics with a capital P, and consequently shakes the political convictions of citizens and reduces their involvement in activities that tend to be considered political (Bauman, 2001). Citizens not only lose the need to think about life in terms of a 'happy society', 'fair society' or 'good society', which set ideal goals, such as the Public Good, Happiness, Equality, Freedom, or Fraternity, but they lose the skill of thinking politically. "The real danger in contemporary societies is that the bureaucratic, technocratic, and depoliticized structures of modern life encourage indifference and increasingly render men less discriminating, less capable of critical thinking, and less inclined to assume responsibility" (Beiner, 1982, p. 113).

The political life of citizens, the one called *βίος πολιτικός*, is being replaced by everyday politics of individuals (Boyte, 2004; Kerkvliet, 2009; Clément and Zhelnina, 2020). Everyday politics is limited to the range of everyday problems: reducing taxes and food prices, increasing pensions, reducing waiting lists and queues in hospitals, reducing the number of beggars on the streets, protecting the environment, etc. On the one hand, the state transfers its former duties and functions so that they begin to belong to the sphere of private interests, forcing individuals to solve their problems on their own (Bauman, 2001). On the other hand, society is deprived of tools of civil resistance to the power of the state. Within society, individuals are divided according to the level of opportunities and abilities to build their own everyday politics. The level of individual opportunities begins to be determined by the degree of dependence of individuals on the authorities. Modern socio-philosophical research makes it possible to personify everyday politics of individuals in terms of *homo sacer* (Agamben, 1998) and *homo sucker* (Žižek, 2002, p. 71; Nikolaidis, 2010), demonstrating the degree of dependence of citizens' lives on the authorities.

The terms *homo sacer* and *homo sucker* open up different ways of interpreting everyday politics. This makes it possible to use the method of philosophical hermeneutics, according to which the assumption that initiates the research process is the thesis that everyday politics of individuals is realized under a lack of thinking, which is the basis of the political life of citizens. The method of philosophical hermeneutics allows interpreting everyday politics of homo sacer and homo sucker in the context of the concepts of the panopticon and the synopticon to investigate the limits of the concept of everyday politics. In the hermeneutic circle of understanding, setting a limit brings back the question of the meaning of the political life of citizens in the post-political world. In the process of exploration as a hermeneutic circle of interpretations, the meaning of the concept of political life begins to be re-cast (Gadamer, 1994) in the context of the realities of contemporary society.

Everyday politics of homo sacer

At present, the concept of *homo sacer* is of particular relevance in connection with economic globalization, changing working conditions and more intense migration processes, which again raises the problem of social rejection or alienation of a person. Unstable earnings (unemployment, temporary work, short-term contracts that do not ensure social security, casual work) and difficult life situations (e.g. disability, imprisonment, or poverty) affect the standards of living, making people need state support. It should also be noted that a difficult life situation leads to isolation or alienation of the individual within society. An exclusion from any social system, according to Niklas Luhmann, in the form of unemployment and lack of income, lack of documents, lack of access to contracts and legal protection, the inability to distinguish political campaigns from carnival events, illiteracy, insufficient medical service, and not enough food leads to the exclusion of the individual from other systems (Luhmann, 1997, p. 630). Such citizens are deprived of the opportunity to exercise at least one of the rights that people have: "civil (equality before the law and right to protection against crime and physical harm), cultural (equal access to enjoyment of culture and entitlement to participate in the cultural life of the community), social (equal access to forms of social protection, including pensions and health care), economic (equal entitlement to undertake income-earning activity) and political (equal right to vote, stand for elections, and participate in the political life of the community)" (Standing, 2016, p. 14). Deprived citizens are included in society de jure, i.e. they may have the right to live and work, but de facto they are 'excluded' within society.

The term *homo sacer*, originating from Roman law, was introduced to the field of research reflection by Giorgio Agamben (Agamben, 1998). In his work, Agamben distinguishes two meanings of *homo sacer*: a sacred person on the one hand and an outcast and/or cursed person on the other hand. In modern studies, homo sacer is considered as a general concept denoting a state of alienation or exclusion (Žižek, 2003; 2011, p. 448). Homo sacer becomes a concept referring to the life of socially disadvantaged population groups, which include the unemployed, large families, single mothers, single pensioners, the disabled, immigrants (workers of foreign origin, undocumented immigrants, migrants, refugees) and former prisoners, i.e., all those who, for one reason or another, have less opportunity to construct everyday politics at their own discretion.

The life of homo sacer becomes dependent on the power of the state, which is reduced to procedural rules for the supervision of second-class citizens. The practice of directed and focused observation of the authorities over second-class citizens is traditionally called the *panopticon* system, which has not lost its relevance so far and is widely used by modern researchers interpreting the system of state control over the life of society (Caluya, 2010; Champion, 2019; Couch, Han, Robinson, Komesaroff, 2015; Galič, Timan, Koops, 2017; Farinosi, 2011; Simon, 2005, etc.). The word *panopticon* derives from the ancient Greek *παν-ὀπτης (πανὀπτας)*, which means *all-seeing* and refers to gods (Zeus), and the word *ὀπτιλος*, which is its part, is translated as *eye*. The panopticon system was developed by Jeremy Bentham for penitentiary institutions such as prisons, houses of correction, care homes, workhouses, factories, asylums, so the main issue for him was the organization of the observation process itself (Bentham, 2008). "The Benthamite response to the question of 'why bother to look?' seems to be a matter of added value. For Bentham supervision is ultimately necessary only to direct the system, detect any transgression and to make good on the promise of retribution" (Champion, 2019, p. 11). In contemporary social philosophy, the expansion of the panopticon concept, i.e. the transfer of the penitentiary surveillance system to the whole of society, turns the panopticon system into a universal model of power that oversees, disciplines (Foucault, 1995), and controls the lives of individuals (Deleuze, 1992).

The panopticon system involves the division of society into a controlling minority and a supervised or controlled majority. The power of the state, represented by a supervising minority, is most fully realized in bureaucratic control over those individuals who become clients of social services (Bauman, 1989). Clients of social services lose the status of full citizens, which means they are deprived of personal autonomy and individual freedom. Clients of social services are 'objectified' and become an object of patronizing care of the state authorities. In the panopticon system, objectification becomes a mechanism of power that gains mastery over the life of the supervised and controlled part of society. The bureaucratic mechanism of control is based on the subject-object (S-O) interaction, which maintains the asymmetry of relations based on the principle of 'see – be seen'.

In the bureaucratic system of control, the function of the subject of observation or observer is performed by an inspector, who acts as an expert. Experts are believed to have special knowledge which enables them to determine the threshold of poverty, i.e. to distinguish between the true needs of individuals and whims, between frugality and prudence, between reasonableness and unreasonableness of individuals. In the state control system, the inspector functions as 'the subject supposed to know' (Žižek, 1998, p. 2). It is assumed that such a subject knows about individual needs and the needs of social service clients more than the individuals themselves know about themselves. The inspector organizes the daily life of the clients at the level of elementary needs. Bauman writes that the expenses of social service clients, their furniture, clothes, food, and lifestyles are carefully controlled. The privacy of individual lives is violated by sudden visits of specialists in health, hygiene, education, and so on. Benefits are granted only in exchange for a full confession and exposure of the most intimate aspects of life to importunate officials. As a result, payments are set at a level that leaves the recipients with no room for discretion and choice, allowing only the bare necessities (Bauman, 1989, pp. 111-112).

The client's life becomes absolutely transparent to the inspector's controlling gaze. The controlling gaze moves from the outer, i.e. social, layer of the individual's life to the inner one in such a way that the inner space of the individual's controlled life is presented to the inspector in a state of bare life (*nuda vita*) (Agamben, 1998, p. 53). Bureaucratic supervision precludes the existence of an impenetrable private space that is not under or subject to state control. Bureaucratic regulation of everyday life seeks to penetrate into the most intimate areas of the lives of individuals. The most vulnerable groups include the elderly (Mortenson, Sixsmith, Woolrych, 2013), the unemployed and the poor (Bauman, 1989), former prisoners (Standing, 2016), etc. The internal space of the private, and even intimate, life of individuals (*zoe*) becomes external (*bios*), i.e. is put on public display. According to Foucault, the panopticon in which the observed is exposed to be seen by everyone functions as menagerie: "The Panopticon is a royal menagerie; the animal is replaced by man, individual distribution by specific grouping and the king by the machinery of a furtive power" (Foucault, 1995, p. 203).

The universality of the panopticon model lies in the fact that this model operates in a dual mode of simultaneous *inclusion* and *exclusion* of individuals. Inclusion in the system of bureaucratic control simultaneously means exclusion of social service clients from the environment in which they live. Bureaucratic regulation of life isolates the supervised, so that they are deprived of all human contacts within society. Bauman argues that the most noticeable aspect of life in poverty is the self-exclusion of the poor from social interaction, the tendency to break old social ties and hide from public places in their own home, which turns into a refuge from the real or imagined threat of communal condemnation, ridicule, or pity (Bauman, 1989, p. 137). Clients of social services transfer full responsibility for their own existence to the state authorities. Although providing a minimum level of income necessary for the biological reproduction of nuda vita, the authorities, at the same time, relieve individuals of the need to build their own life strategy.

Everyday politics of homo sacer is directly related to the maintenance of the biological standard of living, i.e. it is a kind of survival policy. The essence of such politics is determined by everyday fear, which Heidegger calls *Fürcht*, meaning fear for life as such or fear of life. “Fear always reveals Dasein in the Being of its ‘there’, even if it does so in varying degrees of explicitness. If we fear about our house and home, this cannot be cited as an instance contrary to the above definition of what we fear about; for as Being-in-the-world, Dasein is in every case concernful Being-alongside <…> When this is endangered, Being-alongside is threatened. Fear discloses Dasein predominantly in a privative way. It bewilders us and makes us ‘lose our heads’” (Heidegger, 2001, pp. 180-181). Everyday fear turns out to be an unreflected feeling that is not comprehended by the individual, but is experienced.

Everyday fear turns the life of homo sacer into a daily struggle for survival. In the struggle for survival, homo sacer resorts to the means at their disposal. On the one hand, everyday fear initiates territorial resettlement, which occurs in exceptional life circumstances. In this case, people try to escape from something specific that threatens their lives. *Homo sacer* is now becoming the name of refugees and labor migrants. On the other hand, one of the ways to fight for survival is violence. As a result, any distinction between homo sacer and a criminal is erased, which causes criminalization of certain population groups, especially those who find themselves in a difficult life situation. The panopticon system developed by Bentham for the penitentiary environment forms skills and habits typical for such an environment. Imprisonment becomes an alternative way, but this time it is a way of physical ‘exclusion’ of part of society from social relations. In today’s individualized society, Bauman argues, criminals are seen as ‘bottom’ of society, and urban ghettos and disadvantaged areas are viewed as incubators for crime and criminals (Bauman, 1998, p. 122).

The existence of individuals who have the status of homo sacer uncovers the obscene underside of modern society, showing that the absence of political life deprives society of instruments of civil resistance to the power of the state. In this case, homo sacer is the element of society that is ‘excluded’ from it, and at the same time becomes the principle of its organization, demonstrating the inequality of opportunities for individuals in determining the strategies of everyday politics. Therefore, concern of the state with the life of individuals in a difficult life situation captures the biological level of life of individuals. Under the gaze of the authorities, homo sacer appears in the nakedness of bare life, the right to dispose of which is transferred to the authorities. Individuals lose their status as full-fledged citizens and turn into an object of state patronage. The dependence of bare life on external control of the authorities forces social service clients to remain socially passive and politically indifferent, endlessly in need of an inspector. This means that the ‘excluded’ individuals must come to terms with their social inferiority and lack of rights. Any voice of protest and resistance of individuals begins to be regarded by the authorities as a matter of public order, when social ‘exclusion’ can always be replaced by physical isolation of the ‘excluded’.

Everyday politics of homo sucker

In modern society, an alternative to the life of homo sacer, which exists under the supervision of bureaucratic power, is everyday politics of *homo sucker*. In modern social philosophy, *homo sucker* expresses liberal ideas of individuals about wealth and well-being. The concept of *homo sucker* is used with the meaning that the noun *sucker* has: a simpleton, a parasite, an offset or a side shoot. In social philosophy, homo sucker is seen as a product of liberal ideology (Žižek, 2002, p. 71), who, in the comfort of petty bourgeois life, turns out to be insensitive to human suffering, but at the same time begins to reason from the perspective of the ‘end’: world, history, culture, and politics (Nikolaidis, 2010). Homo sucker gives priority to the sphere of private interests and consciously not only recoils from active participation in political life, but also avoids any form of public activity. Everyday policy of homo sucker is realized within the limits of consumer freedom.

A normal custom of homo sucker is irony, which allows individuals to distance themselves from the demagogy and populism of the authorities. Yet, at present, those in power not only allow individuals to treat the authorities with a touch of irony, but also provoke individuals to treat them in such a way. The irony of individuals, which keeps them away from any political activity and “common cause” projects, is beginning to be actively used by the authorities. Homo sucker as a figure of liberal subjectivity turns out, despite irony, to be a naive sucker. Slavoj Zizek writes, “When we think we are making fun of the ruling ideology, we are merely strengthening its hold over us" (Žižek, 2002, p. 71). The authorities use consumer orientations of homo sucker to their maximum benefit.

New technologies of power are being developed that allow the majority to observe the minority with technical means of the mass media. The mass media practice of directed observation of the minority by the majority is called the *synopticon* system (Bauman, 1998; Mathiesen, 1997). A different mechanism of power emerges, in which the observed become observers. The synopticon turns out to be the optical model of observation opposite to the panopticon. The word *sinoptikos* originates from ancient Greek. In ancient Greek, *σύν-οψις* means a review, a brief outline. The minority, which is watched by the majority, belongs to the institutional elites, who hold leading positions in political life, state bureaucracy, private enterprise, and so on (Bauman, 1998).

The synopticon model 'excludes' any active participation of individuals in political life, but includes them as viewers in an interpassive position. Interpassivity becomes a form of manifestation of the activity of individuals through the 'big Other', whose function is performed by the mass media (Žižek, 1998). The mass media gain mastery over individuals through seduction rather than coercion, which allows them to maintain the interest of consumers of information in politics at the level of curiosity (Baudrillard, 1979).

In the synopticon model, the subject-object (S-O) interaction based on the 'see – be seen' principle is opposite to the panopticon model. The optical model of the synopticon seeks to bring the observing majority as close as possible to the object of observation. The maximum approach to the object of observation allows the observer to penetrate into the private space of the observed minority. It is believed that the more attention the media pay to the private life of a member of institutional elites, the more curiosity one arouses and the more famous one becomes. The mass media tempt TV viewers with the very opportunity to sneak a peek at celebrities, showing and telling about every detail of their intimate lives.

The synopticon system keeps homo sucker away so that individuals can watch, thus satisfying their curiosity, only what the media show. Focusing attention on the private side of the life of politicians, the media leave out political and social problems relating to the principles of living together. In the optical system of the synopticon, the observation process unfolds from the internal to the external, i.e. the observer's gaze moves as if it were inside the object. From the opposite perspective, the desire of observers to get as close as possible to the private life results in a thicker "covering", thus increasing the protective layer over the public life and the political life of institutional elites. It turns out that the mass media hide the public life and the political life of institutional elites from being watched by observers.

The media control the surveillance process in the following way: by keeping the majority away from the authorities, they give the authorities real freedom of action. Invisibility becomes the strategic principle of the existence of power. The maximum remoteness of the authorities from the life of society allows them to act in personal, purely selfish interests which do not even need to be presented as state interests, and therefore, justified to society in any way. The optical model of the synopticon effectively protects institutional elites, for whom politics becomes a source of income, constantly increasing their personal wealth.

The ironic detachment of social individuals does not affect the foundations of the existence of power, but is used by those in power. Cynicism becomes the dominant position of power, which makes any criticism of government decisions impossible and useless. Cynics perceive their own political activity quite realistically; they are well aware of the practical opportunities and economic benefits that life 'at the expense of politics' opens up for them (Weber, 1946).

The position of modern authorities can be expressed in the cynical mind formula of Peter Sloterdijk: "they know very well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it" (Sloterdijk, 1988). This formula shows that the authorities are fully aware that their actions hide private interests (Žižek, 1989, p. 25). There is a peculiar pattern: the more a part of society distances itself from political life, the more often the authorities begin to act in private, selfish interests, and the more homo sucker's life becomes dependent on uncontrolled and undesirable decisions of the authorities. By provoking an ironic attitude towards themselves, the authorities seem to be making it clear to society that everything that happens should not be taken seriously, thus gaining mastery over society and strengthening their position.

It turns out that homo sucker appears to be exercising his formal right to determine his own everyday policy under conditions that do not depend on his choice. The dependence of life on the authorities deprives homo sucker of a sense of confidence, security, and stability. Homo sucker's care of his own life turns into anxiety about his personal insecurity. The feeling of insecurity becomes the source of everyday fear (*Fürcht*). The everyday fear of homo sucker is manifested in the fear of losing certain material goods and deteriorating well-being. Since the source of everyday fear is not comprehended, but experienced, the lack of reflection allows everyday fears to last indefinitely in a sense of social uncertainty. The stronger the feeling of social and everyday insecurity is, the greater everyday fears turn out to be, and the more insecure and scary life in society seems. Social insecurity is similar to mental depression, which is expressed in a feeling of powerlessness and inability to think rationally, and therefore to adequately build one's everyday politics.

Therefore, the universality of the synopticon model lies in the fact that this model also operates in a dual mode of simultaneous 'inclusion' and 'exclusion'. The inclusion of homo sucker as a consumer simultaneously "rules out" the very possibility of any political activity, the absence of which is intensively supported by the authorities that allow the majority to satisfy their curiosity.

Thinking as a form of political life

Modern social philosophy re-raises the question about the essence of political life, which, starting from ancient philosophy, is called *βίος πολιτικός* (Agamben, 2000; Arendt, 2005a, 2005b). If we make a distinction between everyday politics and political life in Heidegger's terminology, then we can say that everyday politics refers to the ontic level of the life of individuals, while political life refers to the ontological beginnings of the life of citizens. The return to the ontological level of research can be explained by the self-evident fact that in modern conditions, the survival of a person depends directly on the person's ability to think.

The concepts of everyday politics of homo sacer and homo sucker contain the limit of ideas about political life, the function of which is performed by fear. Everyday fear (*Fürcht*) can be considered as such a limiting state of human life that deprives a person of the basis of existence. However, it is the achievement of the limit that shows that a person deprived of a foundation has nothing more to rely on and no one to rely on except himself. As Heidegger writes:

> This 'fearfulness' is not to be understood in an ontical sense as some factical 'individualized' disposition, but as an existential possibility of the essential state-of-mind of Dasein in general, though of course it is not the only one (Heidegger, 2001, p. 182).

The positivity of establishing the limit lies in the fact that a person in this state can only turn to himself. As a result of a person's turning towards himself, two aspects of being are revealed: a person discovers himself not only as an existing (*ego sum*) individual, but also as a thinking (*ego cogito*) (Descartes, 1998) personality. In modern social philosophy, thinking is beginning to be considered as a special form-of-life that makes various manifestations of life meaningful, which is radically different from the bare life of individuals. Agamben writes:

> I call *thought* the nexus that constitutes the forms of life in an inseparable context as form-of-life. I do not mean by this the individual exercise of an organ or of a psychic faculty, but rather an experience, an *experimentum* that has as its object the potential character of life and of human intelligence (Agamben, 2000, p. 9).

On the one hand, thinking is not one of the daily activities of a person, therefore, exceptional life circumstances can serve as an impetus to launch thinking as a process of internal activity. On the other hand, thinking does not have to be initiated by some extraordinary or catastrophic life events; it can occur at any moment in time.

Thinking as a special form of thought, according to Agamben, is the potential of a social community. Modern ideas about the role thinking plays in political life should not begin with the classical idea of a solitary intellectual leading a contemplative lifestyle, which in ancient philosophy was called *βίος θεωρετικός*, but they should rather begin with *averroism*, i.e. with the idea of a single possible intellect, common to all people (Agamben, 2000, p. 10). The modern concept of political life cannot be explained in terms of a person, by whom modern philosophy understands mainly an individual living in an individualized society (Elias, 1991) where the private sphere of life has priority. Ideas about political life should be based on the principle of plurality, since the intellectual potential of the political community is people in the plural rather than a person (Arendt, 1982, p. 40). In this connection, thinking is understood extremely broadly as an intellectual ability that many people have, yet the intellectual ability of each individual person is unique. The transition from the inertia of life to a thinking existence is an individual act that requires a person to make a personal decision. As a result of such a decision, the status of a person is changed: the person is no longer referred to as *homo,* but is defined as a personality.

Referring to the etymology of the word *persona,* Hannah Arendt writes that originally this word meant the actor's mask hiding his individual, 'personal' face and telling the audience about his role and function in the play:

> But in this mask, which was designed and determined by the play, there existed a broad opening at the place of the mouth through which the individual, undisguised voice of the actor could sound. It is from this sounding through that the word *persona* was derived: *per-sonare,* 'to sound through,' is the verb of which *persona,* the mask, is the noun"(Arendt, 2005a, p. 12).

The Romans began to use the word *persona* in a metaphorical sense, since "in Roman law persona was somebody who possessed civil rights" (Arendt, 2005a, p. 12). In terms of the meaning, the word *persona* differed from the word *homo,* which meant someone who was just a human being with no special status. Therefore "*homo,* like the Greek *anthropos,* was frequently used contemptuously to designate people not protected by any law" (Arendt, 2005a, p. 13). In this sense, *homo sacer* and *homo sucker* can be interpreted as simply human beings who have either lost or lack the ability to think (homo sacer), or who do not see the need for thinking (homo sucker), but who are accustomed to living in a certain way.

Thinking as the form-of-life of a community can be seen as a force that allows individuals to resist not only the inertia of social existence, but also the life watched carefully by the authorities. In philosophy, thinking existence is traditionally defined by Descartes' statement 'ego cogito, ergo sum' (Descartes, 1998). However, thinking and existence are interchangeable in this declaration, i.e. 'I think, therefore I am' is equivalent to 'I exist, therefore I think.' In a condensed form, Descartes' statement can be represented as follows: 'I think = I exist', where the join of identity of thinking and existence is "I". This means that by resisting the power of thought, the "I" is aware of the dependence of life on the potential that thinking has, especially in politics. It is this awareness that produces the power of resistance. The "I" appears to itself as a 'resisting person', i.e. the one thinking at every moment of its existence and thereby overcoming the inertia of life. In terms of resistance, Descartes' statement 'ego cogito, ergo sum' can be presented in two ways: '*I resist, therefore I think'* and *'I think, therefore I resist.'*

The thesis 'I think, therefore I resist' can be illustrated by the theory of Alain Badiou, who considers political life in the context of the politics of activism. Badiou connects activism with the activity of thought, by which he understands the intellectual ability inherent in all people. The internal need of people to think is the basis of their political activity. Active thinking begins with understanding that resistance is an unavoidable necessity. At the same time, Badiou notes that the way of thinking is an individual choice that requires determination, courage, and will from the individual. "Not to resist is not to think. Not to think is not *to risk risking*" (Badiou, 2005, p. 8). The path to thinking begins with a logical gap between the postulates of common sense on the one hand and the prevailing attitudes of public opinion on the other hand. The gap opens up the possibility of 'standing one's ground', when thinking begins to rely only on those axioms that the individual formulates himself, on his own behalf, based on the current situation. As a result, the individual is deindividualized and included in the process of becoming a subject, which Badiou calls *'resistant by logic'* (Badiou, 2005, p. 4). Badiou connects the axiomatic nature of political thinking with the production of judgments of truth, which are formulated by the subject situationally. "Only the complexity of this cycle explains how there can be political judgments *as judgments of truth*, as opposed to mere opinions" (Badiou, 2005, p. 22).

The ability to think logically and resist the power of the state with the power of thought limits the circle of people capable of participating in political life. Badiou's exemplary subjects leading a political lifestyle are philosopher-mathematicians, philosopher-logicians, and mathematicians, which include Albert Lautman, Georges Canguilhem, and Jean Cavaillès (Badiou, 2005, pp. 1-8). Alain Badiou's mathematical logic is a model of political thinking. Thinking, called *λογος* in ancient philosophy and *cogito* in modern European philosophy, is replaced by Badiou with mathematical logic in the truest sense of the word (Zhurbina, 2021, pp. 156-157). Therefore, in the context of the statement "I think, therefore I resist", thinking is a universal ability inherent in all people, i.e. the pure potentiality of a social community. However, according to Alain Badiou, this ability is actualized only in intellectuals – philosophers, logicians, and mathematicians who possess a system of reasoning, i.e. the logic of argumentation and the rules for deriving consequences.

The second option 'I resist, therefore I think' is presented in Hannah Arendt's theory, in which thinking is the basis of political life. In the absence of thinking, the individual becomes a cog in the state machine, which not only starts the machine, but also becomes involved in the execution of the criminal orders of the authorities (Arendt, 2005a, p. 58). A feature of political life is that it requires individuals to undertake mental activity, i.e. the ability to tax the brain and think at every moment of their existence.

When asking the questions: "How is the life of the mind possible?" and "What makes a person think?", Arendt turns to common sense as the basis of political thinking. According to Arendt, thinking cannot be reduced solely to logic and logical reasoning. The main political difference between common sense and logic is that common sense presupposes the existence of a common world in which people live together and where the human need for understanding is realized. In turn, logic and self-evidence of logical conclusions do not depend on people. "It has often been observed that the validity of the statement 2 + 2 = 4 is independent of the human condition, that it is equally valid for God and man" (Arendt, 2005b, p. 318). Common sense is a sense shared by all people; the human ability to think is realized through it. "The *sensus communis* is the specifically human sense because communication, i.e., speech, depends on it" (Arendt, 1982, p. 70).

According to Arendt, thinking opens the eyes of the mind, connecting the five external senses – sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch – in such a way that a person discovers many perspectives to perceive the world. In this sense, thinking is a special kind of *contemplation* that allows a person to observe, reason, and make a judgment. At the same time, thinking interrupts any ordinary activity, since it requires a person to 'stop and think'. "Whenever we think, we stop whatever else we may have been doing <…> we are unable to do anything but think" (Arendt, 2005a, p. 105).

Arendt believes that the initial condition for thinking is the ability of a person to conduct a dialogue with himself, during which a person appears to himself as a thinking being. It is by thinking that a person resists the impotence of human singularity. This can be explained by the fact that the thought has an attribute of plurality. In the process of thinking, the "I" turns to itself with questions and receives answers. The dialogue develops between the two that make up our "I", Arendt argues:

> It is true, however, that even in the singularity or duality of thinking processes, plurality is somehow germinally present insofar as I can think only by splitting up into two although I am one. But this two-in-one, looked upon from the standpoint of human plurality, is like the last trace of company – even when being one by myself, I am or can become two – which becomes so very important only because we discover plurality where we would least expect it (Arendt, 2005a, p. 106).

In the process of thinking, the internal, silent dialogue of "I" with oneself can turn into an external dialogue, when a person begins to take into account the opinions of others. The more other people's positions are present in the mind when thinking about the problem, the better the "I" begins to understand what you can feel and think in their place.

However, the ability to think politically is actualized in times of crisis, when there is no longer a set of truths – doctrines, teachings, or beliefs that guide our thought and allow any particular case to be brought under a general rule. Because of the destruction of general rules, the political potential of personal judgment about the particular is released. Arendt defines political thinking as 'thinking without a bannister', which allows one to make one's own judgment. The crisis period draws a line between those who want to think, and therefore make their own judgment, and those who avoid it.

At the same time, it should be noted that Arendt considers thinking as an intellectual ability inherent in all people, and not just in "thinkers by profession", whose bright representatives are philosophers who completely devoted themselves to a contemplative lifestyle called *βίος θεωρετικός*. The need for philosophy arises in times of transition, when the question of the conditions of human life becomes especially relevant. In philosophy, contemplation is the highest state of mind, the attainment of which requires solitude. Here Arendt refers to the Epicurean dictum *'lathē biōsas'* or *'live in hiding'*. The solitude of the thinker's life is determined by the nature of thinking, which has no external expression and does not have the urge to appear to others. "For thinking itself, as distinct from other human activities, not only is an activity that is invisible – that does not manifest itself outwardly – but also and in this respect perhaps uniquely, has no urge to appear or even a very restricted impulse to communicate to others" (Arendt, 2005a, p. 8).

The philosopher, distracted from the hustle and bustle of the everyday and trying to live in solitude, begins to ask questions: "Who am I to judge? (Arendt, 2005a, p. 18), "What is the voice of conscience?", "Where is the line beyond which I can no longer live in harmony with myself?" (Arendt, 2005a, p. 44), "What is personal responsibility?" etc., initiating the beginning of reasoning. The philosopher, as professional thinker, remains a person endowed with a general feeling and sane enough to simply live. All the questions that philosophers pose by virtue of their professional activities arise from the experience of everyday life:

> Philosophy is a solitary business, and it seems only natural that the need for it arises in times of transition when men no longer rely on the stability of the world and their role in it, and when the question concerning the general conditions of human life, which as such are properly coeval with the appearance of man on earth, gain an uncommon poignancy (Arendt, 2005a, p. 9).

At the same time, the individual, immersed in everyday life, begins to conduct a silent dialogue with himself: "How do I live on or what do I do in the current situation?", "Why do I support this government?" etc. In this case, the beginning of thinking as an activity can be any event – from an incident on the street to any event or occurrence that affects the life of an individual. "However, while thinking in this nontechnical sense is certainly no prerogative of any special kind of men, philosophers or scientists, etc. – you find it present in all walks of life and may find it entirely absent in what we call intellectual" (Arendt, 2005a, p. 94).

The basis for the equality of philosophical and non-philosophical positions is the universal human need for thinking as the highest human ability. The two opposing positions of the individual and the philosopher coincide, demonstrating that thinking is the only way to resist a meaningless life ruled by power.

Conclusion

Modern strategies of neoliberal politics are oriented towards the depoliticization of the life of society, which reveals its limits in everyday politics personified by the lives of homo sacer and homo sucker. In this case, everyday politics of homo sacer and homo sucker reveals the ontic level of life of individuals immersed in everyday life. In this sense, homo sucker is equated with homo sacer in the lack of rights and dependence on power, which in modern society functions either through the mechanism of the panopticon or the synopticon.

Socio-philosophical studies of the political life of citizens in the post-political world show that the well-being of people depends on their awareness of the fact that life depends on the potential that thinking has in political life. In this case, the existence of a person can be considered as a meaningful existence of a citizen who, by thinking, resists a meaningless life controlled by power. The existence that is identical to the process of thinking forms an image of political life, according to which a person begins to live the way he thinks and speaks, and speaks and thinks the way he lives. This means that political life is based on the philosophical idea of existence by thinking, which can be represented in two ways: 'I resist, therefore I think' and 'I think, therefore I resist.'

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CREATIVE AND RESEARCH SEGMENTS OF EUROPEAN HUMANISM: DEVELOPMENT OF A SINGLE CULTURAL SPACE

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Abstract:

The relevance and theoretical weight of the mentioned topic of research consists in the definition of the phenomenon metamodernism, which, in modern humanitarian knowledge and in literary and artistic practice, determines the need to distinguish and analyse segments of European humanism as means of in-depth reproduction, nuance and personalisation of historical and cultural stages, in the context of the specified systematisation of the movement of segments from the middle of the 19th to the first two decades of the 21st century. The main goal of this study, considering the creative and research potential of segments that contributed to the gradual layering of specific features of European humanism, is the reconstruction of arguments for and against those processes that caused the development of a single cultural space. The basis of the methodological approach in this study is the principles of historicism with the assignment of analytical, comparative, and chronological approaches to the determination of a wide range of issues that are of significant importance in the context of the stated topic. In the course of carrying out this research, results were obtained that have significant theoretical and practical significance, because they contribute to the further scientific and theoretical understanding of the dynamics of the European humanistic movement from the second half of the 19th to the first two decades of the 21st century, and can be used in lectures on aesthetics, philosophy, cultural studies, history and the theory of art for students of humanitarian and artistic creative universities. The results obtained during the implementation of this research, and the conclusions formulated on their basis, are of significant importance in the context of determining the key trends in the recognition of the creative and searching tendencies of European humanism, which play an important role in the process of forming a single cultural space.

Key words: segment; falsification of feelings; corruption of consciousness; turn; metamodernism; personalisation; dialogism; polygenre; polystylism.

Introduction

The guidelines of modern European humanism regarding the development of a single cultural space dictate the need, on the one hand, to systematise, first of all, the cultural experience of the past, and on the other hand, to emphasise those (experience) assets that had transcultural significance, stimulating a creative and searching attitude to reality. Such a reaction to reality required significant efforts from the entire community of intellectuals, who – in one way or another – determined the essence of European humanism. The problem stated in this study requires, firstly, the definition of the "segment", which can be considered as "the beginning – the organizing basis", starting from which the dialogue of European cultures gradually intensified, and secondly, the outline of the most promising theoretical provisions that elicited appropriate support from representatives of the literary and artistic community. Thirdly, since each segment is associated with a personality, the non-intermediateness of which has clearly manifested itself in scientific or artistic fields, the material of research is consistently personalised, which makes it possible, so to speak, to humanise the developed theoretical construction (Kuksa et al., 2022).

The senso-life inquiry of the contemporary, intensified in postmodernity, is central to three soul-helping discourses – ethics, religion, and psychology. It is possible to consider the meaning of a contemporary's life strategy from the standpoint of the competition of these discourses for a person, to ask questions about the specific features and limits of each of them, to be a border guard and to catch violators who go beyond their field and colonise the neighbouring ones. The approach from the standpoint of dedifferentiation is different and is related to what is happening with the blurring of the boundaries of the three discourses (Shalagina, 2021). Today, a worldview that combines ethical, psychotechnical, and religious content has developed, with the leading role of ethics; after the crisis of the great narratives of modernism, a new sense-life narrative is being formed. The point of assembly here is a practical philosophy (ethics), which centers physical, medical, spiritual, new religious, spontaneous educational, artistic practices.

At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, two psychological currents emerged simultaneously in Europe, which were initiated by V. Wundt and F. Brentano (Hoop et al., 2022). The psychology of V. Wundt, free from metaphysical and aprioristic layers or philosophical disputes, did not touch subjective intention. On the topic of V. Wundt's intentional realisation of psychology, E. Husserl expressed the opinion that such an approach makes it impossible for psychology to exist in the full sense of the word: "Since in essence, if we are talking about the soul, then subjectivity is perceived as individual subjectivity, as impersonal subjectivity and impersonal life, or more broadly – as subjectivity that was inscribed in history and the social environment, and it will always be absurd to attribute to it an objectivity similar to the objectivity of modern natural sciences" (Goncharenko, 2014). From the standpoint of the development of a single cultural center of European humanism, this was of significant importance, because the very perception of the soul as an integral part of the human essence is an objective reflection of the development of social awareness of issues of human individuality in the context of the general cultural space.

The enormous creative possibilities of modern humanism purely as a theory and worldview are connected with the authors' introduction of concepts pertaining to research methods and worldview. Contemporaries have the opportunity to observe a very diverse palette of concepts, institutions, and ideological content. The consistent use of the principles of skepticism allows identifying peculiar traps of consciousness in the newly formed theory of modern humanism. At the same time, their development becomes possible only when the researcher enters the space of mental forms and limits himself to them (Konoplyov & Reshetnikov, 2012). There is nothing special in secondary interpretations of what has already been said by authoritative people, if the researcher periodically checks his conclusions with the phenomena of objective reality. However, a one-sided fascination with theoretical constructions leads to the formation of a quasi-reality in the researcher's mind, which is perceived as a single fact. In its pure form, humanism exists as a scientific concept, as an abstraction; in life it manifests itself in certain, particular, national forms, which are united in essential features, but also connected by demarcating features.

The relevance and theoretical weight of the mentioned topic of research consists in the definition of the phenomenon metamodernism, which, in modern humanitarian knowledge and in literary and artistic practice, determines the need to distinguish and analyse segments of European humanism as means of in-depth reproduction, nuance, and personalisation of historical and cultural stages, in the context of the specified systematisation of the movement of segments from the middle of the 19th to the first two decades of the 21st century.

Materials and methods

The basis of the methodological approach in this study is the principles of historicism with the assignment of analytical, comparative, and chronological approaches to the determination of a wide range of issues that are of significant importance in the context of the stated topic. The main research is preceded by the creation of a theoretical base, which is formed from the results of the analysis of the scientific developments of some authors who have carried out their own research on a wide range of issues related to the definition of creative and searching segments of European humanism, which are important in the development of a single cultural centre. The theoretical basis of research is necessary for better coverage of the declared topic and for obtaining objective conclusions and results.

The analytical approach to highlighting the issues of the creative and searching segments of European humanism in the context of the development of a single cultural space consists in highlighting the problems of a separate segment as the organising basis of humanism, with the determination of key development trends in the context of time. In addition, an important aspect in the context of the specified analytical approach is the assessment of the prospects for elaboration and activation of the introduction of the broad theoretical use of the term "segment" itself, as consonant with the formal-logical structure of certain historical and cultural stages of development. The development and consistent implementation of the analytical approach implies the mandatory personalisation of segments as a means of separating the content, which is necessary to strengthen the moral and psychological responsibility for choosing the direction of one or another humanitarian discipline.

The practical application of the comparative approach consists in the use of a comparative analysis of the real state and development in the context of time of the creative and research segments of European humanities and the dynamics of their development in different European countries. The comparison takes place both in the context of the actual state of the issue being highlighted, and in the perspective of historical development, starting from the middle and second half of the 19th century and up to the present time. At this stage, the possibilities of chronological analysis are added to the comparative analysis, because there is a comparison of the development trends of the English and French humanistic models of the past and past centuries, with the identification of common features and differences that are important from the point of view of highlighting the historical perspectives of the development of a single cultural space. The organic combination of the specified methods of scientific research allows for qualitatively tracking the sequence of development of the key trends of European humanism in the combination of individual segments of this development, which generally determines the prospects for the formation of a single cultural centre, in relation to the European countries considered in the study.

The qualitative expansion and clarification of the results obtained in this study are facilitated by their analytical comparison with the results and conclusions of other researchers who highlighted the issue of the development of a single cultural space, based on the study of key trends in the development of the humanities in developed European countries over time. The results obtained in this research, and the conclusions formulated on their basis, can be used in the future as a methodological basis for research in the field of the development of the general cultural space of European humanities, and trends in the development of cultural consciousness, considering the general European experience.

Results

The problem presented in the subject of this study requires elaboration and activation of the introduction into wide theoretical use of the concept of segment – from the Latin Segmentum – a segment that corresponds to the formal and logical structure of the historical and cultural stage. In general, by and large, this is referencing a ratio, since a stage consists of a certain number of segments, each of which allows one to observe changes in cultural creation much faster and more clearly than a stage can: its time span is quite long, which inhibits the understanding of the current movement of culture. A positive aspect of the segment is the possibility of personalisation, i.e., the selection of a figure that is an expression of its content, which strengthens the moral and psychological responsibility for the theoretical orientation of a particular humanitarian science. The thesis outlined by us carries a special burden in the conditions of the postmodern model of humanitarian knowledge, some of whose representatives profess the principle of permissiveness.

The creative and exploratory nature of the segments identifies an appeal, in particular, to the experience of Franco-English humanism. Of the reasons for this emphasis, the most critical is the following: the cornerstone of French humanism is its dynamism, its constant attraction to change. In the French cultural space, both scientists and artists of other European countries adapted quite easily, and this, on the one hand, contributed to the establishment of a dialogue of cultures, and on the other hand, it did not bypass the factor of national identity. Unlike the French, the English model of humanism is built on traditionalism, where the principle of succession operates consistently. The research space of England is not characterised by either earth-shattering shifts or jumps, nor zones of silence, when there is a pause in theoretical studies. If we were to assume the possibility of such a pause, it would quickly and almost imperceptibly to an outsider's eye be filled with the reflections of those who moved, so to speak, in the wake of a particular outstanding thinker. The thesis about the segment as the beginning, or the organising basis, is demonstrably representative of the period between the middle of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, during which, firstly, the relationship of one stage – several segments is clearly outlined; secondly, the specificity of personalisation is clearly identified; and thirdly, the events that accompanied the specified period give reasons to emphasise various aspects of the French-English cultural and creative dialogue of that time.

For French humanism, the second half of the 19th century turned out to be a rather important, creative, and productive period thanks, first of all, to the philosophical and aesthetic and artistic innovations of O. Comte – I. Ten. Since the influence of the philosophy of positivism on the scientific and artistic pursuits of Europeans has been comprehensively investigated and evaluated as having an impact on the orientation and reorientation of the contemporary European intellectual community, we will focus on another tandem – T. Gauthier – Ch. Baudelaire, whose position acted as a plastic bridge in the process of implementing the Franco-English dialogue. Despite the lack of both personal and theoretical integrity, the lifestyle and theoretical ideas of T. Gauthier (1989) proved to be consonant with the creative atmosphere that was formed on French soil during the 1840s and 1850s. This feature is clearly confirmed by the theory of “art for art's sake”, which is still interpreted according to the either/or principle, seeking in its provisions either a refutation of the social essence of art or a denial of its mimetic nature. In the projection of time, especially considering the attitude to the theory of art for art's sake on the part of Baudelaire (1986), it becomes obvious that it was supposed to protect the aesthetic essence of art, allowing it to liberate human sensuality, which, in the opinion of the theory’s proponents, was branded, so to speak, by the numerous functions that the artistic body had to perform composition. This is exactly what Gauthier (1989) tried to convey to his contemporaries: “We believe in the independence of art; art for us is not a means, but an end, and an artist who strives for anything other than beauty is not an artist” (Gilbert & Kuhn, 2000).

“Liberation of sensuality” as a task for a segment of a specific historical and cultural stage also captivated Baudelaire (1986) – an outstanding poet and art theorist, who in *The Salon of 1846,* published material devoted to the paintings of Ary Schaeffer, using for their analysis and evaluation the concept of "falsification of feelings." Almost a hundred years after the publication of Baudelaire (1986), an outstanding English historian of science, philosopher, esthetician, and art theorist, R.J. Collingwood (1999), in the monograph *Principles of Art*, operated with the concept of “corruption of consciousness”, which he used for the analysis of cultural ideas that have aesthetic, artistic, and psychological “colouring”. The specificity of the segment that we consider in connection with the concept of corruption of consciousness is that its content has not deviated from the “beginning – organising basis” to date, requiring consideration at an interdisciplinary level. Incidentally, it can be noted: when explaining his thesis, Collingwood (1999) used the expression, “corruption or untruth (lie) of consciousness”. Corruption of consciousness is a concept that is undoubtedly the author's, although the first outlines of the idea of the “behavioural bifurcation” of consciousness, as Collingwood (1999) noted, are found in Plato, Spinoza, and Freud. Collingwood's “corruption of consciousness” accords with Baudelaire's idea of “falsifiers of feeling”, and therefore, gives grounds for positing a Franco-English dialogue of ideas, which, unfortunately, has not received due attention or understanding.

It should be emphasised that Collingwood (1999), in his monograph *Principles of Art*, does not refer either to Baudelaire's surname or to the construct of falsifiers of feeling, so it can be assumed that he was not aware of Baudelaire's article. However, the English theoretician operated with the concept of "falsification", although he did not connect it with the problem of "sensation – feeling", but touched upon it only in connection with the issue of falsification in photography. Baudelaire's sharply negative attitude towards artists, who should be considered "falsifiers of feelings", was made public in *The Salon of 1846* and focused around the paintings of Ary Schaeffer (1795–1858), which in general, according to the poet, were admired by the public. Why then does the question of the falsification of feelings arise? In answering this question, we must first emphasise the relevance of the use of the concept of falsification – from the Latin falcificare, i.e., forgery, deliberate distortion of facts – by Baudelaire. This concept is quite widely used in history and political science. In modern art studies, it is used mostly in a criminal context, regarding the forgery of works of fine art.

Among the examples of falsification outlined by Baudelaire (1986), those that are consistent with the concept of corruption of consciousness can be singled out. These include: the fallacy of the thesis about the possibility of creating a poetic picture: "painting and poetry are close to each other to the extent that poetry itself is able to evoke picturesque images in the soul of the reader"; "... great artists, relying on an unerring instinct, take only very picturesque visual images from poets". It should be emphasised that Baudelaire (1986), focusing on a specific painter, whose work can serve as an example of falsification, was concerned not so much with the artist, but with the problem of feelings in general. This makes his position similar to the reflections that Collingwood (1999) offers through the concept of corrupted consciousness, using a rather unexpected comparison: "...bringing a wild animal into the house, we hope to tame it, but when it turns out that it bites, we lose patience and let it go free. Our guest turned out not to be a friend, but an enemy". Thus, there is every reason to consciously emphasise that between the theses of falsifiers of feelings and corruption of consciousness there was a distance of almost a hundred years, which was needed for the segment to finally manifest itself, recording, on the one hand, the complexity and contradictions of the process of the liberation of sensuality, and on the other hand, the movement of the conceptual-categorical apparatus, which ensures the effectiveness of the research process regarding the potential of sensuality.

Discussion

Continuing the search for arguments for introducing the concept of corrupted consciousness into theoretical use, Collingwood (1999) believed that one should first pay attention to "a certain feeling and then "be aware of it". This awareness can "frighten us, but not because the feeling as an impression turns out to be frightening, but because the idea into which we transform it is a frightening idea". It is about the fact that feelings, according to Collingwood's logic, should be set free, just like a wild animal, switching attention to a new sensation-feeling: "I call it the 'corruption' of consciousness, because in such cases consciousness allows itself to bribe, distorts its function, switching from a difficult and dangerous task to something simpler." This is fundamental, because during the outlined time, the European cultural space was filled – it is obvious from the overview of time – with a number of processes that formed the European cultural space of the 20th century. Thus, the outstanding Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce (1902) (1866-1952) published a thorough study, *Aesthetics as a Science of Expression and as a General Linguistics*, directly participating in the linguistic cultural turn. During the 1920s, Collingwood translated *Aesthetics* into English, which helped popularize the aesthetic concept of Croce on English grounds (d'Ovidio & Cossu, 2017). This, on the one hand, actualises the Anglo-Italian dialogue, and on the other hand, it is reflected in the research of the neo-positivists.

European cultural space of the late 19th and early 20th centuries is marked by fluctuations between the sensual and the rational and the conscious and the unconscious as well as the development of fundamentally new directions in the development of art, where the sensual was equipped with the symbolism of Stephane Mallarmé (1842-1898), and the rational was mainly established thanks to the tandem of Comte-Zola. The naturalistic novels of Emile Zola (1840-1902), which brilliantly interpreted the French model of positivism, consistently actualised interest in natural knowledge and questions related to the problem of heredity, which in his works were articulated as "stupid heredity" and, therefore, demonstrated a clear focus on mental and physiological pathology. Positivism turned out to be a rather resonant system of philosophical views in the 1870s and 1890s as well as the early 20th century, declaring a new segment of European humanism in which the connection of positivism with its literary and artistic modification acted as "the beginning – the organising basis" in an independent segment, which to this day reproduces the traditions of mimetic art (Bennet, 2020).

In the first decades of the 20th century, the theoretical weight of this segment was transferred to neo-positivism, which most clearly declared itself in the English territory, and this proved that the Franco-English cultural dialogue had gained new momentum, focusing attention on the development of linguistic arts, which included all literary genres. Avant-garde, which began to take shape in 1905, when an exhibition of Fauvists led by Henri Matisse (1869-1954), an outstanding French painter and art theorist, was held, witnessed the emergence of a new segment that stimulated an active cultural dialogue in the field of "non-realistic" art (Koefoed, 2018). Construction of the concept of non-realism should not only emphasise the fact that avant-garde artists rejected realism, such as the novels of Honoré de Balzac, but also outline the trend of changing the paradigm of the aesthetic and artistic development of art. At the same time, avant-garde, having clearly declared itself, quickly began to demonstrate the process of internal instability and self-destruction: cubism and cubo-futurism exhausted themselves, suprematism turned out to be tangential to abstractionism, and Dadaism accepted the role of appendix to surrealism.

However, avant-gardism moved almost in parallel with modernism, which demonstrated not only a noticeable stratification among European intellectuals, but also brought to life a number of fundamentally important theoretical and artistic phenomena. So, for example, trying to protect realism, the French philosopher R. Garaudy (1955; 1962) – the author of the investigations *Grammar of Freedom* and *Answer to Jean-Paul Sartr*e – in the pages of the work, *On Realism without Shores* (1966) suggests a new model of realism based on the work of Pablo Picasso, St. John Perse, and Franz Kafka. Garaudy's theoretical research took place in parallel with the philosophical and artistic substantiation of the absurd – an important idea of French existentialism, advocated by Albert Camus (1913-1960). The research of this generation of French intellectuals was quickly refuted by the next generation, which was not interested in realism, which never left the shores, and treated "absurdist constructions" somewhat differently (Cooke, 2015). Thus, its representatives significantly expanded the boundaries of the absurdity of life, and also openly mocked the existential quests of J.-P. Sartre. Boris Vian (1920-1959), for example, is an outstanding forerunner of postmodern literature, who, in a bright sarcastic form, brilliantly demonstrated the potential of the cynical mind in his work. Therefore, from the beginning of the 1970s, the second stage of modernism confidently declared itself: postmodernism, which became a new segment of European humanism represented both in the models of prominent thinkers and authors–primarily in French philosophy–and in the literary and artistic experiments of the late 20th century through the beginning of the 21st century (Mulero et al., 2017).

The "beginning – organising basis" in the segment of postmodern culture actualised the interest of scientists in surrealism as a constituent structural element of the avant-garde. Of crucial interest in particular are the following: he probability of personalisation of the specified segment, based on the painting and cinematographic contribution to modern culture by Salvador Dali (1904–1989), and the transcultural nature of the segment, the content of which has retained its meaning from the birth of"surrealism to its modernist modification. There are several reasons explaining this interest, a primary one being the consistent use of surrealist means of aesthetic and artistic expressiveness in the literary and cinematographic experiments of artists of the postmodern genre (Kolokytha, 2022).

O. I. Onishchenko (2021), working out the concept of metamodernism, reconstructs its process of transformation as follows: "modernism – postmodernism – post + postmodernism – metamodernism", where the specificity of each of the stages, on the one hand, is reflected by a new conceptual and categorical apparatus that ensures research is postmodern, including research in metamodernist areas, and on the other hand, in various types of art,demonstrates active experimentation with polygenre and polystylist work.. The active use of these artistic techniques can be traced to the transition from the 20th to 21st century in the work of both European and American artists, including E. Dox, T. Morrison, D.-F. Wallace, M. Danilevsky (literature); and K. Tarantino, M. Gondry (cinematography). From the standpoint of the quality of cultural assessment, special attention is drawn to the experiments of the Anglo-Italian sculptor and painter, Davide Quaiola, who, working in different regions of the world, tried to combine the past with the present, traditions with innovations, realism with abstractionism and surrealism (Wandersman et al., 2016). A similar aesthetic and artistic orientation is characteristic of other artists at this time, with representatives from the fields of literature, cinematography, and the fine arts. As such, specialists have reason to consider metamodernism in the context of cultural and visual turns, which are actualised in modern humanism.

The position of T. van Sierd (2020) affirms this. Based on the work of D. Quaiola and other modern experimenters, T. van Sierd introduces the concept of the "craft turn", which is not just a symptom of postmodern nostalgia, i.e. alternatives or cases that took place in the past, which are allowed to assert themselves again. Rather, it is our very experience of knowing time that has changed. This view provides grounds for predicting that the number of turns in further humanitarian progress will only increase. Therefore, there is every reason to talk about the procedural nature of metamodernism, which, although it is at the initial stage of its development, has at the same time already given grounds for identifying its specificity, which "consists in the fact that, on the one hand, it is a theoretical reality, because since 2000, one way or another, it has been involved in the theory of postmodernism, and on the other hand, it is one of the examples of 'mind games' that were very popular at the end of the 20th century" (Onishchenko, 2021).

It should be emphasised that for a certain period it will hardly be possible to talk about metamodernism as an "independent segment" of European humanism since there are still not enough studies that would argue its fundamental difference from "postmodernism – post + postmodernism". However, it is likely that over time the development of a new segment of cultural creation, i.e. that of metamodernism, will become obvious (Banks, 2009). Indeed, the unique processes of metamodernism, related to the extremely negative attitude of the metamodernists both to mimesis and to other structural elements of the classical work, including the artistic image, can only become more apparent with time. Such a tendency can already be seen quite clearly today. This in turn, has begun the levelling of the moral and ethical foundations of art, since, following the surrealists, these metamodernists profess the principle of creative permissiveness. We can expect this tendency to lead to radical changes, actualising the search for a new artistic paradigm.

Numerous attempts to define the right of humanism are connected with the need to define a whole set of complexities that have both an objective and a subjective nature. There is a real need to rethink existing approaches to a certain set of issues that determine both the definition of key concepts and the assessment of general definitions that outline the range of issues related to humanist law and the specific features of its development in the context of time. In general, the question of humanism is closely related to the question of law (Kirchberg & Kagan, 2013). The biggest problem is precisely that the term humanism has a close connection with the culture of a certain people living in a separate territory. In general, this question refers to a certain cultural space in which the humanistic tendencies characteristic of one particular culture had developed. For the most part, cultural humanistic principles characteristic of a certain cultural stratum can be very limited and will not have a significant impact on the traditions of another culture. Therefore, the definition of the main cultural relationships, typical for one or another paradigm of humanism, characteristic of a separate cultural space, is the main task of a whole set of measures aimed at the development of a single cultural space within individual time segments.

Conclusions

The material considered in this research has allowed us to argue the need to introduce the concept of segment into theoretical use, which, as explicated above, is interpreted as "beginning – organising basis", and records and personalises the historical and cultural process of the development of European humanism. Segment, covering the nuances of the theoretical positions of certain personalities, preserves both individual and collective experiences that could have been overlooked by researchers. The importance of interdisciplinarity in the development of a single theoretical space in the process of solving a number of important problems is emphasised by this concept. Starting from the middle of the 19th century and proceeding to the first decades of the 21st century, we have reconstructed the development of segments and shown their coexistence with linguistic, cultural, visual, and craftsmanship turns. This has allowed us to identify metamodernist literary and artistic creations, and demonstrate how these may give rise to new artistic movements and experiments.

The materials of this study may be useful to teachers when giving lectures on aesthetics, philosophy, cultural studies, history, and theory of art, to students of higher education at humanities and artistic creative universities, and to postgraduate students and scientists whose interests relate to European humanities. The material presented in the article requires further analysis in order to improve the conceptual apparatus of metamodernism. This may contribute to the introduction of new ways of researching specific features of artistic creativity and the aesthetic and artistic methods of metamodernism in various types of art. The results obtained during this research, including the conclusions formed on their basis, can be used in the future as a methodological base for research on various aspects of the development of a single cultural space using the creative and research-based segments of the European humanities. In general, the issue of the development of the European humanistic space requires further careful research in connection with changes in the field of the cultural development of contemporary Europe and in view of the presence of many limitations of the cultural space of European countries by modern economic trends and realities.

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ELUCIDATING THE ONTOLOGICAL POTENTIAL OF CARE ETHICS: TOWARDS A REVISED NARRATIVE OF MORALITY

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Abstract:

The following paper aims to re-examine the nature of the moral self as expounded by the Care Ethicists with the prime objective of understanding its ontological potential. It will be argued that this philosophical endeavor of examining the nature of the moral self in light of the Care Ethics theory echoes ontological thoughts and ideas that orbit around themes such as *relationality*, *emotionality*, and *contextuality*. The paper seeks to exhaustively explore the moral significance of these detected ontological standards of the Ethics of Care project. Through this engagement, an affinity between the moral and the ontological aspects of Care Ethics shall be identified. Discussing the proposed ontological significance and implication of the care theory, we shall determine if there is a possibility for developing a dialogue between the domain of ethics and ontology, and if so, then consider what the ontological roots of feminist Care Ethics are. Consequently, through this project, we shall present a revised narrative of morality altogether.

Key words: Ethics of Care, Feminist Ethics, Moral Self, Relational Ontology, Ontology of Morality.

Introduction

Generally speaking, the ultimate nature of human beings and human existence could be exhaustively comprehended by engaging with the idea of the *Other*; thus, the nature of the self can be understood in light of the category of the other and the broader theme of *Inter-subjectivity*. However, in the moral realm, several long-established conventional moral theories have been structurally based on themes like individuality, rationality, autonomy, and rigidity, consequently, disregarding the role of the significant *Other* in the moral domain. Viewed under a gendered lens, it is argued that these mainstream moral theories have furthermore trivialized women's voices, virtues, and values. Philosophers like Aristotle, Augustine, Kant, Rousseau, Hegel, etcetera have centrally emphasized and cherished the role of rationality in the moral realm, thereby, manifesting a reason-centric and consequently, a male-centric moral project. For instance, Aristotle had explicitly uttered that women are "children who never grew."[1]

Addressing the inadequate position of the moral self, Kant has been indicted for speaking in a masculine tone and promoting masculine values such as rights, independence, self-determination, will, autonomy, transcendence, etcetera. Michael Sandel (1984) writes about Kant: "According to Kant the right is derived entirely from the concept of freedom

[1] For Aristotle, women lack reasoning capacity due to which they are morally impotent and powerless, consequently granting them a passive status. The book, *Women and Law in Classical Greece* (Raphael Sealey 1990, p.151), has examined Aristotle's deficient reflection on women's issues and overall gender bias, and the moral, social, and political status of women at the time.

in the external relationships of human beings, and has nothing to do with the ends which all men have by nature" (Sandel, 1984, pp. 84–85). In saying so, Sandel wants us to realize that the followers of liberalism (like Kant, in this context) have devised the principles or rules of morality by pursuing a very narrow concept of the self. Following Sandel, other communitarians as well as feminist thinkers have critically assessed the position of liberalism and theories offered by its adherents. In a nutshell, moral theories such as Deontology, Utilitarianism, and even sections of Virtue Ethics are claimed to advance an essentially rational, individualistic, and unemotional impression of the moral subject.

All things considered, the fundamental aim of the paper is to reconstruct the moral essence and substance of the self in the moral domain by employing the feminist Ethics of Care theory as a foundational premise. By considering the Care theory, the paper intends to eventually evince its contributions toward the fusion of the ethical and the ontological realm. Specifically, by doing so, the constitutive ontological *soul and potential* of the Care Ethics theory shall be unveiled and acknowledged. Three distinctive yet connected elements attached with the Ethics of Care theory, namely, *relationality, emotionality,* and *contextuality* shall be individually contemplated. Therefore, by regarding these three facets, the aforementioned *ontological potential* of the Care theory shall be elucidated. Moreover, after examining these three ontological elements, the paper shall unravel their contributions towards refurnishing and re-structuring the gross moral realm. In simple terms, we shall conclusively uncover the moral significance and implications of the ingrained ontological potential of Care Ethics.

This paper is organized in three discrete segments. The first section offers a brief overview of the theoretical position of the Ethics of Care theory, comprising its origin, features, and objectives. The second section explicitly surveys three distinctive yet connected elements attached with the Ethics of Care theory, namely, *relationality, emotionality,* and *contextuality* in order to categorically elucidate its ontological roots. After studying these themes, in the concluding section, an attempt to understand the moral implications of this ontologically rich aspect of Care Ethics shall be made. Mainly, it shall be demonstrated how with its ontological potentials, the Care Ethics project helps in revising and rephrasing morality and matters around moral deliberation.

Therefore, the paper aims to display the constitutional sum and substance of the moral subject as underpinned by the advocates of the feminist Care theory. Accurately put, it principally seeks to explore the ontological spirit and implications of the moral self as proposed by the ideology of Ethics of Care.

1. Position of the Ethics of Care Theory: Context and Background

Before promptly estimating the fundamental tenets of the Ethics of Care theory, let us contemplate and know the circumstances that led to the origination of *feminist* Ethics of Care theory. Care Ethics theory emerged in the moral realm because its exponents like Carol Gilligan and several others recognised traces of prejudice and unfairness in the moral sphere. Concisely, the fundamental interest of the theorists lies in criticizing an abstract, rational, and individualistic model of self as extended by mainstream moral theories. Contrarily, by reconsidering these traits associated with the nature of the moral self, care theorists established a divergent model of the self, wherein the idea of self is known to be aligned with themes like relationality and emotionality. There are two fundamental reasons that the feminist label is assigned to the Ethics of Care: first because it essentially focuses on the *inclusion* of women and their voices in the moral sphere, and second, because it is concerned with relations of power, social justice, and socio-political change, which according to its proponents, exert influence on moral decisions and actions.

Regarding the inclusion of women's voices in the moral realm, Carol Gilligan (1982) argues that we have been continuously ignoring women's perspectives, reasoning, and frame of mind; thereby, over-emphasising the value of masculine voices and thoughts. According to her, this form of bias in the moral sphere has led to two problems. Firstly, it has silenced the voices of women, and secondly, this male prejudice has led to an incomprehensive and uniform understanding of morality. As a panacea, Gilligan renders a gender-specific (women-specific) version of moral theory. She does so by engaging in a comparative analysis of the moral development of boys and girls and gradually arrives at the conclusion that moral judgment and reasoning patterns differ for men and women.[2] In a nutshell, regarding the Ethics of Care, she writes:

[2] Gilligan finds that the theory of moral development presented by Kohlberg is insufficient and incomplete. Her

> Women's construction of the moral problem as a problem of care and responsibility in relationships rather than as one of rights and rules ties the development of their moral thinking to changes in their understanding of responsibility and relationships, just as the conception of morality as justice ties development to the logic of equality and reciprocity. Thus the logic underlying an ethic of care is a psychological logic of relationships, which contrasts with the formal logic of fairness that informs the justice approach (Gilligan, 1982, p. 73).

Thus, what we gather from Gilligan's position is that an Ethics of Care rests on the idea of interpersonal relationships and human needs. This perspective is grounded in women's voices and the value of recognising their voices. This voice is essentially the voice of care. Hence the name, Ethics of Care.

In the background, a significant question surfaces, 'what had led to the emergence of the very need for a new-fangled ethical framework along feminist lines?' Let us try to address this question with the help of a few arguments presented by Susan Parsons (1998), in which she explicitly discusses a few reasons that led to the critical evaluation of traditional models of morality in order to prove their limitations and inadequacies. According to Parsons, the main reason for the subordination of women in the ethical sphere and the neglect toward their moral experience revolves around some presumptions that ruled the minds of mainstream moral theorists (Deontology, Utilitarianism, and Justice theories). The presumptions are as follows:

1. The first presumption according to her is that the traditional moral theories have been devised in such a way that they merely consider the agency and reasoning capabilities of men. To be precise, the first presumption emphasizes that only men are morally sound agents. Parsons says that this is due to a general mindset which has led women to be thoroughly ignored and have the nature of their ethical reasoning overlooked. Thus, it is correct to claim that this presumption of considering the experience of men and emphasizing the traits that are typically associated with men is one of the main reasons that calls for a need to rethink morality.

2. The second presumption that Parsons discusses centers on the traditional models of morality that have always tagged women as inferior beings. She writes, "The nature of women is inferior to that of man's, or women are restricted to the spheres and activities of life that are chosen for them by men" (Parsons, 1998, p. 136). This presumption rests upon the idea that an inferior or superior status is given to a person on the basis of the role they play in the social domain in accordance to their nature and traits. Similarly, women are considered as morally deficient and feeble due to this established gender role apparatus which patently render women as weak, impotent, and subservient.

Having explained the origin of Care Ethics, let us now explore its elementary attributes. To begin with, let us make a momentary reference to a quote from Sarah Hoagland (1991), who defines the feminist Ethic of Care as "an approach to ethics originating predominantly from feminist writing which focuses on close personal relationships and emphasizes emotional commitment as a basis for acting rather than reliance on abstract rules and principles" (Hoagland, 1991, p. 248). It is clear from Hoagland's statement that Ethics of Care is a theory that considers interpersonal relations and human emotions.

Precisely put, the major position of the Care Ethics theory are as follows: for the exponents of Care theory, rigid rules and principles are irrelevant; interpersonal relationships and human bonding hold a significant position in the moral realm; context-specificity is a vital attribute of moral reasoning; human emotion, affection, and sensitivity are an integral part of moral life; and lastly, and most important of all, responsiveness, accommodation, and flexibility are dominant elements of Care theory.[3]

Furthermore, Nel Noddings (2003) argues that, "Justice Theory focuses on 'what is just' as in what is strictly prescribed and the Ethic of Care appeals to concepts like compromise and accommodation" (Noddings, 2003, p. 43). Feminist ethical theorists insist on the idea of mutual understanding and compromise. Indeed, regarding the idea of compromise, the Ethic of Care orbits around the close tie between

work on feminist ethics can be considered a reaction to the work of Kohlberg. This is because Kohlberg conducted experiments and by doing so, he concluded that boys mature morally ahead of girls. Gilligan agrees with one aspect of Kohlberg's experiment–that moral reasoning is different in regard to boys and girls–but she disagrees with Kohlberg when he claims that boys are morally more mature beings as compared to girls.

[3] In order to get detailed insights on these themes, one may refer to the works of leading Ethics of Care theorists, namely, Carol Gilligan (1982), Nel Noddings (1984), Joan Tronto (1993), Annette Baier (1995), Virginia Held (2006), and a few others.

interconnection between beings and the value of responsibility.

After discussing the basic tenets of both the doctrines of ethics, it is now easier to understand the position of feminist ethics and comprehend its essence. Having laid the conceptual framework of Care theory, in the next section, the paper shall address the fundamental question, 'what does it mean to have an ontological soul in the first place?'

2. Cataloging the Ontological Potentials of the Ethics of Care Theory

Generally speaking, ontology comprises matters relating to human existence, patterns of existence, being, relations of being, the idea of becoming, etcetera. However, for the sake of precision, in this context, we shall refer to the *existential pattern of being*[4] in order to further exemplify the ontological potentials of Care Ethics. Against this backdrop, three distinctive yet connected elements attached with the Ethics of Care theory, which underscore the deep-rooted ontological undertones of it, namely, *relationality, emotionality,* and *contextuality* have been sketched out. Let us now reflect on each of the themes individually.

Relationality

Care Ethics is often described as a relational ethical theory. The uniform individualistic conception of ethics was re-evaluated by the advocates of Care Ethics. They emphasize the role of interdependency and interactive facets attached with morality and moral conversations between beings. Following Gilligan's path, Nel Noddings writes that "the virtue described by the ethical ideal of one-caring is built up in relation. It reaches out to the other and grows in response to the other" (Noddings, 2003, pp. 80-81). Noddings claims that the ideal vision of self is one who exists and operates in a web of relationships. She furthermore elaborates the role of moral responsibility, obligation, and receptivity in moral life. These themes are manifested fundamentally if we read and understand the moral self in light of relationality.

In a similar vein, Virginia Held construes that Ethics of Care "sees persons as relational and interdependent, morally and epistemologically" (Held, 2006, p. 13). Additionally, she explains care as a relational emotion which captures the concerns of mutual love and care and the virtues of being in intimate relationships with fellow beings. It is this inclination towards *caring relationships* between individuals which allow us to re-think the very socio-ontological nature of the moral self. Thus, Held recognizes the moral self not merely as independent and autonomous nor the idea of moral good as something ontologically self-oriented and dependent; instead, for her, moral life and the idea of moral good are elementarily interlaced in relationships. This relational entwinement between the self and other(s) further insinuates that when in tune with the ideals of Care theory, we in a way at the same time are upholding a novel view that human flourishing somehow is interdependent.

Hence, Ethics of Care ascribes intrinsic value to relationships because relating to others in a loving and caring way is a basic human need. Held studies how care and the act of caring appraises the value of human need, good, and well-being. Additionally, we also witness Christina Traina (1999) uttering almost identical views on the interdependent character of moral good and human flourishing. She explicitly states: "the good of one individual depends upon the good of the other" (Traina, 1999, p. 45). In brief, flourishing is a matter of the common human good and wellbeing. There is a close connection between self and other members of the moral community.

Therefore, mindful of the perspectives furnished by Care ethicists, we have discerned and appreciated the significance of human relationality in light of the logic of psychology, contingency, and sensibility. We may now recognize Care theory as one which calls attention to the need for inter-subjective interconnection, a mutual sense of responsibility, and receptivity to and equal recognition of others' voices. Consequently, we may spotlight potential ontological undertones of this nature.

Emotionality

Speaking of the ontological potential of Care Ethics, we have at the outset detected the first ontological imputation of it, i.e., the *relational* facet attached to it. In addition, we have also discovered how as an ethical ideology, Ethics of Care creates a capacity for the inter-subjective emotions of love, compassion, responsibility, and responsiveness in the moral realm. We are also aware that philosophers have been constantly struggling with the question of whether subjective feelings must be considered in the realm of morality or not. The proponents of Care theory are therefore witnessed as re-formulating the long-established moral theoretical insights around the role of emotionality in moral life.

[4] I would like to clarify here that I shall use the term moral 'self' throughout the study, and this idea of self is identical with the above-mentioned ontological entity, 'being'.

In this spirit, let us contemplate how they do so and comprehensibly cognize the emotional connotations of Ethics of Care in order to further fabricate and rationalize the claim that it evinces comprehensive ontological insights.

Annette Baier writes, "The justice perspective yields an unreal idea of freedom of choice, also overlooks the difference that exists between individuals, and most important of all it completely shuns the role of human emotions in the moral sphere" (Baier, 1985, p. 56). According to her, adherents of the Justice account like Kant had only attributed rationality to the ontological nature of a moral self. As a reformative venture, she calls for expanding the horizon of morality by asserting that the moral self is not just rational but also emotional in nature.[5] Caring relations are determined by moral sentiments and Care ethicists like Baier, Held, Noddings, Kittay and Meyers have explicitly investigated the practice of care-giving/ care-receiving as an emotional undertaking. In recent times, feminist scholar, Elena Pulcini (2015) in her article, "What emotions motivate care?", writes about Care ethicists: "Gilligan highlights the role of compassion and attachment in moral choice; Kittay traces care work back to love; and Held points out that individuals are not only motivated by selfish passions but also by empathy and responsiveness" (Pulcini, 2015, p. 2).

However, Joan Tronto (1993) raises a concern about over-emphasising the value of care rigidly in terms of human emotions. Instead, she argues that the evident role of emotions associated with the act of caring such as love, compassion, sympathy, pity, empathy, etcetera must be regarded in close connection to the ontological spirit of relationality and inter-dependency amongst beings. Additionally, she argues that it would be inappropriate and fallacious to identify the role of these emotions as mere *dispositions*.[6] For her, care could be considered as a *dispositional sentiment* which further fabricates a cluster of human emotions such as love, sympathy, empathy, compassion, etcetera.

Focusing on the nature of the other in caring relationships, Pulcini presents three models. The three models allude to the private, social, and global aspects of existence. Categorically placed, the first model is caring out of love; second, care work out of compassion; and third, caring for distant others out of generosity (Pulcini, 2015, p. 3). Therefore, Pulcini examines the value of emotions in view of these three models of caring relationships, namely, private, social, and global. She also offers an ontological theorization of the act of caring.

Therefore, the moral self is emotional in nature and there is space for emotions in moral life. Also, the emotional nature of the moral self when read along Care Ethics ideals exhibits profound ontological nuances, as traces of emotionality in Ethics of Care communicate the prospect for re-thinking the nature of the moral self as sensitive, connected, interdependent, attached, and concrete.

Contextuality

Here, the paper intends to clarify that by reviewing the role of contextuality, a discussion on the theme of *particularity* shall be undertaken.[7] One may recognize an inward relation between contextuality and particularity simply because of the perennial contention that Care Ethics is a relation-based moral project and relation-specificity does not necessarily stipulate similarity or generalization of any

[5] Liberals like Kant consider rationality as the most essential feature that can be attached to an individual. He gives pride of place to reason in his moral doctrine and even defines a moral self in terms of this feature. Moreover, Kant has devalued women, claiming that they are emotional creatures and they tend to shape their moral actions on the basis of emotional inclinations. Rejecting this view of Kant, Care Ethicists (Baier being one of them) have made a fresh attempt to make room for emotionality in the moral realm.

[6] In this context, I would like to make a momentary reference to philosopher of emotion, Jesse Prinz (2007). Prinz, in his embodied appraisal theory of emotions, contends that there is a vital difference between emotions and sentiments. In his understanding, sentiments are dispositions which further engender emotions. In this case, if we apply Prinz' theory to our understanding of Care Ethics and its association with emotions such as love, empathy, sympathy, compassion, etcetera, we realize that in this case too, care/caring is a sentiment which engenders emotions like love, empathy, sympathy, compassion, etcetera.

[7] Engster & Hamilton, Care Ethics and Political Theory, p. 4. I would like to add here, an Ethics of Care revolves around the concept of particularism. In this sense, it can be considered as being conceptually and structurally different from the established rule-centered ethical theories, and for that matter, an Ethics of Justice. In an Ethics of Justice doctrine, as propounded by Kant, Rawls, and others, we have observed that actions are fundamentally guided by rigid, universalized principles, thereby granting no access to particularism. Hence, contrary to particularism, they have emphasized the function of universalism. With the emergence of Care Ethics, we encounter a revised narrative of the moral self and issues relating to moral life. One such revised ingredient pertains to its insistence on the significance of moral particularity. I would also like to remark here that this emphasis on particularity is a sub-element of their relational estimation of ontology.

form; it implies distinctiveness and reactivity. Hence, it is essential to consider the theme of particularity because in a pragmatic sense, human relations are not homogeneous, but rather, differ provisionally. About this facet of Care Ethics, Engster and Hamilton (2015) have recently stated:

> Unlike traditional abstract and universal Western theories of ethics, care ethics values particularism. An authentically caring response is unique and individualized. It requires understanding the particularities of the other's experience, including their history, relative power, relationships, and so forth.[8]

Speaking definitely of the ontological core of particularism, the exponents of Care Ethics profess that a moral self is guided by relational particularities and shape his/her actions according to certain desires, one's past history, and one's personal perspective. Joan Tronto (2012), in her article, "Partiality Based on Relational Responsibilities: Another Approach to Global Ethics," identifies a few parameters which account for particularism. These parameters are: "presence, biology, history, practice, environment, shared projects, institutions, play, trade, conversation, and other 'less structured' interactions" (Tronto, 2012, p. 306). In my understanding, by rendering these parameters, Tronto did primarily strive for arguing in favor of particular characteristics, experiences, and conditions as essential to beings in a moral situation.

Scrutinizing the ontological soul of the moral self in tune with the themes of contextuality and particularity as foregrounded by the adherents of Care Ethics further compels us to identify beings as concrete in nature. Feminist ethicist, Seyla Banhabib (1987) argued along this line that the feminist moral self as propounded by the adherents of Care Ethics has a concrete identity, thereby, differing from the rigidly abstract and universalized presentation of it extended by Justice theorists. She writes: "Perhaps the most distinctive and controversial feature attributed to care thinking is its particularity, which means not only that it addresses the needs of others in their concrete specificity but that it is unmediated by general principles" (Benhabib, 1987, p. 164). In particular, what she meant by stating this is that it would be inaccurate to claim that the moral self can only be identified in terms of abstract and generalized traits. Instead of discussing the moral self in generalized, and even ambiguous, terms, it would be more insightful and comprehensive if we consider the fact that individuals also have a *concrete* identity.

Now, having categorically deliberated about and ascertained the facets that underpin the ontological spirit affixed with the ideology of Care Ethics, it is necessary that we realize and estimate the progressive implications of these ontological elements.

3. Construing the Moral Significance of the Uncovered Ontological Potential of Care Ethics: A Revised Narrative of Morality?

In this section, let us consider the moral signification made by an Ethics of Care with specific attention to its relational ontological assertions. Simply put, the question that shall be undertaken here is, 'how do the ontological tenets attached with the Care theory model a revised version of morality?' The contribution of the Care theory toward the revision of moral life and morality, in my understanding, pertains to one fundamental characteristic: that when read along with the ontological structure of Care Ethics, we observe a change in the overall *moral question*.

Contrary to long-established themes of rigidity and abstraction that were customarily associated with morality, focusing on ontology, the Care Ethicists follow a different route to understand morality and moral affairs. Moreover, they address a different moral question altogether. In fact, there is a shift in the moral question from a generalized attitude to a more particularistic one. For instance, I recognize this shift as a shift from the question, 'what is just?' or 'what is right?', to possible questions, such as, 'how do I respond?', 'how would I act?', 'what would be the best possible action in a particular context?', etcetera. It is also to be noted that there is a change in the main essence of the question– meaning, there is a shift from *should* to *would.* In this context, *would* expresses a conditional mood or refers to a situation that we consider as occurring. Conditions are also ascribed to the notion of would when we consider posing moral questions.

Having pronounced that there has been an overall shift in the moral question, i.e., from the idea of *should*, which indicated a form of compulsion, duty,

[8] Additionally, one may refer to the work of Fiona Robinson (2011) in the book *The Ethics of Care: A Feminist Approach to Human Security*, wherein, just like Engster, Robinson has addressed the element of particularity by contrasting an Ethics of Care with an Ethics of Justice. Similarly, Grace Clement's (1996) work in the book *Care, Autonomy and Justice: Feminism and the Ethic of Care* could be referred to in this context.

or obligation, to the idea of *would*, which indicates a sense of conditional and voluntary mood, we may learn that the underlying concerns and objectives of Care Ethics stipulate a new version of morality altogether. However, when profoundly investigated, we realize that the introduction of the idea of *would* in the moral domain also has certain undeniable implications pertaining to the above discussed ontological spirit and substance of Care Ethics. The emphasis of Care Ethics on the *would* aspect of moral inquiry and questioning further compels us to address a shift from *speaking* to *listening* and from *impartiality to partiality*. Therefore, what the paper primarily attempts to do in what follows is to explore these two aspects of the repositioning of the essence of moral questions in order to further construe the moral significance of the unveiled ontological potential of Ethics of Care. Let us now explore the two claims in detail.

Focus on *Listening*

We are aware that Carol Gilligan has detected and further highlighted the gender bias present in the moral realm in relation to the thorough neglect of women's voices. She further makes this concern explicit in her recent article named, "Revisiting 'In a Different Voice'" (2018) wherein she writes about her background and the provenance of her work:

> As a child I loved stories. I have always loved literature—that's what I studied in college. I also was very involved in music and singing. When I came into the field of psychology, it makes sense that I would be someone who would listen and ask, "Who's speaking"? The sort of questions you ask if you are used to thinking about stories. "Who's speaking to whom?" and in what societal and cultural frameworks? That's the origin of my work (Gilligan, 1982, p. 25).

Here, Gilligan underlines the crux of her research as she is primarily concerned with the linguistic patterns in psychology (mainly moral psychology). By critically studying the linguistic patterns, she aspired to construe the status of women subjects in moral theories and the estimation of their voice in the moral realm. For Gilligan, the first stage of feminist movement in the moral realm pertains to the acceptance of women's voices, and the second stage, according to her, deals with the idea of recognizing various ways in which their voices could be *heard* and apprehended by the listeners (other members in a moral situation).

Let us make a momentary reference to Elizabeth M. Schneider's position. About this strand of Gilligan's project, she writes:

> Experiences that were previously invisible like rape, intimate violence, sexual harassment and incest are now made visible. But again, as Gilligan describes, visibility does not mean being listened to, that the listener 'gets it,' or that the listener, or society at large, has really 'taken it in' (Schneider, 1995, p. 35).

When one closely interprets Schneider's assertion about Gilligan, one may understand the fundamental difference between hearing and listening. From my understanding, the concept of hearing or being heard signifies a flimsy grasp on the demand for recognizing women's voices in the moral domain; contrary to this, as Schneider maintains, the concept of listening denotes the aim of absorbing it or *taking it in*.[9] The notion of listening in this context is confederated with the idea of attentiveness, sensitivity, and responsiveness. By emphasizing the role of listening in the moral domain, Gilligan, along these lines, has striven to achieve a two-fold objective. Her objectives may be perceived as follows: first, to address the gender bias in moral matters. and second, to call attention to the deeper onto-emotional facet of moral behavior and affairs, i.e., by laying the grounds for themes such as awareness, attentiveness, and sensibility. Specifically, Gilligan highlights women's inclination towards human relationships and feelings of care and responsibility. Thus, within her proposed pronouncement of moral reflection *in a different voice*, she inwardly discloses the role of an Ethics of Care. This way, in order to investigate the relevance of *appreciating* and *understanding* the different ways in which women subjects speak, it is indubitably essential to consider the role of attentiveness and sensitivity from the listener's end.

Following Gilligan's path, Joan Tronto encapsulates this notion of listening in moral matters. Categorically, she contends that the idea of listening is not just casual in nature; instead, it is closely tied to understanding, evaluating, and most important of all,

[9] Gilligan did not merely bring out the significance of hearing women's voices (recognizing them); instead, she brought out the significance of listening to their voices (paying active attention to them, reflecting on their implications, and understanding them). Bearing this direction in mind, I have selected the concept of listening and not of hearing as one of the moral implications associated with the ontological soul of Care Ethics.

responding. In this regard, the paper shall discuss *responsiveness* and *attentiveness* as the most important dimension of the art of listening. According to Tronto, the four elements of caring include attentiveness, responsibility, competence, and responsiveness of the care receiver (receiver is the listener in this context) (Tronto, 1993, p. 127).

Reading the notion of *listening* mindful of both the speaker's and listener's perspective provides further support for understanding caring beings as *engaged individuals*. When it was initially claimed that with the emergence of Care theory there has been a shift from the idea of speaking to listening in the realm of morality, the intent was not to completely disregard the act of speaking in the moral realm. Instead, by precisely emphasizing the scope of listening, the motive was to add and acknowledge the *engaged* facet of moral beings. By using the word *engaged* here, a reference to the moral subject as someone who is *active* and *involved* with others is being made. In framing caring relationships in this way, we have discerned that such a paradigm of moral life does not only define an individual, but care as an activity can also be considered a criterion that explains humanity's ontological nature and human existence.

Focus on *Partiality*

The proponents of Justice Ethics had defined the moral self as impartial based on the view that it strives to follow determined moral duties and principles dispassionately and in an uninvolved manner. For instance, deontologists and consequentialists like Kant and Bentham have focused on generalizability and universalizability. Their emphasis on universalizability further enriches the prospect for impartiality in moral decision-making and moral events.[10] In contrast, the proponents of feminist Care Ethics detect moral worth in terms of partial, preferential, caring relationships. This ethical framework starts from a particularistic approach to morality,focusing on particular experiences and contexts that are founded upon human relationships. The paper identifies the scope for moral partialism as an outgrowth of the relational ontological outlook of Care Ethics. Just as it fosters a paradigm shift from universalism to particularism[11], Care Ethics as a new moral theory also makes provision for specifying a shift from im-partialism to partialism.

In his book, *The Ethics of Care and Empathy*, Michael Slote supports the idea of partiality by stating that in matters of morality, it is "permissible and good to favour one's own near and dear" (Slote, 2007, p. 43). In my view, according to the advocates of Care Ethics, partiality is justified in moral affairs simply in the light of the relational character of beings. Here, I will highlight a central feature of this approach: Care ethicists do not rigidly support the idea of partialism; instead, by stressing the importance of partiality, they merely intend to re-work and expand the horizon of the established justice-oriented theories of morality.

Held justifies the role of partiality in ethics by arguing that traditional moral theories like that of Kant (deontology) have overemphasized impartial moral rules and principles, thereby proving to be inefficient in addressing real life situations which involve human relationships. In her argument, she offers the example of a man who is a father of a child and also a teacher of a student and imagines a situation wherein the man must choose between his child and his student. According to her, when examined through a Kantian lens, the man would be obligated to attend to the needs and demands of the student as he would be acting as a rational, abstract being. Therefore, there would be no scope for partiality against this backdrop. However, when considered in light of an Ethics of Care, the man would prioritize his child, bearing in mind the value of his relationship with the child.

Regarding the man's decision in view of a Care perspective, Held writes:

> He thinks that out of concern for this particular relationship he should spend more time with his child. He experiences the relationship as one of love, trust, and loyalty and thinks that in the case being considered he should subordinate such other considerations as exercising his professional skills to this relationship. He thinks he should free himself from extra work to help his child feel the trust and

[10] An Ethic of Care can be conceived as being completely opposite to Justice Ethics, which promotes neutrality and impartiality. One may consider Kant for a moment. We can say that Kant's moral self is impartial because it only strives to follow the moral duties and principles dispassionately and in an uninvolved manner. The impartial nature of moral duty that has been assigned to the moral subject makes it impartial. This further indicates that the Care Ethics approach and Kantian Ethics view interpersonal relationships differently.

[11] This has been discussed in Section 2, wherein I have illustrated the role of contextuality in defining the ontological structure of Care Ethics.

> encouragement from which his development will benefit, even if this conflicts with impartial morality (Held, 2006, p. 99).

As such, Held indicates a type of criterion shift from a measure of *rightness* to a measure of *what would be right* in a given situation.[12] According to her, impartiality also suggests giving *equal* consideration to everybody one is associated with, be it family, friends, colleagues, etcetera. She notes that Kant distinctly places both family and friends on the same level and insists on the equal treatment of both (Held, 2006, p. 98). Hence, in order to re-think and rectify this standpoint, Held calls upon her reader to reflect on the significance of flexibility and context-specificity in moral decision-making. When thought along this line, antithetical to the case of impartiality, the focus on partiality echoes deep ontological undertones. The paper recognizes these ontological undertones in the character of the formerly discussed theme of contextuality.

Thus, we have comprehensively grasped how the proponents of Care Ethics (mainly Held in this context) view partial feelings and emotions as a moral foundation, consequently encouraging and contributing to a gross shift in matters of morality and the way we have been engaged in moral decision-making and behavior.[13] Similarly, Noddings (2003) has explored the role of partiality in moral discourses by employing the concept of inner circles of caring (Noddings, 2003, pp. 47-48). Like Held, Noddings clarifies that members of one's inner circles, such as family and friends, are people towards whom we tend to be partial in moral deliberations.

Moreover, according to her, there is another circle to consider in the moral realm, namely a circle comprising "proximate others" (Noddings, 2003, p. 47). By the circle of proximate others, she mainly refers to one's relations with acquaintances and work associates. In a nutshell, for Noddings, we tend to be partial to members of our circle (both close and distant), a fact that attests to the ontological soul of Care Ethics as a material moral theory, rather than a theory grounded in abstract generalizations.

Categorically speaking of the claim that has been made about the partiality aspect of Ethics of Care, it is now essential to reflect on the fact that through this introduction of the notion of partiality in moral discourses, the exponents of Care theory have in a way re-worked and expanded discussions of morality. Over and above that, by studying the role of partiality in moral discourses, the paper has elucidated how their focus on partiality is fundamentally based on the ontological essence of the Care moral project.

The ontological attributes which are assigned to the moral self further induce a discernible modification of the way we had been doing morality and carrying out moral deliberations. In this regard, the primary idea behind considering the themes of *listening* and *partiality* is to contend that Ethics of Care as a moral theory opens the way for a more flexible and contextual approach to understanding moral situations and moral life.

Conclusion

This paper has made a case that reveals the contributions of Care Ethics toward the encouragement of a fusion between the moral and the ontological realm. The primary intention of the paper was to review the Ethics of Care theory from not merely a feminist perspective, but to learn about its ontological soul and substance. By uncovering the integral ontological tenets of Care theory, the paper has further investigated one crucial question, 'what amendments does the Care Ethics approach fundamentally in view of its ontological posture bring about in the realm of morality?' By addressing this question, we have evinced how an Ethics of Care makes room for two customarily neglected themes, i.e., moral *listening* and *partiality.* In simple terms, the central objective of the paper has not only been

[12] I would like to offer a remark about these two measures for the sake of clarity and coherence. Here, by the rightness approach, I am suggesting the mainstream universalized outlook of morality like that of Kant. Contrary to this established rule-centric and rigid viewpoint, I advocate a particularist approach to morality that is inclined towards considering the engaged act of selecting which action would be right. Additionally, I would like to draw attention to the previously discussed shift in the moral question, i.e., from discourses around the idea of should to would. In tune with this shift, by developing her partiality argument, Held also makes an effort to implicitly vindicate a shift in the overall moral question.

[13] In addition, it is essential to foreground the fact that, due to their meticulous insistence on partialism, Care theorists have been stormed by a range of criticisms. One of the mainstream criticisms is associated with concerns around nepotism and favoritism. The solution to this concern according to the Care Ethicists is first, to distinguish between different the range of emotions and sentiments. This distinction is one of the ways to avoid the problems in regard to favoritism or prejudice in the moral realm. In this regard, Held defines "sympathy, empathy, sensitivity and responsiveness as moral feelings that are desirable" (Held, 2006, p. 22). She also separates these from other selfish and cynical feelings.

to succinctly outline the ontological tenets of Care Ethics but to explore the ingrained connotations and import the theory has on the overall field of morality. Thus, the paper has extended a comprehensive understanding of the moral implications of the hitherto sketched out ontological potentials of Care Ethics. Consequently, space for a flexible, pragmatic, and comprehensive interpretation of discourses around morality has been established.

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THE NORMATIVITY QUESTION IN QUINE'S NATURALISM: THE CONTEXT OF THE LANGUAGE LEARNING SITUATION

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Abstract:

Quine has been charged with eliminating the normative dimension from his naturalized epistemology. The aim of the paper is to look at the role of empathy in Quine's language learning situation, which in its simplest form is constituted by the parent-child relation. We will explore the normativity of the role of empathy thereof by exploiting the sociality of the language learning situation. Since the sociality of Quine's notion of empathy is implicit, to explore the normativity expression thereof, we will examine the explicit sociality of Wittgenstein's language learning situation–also constituted in its simplest form by the master-novice relation–and the normative character of it. By explicating the normativity of the calibrating role of the master and of rule following generally, we will parse the moral dimensions of the empathizing role of the linguist in Quine's language learning situation. Finally, by examining the nature of normativity in empathizing, we will establish that the normativity of empathizing involved in Quine's language learning situation is socially grounded without denying its individual dimension. We will conclude that the normativity objection against Quine's naturalism thus stands refuted.

Key words: empathy, language learning, naturalism, Quine's normativity, sociality, Wittgenstein's rule following.

1. Introduction

In his influential paper *Epistemology Naturalized* (1969b), Quine puts forward a theory of epistemology called naturalized epistemology, according to which epistemology has to be made a chapter of psychology, which distinguishes it from the traditional epistemology. This view has been subjected to several objections. These objections target naturalized epistemology for its dramatic departure from traditional epistemology. The normativity objection, which holds that Quine has eliminated the normative dimension of epistemology, or that naturalized epistemology cannot account for the essentially normative character of epistemology, is one of the most common objections raised against naturalized epistemology. This objection has found various expressions in the literature. The severity of the complaint is such that one has to deal with it and give a certain satisfactory response to it if one wants to maintain a viable naturalist approach not only in epistemology but philosophy as a whole, that is, philosophical naturalism. The present paper is concerned with how the normativity objection may be met by examining Quine's language learning situation and the normative expression within it. The paper is divided into six sections.

The paper begins by recapitulating the main ingredients of the normativity objection by first pointing out how Quine's naturalized epistemology's goal departs from that of traditional epistemology. It will then discuss the key role that Quine's behaviourism plays in both his account of knowledge and theory of language. Quine's response since the late 1980s, in general, to this normativity objection is that normativity has entered into the naturalized epistemology as a 'the technology of truth-seeking.' However, this response has not completely defeated the objection. It shows either that Quine's view has been successfully refuted or that the objection has to be modified or abandoned. To present all of these objections is beyond the scope of the present work. What I will do is tackle the normativity objection by looking at Quine's language learning situation and shedding light on the normativity expression thereof.

The third section will explicate Quine's language learning situation with an aim to establish the normativity expression thereof. The role of the principle of charity and perceptual similarity in Quine's behaviourist theory of language learning will be discussed. The role of the notion of empathy in Quine's language learning, characterised by the master-novice learning situation, will also be discussed with an aim to explicate the implicit sociality and normativity thereof. The fourth section will discuss Wittgenstein's language learning situation and explicate the normativity expression thereof. Wittgenstein's rule following will also be discussed, and its normativity will be demonstrated by examining its social grounding, particularly the community standards which the master carries and the novice is made to conform to. The fifth section will look into the individual and social dimension of the normativity of language learning. It will aim to illustrate how the role of calibrating in Wittgenstein's language learning is similar to that of Quine's empathizing, allowing us to explain the normativity of the higher level empathy. It will, however, be argued that the same cannot be confidently said of the question concerning the normativity of the lower level empathy that operates at the unconscious neurological level. In this way, the paper will attempt to refute the normativity objection that Quine has eliminated the normative dimension from his naturalized epistemology.

2. The Normativity Objection and Quine's Response

Quine rejects the traditional view that epistemology aims to establish and validates the grounds of science through a logical reconstruction of the theory's formation, i.e., an investigation of the logical relation between our theories and their evidence (1969b, p. 75). He argues that epistemology's focus should be on discovering and explaining truths about how our beliefs about the world are causally related to evidence, or sensory data. According to him, epistemology

> studies a natural phenomenon, viz., a physical human subject. This human subject is accorded a certain experimentally controlled input–certain patterns of irradiation in assorted frequencies, for instance–and in the fullness of time the subject delivers as output description of the three-dimensional external world and its history. The relation between the meager input and the torrential output is a relation we are prompted to study for somewhat the same reasons that always prompted epistemology; namely, in order to see how evidence relates to theory, and in what ways one's theory of nature transcends any available evidence (1969b, p. 83).

Replacing epistemology with psychology implies that epistemology should use science, specifically psychology, to investigate and understand how we come to acquire beliefs or theories from our sensory experiences. Quine asks us to use psychology (1969, p. 75) because it can provide correct information about the necessary causal relation between our theories and the sensory evidence. Epistemologists should thus appeal to psychology in their quest to understand the world. Quine therefore thinks that since scientific theories are formed from evidence, considered as the totality of our sensory stimulations, the relation between science and its evidential base can be better investigated by using psychological methods, which give reliable causal information about our cognitive processes, including our sensory stimulations.

In taking verbal behaviour as the only evidence that we can conceive of for establishing the semantics as well as the epistemic claims, behaviourism can be taken to serve as the key to both Quine's account of knowledge and of language. In other words, he uses his behaviourist theory to establish the relationship of the sensory input with verbal input as well as that of the evidence with theory. By conceptualizing the stimulation of sensory receptors instead of external objects as available for scientific theory (1969b, p. 75), Quine's naturalised epistemology studies the input-output relation from a narrow basis of sensory evidence or stimulation.

Davidson (1986) claims that Quine has confused causes and reasons. According to him, the kind of relationship that sensory stimulations have with their observation-sentences counterpart has to be conceived of as a causal one. Therefore, their relationship is not a justificatory one because "nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief" (Davidson, 1986, p. 310). This implies that since naturalized epistemology focuses on how our scientific theory causally develops from our sensory evidence, it should refrain from the subject matter of justification of our beliefs or theories. Davidson's point is that naturalised epistemology so conceived is descriptive and not a normative discipline.

Jaegwon Kim (1988) also brought forward the normativity objection against Quine's naturalised epistemology. According to him, Quine takes the relation between sensory stimulations and scientific theory as a causal or nomological one (Kim, 1988, p. 389). So, Quine's naturalised epistemology aims to investigate how sensory stimulations causally lead to the formation of scientific theory about the world. Therefore, it is not the job of naturalised epistemology to investigate how we are justified in holding a scientific theory on the basis of sensory stimulation as available evidence. Justification is not a concern for Quine's naturalised epistemology. His argument is that since knowledge, defined as justified true belief, is itself a normative concept and justification is intrinsically normative, by eliminating justification from knowledge, Quine's naturalised epistemology eliminates the normative dimension from the theory of knowledge. Thus, he concludes that Quine's naturalised epistemology lacks a normative dimension.

In a nutshell, according to the normativity objection, there is no point in asking whether Quine's naturalistic epistemology satisfies the goal of traditional epistemology since it is deprived of the normative dimension to do so. However, Quine responds to these normative objections by arguing that

> naturalization of epistemology does not jettison the normative and settle for the indiscriminate description of ongoing processes. For me normative epistemology is a branch of engineering. It is the technology of truth-seeking, or, in a more cautiously epistemological term, prediction…There is no question here of ultimate value, as in morals; it is a matter of efficacy for an ulterior end, truth or prediction (1986, pp. 664–665).

Quine might, thus, be construed as claiming that naturalised epistemology retains its normative character insofar as, just like any other discipline of science, it aims to discover the truth and enhance our understanding of the world. The normative term which Quine employs is the 'technology of truth-seeking,' which implies that because truth-seeking is fundamentally evaluative or normative, epistemology is itself a normative discipline. In other words, while trying to unravel the causal story behind our true beliefs about the world, epistemology evolves its own norms in much the same way in which science evolves its norms while trying to establish truth claims about the world (Crumley, 2009, p. 192). In what follows, we will examine how the normativity issue may be dealt with in the context of Quine's language learning situation, keeping in mind that in Quine's philosophy, epistemology and language are intertwined. We will assess the normativity of the principle of charity and the notion of empathy in Quine's language learning situation.

3. Explicating Quine's Language Learning Situation

In his behaviourist theory of language, Quine asks how from impacts to our sensory surfaces, we have come to acquire or learn hitherto unknown language and develop our systematic theory of interpretation or translation of hitherto unknown language. Quine acknowledges that the field linguist relies on certain normative principles, the most important of which is the principle of charity.

The central idea of the principle of charity as a methodological strategy is that any translation manual according to which native speakers are construed as believing silly claims (e.g., the law of non-contradiction is false) is less likely to be accurate, making that translation manual a bad one (Wilson, 1959). Accordingly, it asserts that there is methodological ground for translating such that a native speaker can be construed as believing in claims that are true by the linguist's standards. Quine uses this principle when it comes to the task of translating observation sentences (1960). When carrying out the translating task, the field linguist assumes that the native speaker is rational and is not generally wrong about anything. Quine states the principle as:

> The maxim of translation underlying all this is that assertions startlingly false on the face of them are likely to turn on hidden differences of language. This maxim is strong enough in all of us to swerve us even from the homophonic method that is so fundamental to the very acquisition and use of one's mother tongue. The common sense behind the maxim is that one's interlocutor's silliness, beyond a certain point, is less likely than bad translation–or, in the domestic case, linguistic divergence (1960, p. 54).

This passage shows that Quine generally believes that the principle of charity can help make sense of the outcomes of translation. This means that they are not to be taken as limited to the circumstances of the field linguist because, while learning a language, no one has access to any evidence that the field linguist is lacking. In asserting that "one's interlocutor's silliness, beyond a certain point, is less likely than bad translation" (1960, p. 54), what Quine has in mind is that it may turn out that on the basis of the translations that we put forward, the native speaker may seem to deny obvious truths while denying that a statement and its negation both be true. It follows that some of our proposed translations can be wrong rather than that the native speaker does really deny the obvious truths.

The issue at hand is whether the principle of charity shows that translation is imbued with norms. By employing this principle, the translator is attempting to make sense of the utterances of the native speaker. But, the notion of "making sense" is essentially a normative one (Baghramian, 2016, p. 30). This line of thought may be objected to. It could be argued that unlike Davidson, Quine takes the norms of translation that are assumed by the field linguist as heuristic devices in radical translation and not as the indispensable presuppositions of the translating act. Critics may go so far on this point as to claim that even what we often regard as fundamental principles, such as the principle of noncontradiction, on Quine's account, are defeasible and not prerequisite of all linguistic ascription. Quine is willing to permit circumstances in which the field linguist may attribute irrational beliefs to the native (1995, p. 80). Another objection one can raise is that the principle of charity, on Quine's account, is grounded in empirical considerations in his later writing. This is the case, for instance, when Quine (1970, p. 2) asks us to take the target of the translating task as "plausible messages," and to provide an empirical account of such messages. However, we know that plausibility is a norm-governed notion that basically makes a claim about what is right to believe in certain situations (Baghramian, 2016). We can, thus, claim that Quine's naturalistic account of language is undermined by neither the normative demands of the assertoric usage of language nor those of radical translation.

The issue remains as to how we may establish that the speakers and learners act on the same stimuli. Quine responded to this by invoking two interconnected principles–the principle of similarity and the notion of empathy. The linguist will match the native speaker's 'gavagai' with his own 'rabbit' on the grounds that each sentence would be assented to and dissented from under the same pattern of nerve hits experienced by the native and himself (Quine, 1960). This view seems to require an extraordinary acquaintance with the minute details of his own and everyone else's physiology on the part of the linguist, and to rely on an implausible assumption of a close physical similarity among them. For this reason, Davidson (1990) has tried to persuade Quine to locate the relevant shared stimulus not in the sensory surfaces but farther out, in the publicly observable object or situations that cause the speakers to express assent or dissent regarding the sentences in question. That is, Davidson implores Quine to think that we can achieve the sameness of meaning by considering the role of what he called 'distal stimuli' shared by speakers, which would connect both 'Gavagai' and 'rabbit' with an animal (rabbit) that appears there–or at least with something that is publicly observable.

Quine, however, insists that his naturalistic view of translation allows only stimulations of nerve endings through the speaker's encounter with the world ('proximal stimuli' as Davidson calls these) as stimuli that are suitable for scientific consideration. This implies that Quine insists on locating stimulus meaning at the level of neural input and not publicly observable situations (Quine, 1990a, pp. 41-42). Although he insists on locating stimulus meaning at the level of neural inputs, Quine acknowledges that the psychological account of individual speakers' assent and dissent regarding statements about stimuli cannot alone explain how the speakers could be said to share the sets of stimuli and also share a language(s). Consequently, in the 1980s, Quine began to adopt a new approach, postulating that it is the innate shared sense of similarity between speakers that grants the sameness of stimulus. That is, Quine emphasised that a certain sense of similarity is essential for language learning. Without this shared similarity, neither language learning nor induction and prediction would not be possible. He writes,

People have to be in substantial agreement, however unconscious, as to what counts as

> similar if they are to succeed in learning, one person from another, when next to assent to a given observation sentence.Subjects radically at odds in this neural way could never learn observation sentences or anything else from one another. Our training even of a dog, horse, bear, seal, or elephant hinges on a conformity of his inarticulate similarity standards to our own (Quine, 1984, p. 294).

It may, however, be noted that since there are infinitely many ways by which an object and state can be found to be similar or to differ, we first have to pick the one respect in which they are found to be similar or differ. So, Quine admits that similarity in stimulus and response patterns does not itself alone guarantee the sameness of stimulus meaning. The similarity in patterns of stimuli and responses is not enough for language learning and translation. The particular way in which the object and state are similar or differ is contingent upon the characteristics of the context in question. We can observe that what can be considered similar cannot be exhaustively determined on a shared neuronal basis alone; context is also relevant in making these judgments. Since judgments of similarity, as Quine admits, may be relative to our own interests, in addition to a shared sense of similarity, a speaker may need to attune himself or herself to what other speakers consider similar in a given situation. It is at this point that Quine has begun to resort to the notion of empathy.

Quine, therefore, thinks that perceptual similarity is necessary for learning and that any creature capable of learning must have some innate standards and principles of perceptual similarity. However, he thinks that there is a similarity in the sense data that results in the similarity of perception, which serves as the basis for objective knowledge (Quine, 1960). Objectivity is defined for only one individual if the perceptual response is the same irrespective of the difference in the sense stimuli (Quine, 1990b, pp. 3-4). This is similar to the notion of a specious present with which one can define the identity of a perceptual object, that is, the perceptual continuity of the same object at different times. The starting point for Quine is to acknowledge that we are born with some instinctive ability to recognize similarities. Recognizing similarity can be across space and across time. The ability to re-identify an object would be to recognize its similarity across time, and the ability to see the similarity among several objects would be the ability to acquire a natural kind term. For instance, we have the ability to identify and re-identify our lost bag. We can perceive motion when discrete pictures that resemble one another with slight variations are screened at the rate of eighteen frames per second. Quine has recognized this ability, which is normally identified as a specious present. Psychologists have measured that the span of perception is $1/16^{th}$ of a second. We retain any perception for this period even if the span of an object hitting our nerve endings is less than this. This human ability is the one that is able to give us continuity of perception of objects, eventually resulting in the identity of objects.

Since learning depends on perceptual similarity, perceptual similarity itself cannot be learned by using something else. Quine grants this basic learning of similarity to be innate. He believes that the standards of perceptual similarity change when we advance in learning (Quine, 1995, p. 19). The change in perceptual similarity does not result from a change in our innate abilities but from the change that is brought about by new perspectives and their concepts. Quine thinks that the innate standard of perceptual similarity is an evolutionary endowment (1993, p. 113). He considers it essential for two types of similarities, viz., one at the level of phonetics or language, and the other at the level of perception in order to have scientific knowledge (Quine, 1969b, p. 32). Similarity at the basic level is provided by our innate notion of natural kinds, the basis for our primitive induction. We can learn the notion of one crow, two crows, three crows, and so on without involving the notion of inductive generalization by simple enumeration (Quine, 1995, p. 23). Quine takes the principle of shared similarity to be interconnected with the notion of empathy. In his behaviourist theory of language learning, the notion of empathy underpins language learning. In other words, the ability to empathise is the basis on which the child learns language and a necessary condition for language learning:

> Empathy dominates the learning of language, both by child and by field linguist. In the child's case, it is the parent's empathy. The parent assesses the appropriateness of the child's observation sentence by noting the child's orientation and how the scene would look from there. In the linguist's case, it is empathy on his own part when he makes his first conjecture about 'Gavagai' on the strength of the native's utterance and orientation, and again when he queries 'Gavagai' for the native's assent in a promising subsequent situation. We all have an uncanny knack for empathizing with another's perceptual situation, however ignorant of the physiological or optical mechanism of his perception. The knack is comparable, almost, to our ability to recognize faces while unable to sketch or describe them (Quine, 1990a, pp. 42–43).

This sheds light on how an act of empathising underlies language learning. In her encounter with the parent, the child acts and adjusts her behavior according to the reactions of the parent to the situation. By observing the reactions of the parent to the situation, the child progresses in the process of learning one-word sentences, "Gavagai," "mama," etc., and learning other, more complex sentences later on. Any of the child's mistakes is corrected by the parent, which can be said to have two sides (Van de Herick & Rietveld, 2021). On the one hand, being corrected can be rightly considered as a normative phenomenon that occurs between two or more persons who are interacting in a given situation. On the other hand, this empathising act or interaction that influences the child is such that it enables her to act or assess linguistic behaviour appropriately in the given situations. As such, it is the empathising ability that underlies the development of the linguistic skills of the child. As such, one interesting aspect of this phenomenon of the learning situation is that it extends the established communal pattern of linguistic behaviour.

The behaviour that is characteristic of the learning situation is empathising in nature in a double sense. Firstly, in responding to a situation, an individual exhibits his/her capacity to be *affected* by the world and others. Secondly, this behaviour is accompanied by the possibilities of being *motivated* by the world and others, as manifested in the subsequent development and use of linguistic behaviour and skills. This kind of empathising behaviour expresses the tendency of an individual to pre-reflectively experience the situation and act on certain possibilities for linguistic behaviour. Since socio-cultural practices have shaped an individual situation, the act of empathising, even in an unreflective form, is social in nature. Individuals with developed linguistic skills have a tendency to be drawn to those possibilities for linguistic behaviour afforded by the encountered situation that is appropriate to socio-cultural practices. The unreflective empathising reaction is social because the conditions that constitute better or worse or appropriate or inappropriate linguistic behaviour can be traced to socio-cultural practices. We can see that this sociality is inbuilt in Quine's notion of language learning:

> The linguist will rely also on observation of the local folkways...the linguist will not accept everything the native says as true. He will indeed assume sincerity, barring evidence to the contrary, but he will try as an amateur psychologist to fit his interpretations of the native sentences to the native's likely belief rather than to the facts of circumambient nature. Usually, the outcome will be the same, since people are so much alike; but his observation of the folkways is his faltering guide to the divergences (1995, p. 80).

With her improvised cognitive background, the linguist enacts the material conditions that allow for the possibility of language learning and the expression of appropriate linguistic behaviour. Our linguistic behaviour is not an expression of private judgments. Instead, it is an expression of our attunement to certain linguistic practices. By empathising, the child is initiated into language learning and hence into certain ways of acting and judging the world. In her linguistic behaviour, she gives expression to these ways. Of course, the view that language is primarily social is at the core of Quine's view (1969a, p. 26). Seen as a social art, language expresses skilful behaviour that attends to certain aspects of a given situation. Language, thus, is primarily a means by which the linguist/parent conditions the child/novice to recognise and respond to certain aspects of a given situation in ways that are appropriate to socio-cultural practices. The linguist/parent may teach the child/novice how to recognise similar situations by pointing out that one aspect of the given situation is similar to earlier situations. For example, the master can teach the child to learn to say the word 'rabbit' by ostensively pointing to the object 'rabbit.'When the child uses that word correctly on a subsequent occasion, she has thus learned to correctly treat the thing in front of her as a 'rabbit'. This is why we can assert that linguistic behaviour links the given situation to situations encountered earlier, thereby suggesting a way of treating the given situation appropriately according to certain socio-cultural practices.

Empathising involves adopting a certain behavioural response towards the situation encountered. It is a form of engaged interaction in that the appropriate linguistic behaviour is not determined in advance but spontaneously produced in the lived experience of situations. The fact that the empathetic response on the part of the master can be more or less directed or immediate points us towards an important function that empathising plays in language learning. What came up in the process of empathising interaction is the way the child imitates the way the linguist usually behaves and talks; that is, how she comes to learn linguistic practices and uses linguistic terms in the appropriate situations. The empathising ability thus enables the master-child to engage in a situation together, with the master attempting to draw the child's attention to certain aspects of the situation in ways that are appropriate to the social practices the master is already a part of. In serving as the basis for the language learning activity, empathising is part and parcel of the pair's socio-cultural practices rather than standing outside of these practices. This empathising is one of the constitutive parts of a particular situation in that the child learning which term to use in order to be understood is a part of this activity. Hence, language learning is an engaged activity. There is a relation between what satisfies a master and what is appropriate in a particular practice. In general, what satisfies a master who is attuned to a particular practice is what is appropriate in that practice. Through ostensive teaching, the master attempts to condition the child to learn and recognise the linguistic behaviour that is appropriate to certain socio-cultural practices. Through such empathising attunement, the child acquires normative behaviour that is appropriate to a certain socio-cultural practice. Thus, Quine's learning situation is normative; further, it is also an engaged and not a detached interaction.

The sociality of Quine's language learning situation, and, of course, that of the normativity expression thereof, still stands in need of further explication. To this point, we now turn to Wittgenstein's language learning situation, similar in structure to that of Quine, which demonstrates explicit sociality and normativity.

4. Explicating Wittgenstein's Language Learning Situation

Similar to how the notion of empathy is fundamental to Quine's linguistic naturalism, bedrock judgments of normative similarity are fundamental to Wittgenstein's linguistic naturalism.[1] In particular, Wittgenstein takes bedrock judgments of normative similarity as fundamental to language learning (William, 2010). Similar to the way that the linguist-child relation is characterized in Quine's learning situation, the master-novice relation is characterized in Wittgenstein's language learning situation. Indeed, he identifies ostensive pointing as the method of language learning:

> How do I explain the meaning of 'regular', 'uniform', 'same', to anyone?…if a person has not yet the concepts, I shall teach him to use the words by means of examples and by practice.

[1] Wittgenstein discusses this in his book *Philosophical Investigations* (1953/2009). In his other works, such as *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics* (1966/1978), he also discusses the normativity of unreflective action in craftsmen, portrayed as a kind of aesthetic practice.

> I do it, he does it after me; and I influence him by expressions of agreement, rejection, expectation, encouragement. I let him go his way, or hold him back; and so on.
>
> Imagine witnessing such teaching. None of the words would be explained by means of itself; there would be no logical circle.
>
> The expressions 'and so on', 'and so on ad infinitum' are also explained in this teaching. A gesture, among other things, might serve this purpose. The gesture that means 'go on like this', or 'and so on' has a function comparable to that of pointing to an object or place (PI, §208). [1 2]

Wittgenstein's point is that the novice is initiated into language learning by ostensive teaching on the part of the master. The cognitive background of the master is an improvised one, while that of the novice is an impoverished one. That said, the novice comes to learn how to act and judge appropriately by looking at those examples that the master has displayed. Being without the requisite concepts or rules for acting and judging appropriately, the ostensive teaching cannot be conducted in reference to them. Ostensive teaching relies on our shared natural capacities to perceive and react to certain observable aspects of the physical world. Since the adult has the table-concept, he uses it to describe and make his judgment about the table-object when he sees it. On the other hand, since the child does not have the table-concept, his experience of the table-object is only a matter of perception of the table-object. The child acquires the ability to make an appropriate judgment about her experience of the table-object through ostensive teaching on the part of the master.

Wittgenstein thus advises the child with an impoverished cognitive background: "don't think, but look!" (PI, §66). Through ostensive learning, the novice is calibrated into the bedrock practices. She is calibrated to say 'table' in seeing the tables as the master does. The similarity in their perceptual judgments is that they both use the table concept. For example, the master may point to a red apple and utter the words 'this red apple is red'. For him, uttering these words is calibrating the novice to acquire a standard of colour perception to become a competent participant in a language game. The similarity in their judgment or utterance that 'this red apple is red' or any other verbal judgment is possible given two things: the cognitive background that the master imparts in teaching the novice and their shared natural capacities to perceive and react to salient physical aspects of the environment. According to Wittgenstein, our shared natural capacities to perceive and react to salient features of the environment constitute the "common behaviour of mankind" (PI, §206) without which we cannot make bedrock judgments of the obvious. Ostensive teaching is the means by which this common behaviour is exploited. By acquiring the similarity of bedrock judgments, the child shares a cognitive background with the master. It is because of this shared cognitive background that there can be language games of colour, length, or numerosity, and so on between child and the master.

By calibrating the child with an impoverished cognitive background, she is made to conform to the master. That conformity of the child can best be described, in extreme cases, as blind obedience. The master provides the cognitive background against which the words and behaviours of the child are assessed and sustained. By blindly conforming to the master, the child blindly conforms to the normative practices of the community. Calibration of the child, thus, is a triangulation among the child's words, adult's words, and causal relation to the surrounding world that they share (William, 2010, p. 364). In other words, it is not only the child-master relation but also the normative practices of the community, the shared standards of members of a community, that are responsible for calibrating the child. Younger members of the community are calibrated by the masters of language to conform to the standards of the community. The child acquires mastery of the language through acceptance of the standards of the community. For the child, there is no alternative but to accept or conform to the community's standards blindly, that is, to adopt the ways that the community acts and judges the world.

Wittgenstein claims that blind rule following is normative. In other words, according to him, the bedrock of immediate action where we act without justification but not "without right" (PI, §289) is

[2] The abbreviation PI will be used for *Philosophical Investigations* (Wittgenstein, 1959/2009) and the symbol § for its section.

normative. Like McDowell (1984), we will claim that, according to Wittgenstein, the bedrock of both immediate action and 'blind' rule following are inherently normative. This implies that they are normative irrespective of whether or not the person can reflect or possesses linguistic expression since the normativity of bedrock immediate action results from the fact that the individual is already a participant in certain socio-cultural practices.

According to Wittgenstein, a bedrock of immediate action underwrites the practice of giving reasons and justifications. As he states,

> 'How am I able to follow a rule?' – if this is not a question about causes, then it is about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do. If I have exhausted the justification I have reached bedrock and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: 'This is simply what I do' (PI, §217).

That is, the bedrock of immediate actions is the most fundamental of actions in which we act without reflection. It explains how we embody norms blindly. As Wittgenstein states: "When I obey a rule, I do not choose. I obey the rule blindly" (PI, §219.) This shows that when we reach the bedrock, rule following should not be considered as the outcome of reflection or of a conscious decision to act in some way. The issue at hand is whether or not the bedrock of immediate action is to be construed as normative. According to Baker and Hacker 1985), the bedrock of immediate action is non-normative because it is not an explicit linguistic practice. By contrast, McDowell claims that Wittgenstein characterises even this most fundamental level of action as normative (McDowell, 1984, pp. 241-242). The question is, how can blind rule following be normative? The answer lies in the custom or regularity in the use of the rule induced through training:

> How can a performance both be nothing but a 'blind' reaction to a situation, not an attempt to act on an interpretation…and be a case of going by a rule ...? The answer is: by belonging to a custom (PI, §198) (McDowell, 1984, p. 242).

The fact that the child is trained in a particular cultural setting provides the context in which the normativity of the bedrock practices can be understood. Being trained in the community's custom, the child acquires the community's ways of speaking and behaving and hence the tendency to blindly respond to the environment or situation (McDowell, 1984, p. 255). Accordingly, the community's standards act as the basis by which to evaluate the appropriateness of the individual's words and behaviours. We claim that McDowell is right in thinking that Wittgenstein considers the bedrock of immediate action to be normative. In this way, the community of speakers of a language is responsible for the socialisation of the child. They will repeatedly train the child until she conforms, that is, until she is able to use words or behave in certain circumstances in expected ways.

By claiming that the answer to the issue of the normativity of blind rule following lies in the communal custom, what Wittgenstein means is that custom is a middle course between the pure behaviourist and purely rationalist means of language learning (William, 2010, pp. 368-369). That is, we are neither behaviourists nor Cartesian rationalists. This is because a pure perceptual novice, or behaviourist, whose behaviour is shaped by way of responding to the environmental stimuli could not make a move in the normative space, and the Cartesian rationalist, who formulates theories about the world and draws out their logical implications, cannot but makes move in a language game. In invoking the role of custom, Wittgenstein is thus in line with Quine. This is due to that fact that Quine (1960, p. 80) also refers to folkways in articulating empathetic language learning in that empathetic learning on the part of the child takes place against the cognitively impoverished background or the background of socio-cultural practices of the master or linguist. According to Quine, the speaker will manipulate the child until she conforms, that is, until she possess the ability to use the words rightly in given situations, or, as he states, until the child "ends up using the word to suit" (1960, p. 7). To enable a child to conform, the speakers use corrective behaviour that includes positive and negative responses on the part of the community–which may include rewards and punishments–towards the linguistic behaviour of the child. From this, in the fashion of Van de Herick & Rietveld (2021), we can claim that what follows is, according to Wittgenstein, the simple fact that one reliably participates in a communal custom rather than that one possesses the capacity for linguistic reflection, and this is what matters for understanding the normativity of (even “blind”) rule following. Accordingly, it can be observed that it is the traditions of a community that the individual in question belongs to that constitute the normativity of his or her linguistic behaviour or practices. Individuals may sometimes act without any explicit reasons in an unreflective action. The unreflective action of a skilled individual as a blind response to certain situations is still normative.

5. Is the Normativity of Language Learning Situation Individual or Social?

We want to know what it means to act on the basis of empathising ability in a learning situation. How do we understand, for example, the way the linguist or parent reacts to the child’s actions to obtain appropriate linguistic behaviour in a situation? What kind of relation obtains between the empathising act and the normativity involved in the learning situation? The linguist’s empathising act is internally related to the normativity embedded in the language learning situation. Therefore, we can describe the learning situation by appealing to the current state of the child (the child showing signs of improvement in learning the linguistic expressions) and to the reactions of the expert (signs that she has improved the linguistic skills of the child or is dissatisfied with the state of the child’s linguistic skill) (Van de Herick & Rietveld, 2021). This shows that in such an empathising act, the correctness of the child’s linguistic behaviour and the linguist’s attitude are related. The correctness of the child’s linguistic behaviour is measured against the community’s standards, or what is considered appropriate according to his socio-cultural practices.

The child can learn whether she behaves appropriately from the linguist’s posture, facial expressions, etc. These are some of the ways by which the linguist normally corrects the child and encourages them to behave rightly. They indicate her normative state (Van de Herick & Rietveld, 2021). So, the state of satisfaction usually indicates the normative state in the unreflective empathising act of the linguist. We can say that to act in a learning situation means the linguist reacts to, for example, the impoverished linguistic state of the child or that the child invites correction. The linguist's readiness to correct the child and the experience of the child go together. So, correcting the child’s behaviour implies improving the linguistic capability of the child as a whole. Through this corrective measure, the linguist improves the child’s linguistic behaviour and skills. The normativity involved in correcting the child has an essentially public dimension.

There is a link between the normativity of the linguist’s socio-cultural practice and the normativity of the learning situation (Van de Herick & Rietveld, 2021). The fact that the empathising acts take place in the context of certain communal practices is crucial to grasping the normativity involved therein. When it is seen from the perspective of the linguist, the normative dimension of a situation is to be grounded in the practices that characterise the typical behaviours of the members of the community. So, the normative character of the empathising act is related to the norms established by the custom or tradition of the community in question. In this way, being trained to act rightly, the child is bound to behave in ways considered appropriate to certain socio-cultural practices. In other words, the child can experience the feeling that acting in some way is appropriate in certain situations. It is not only the child’s ability to empathise that plays a role in his learning of language but also the skills pertaining to participation in these socio-cultural practices. The sociality of the normative dimension can be seen in how the learning situation focuses on linguist-child relationship or interaction rather than each of the individuals considered separately. For example, consider how the linguist in a learning situation teaches the child what a rabbit is by behaving in certain ways in response to the child’s reaction. With training, over time, the child will learn to behave appropriately in accordance with the established custom of the community. By dint of learning from the linguist, training hard, trying repeatedly, the child will develop the linguistic sensitivities and abilities of the linguist. She will develop appropriate linguistic behaviours and skills for various situations. An important part of this training is that the attunement of the child to certain practice can occur implicitly, without her being aware that it is happening, as, for example, when she unconsciously imitates the linguistic behaviour of those around her. The community's ways of behaving and acting will become ingrained in the child in the long run. The child, then, will be able to display appropriate linguistic behaviour instinctively, in Wittgenstein's sense. Given this training and the child's empathising sensibilities, the child becomes accustomed to a certain socio-cultural tradition and learns what is and is not appropriate linguistic behaviour within this tradition. Accordingly, Stoutland (2000) asserts that the normativity of Quine's approach to meaning lies in (a certain degree of) uniformity amongst the speakers. This is required in order for one to learn the correct meanings of the terms of a language and to become a member of the community who speak it:

> On this view, the normativity necessary for linguistic meaning and competence derives entirely from the fact that speakers of a language come to respond uniformly to certain sentences so that those who conform use the sentences correctly, those who deviate use them correctly. These sentences are such that speakers become competent in the language by acquiring the same dispositions to assent or dissent to them, so that a speaker who does not share those dispositions does not understand what the sentence means(Stoutland, 2000, pp. 184-185).

Clearly, the community in question can influence and correct the child, or anyone for that matter, introducing them to the acceptable associations of words or sentences with the corresponding stimuli in the relevant situations. The corrective apparatus of the linguistic community plays a crucial role in sustaining uniformity amongst its members. Language learning takes place by way of listening and using words of the language in question in the presence of the appropriate environmental stimuli that act both on the learner and the teacher. The social dimension, therefore, is at the heart of Quine's language learning as language is "socially inculcated and controlled" (Quine, 1969b, p. 81). This shows the essential role of communities–for example, their corrective behaviour–in language learning.

We can observe that the sociality of the normativity[3] involved in the learning situation is established beyond doubt. But, the individual dimension remains intact. In fact, normativity has both dimensions in that it should not be reduced to either of them. We can to certain extent confidently assert that questions of norms pertaining to a tradition can be answered rightly, especially by those who are the members of the community of the tradition in question. One way to understand this is by looking at the communal nature of actions of a particular community. This way of understanding the normativity of communal actions or practice–that is, by looking at the social dimension of the normativity of the practice–indicates that normativity cannot be reduced to the individual level. However, the individual dimension of normativity remains intact. Luntley (2003) claims that actions even at the communal level emerge from actions at the individual level. This may be correct, but it does not completely establish that the individual level is prior to the social level because the actions of individuals are, first of all, often influenced and shaped by their experience and training within a certain social practice. This does not, however, completely establish that the social dimension of practice is prior to that of the individual, because the individual must possess the natural capacity to learn in order to be trained by others. This comes to prominence when we take into account the fact that infants already possess the innate empathising capacity to act:

> Empathy is instinctive. Child psychologists tell us that an infant just a few days old responds to an adult's facial expression, even to imitating it by the unlearned flexing of appropriate muscles. Dogs and bears are believed to detect fear and anger in people and other animals, perhaps by smell (Quine, 1995, p. 89).

The innate empathizing capacity of the individual is key to language learning. It is, in fact, presupposed by those who exclusively emphasise the social dimension of the normativity of the practice. The child's ability to empathise typically develops early and rapidly (McDonald & Messinger, 2011). Our ability to empathise is partly due to genetics. Contemporary studies in neuroscience have allowed us to understand the neural basis of empathy. They enable us to see how mirror neurons are activated and explain empathy's basic process-

[3] See Mate (2022) for information about some attempts on establishing the sociality or social grounding of normativity in the scientific context.

es. Mirror neurons and the mirror neuron system, on their own, do not cause the feelings of empathy, but they do provide a neural basis for connecting our experiences with those of others (Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006; de Waal & Preston, 2017). This is what Alvin Goldman (2011) calls the low level or the mirror route to empathy.

The view that, at a subconscious level, humans and some animals experience some sort of 'mental mimicry' or 'mirroring' is supported by the discovery of mirror neurons. The fMRI studies provide evidence that observation of a face that expresses disgust generates mental mimicry or empathy in the observer (Wicker et al., 2003). Quine goes as far as asserting that the perception of another's unspoken language by means of instinctive empathy is older than language and that the responses of the newborn infant to the facial expressions of adults, or its tendency to imitate these with an unlearned flexing of the appropriate muscles, are in line with these recent findings in neuroscience regarding empathy (1995, p. 89). Besides this, Alvin Goldman (2011) talks about another, more complex kind of empathy called reconstructive empathy. It is a conscious and reflective process that is akin to attuning our feelings with others' and involves the brain's higher functions, such as the ability to ascribe mental states. Baghramian (2016) contends that it is the second type of empathy that essentially involves and relies on normative elements. According to her, the first type of empathy is an innate capacity for mimicry that works "at a preconscious level and is a non-linguistic or pre-linguistic stratum of cognition," and hence, is deprived of normative concern (Baghramian, 2016, p. 35). Because the higher level empathy can be taken to be a kind of Wittgensteinian rule following that operates at the social level, its normativity can be explained by appealing to the social practices of the linguist. However, the lower level empathy that operates at the neurological level is deprived of the social dimension. We can see that although both blind rule following and low-level empathy operate at an unconscious level, the normativity of the former can be explained by appealing to the social practices that the latter, which operates at the neurological level, is deprived of.

We can see that there is a normative expression in Quine's language learning situation involving blind rule following grounded in social practice. We can, in principle, agree that rule following implies normativity, but the question concerning the role of empathy remains to be answered. As discussed above, in language learning, the child may blindly follow the instructions of the master. In this way, there is rule-following behaviour without conscious empathising on the part of the child. As the child grows and becomes accustomed to linguistic rules, rule following may become a part of his daily life and he does it at times unconsciously. This does not imply that there is no room for empathy. Rather, there is still a role for empathy to play or operate at the unconscious level. That is, it is possible to have unconscious rule following without higher-level empathising. In other words, we may conclude following Quine (1990a, pp. 42-43) that empathising is a necessary condition for learning (socially grounded) linguistic rules and practices.

6. Conclusion

The paper has reevaluated the normativity objection to Quine's naturalism in the context of the language learning situation. By starting with Quine's view that epistemology and language are intertwined, an attempt has been made to establish that Quine has retained the normative dimension in his naturalism by establishing the normativity and explicating the implicit sociality of the role of empathy in his language learning situation. Toward this end, the normativity and explicit sociality of the role of calibrating and rule following in Wittgenstein's language learning situation(constituted similarly to Quine's), in its simplest form (i.e., the master-novice relation), has been examined with an aim to aid us in explicating their implicit counterpart in Quine's language learning situation.

Being equipped with the proper cognitive background, the calibrating act on the part of the master involves rule following and, of course, blind rule following for she may do it without reflection. The role of calibrating in Wittgenstein's language learning situation has been found to be similar to that of empathising in Quine's language learning situation. It has also been found that since the calibrating act involves (blind) rule following, it can be interpreted as normative. Since empathising in Quine's language learning situation, as in the case of Wittgenstein's, also operates against the cognitively improvised background of the linguist, it can be interpreted as normative. This shows that Quine relies on an essentially normative notion of empathy to explain our ability to learn language. In other words, language learning, for Quine, is underpinned by empathy, a normative concept that underwrites our ability to learn a language. The normativity in the language learning situation is that of the higher-level empathy that operates against the cognitively improvised background of the linguist. The same, however, cannot be confidently said of low-level empathy, which operates at the neurological level, thus leaving the question of its normativity unanswered. By being characterized by the master-novice relation in its simplest form, the language learning situation is a social phenomenon and the normativity involved in it has a social aspect without denying its individual aspect, however.

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THE ART OF EDUCATION: CREATIVE THINKING AND VIDEO GAMES

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Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic has shed new light on some significant problems that have been present in the education systems for decades. The lack of various educational methods is becoming more and more evident, leading to a decreasing interest in learning and critical thinking. On the other hand, more and more research shows that different types of digital games can enhance creative and critical thinking in students. A closer look at the requirements of the educational programs shows how strict they are in their demands on students. Digital games like role playing games can be a bridge between students' imaginations and complex educational material. Video games feature a variety of game mechanics that stimulate creative thinking and spark interest in otherwise difficult to understand topics. Motivation and engagement in digital games can be used in a specific way for educational purposes. If we think of teaching as an art in itself, what better method of teaching than through interactive arts.

Key words: philosophy of education, gamification, game design, educational theory.

Introduction

The unprecedented development of technology is having an important impact on creativity. Problem solving is directly related to creative thinking, which is an increasingly sought-after resource in every industry. Many of the jobs that people did a century ago are now being done by programs and machines, or at least will be in the near future. With the narrowing of the range of opportunities for professional realization, employers are mostly looking for qualities that machines are not capable of. Therefore creative thinking is the main criterion in the development of strong artificial intelligence. Under these circumstances, a paradox arises within the development of creative thinking. On one hand, it is increasingly in demand and necessary to ensure progress in science and technology, but on the other hand, the conditions in which creativity can be developed are increasingly scarce. The technological world and hectic everyday life cannot offer the same environment for reflection that inventors and creators of the past had. In order to achieve such a mindset, it is necessary for the mind to adapt to new living conditions and to look for non-standard methods of inspiration. We will argue that the interactive environment of digital worlds can be a source of providing such conditions and could be a place where the mind can escape everyday problems.

Problem

The difficulties for creative thinking in contemporary technologically-advanced societies begin with modern educational systems. Inspiring creativity and developing critical thinking in students has been a problem for the modern education system for decades. Its inability to sustain students' interest and attention during classes is a huge obstacle. These problems have been discussed in depth by theorists in the field of traditional education such as Alfred Whitehead, John Locke, and John Dewey among others. In the 18th century, Locke noticed that traditional forms of education, focused on memorizing and learning in one way, are not enough: "The business of education is not, as I think, to make them perfect in any one of the sciences, but so to open and dispose their minds as may best make them capable of any, when they shall apply themselves to it" (Locke, 1764: 44). John Dewey later developed the idea embedded in the philosophy of Locke, leading to the birth of progressive education. A part of the philosophy of education, progressive education suggests that humans, as social animals, are best educated in a social environment where they can perform activities together and learn while events unfold. This model of learning is known according to the philosophy of John Dewey as "the pattern of inquiry" (Dewey, 1938). According to Dewey, the learner must first familiarize himself with the problem, then he has to define it, propose a hypothesis for its solution, then evaluate the hypothesis based on a past experience, and finally he must find the most plausible solution. The emphasis in progressive education is on learning by experience, developing strong problem solving and critical thinking skills, and working in a group on projects while developing social skills and understanding the goals of learning.

Even now we notice similar problems in the Bulgarian educational system. The limitations placed on teachers and their teaching methods are well described in the so-called Teacher's Book, which accompanies each subject and textbook. Opening such a manual immediately shows strictly constructed instructions to teachers for the purposes of the lesson, or "methodological instructions," as well as how much knowledge the student is expected to have mastered. Particularly worrying are the instructions given to teachers in the fields of art, music, and philosophy. At the beginning of each Teacher's Book there is a well-marked table with "expected learning outcomes". The assessment instructions for the subjects in question are also quite worrying. In the *Teacher's Book of Fine Arts for First Graders* published by Prosveta reads the following: "The level at entry and completion are assessed by: the result of performing a specific task and visual test" (Tsanev, Strashilova, Karapanteva, 2020: 11), as well as "Aesthetic indicators must reflect the qualitative characteristics of individual creative manifestations of the student" (Tsanev, Strashilova, Karapanteva, 2020: 11). Among the listed "key competencies" that the student must acquire (in the fine arts!) are "mathematical competence and basics", "foreign language skills", "competence in science and technology" and many other competencies "that the first-grader has to provide through his drawings" (Tsanev, Strashilova, Karapanteva, 2020: 11). It seems that for the Ministry of Education and Science, the muse, inspiration, self-expression through the freedom of art, are not that important for students, as they do not fall into the category of "competencies". Instead, art has become a tool for acquiring "competencies" from an early age.

Furthermore, the creative freedom of students and the opportunities for improvisation and inspiration from teachers are limited by the so-called "methodological guidelines". The same pattern is observed in other handbooks for teachers, regardless of the nature of the subject. The exaggerated desire for interdisciplinary connectivity throws into paradox the attempts for adequate education by neglecting individual interests and opportunities for self-expression. Although the teacher has little freedom in the method of teaching and deviating from the educational program, in the end, students are expected to show the results described in each subject and in an equally systematic way. The teacher is forced to report to the Ministry of Education and Science and adhere to a strictly followed program, which is preset and difficult to update.

Online learning poses an additional difficulty as the preparation takes a huge amount of time and effort, both by teachers and students. Problems in teaching and learning increase as students become more distracted and lose interest in the subject matter. In order for classes to be successful, the physical lack of a teacher and learning environment must be overcome, which often forces the student to pay attention, even though the subject is not interesting to him. The loss of interest in the subjects is a consequence of the restrictive methods of teaching and the established, already outdated educational system. In the case of the humanities and arts, the method of teaching and the educational system are suffocating and detrimental to the student's imagination. Education is increasingly instrumentalized to focus on serving corporate and business interests. Many universities around the world report declining numbers of students in these departments, while in others the influx is immeasurably greater. A report by Britain's

Higher Education Policy Institute (HEPI Report 141) suggests that the number of students taking humanities classes dropped by 40,000 in only 10 years. The research found that the number of students studying humanities in British universities decreased by 18% in the last 10 years. The declining interest in humanities is observed at the grade school level as well. Many universities across Europe are reporting similar issues, including Bulgaria.

In this paper we will consider how digital games and gamified activities can diversify the learning process,and support the imagination and creative thinking while helping students to stay focused on complex concepts.

Role- playing games as contemporary form of creative thinking

Philosophy has long considered how the human imagination is formed and whether this process can be intentional. Creativity itself can be seen as the driving force of the imagination through the formation of ideas and theories as well as the cause of the appearance of many physical objects, such as inventions and works of art. Creativity could be seen as the intentional character of the imagination. For Thomas Hobbes, imagination presents a very important part of human cognition. According to him, imagination and memory are closely connected with understanding: "The imagination that is raised in man (or any other creature endued with the faculty of imagining) by words, or other voluntary signs, is what we generally call understanding, and is common to man and beast" (Hobbes, 1651, 2.10). If we agree that imagination and understanding are connected, then we can assume that with better imagination comes better understanding, and creativity occurs when imagination and understanding work in sync. Curricula often ignore this connection and work entirely toward instrumentalizing knowledge. This deepens the problems with understanding classes in school that students often report, and leads to a disconnect between the knowledge studied in individual disciplines. As a unifying factor between separate bodies of knowledge,and at the same time an activity that stimulates the imagination, storytelling in its modern interactive form can be considered. Creativity and storytelling are inextricably linked. To get invested in a story means to have your attention focused on its content and details, and for that focus to manifest on a personal level, which can then easily lead to internalizing the information the story transferred.

Evocative storytelling has been used as a means of entertainment, education, transmission of important ideas, and preservation of cultural values. Characters and their narrative functions have been two key elements in any act of storytelling since the dawn of legends and myths. AsVladimir Propp (1928) has noted, the simplification of individual agents in a narrative to sets of traits referred to as "archetypes" allows the audience (readers, listeners, etc.) to more easily relate to and internalize the lessons of a story. This formula has persisted to this day, transcending the limitations and boundaries of storytelling methods, showcasing exactly how potent of a tool the notion of storytelling is.

It is exactly by utilizing the principles of narrative function and archetypes defined by Propp that storytelling through role-playing games became extremely popular in the 1970s. Tabletop role-playing games became a source of entertainment for many people because of the combination of archetype-based storytelling and collaborative gameplay (the way in which players interact with a game through rules, challenges, and the player's connection to the narrative). Unlike in traditional storytelling environments, the story is no longer told by a single narrator to an audience, but is a collaborative product of multi-agent participation, with the narrative direction itself structured via a set of rules and resources limiting the courses of action available to the participants. The main limitations to the agency of the participants come in a manner very similar to Propp's archetypes ("False Hero", "Dispatcher", "Helper", "Villain");however, in this case, these tend to be character classes ("Rogue", "Wizard", "Cleric", "Warlock") that can only execute certain actions according to certain rules. This participation in shaping events and narratives in tabletop role-playing games gives participants a sense of experiencing the story and of being immersed in the imaginary world on a deeper level.

Of course, this interactivity is the big differentiator between traditional storytelling and the experience of role-playing. While in other forms of storytelling, such as theater, films, books, paintings, music, fairy tales, and even commedia dell'arte and improvisational theater, there is still a clear divide between performer and audience, in role-playing games, everyone is an active participant who makes decisions and changes the narrative of the story. Similar forms of storytelling are found in children's games, where children pretend to be different imaginary characters while participating in a game together. Role-playing games work on a similar principle, but with the difference that the players are consistently developing an idea while following rules taken from traditional storytelling.

The first commercially successful and established role-playing game was Dungeons & Dragons (D&D), released in 1974. The game was inspired by fantasy literature and became so popular that it is considered the foundation of the tabletop role-playing game industry. With the growing popularity of this type of narrative game and the development of technology in the 1990s, this relatively new method of storytelling was translated into a digital medium, giving birth to role-playing video games– with one of the earliest domains where player creativity could thrive being MUDS (Multi-User-Dungeons), in which players could develop communities with complex social hierarchies between players in their fictional roles. These have been extensively studied as one of the earliest digital collaborative spaces where player creativity and self-expression were the foundational element of the user experience (Bartle, 1996).

It should be noted that with their text-based user interfaces and focus on goal-driven collaboration via chatting and exchanging limited visual information, MUDs were in many ways incredibly similar to modern collaborative remote teaching and learning platforms and related tools that have come to prominence in modern education. Every contemporary co-learning platform in which the user has a profile, a user avatar (such as an image or a photo), and the ability to communicate with others, while at the same time participating in a system of rules, requirements, and rewards can be argued to fit (at least mechanically) the definition of a MUD.

MUDS were of course not the only form in which role-playing games made the jump to the digital domain. With their transition to digital platforms, role-playing games developed into multiple sub-genres based on different elements of their design–point of view (first or third person), player action structure (real time or turn based), and whether the game is meant for one player (single player) or multiple players (multiplayer). Single player role-playing games allow players to participate in an interactive narrative without requiring the participation of other players. The in-game story is mainly driven by the player’s interactions with the so-called NPCs (non-player characters). Single player games, however, lack an important element of tabletop role-playing games, and that is the collaboration between players to participate in building a story together. “In some ways, the emphasis on character development has impeded progress in storytelling with RPGs. The central premise of these [computer RPGs] is that the player steadily builds his abilities by acquiring wealth, tools, weapons, and experience. This emphasis on character development tends to work against the needs of dramatic development – dramatic twists and turns clash with the prevailing tone of steady development” (Crawford, 2003: 163). Although Crawford notes the inherent tension (“clash”) between the needs of the story and the focus on player agency and empowerment (what is often referred to as “player histories” (Sicard, 2009)) single player role-playing games perfected one of the first and by far most popular approaches to emotionally engage the player with the story and situation presented by giving them the opportunity to maneuver and influence the development of the story via different options for choosing how to act in certain situations within the game. Often these options are based on moral decisions around how to resolve a certain situation or develop the relationships with NPCs via dialogue segments. It is exactly role-playing games with interesting moral decisions that are appreciated and acclaimed as some of the best examples in their respective genres, with titles such as *Mass Effect* or the *Fallout* series. They provide the player with options for multiple endings, depending on the decisions made by the player during gameplay. Here it is important to note that the nature of the moral quandaries these titles present to players is at the very best binary and Aristotelian in nature, but it is exactly this level of simplification that makes them well suited for presenting moral issues to a school-aged audience.

Other titles in the role-playing genre feature elements that directly encourage imagination and creativity. While lots of games have a specific way of solving puzzles, the *Legend of Zelda* series provides the player with puzzles and interactions with the environment that require creative thinking. *The Legend of Zelda: Breath of the Wild* is an excellent example of a game that allows players to use its physics system for solving puzzles without recommending a specific direction. The game provides many different ways for overcoming challenges by creatively using its physics elements. The free use of physical elements in a digital environment gives precisely the kind of experience and type of learning that Dewey presents as the subject of education: “Progress is not in the succession of studies but in the development of new attitudes towards, and new interests in, experience" (Dewey, 1897: 38). According to Dewey, students should not be placed in the situation of passive participants in the learning process. Apart from learning through experience, the information provided to the student should be in different forms and images, so that he himself can determine the direction of his interests and development.

But when it comes to freedom in solving problems and puzzles, sandbox simulators are best at constructing causal relations. Sandbox games such as *Minecraft*, *Rust*, and *Don't Starve* feature an interactive open world environment where players can freely walk through and interact with their elements. By developing in such an environment a variety of skills and information learned in school, the possibility of knowledge losing value until the student learns how to use it in real life situations is avoided. Whitehead identifies this risk as the accumulation of "inert ideas" "In training a child to activity of thought, above all things we must beware of what I will call 'inert ideas' – that is to say, ideas that are merely received into the mind without being utilized, or tested, or thrown into fresh combinations" (Whitehead, 1929: 1). This applies exclusively to the humanitarian disciplines, which mainly rely on theoretical knowledge. Students have difficulty contextualizing complex philosophical concepts and lose motivation to pursue and develop philosophical ideas in their own way. "Theoretical ideas should always find important applications within the pupil's curriculum. This is not an easy doctrine to apply, but a very hard one. It contains within itself the problem of keeping knowledge alive, of preventing it from becoming inert, which is the central problem of all education" (Whitehead, 1929: 5).

Finally various games manage to put philosophical ideas into context, which considered separately can only accumulate "inert knowledge". For example, existentialism is well represented in the story of games such as *Dark Souls*, *The Talos Principle*, *Nier: Automata*, *Bioshock*, while the philosophy of consciousness and the mind-body problem are embedded in the narrative of the *Metal Gear Solid* series, *System Shock* series, *Shin Megami Tensei,* and others.

So far in this research, we have been able to point out how human imagination, creative thinking, and the contextualization of learning material can be stimulated by role-playing video games. We have pointed out how some existing video games manage to convey important philosophical messages and at the same time interact with the player, thus enriching his creative thinking. Tracing the relationship between the examples described and the philosophy of education gives us a better idea of how video games can enter the educational system. But this is far from exhausting the subject set in the present work. In the next section of this paper, we will take a closer look at how the medium of digital games is presented in an educational context. Special attention will be paid to opportunities to encourage creativity and expression.

The medium of digital games in an educational context

The history of using the potential of digital games for education is almost as long as the history of the video game medium itself. The original purpose of many digital games, which only later on became commercial products, was to assist the education and training of military personnel, or to help simulate complex systems (such as astro-physical phenomena or economic processes) in a way that can be observed in real-time (Halter, 2006). In time the term "educational games" or "edutainment" was codified to specifically refer to digital games that were created explicitly for the purpose of being included into the educational curriculum and help with the teaching of a certain subject, or even a specific problem within the subject (Squire, 2011).

There are countless examples of such titles, with the "First Wave" of their popularity in Western educational institutions happening in the 1980s and being associated with video games such as *Math Munchers:Play Math With Games* and *The Oregon Trail*. Since then the format of educational video games has remained largely unchanged even in modern educational games. (Karhila et al., 2014).

The student (presumed player) is presented with a set of problems to resolve, and resolving these problems will allow them to proceed further in the content of the game. This progression is tied to a reward system (points, in-game resources, items for their player character) and, in turn, gives them access to a new set of problems to resolve. Of course, the solution of these problems is directly tied to the student demonstrating mastery of the subject in question–answering quiz questions related to history, solving math problems, providing correct answers to simple chemistry and physics problems, etc.

These kinds of educational games aim to increase student motivation by essentially bolting on the extrinsic motivation of video game progression and reward mechanics as an additional layer on top of the educational content. This already creates a powerful tool to hold students’ attention and to motivate them to explore the subject further–or at least until the novelty value of the progression mechanics wears off (Jenkins & Squire, 2003).

This framing of the test/evaluation component within a video game-like progression and reward mechanics in conjunction with the presentation of the actual educational material still following standard format (such as text panels, slides with images, short video lectures) is the dominant paradigm in educational games. There is rarely a focus on the entertainment value of the gameplay experience. This is largely due to the fact that the goals of educators/educational institutions and those of game designers and developers seem to be in conflict over the student/player’s attention. When attempting to increase the effectiveness of the use of video games for educational purposes, this intrinsic tension is exactly the problem we should be aiming to resolve.

Motivation and Engagement in Digital Games and their use for Education

The traditional conception of learning–acquiring, processing, and memorizing information–is understood as a conscious process within the framework of the educational system. Simply put, a student is supposed to be consciously aware of the act of learning in order to focus on the things being taught. At the same time, in game design theory, there is a strong emphasis on getting the player to achieve a state of Flow, a state of mind in which a player is focused on an activity without being intentionally aware of its components.

Defined by the Hungarian psychologist Mihali Csikszentmihalyi, Flow is a mental state of focus in which the difficulty of problems an individual is required to solve and the amount of information necessary to process in order to solve them are in balance–the situation is engaging enough without being too overwhelming. When the amount of information, complexity of processing it, and interactive agency required from the person follow a certain curve of gradually increasing complexity, the individual is both developing skills/learning, motivated by their progress, and at the same time, not aware of their own effort and focus in processing new information (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975).

Flow theory is often used in conjunction with various breakdowns of player motivators, such as Bartle and his taxonomy of players (Bartle, 1996) or various “player persona” models (Vahlo &Koponen, 2018).Player motivators are best described as drives, needs, and aspirations individuals have that inform what players are looking for in a game experience and serve to engage them and keep their attention. By understanding what kind of game mechanics and gameplay a digital game will have (i.e., the designers can identify the motivations driving the players to play that game),designers can use that information to create further mechanics or content that will appeal to players with these motivations. For example, a game that is highly competitive and focused on managing resources (such as a historical strategy game) will appeal to player to players with “Control”, “Management”, and “Killer” (“Killer” is a term from Bartle’s taxonomy used as an umbrella term for competitive players) motivations. Knowing this, the designers might choose to put more effort into developing features related to battlefield strategy instead of diplomacy.

The presence of game mechanics that match the players’ motivations makes it easier to engage the player in activities that are interesting to them, thus making it more likely they will reach a state of Flow and will enjoy the act of playing, without being frustrated or distracted. That means that they will participate in the activity for its own sake (the act of play) and will choose to return to it, even if there are no external requirements that pressure them to do so.

Even though progression, rewards, and winning/losing conditions are the most immediately recognizable aspects of gamification for educational purposes, the actual core value of player experiences is their ability to be motivating and satisfying on their own–for the player to play and enjoy playing, even if they have collected all the gold stars, reached the maximum grade, and so on. This means that they will interact with the game content (the educational material) again and again, opening up many opportunities for educators to expose students to useful knowledge. If this is done correctly, such an educational game can create an environment for students to self-motivatedly improve and master the needed information, while at the same time constantly evaluating and encouraging their progress, providing them with more complex problems and tasks to maintain flow state. This evaluation can then be easily matched to the evaluation standards of the educational system itself.

Codifying creativity in digital games: Exploration and expression

If the goal is to create educational game experiences that can motivate the student intrinsically (as a game) to interact with them in order to have them engage with the educational content over and over, while at the same time improving their level of mastery/meeting the requirements of the curriculum, a good starting point would be to look for a practical example of this.Encouraging creativity in children and junior school students forms a large part of their curriculum, so finding a means of developing creativity and self-expression through digital games would make for a good example.

In digital game theory, the agency of creativity is often associated with two prime motivators, exploration and expression. The player explores by using different tools and means, investigating possibilities and finding a path to the desired outcome, while at the same time performing actions and choices that enable them to express themselves and achieve an outcome different than that of the other players.

Thus we end up with a very clear set of problems to solve:

– Finding digital game mechanics that build upon the motivations of expression and exploration, to engage players/students in a creative activity;

– Structure the activity in such a way as to facilitate the development of a flow state in order to keep the players/students focused and practicing their creative skills;

– Use progression-based game mechanics and win/lose conditions to disguise student evaluation, while sustaining the player's long term engagement.

Plenty of existing commercial games heavily rely on mechanics built around ex nihilo creation and elements of self-expression as their core game loop (core set of game mechanics). Some of these titles can easily be incorporated in creative exercises as part of the curriculum, or non-commercial educational versions of such games could be created. Some examples include *Dreams* (Media Molecule, 2020), *The Little Big Planet* Series (Sumo Digital, 2014), *Minecraft Creative Mode* (Mojang Studios, 2011), *Roblox* (Roblox Corporation, 2006) and *The Sims* Series (2001-2020).

If we take *Roblox* for example, it is an online video game creation platform that allows players to create games themselves or play the games created by other players. *Roblox* was a relatively small platform until the COVID-19 pandemic, when social contacts between people were limited due to mandatory quarantines. *Roblox* then became a place for kids to communicate and play together. The platform even allows birthdays to be celebrated online. In addition to a social environment, the game platform develops creative thinking in combination with problem-solving skills to be used as ideas for creating new worlds. Players also learn key programming skills using the Lua programming language. In the process of creation, players also build important logical skills based on trial and error. The environment allows players to iterate or try different things without the risks that exist in the real world, thus exercising their logical and critical thinking in a protected environment. Parts of the game even encourage players to do their own research to get more information about how to build new worlds. Thus, the platform develops players' critical and creative thinking while they learn useful skills.

As another example, we can consider *Minecraft Creative Mode*. A case study has shown "that Minecraft can be used as a space for participants to express their creativity in ways that would typically be much more costly. Also, the open-nature of the game allows the participants to experiment with various conceptions of characterization and plot that are not limited to physical materials" (Cipollone et al.,2014). As a result, the research also indicates an existing gap between "the knowledge production that is characteristic of the game" and "the culture of the formal education system" (Cipollone et al., 2014). If that's to be believed, such games stimulating creative thinking can provide an opportunity to establish a bridge between traditional forms of learning and student interests if used appropriately. Such an attempt has already been made by historians at Glasgow University. They launched a computer representation of 18th century plantations in *Minecraft* to better show students what slavery looked like. "We have found that pupils engage with it immediately, as it is a creative way to approach history teaching. Once you succeed in getting that interest then pupils can begin to respond, engage and connect, which helps them understand sometimes very complex issues," says Nelson Mundell, a historian at the University of Glasgow (O'Sullivan, 2017). This is just one of many examples of commercial video games being used for educational purposes in schools. Unfortunately, despite the positive results that are noted each time, the practice of using video games in classrooms remains unpopular as an educational tool in curricula. We can only hope that such studies will give more weight to this teaching method so it can be incorporated more broadly across the educational system.

Conclusion

In the present study, we posed the problem of inspiring and sustaining creative thinking in students. We have shown how it is limited in the Bulgarian education system, especially in art classes, and how this affects student interest in further studying the humanities and fine arts. We have drawn attention to some basic principles in the philosophy of education, which represent foundations for developing the modern education system by Alfred Whitehead (Whitehead, 1929) and John Dewey (Dewey, 1897). As an alternative to established, traditional notions about education and learning, we have suggested that role-playing games can be considered a modern method of developing creative thinking by involving players in character development and plots that allow full immersion in a given subject. Then, we covered the medium of digital games in an educational context and how they can specifically help to maintain interest in and attention to the educational material (allowing students to enter the so-called flow state). Finally, we focused on several examples of video games and how they can be used in the educational system to improve creativity and logical thinking in students.

From all this, we can conclude that educational systems, including the one in Bulgaria, need serious reform in order to meet the needs and interests of modern youth. Old teaching methods are no longer effective for a generation growing up in the age of technology. If we want to continue to develop as a society and transmit more and more knowledge to future generations, we must listen to the philosophers of education in the past and look ahead to the future, where we can implement their recommendations through technology and interactive learning methods.

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THE ENDOPHILOSOPHY OF INTERCULTURALISM AS A NEW TERMINOLOGY TO DESCRIBE THE EQUILIBRIUM OF BEING WITHIN THE CONSTRUCTION OF CULTURE AND IDENTITY

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Abstract:
Research on the meanings of self and others' perceptions, beliefs, values, and attitudes in intracultural and intercultural relations is of significant social relevance. A micro-analysis of its development as a whole process differentiated by the single substrates from an endophilosophical and ontological viewpoint will allow the implementation of a new definition of the self, being, and other according to the principles of dynamics and interculturality. This new sense of defining being will not only produce a good conception of the impact of culture on identity but also depict how the opposite, or pathogenic identity, should be considered, especially in times of existential crisis and change. Healthy or pathogenic patterns themselves organize situations where the basic needs of interaction with space are constructed and the equilibrium of everyone is maintained. Therefore, depending on the received information, professionals can formulate an objective analysis of the conscious self.

Key words: identity, culture, being, endophilosophy, differentiation, equilibrium.

Introduction

Our present time seems destined to explore difference from every angle: the difference between "mine" and "yours", difference in terms of gender, the difference between nature and nurture, the differences between cultures, etc. (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Kashima et al., 1995). Today, the human being never appears stimulated by a knowledge of these differences: everything that is a product, thought, or represented is immediately spread, exported, or sold. As Zygmunt Bauman (2006) argues, this synergy is translated into the need to make values, languages, goods, and meanings universal and the need to divide, specify, differentiate, and individualize. The need to rediscover the certainty of a common human root, however, emerges in current geo-political scenarios, including centrifugal forces, which, precisely in the name of alleged differences, invoke isolation and often impose dramatic exclusions and painful expulsions. In a similar context, it seems that ethical-political reflection not only reflects on the effects of modernization, which are felt at the cognitive level, but also on the effects of globalization, which are shown especially at the experiential level, and which contribute to a process of redefining the boundaries of the person's experience beyond those of the society and culture to which they belong (Shin, 2013; Jenks et al., 2013; Benet-Martinez, 2012; Lieber & Weisberg, 2002; Caldas & Caron-Caldas, 1999).

Rediscovering also helps to rethink the forms and structures of an increasingly global and multicultural society, which is ever more inclined to confront an often-viewed alter ego. Even to the least discerning observer, these discoveries cannot escape the changes in the signs of cultural differences that occur within our countries. The concepts of social composite, pluralism, and polyculture in our environment is often difficult and urges philosophical reflection to rethink the concept of society, considering both the interweaving of local and global structural elements and individual and social action present in common living (Büyükdüvenci, 1996).

The Self-identity and identity construction

Philosophy, in its theoretical attitude-practice, is called upon to address the issue concerning the encounter with strangeness, which is revealed in cultural forms, new forms of thought, and the transformation of how to keep identity and difference together, and thus to mark the passage in contact with diversity, with the ultimate goal of arriving at the ideal of democratic being, based on dialogue and focused on the search for a "common good," acceptable and shareable by all those who share the same social space (Baker, 2014; Bish, 2011; Carpenter & Karakitapoglu-Aygün, 2005). Issues regarding the recognition of diversity and living well in common, multiculturalism, or cultural pluralism may raise a concern that the symptom represents a concept by its polysemic nature, whose constituent references refer, in a very significant way, to both migratory phenomena and the construction of an unprecedented transnational society. A similar conformation of the social is translated into the exhortation to take on a new logical and ontological positioning in the comparisons between identity and the other and between thought and action (Heyman, 2017; Gupta & Fergusson, 1997). The research defines identity as a non-static construct with a dynamic nature that is constantly negotiated with the rest of the members of the community–a construct subject to continuous modification caused by and produced with others, with the significant other external to the person as matter and anti-matter (Dugan et al., 2001; Stets & Burke, 2000; Stryker & Burke, 2000). Conceptions, conducted on the thread of a weak reason, can enrich the intercultural discourse of analysis and knowledge of the present, tools that, starting from a trans-valorizing recovery of tradition, can re-argue the definitions of culture, the values of which remain intact to this day, for understanding our fluid society.

Human behavior is influenced and encouraged by the desire for interpersonal relations and relational interactions. Within the perspective of the questioning between identity, culture, and social coexistence, it appears to be worth considering the Weberian definition of culture as a finite portion endowed with meaning and significance in the senseless infinity, which as such, directs man's action in the world (Udehn, 2002). Culture, by virtue of its being a means of understanding and action in the world, appears as something vital, organic, and structurally open to the outside, where the relationship between being and the environment must be subjected to a "signification" for good management. Precisely by its critical and prudential discourse, identity culture questions itself on the "destiny of the man" that exempts itself from the task of dialogue with one's era and the duty to show the limits inherent in the choices, which are also expressed at a public level, in giving shape to fair and collective life scenarios. Structural and relational patterns provide space for extensive and richer notions of the inner world. Self is the preexistent starting point for all experiences and provides a continuation of the development, coloring, and shaping of all collected experiences (Cross et al., 2011; Gecas & Burke, 1995). As object relations research argues, it is in this specific relation to others that the self expresses and shapes itself in the course of development (Fairbairn, 1952, p. 20). A significant element in the construction of a differential psyche and autonomic self is the perceived *central self (*Fernandez-Duque & Schwartz, 2016). This notion is similar to what object-relation authors (Odgen, 2002; Fairbairn, 1944–1952) defined as the central ego in relation to the idealized object. The entity is what remains of the original self because the two parts were divided by each other. In this sense, the "central self" is not to be understood as an "*endopsychic structure*" like the two other entities but as an organization of self-expression and experience in reference to the external world. The rejecting object contains the most archaic components of the superego, although the moral aspects of its functioning are more implied in relation to the idealized object in the Ego Ideal (Fairbairn, 1952).

Such a connection comes from the central self, which research argues is a moral defense mechanism (idem). The super-ego, as a concept, emphasizes the component of *the object* in the antilibidinal self and not elements of the antilibidinal ego. It serves, thus, as an inclusion of the relationship between ego and superego for a better comparison. The more repressed a part of oneself is, the less it will be open to interaction with the world. Not only the experience and expression of the central self that is reduced by the underneath self but also the quality of its relatedness to the world could be changed. The more severe the tendency to experience the external world with our underneath selves, the more idealized the nature of objects of the central self. In this view, the objects of the central self become idealized objects, so all complexity must be established in the experience of the underneath selves. In clinical conception, all idealizations are based on denying any lived disagreements (Diamond et al., 1991). A healthy identity, the authors argue, does not relate to the placement of these endopsychic structures but to the inner structural differentiation that, as an internal phenomenon, reduces the function of every human being (Cheek & Cheek, 2018). The philosophy of a constructed self and object relations attempts in this sense to transform the meta-psychological nature of classical being into a vector with insight into the D*asein* of being within time (Das, 2016). Human units in the external world involve, essentially, relations with others. In the psychology of inner dynamics, the self must be understood as always existing according to the relationships it has, remembers, wishes, or creates. The unit of self, other, and relation turns into a model for the comprehension of shape in every subsystem within the self. As such, the self is divided into three essential substructures: the ideal self, the libidinal self, and the antilibidinal self (Fairbairn, 1944–1952). The libidinal and antilibidinal selves differ from the original selves because, whereas the original selves are free to experience the world and express themselves in their relationship to that world, the selves underneath them maintain a pre-existential connection for their relations with specific aspects of the world. The libidinal and antilibidinal selves continue to seek experience and self-expression through relationships with the world. The process is limited by the fact that the crystallization involved in the development of each structure allows only that type of experience and expression that is consistent with the basics. This limit in the independent processes, growth, and differentiation of the libidinal and antilibidinal selves is reinforced by their differentiation of the original selves (Celani, 2010; Laing, 1966; Laing, 1961). The division by the center of self has further developed structures as repression, which could be renewed time after time. Studies reveal that self-object differentiation implies structural differentiation within one's identity, and the process of self and object representation is a structural one (Celani, 2010; Diamond et al., 1991). Structural differentiation is a defense and pathological identity process in human development, as the inability to cope with the unsatisfied aspects of the experience sets it in several endopsychic structures. A combination of idealization and disintegration of a given structure makes people find new alternative models to avoid the threat.

The invested energy is directed toward the antilibidinal object, causing destruction in another time of this antilibidinal self by the internal pathogenic patterns. It also leads to the final division of antilibido into seeking gratification within other forms, which in essence, makes this energy available as a pleasure principle for the alternative object. The subjective understanding of the person's inner world over the internalized object relations that oppose unconscious wishes and defenses is therefore mainstream for a constructive ego-related identity and supportive ego ideal. As the authors argue, individuals with a pathogenic cultural identity have an "inner experience of continuity of self through time" (McWilliams, 2014). A well-integrated identity helps the culturally pathogenic person to sublimate and resolve instinctive contradictory impulses. These individuals also use repression to maintain their capacity for reality testing and to protect themselves from guilt and shame.

Culture and the Construction of Identity

Culture is a historical phenomenon of groups and societies (Cross, 2003; Bennet-Martinez, 2002), inherited, transmitted, learned, and socially renewed throughout history and the personal development of everyone (Gupta & Fergusson, 1997). In its most dimensional sense, culture refers to social heritage, which is learned and transmitted from generation to generation. Cultural transmission allows the continuity of identity throughout life and history; culture is a product of human achievements, which are passed down from generation to generation and renewed when necessary (Shin, 2013). Culture serves the group's survival over time and is more than the sum of any single identity in a society. Learning a culture develops during the whole life of the person, with intensity during childhood and adolescence, a process that is generally known as *enculturation* (Monterroza-Rios & Gutiérrez-Aguilar, 2022; Padilla& Perez, 2003). In every culture, therefore, as in every identity, contamination refers to contamination between different elements. In this regard, a particularly significant analysis is given by the anthropologist Jean-Loup Amselle, who stressed the fact that culture, as a living organism, manifests itself and reflects itself already as a "contamination" between different value systems (Meintel et al., 2000). For Amselle, cultural identity is an ongoing factor of movement, determined by constant relationships with other cultures, which makes it an impure element, promiscuous, opaque, and a half-breed. The culture, like a superstructure, regenerates itself continuously over time, appearing in such a composite and layered way, marked by the traces that time has left on its entity. According to the same author, at a cultural level, there is always a historical syncretism in place, in which cultures contain some sort of original purity to be recovered. Identity is a dynamic structure developed by the interplay of the central self and significant other and reflects the material world or unconscious living. Research for a stable identity state has been a fundamental approach in recent decades (Cheek & Cheek, 2018). The great identity resources vary in their degree of significance: the most tangible sources are shown in individual behavior and relevance, whereas the less tangible sources constitute the features of our early personal identity. The main processes of elaboration of cultural identity to identify appropriate development of a given society include:

1. I*dentification,* or the feeling of affirmation, belonging, and enhancement of the ethnic-territorial group to which the subjects belong;
2. E*xploration*, or the activity of research and evaluation of possible identity alternatives through immersion in one's own culture or through activities of various kinds that lead to the understanding and appreciation of one's ethnicity;
3. C*ommitment, which* consists in the importance of ethnic-territorial belonging for the elaboration of the image of oneself and the respective investment of energies to translate into being and the *social and cultural* comparison with other groups.

Other processes concern the methods of integration that are put in place when one fits into the context of other cultures or immerses oneself in the culture of one's time and space. Even the entire development of self-differentiation does not imply the structural division of self but the progressive recognition of distancing that self from the external world with which it interacts and the organization of awareness for its nature and potential. How the self grows is not predicted by the process of structural differentiation; the awareness of self and individual growth is linked to the integrated development of the whole. When an individual reaches high levels of organization and interpretation of his experience, he functions with an increased differentiation level of self-object that shifts from operations of infantile dependence towards more mature modes of adulthood. Research reveals that there is a strong relationship between the non-structural internalization of culture and ego-identity as a matter of being in space and time. In the process of integration, the diffusion between culture and conscious identity requires a series of external elaborations that can predict the dissemination of self as a matter, including:

1. *Assimilation*, where there is a tendency to favor the host culture over that of the original, can facilitate acculturation and integration (*biculturalism*). The person's self tends to adapt to the expectations of the cultural environment in which it must insert itself, with the risk of forgetting belonging and culture and becoming 'like others', thus losing every color and specificity to 'survive' in the interaction with others. In the antimatter background, the self, under the influence of pathological and endophytic structures, may change its nature and cannot be of any further reinforcement to the models;
2. *Integration*, or a process that assumes that society is something culturally homogeneous, is the result of the adaptation of 'different' identities and the change in their way of living and thinking enough to be comfortable with the lifestyle of the environment in which they are inserted. Hence the urge not to demand the total abandonment of one's culture or identity but to tolerate differences;
3. *Division* is a dynamic process opposite to the first two because belonging to the culture of origin is privileged, and we place ourselves in a position of marginality and isolation that not only impoverishes the cultural, affective, and relational levels but can lead to 'destructive' conflicts. In the experience of re-appropriation of cultural identity, authors describe three 'spatial' referents who must in any way be safeguarded in the itinerary: the *geographical space* where the environmental space is inscribed, especially the family with its symbolizations and imaginations; *the entity space* that corresponds to the experience of the corporeal self (each culture has its way of conceiving the corporeal space: the frontiers of intimacy, the conditions of conversation, the ways of receiving, eating, and taking care of body hygiene); and *the linguistic space* that, beyond language, includes non-verbal communication systems, vital worlds, and meaning.

Cultural identity construction in time and space is revealed through two essential procedural moments:

1. Re-definition of one's identity is a continuous process of consolidation through the impact of 'new' identities, in which it is necessary to re-define one's identity, thus already presupposing a certain definition of oneself (Who am I?) and a certain stability (an inner core) despite the transformations to which the ego-liberal self is subjected over time and through contact with others and with the environment.

The progressive restructuring of identity throughout life indicates that identity must be continually 'negotiated'. Identity arrests are often observed, both in contact with other groups, communities, or cultures and along with the seasons of life, especially in terms of various changes (cultural and otherwise). This implies the abandonment of previous identities, and sometimes the 'rupture' in the central self that is necessary to integrate the new structures and relationships resulting from the changed situation. Confronting "the archipelago of our many identities distributed over time" (Heidegger, 1972) is an obligatory path to soliciting processes of self-awareness and reconciliation that then lead to self-unification. A metaversal sense of self, the development of internalization, and interaction between all of these dimensions shift into a mature dependence on identifying the self-object (Cross et al., 2011; Bish, 2011). If all the present work were narrated in the language of Heidegger, the two basic ways of being and possibilities of existence would be authenticity and inauthenticity. Therefore, most of us as individuals are not ourselves when we are involved in everyday work, society, and interpersonal relations (Mitsein) (Abergel, 2020; Mansbach, 1991). Indeed,"Everyone is the other, and no one is himself. Das Man provides the answer to the question of "who" is Dasein in everyday life: the "nobody" to whom every Dasein has already surrendered itself in being 'among-one-another'" (Heidegger, 1972).

Conclusions

The search for cultural identity, as described in this paper, is not a definite work. It refers to membership in a certain cultural group and differences from other cultural groups. Cultural identities are characterized as being dynamic, complex, changing, historical, multiple, contextual, and relational, against essentialist and statist assumptions. Healthy cultural identity is not a progressive process of both elements in their single units; it is a holistic approach that identifies identity and culture as a dynamic interaction between nature and nurture. Identities are constantly being rebuilt according to context, their needs, and their relationships with other cultures. The world in which we were born produces a certain level of conformity. Primarily, everything that we think, believe, and say today was thought, said, and believed before. Our today self is an integration of yesterday's I and tomorrow's Me! Activities that we regard as worthy of our time (learning, work, and play), the values and meanings we attribute them (success, achievement, and love), and the styles through which we pursue these goals were given to us by our different cultures (Bennet-Martinez, 2012; Lieber & Weisberg, 2002). The intercultural and interactive nature of culture and being is seen as a dichotomous perspective of our being and authentic construction. Despite being a matter of human culture, we are also a powerful and pervasive threat to ourselves. Through integration, the being grows its capacity for a strong self-centered ego and a relation not fragmented to the existence of others in terms of content, selection, and energy drives that operate. As a significant entity, human beings cannot avoid its development in form and content, space and time, matter, and counter-matter. Rules, laws, and the meaning of life are processes that can be inculcated in humans as independent and coordinated entities with groups.

No entity can exist as a lonely one, even though, fundamentally, loneliness is a state of default for *das Man* (Abergel, 2020). The autonomy of free choice, expectations, and social forces form Dasein as oriented toward social purposes. Otherwise, it will isolate the self, internalize the individual only as a simple entity without a given state, and produce a pathogenic self over time.

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EXTENDED COGNITION IN EDUCATION. PSYCHODRAMA AS AN EXTENDED MIND TOOL

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Abstract:

This article addresses the question of whether psychodrama can be viewed as an example of the extended mind thesis and can be applied in an educational context. The extended mind thesis (Clark & Chalmers, 1998) proposes that external artifacts can function as integral components of an individual's cognitive system, augmenting cognitive abilities. The article explores the notion that psychodrama, with its scenes, techniques, and social group dynamics, can be regarded as an extension of the mind. By examining this relationship, the article aims to provide a wider understanding of the implications of the extended mind thesis in the field of education. Viewing psychodrama through the lens of the extended mind thesis emphasizes the role of the environment in shaping cognition, underscores the significance of external resources in the educational process, and highlights the potential of psychodrama as an educational approach.

Key words: extended mind, psychodrama, education, technology.

Introduction

The concept of the extended mind emerged as part of a broader philosophical movement known as externalism (Rowands, 2003), which challenges the traditional internalist view in the philosophy of mind and epistemology. Externalism, in various forms, argues that mental states or knowledge are not solely determined by internal factors but are influenced by external factors, such as the environment or social context, in shaping and constituting mental states.

One influential form of externalism in the philosophy of mind is known as semantic externalism or content externalism. This view argues that the meanings or contents of mental states, particularly beliefs and thoughts, are not solely determined by factors internal to the individual's mind but are influenced by external factors, such as the individual's physical or social environment. According to this form of externalism, as Clark and Chalmers suggest, “the relevant external features are passive. Because of their distant nature, they do not play a role in driving the cognitive process in the here-and-now” (Clark & Chalmers, 1998)

According to active externalism on the other hand, cognitive processes should be understood as the product of the interaction between an individual's brain, body, and the external world. The mind is seen as an integrated system that incorporates not only neural processes but also the external objects, tools, and cultural practices that individuals engage with. The key idea behind active externalism is that cognitive processes are not confined to the boundaries of an individual's skull but can be found in the interactions between individuals and their environment. This perspective emphasizes the active role that the environment plays in shaping and supporting cognitive processes. It suggests that external factors, such as physical tools, social and cultural practices, and even other people, can become integral parts of an individual's cognitive system. Active externalism is often associated with the concept of "extended mind" proposed by philosophers Andy Clark and David Chalmers (Clark & Chalmers, 1998). They argued that certain cognitive processes, such as memory and problem-solving, can be augmented by external objects or technologies. For example, the use of a pen and paper to solve a mathematical problem can be seen as an extension of an individual's cognitive abilities.

The terms "extended mind" and "extended cognition" are often used interchangeably and share a similar conceptual framework, but there can be slight differences in their emphasis and application. Extended cognition focuses more specifically on the cognitive processes themselves, examining how they can be distributed across internal and external resources. For the purposes of this article, both are appropriate, as the article focuses its attention on cognitive processes and systems while at the same time acknowledging that the term extended cognition can be understood in a wider sense and can include mental states.

This paper aims to investigate whether the psychodrama scene qualifies as an extension of the mind by exploring the primary criteria for artifacts and external objects to be considered an integral component of an individual's cognitive system. Additionally, it will explore whether the group dynamic in psychodrama can be considered an example of "distributed cognition", which includes other people and tools.

Subsequently, I will delve into an examination of why psychodrama serves as a promising methodology for educational purposes. This exploration will be guided by the applications of the extended mind thesis within the field of education.

1. Psychodrama and psychodramatic scene

Psychodrama, created by Jacob L. Moreno in the early 20th century, is a therapeutic approach that combines elements of theater with group therapy. It involves role-playing, spontaneous dramatization, and expressive bodily movements to facilitate personal exploration and growth. Psychodrama finds application and adaptability in various contexts, including trauma, relationship issues, addiction, mental health disorders such as anxiety and depression, as well as in training and education settings.

The 'scene' plays a crucial role in psychodrama as it serves as the backdrop for the action to unfold. It can be a designated area within a room, including in classrooms, such as the center or one end of the space, specifically arranged to facilitate the effectiveness of the dramatic function. Various props and structures are utilized to enhance the experience. The physical scene aids in creating an 'as if' attitude among the participants. In ancient Greek theater, the term 'proscenium arch' denoted the boundaries of the stage; when someone crossed the arch, they entered the world of the drama. Similarly, in psychodrama, as the protagonist and supporting actors move toward the stage, their ascent signifies their entry into the 'psychodramatic realm' (Kellerman, 1992).

Props may be present on the stage, commonly including a few lightweight chairs and a simple table. These versatile items can represent imaginary or designed figures, act as boundaries or platforms, or indicate height, authority, or status. For instance, a table can transform into the roof of a building, a plank, a judge's bench, a kitchen table, or a cave for huddling or hiding. Pillows, soft cloth, or other materials can be employed for fighting, weightlifting, protection, or even for symbolizing being held like a baby. While additional materials are not necessarily required, their inclusion can yield remarkable effects (Giacomucci, 2021).

2. Does psychodrama serve as an illustration of cognitive extension according to the extended mind thesis?

The concept of the "extended mind" challenges traditional perspectives on cognition and the computational theory of mind. Its origins can be traced back to the work of Clark and Chalmers in 1998 and their article titled "The Extended Mind." In this influential paper they question the traditional understanding of the boundaries of the mind concerning its relationship with the external world. While traditional views tend to consider the body, particularly the skin and the skull, as the defining limits of the mind, Clark and Chalmers argue in favor of the idea that the mind goes beyond these physical boundaries and extends into the environment. As I mentioned before, they term this position 'active externalism,' emphasizing the active role played by the environment in shaping cognitive processes.

Central to their argument is the functional role of external artifacts and the environment in relation to cognition. In essence, functionalism within this context posits that external objects from the world function as integral components of the mind, thereby suggesting that the mind transcends the physical confines of the body. The extended mind thesis proposes that cognitive processes are intricately intertwined with our bodily interactions and the environment, facilitated by the utilization of external objects and technologies. As a result, the mind is not simply confined to the brain or even the brain and body, but encompasses the larger system of the brain, body, and environment.

A key aspect of comprehending the concept of an extended mind is recognizing that cognitive processes can be enhanced by external objects like notebooks, calculators, and computers, which are considered part of an interconnected cognitive system. To illustrate this idea, Clark and Chalmers provide the following example:

> Inga learns from a friend about an exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art and decides to visit it. She remembers that the museum is located on 53rd Street, so she goes there and enters the museum. It appears clear that Inga believed the museum to be on 53rd Street even before consulting her memory. Her belief was stored somewhere in her memory, waiting to be recalled. Otto suffers from Alzheimer's disease and, like many Alzheimer's patients, relies on information from the surrounding environment to structure his life. He carries a notebook with him everywhere he goes. Whenever he learns new information, he writes it down. When he needs to recall old information, he consults his notes. For Otto, the notebook serves the role that biological memory typically plays. Today, Otto hears about an exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art and decides to visit. He consults his notebook, which states that the museum is located on 53rd Street, so he goes there and enters the museum. In these respective cases, the situations are entirely analogous: the notebook plays the same role for Otto that memory plays for Inga. The information in the notebook functions just like the information constituting a regular non-accidental belief, except that this information happens to be located outside the skin (Clark & Chalmers, 1998:12-13).

The example of Otto and Inga highlights a significant implication: Otto's notebook is not merely an external tool he uses; rather, it is considered a part of his mind. This is because the notebook is functionally integrated with his cognitive processes. In the same way that Inga's biological memory serves a role for her, the notebook serves an equivalent role for Otto. The information contained within it functions similarly to the information constituting ordinary memories. The only difference lies in their location. This leads to the conclusion that not only can the processes occurring within an individual's mind be deemed cognitive; external artifacts can also be recognized as belonging to their cognitive system. The inclusion of external objects enhances and expands the individual's capacity for memory and other cognitive processes. This functionality extends beyond memory and applies to various other cognitive processes. The purpose of external artifacts is to augment the individual, increasing their cognitive capacities (Palermos, 2014: 21). Thus, he notebook is also physically integrated thanks to Otto having the habit and skill to use it. Thanks to his motor abilities and his senses, he could expand his memory capacity through the use of an external artifact, such as the notebook.

The psychodramatic scene can be seen as a means of increasing cognitive abilities similar to Otto's notebook. It can be used to symbolically represent internal contents similar to illustrations on a piece of paper. The body also plays a central role in the psychodramatic context involving sensory and motor skills in the scenic process. The use of the stage gradually becomes a skill like a habit over the course of the therapeutic process. I believe that Clark and Chalmers' idea can be applied to the psychodramatic scene because its functional role could be similar to other tools that are used to supplement or augment cognitive processes.

The example of Otto and Inga serves as a crucial illustration in grasping the concepts presented by Clark and Chalmers. It raises the fundamental question regarding the boundaries between mind, body, and environment, which are inherently ambiguous, adaptable, contingent on the situation, and dependent on functionality. The determining factor in defining these boundaries seems to be the successful accomplishment of a cognitive task, such as Otto finding the museum.

In their article, Clark and Chalmers employ additional examples to reinforce their perspective that human cognition is significantly reliant on environmental supports. These examples highlight the prevalent tendency for individuals to utilize external resources and artifacts in cognitive processes. Clark and Chalmers present the example of playing the puzzle video game *Tetris* (Clark & Chalmers, 1998:7). They argue that the act of rotating the game pieces in *Tetris* can be considered an instance of extended cognition because it becomes an integral part of the player's strategy for solving spatial problems. According to research conducted by David Kirsh and Maglio (Kirsh & Maglio, 1994), physically rotating a shape in *Tetris* takes significantly less time compared to mentally rotating it. Physical rotation not only positions the shape correctly for placement but also helps determine if it fits into a specific slot. Kirsh and Maglio refer to this as ‘epistemic action,’ where actions modify the environment to support and enhance cognitive processes such as recognition and search. This is in contrast to purely pragmatic actions, which modify the world for practical purposes unrelated to cognitive processes. The example of *Tetris* demonstrates how external actions and manipulation of the game pieces play a significant role in augmenting cognitive abilities and problem-solving (Clark & Chalmers, 1998:8).

In psychodrama, the use of stagecraft can be viewed as an epistemic act due to its role in creating a spatial organization that actively engages the protagonist in a symbolic reality. This symbolic reality is designed to replicate the spatial arrangement of elements from past events or fantasy scenarios. By recreating this arrangement, stagecraft facilitates the process of recall and deepens the understanding and comprehension of internal contents, much like the arrangement of figures on a screen aids in visualizing information. The intentional spatial organization in psychodrama serves as a powerful tool for enhancing the protagonist's exploration and meaning-making process within the therapeutic context.

The next example used by Clark and Chalmers is the game *Scrabble*. Their vision is that “in a very real sense, the re-arrangement of tiles on the tray is not part of action; it is part of thought” (Clark & Chalmers, 1998:10). They claim that cognitive tasks such as those that occur during the *Scrabble* game are distributed to the environment.

In psychodrama, the protagonist delegates a portion of the cognitive workload to external resources such as people and objects. This process resembles the act of unloading in a game of *Scrabble*. One psychodrama technique that facilitates this is role reversal[1], where the protagonist assumes the perspective of another person involved in the situation. By doing so, they gain fresh insights and a clearer understanding of different perspectives, especially in conflicts with trusted individuals like friends or mentors. Role reversal opens up new avenues for diverse perspectives, ideas, and insights that the protagonist may not have reached independently. Sharing the dramatization experience with group members, both before and after the enactment, also contributes to the delegation process. By objectifying the problem and distributing it among the group, it becomes a collective task. Group discussions allow for a collective exploration of the issue, providing diverse perspectives and insights that alleviate the cognitive load burdening the individual. Psychodrama further allows individuals to offload cognitive work onto external resources through the use of props and symbolic objects. These props serve as representations of various aspects of the individual's inner world or external reality, enabling them to externalize and explore their thoughts, emotions, and experiences

[1] Role reversal in psychodrama is a technique where participants temporarily take on the role of another person or entity within a dramatic scenario. It involves mentally and emotionally stepping into the shoes of another individual to gain a deeper understanding of their perspective, experiences, and emotions.

in a tangible manner. For instance, an animal toy may symbolize lost childhood, while a piece of cloth can represent a perceived barrier hindering the achievement of personal goals. Using props facilitates a deeper engagement with one's inner world and promotes a richer exploration of personal narratives.

The concept presented by Clark and Chalmers is intricately linked to everyday technologies and objects. However, psychodrama takes a different approach, as it is neither technological nor an artifact in the sense that the authors of the extended mind thesis intended. Nevertheless, we can still consider the psychodramatic scene as an extended mind tool comparable to Otto's notebook. To substantiate this claim, we need to examine the criteria for an external object to be integrated into the human cognitive system.

The first and most important criterion that Clarke and Chalmers introduce for the inclusion of an external artifact in an agent's cognitive system is:

> **"...the resource must be available and typically invoked" [Availability Criterion]** (Clark, 2010: 6).

In simpler terms, for an external object to be considered as part of one's cognitive process, it needs to be easily accessible and habitually used by the individual. In the case of Otto's notebook, it must be used regularly without much conscious effort, indicating that Otto is familiar with its use and has incorporated it into his cognitive routine. Additionally, the notebook should always be within Otto's reach, like an engineer with a tape measure hanging from his belt or someone who carries a pocket calculator wherever they go. The key here is reliable connectivity – if the external resources, such as the calculator or Otto's notebook, are consistently available when needed, they become integrated into the individual's cognitive resources. These systems should not be dismissed simply because they can be damaged, lost, or temporarily disconnected, as even the biological brain faces similar limitations during sleep or intoxication. As long as the relevant cognitive faculties are generally present when required, there is sufficient coupling between the external object and the individual's cognitive processes (Clark & Chalmers, 1998:11).

Psychodrama, as a therapeutic process, ensures a high level of reliability and accessibility through ethical norms and work regulations. The groups are structured to meet on specific days and time slots, allowing for the repetition of meetings, which is crucial for therapeutic progress. Moreover, the responsiveness and availability of therapists contribute to the reliability and accessibility of the psychodramatic process. It is an established therapeutic technique practiced by trained professionals in numerous countries. Various professional associations and organizations offer training and certification for psychodrama practitioners, while many educational institutions, including universities and colleges, provide courses focused on this subject which makes the method available.

A further condition is that for an external object or technology to be part of a person's cognitive system, it must be readily accessible. This is the second condition that is set:

> **"...information contained in the resource should be easily accessible as and when required" [Accessibility Criterion]** (Clark, 2010: 7).

The agent must be able to use the process as if it were part of his organism's cognitive system. Clark and Chalmers challenge the notion that Inga has better access to information than Otto. They note that while Inga seems to have a fast and efficient connection to her internal processes and memory, Otto's connection to his notebook is relatively weak. However, this does not mean that Inga necessarily possesses a particular belief or lack of it. To illustrate their point, Clark and Chalmers give the following example:

Let's consider the example of Inga's friend, Lucy, who has a biological memory that is

> not well connected to her central systems due to either biological limitations or past incidents. As a result, the processing of information in Lucy's case may be less efficient, even though the relevant information about the museum's location is accessible to her. For instance, Lucy firmly believes that the museum is situated on 53rd Street. However, if the connection between Lucy's memory and the belief were more indirect, requiring significant effort with inconsistent results, or

> if she needed the assistance of a psychotherapist to retrieve the information, we would be more cautious in attributing the belief to her. It's important to note that these cases are quite different from Otto's situation, where the information is readily available to him (Clark & Chalmers, 1998: 15-16).

Another perspective to consider is that Otto's access to relevant information is limited to perception, while Inga has more direct access through introspection. However, Clark and Chalmers disagree with this viewpoint. They argue that the exchange of information between Otto's notebook and his brain does not involve any external influences; it is akin to the internal flow of information within the brain. The only difference lies in the distinct perceptual experience associated with retrieving information for Otto, whereas Inga lacks such phenomenology. Clark and Chalmers raise an important question: Why should the nature of associated phenomenology affect the status of belief? Inga's memory may have some associated phenomenology, but it remains a belief. Moreover, the phenomenology in question is not visual. To illustrate this, consider the character of the Terminator portrayed by Arnold Schwarzenegger in the eponymous film. When the Terminator recalls information from memory, it appears as if the information is visually displayed in front of him (as depicted in the film from his point of view). However, this unconventional way of recalling permanent memories does not alter their status as enduring beliefs (Clark & Chalmers, 1998: 16).

The effort to symbolically recreate the psychodramatic scene can be seen as an attempt to reach as far as possible the primary perception of the past events that are recreated on stage. It is a symbolic representation of internal contents, but at the same time it evokes memories that approximate the introspection Inga would have had, such as pictures of the museum building, the smell of the grass in front of it, details of the itinerary, and associations with her first visit there. In the psychodramatic scene these pictures can be symbolized on stage using the stage space and location. This does not happen by placing them only as signs, similar to written notes, but by simulating a memory in the way it arises in introspection.

Therefore, their next condition for integrating an external artifact to the cognitive system is:

> **"...any information...retrieved from the non-biological resource must be more-or-less automatically endorsed. It should not usually be subject to critical scrutiny (unlike the opinions of other people, for example). It should be deemed about as trustworthy as something retrieved clearly from biological memory" [Trust Criterion]** (Clark, 2010: 6).

In order for information in a resource to be deemed acceptable without further reflection, it must be recognized as normal and reliable, even if it is not necessarily deemed trustworthy. The level of trust should be equivalent to what we attribute to information retrieved from our own biological memory (Clark, 2010). It is not necessary for the process to be 100% reliable, just as we do not expect our biological memory to be infallible. Clark introduces the criterion of trustworthiness as a cognitive process that functions as a common feature of externalism in epistemology, without necessitating critical examination. For this to be the case, the process must have proven successful in the past and become a cognitive tendency or habit that the individual regularly employs. Through repeated usage, if any issues arise with the process, the individual would be able to detect and respond to them appropriately. Therefore, according to Clark, a reliable process for forming beliefs is one that generates accurate beliefs rather than erroneous ones.

Clark also introduces the notion of reliability, which implies that the process is endorsed more or less automatically and does not require critical reflection. To facilitate this, the process should not have been problematic in the past, at least in most cases. Additionally, it must be a cognitive disposition or habit that the individual has practiced repeatedly. Consequently, with multiple repetitions, if the process proves problematic, the individual would notice and respond accordingly. Hence, a trustworthy belief formation process, according to Clark, is one that leads to true beliefs rather than false ones.

The idea of trustworthiness is also apparent in Clark and Chalmers' conception of extended systems, where trust in the artifact becomes a prerequisite for its integration into the individual's cognitive system. This trust is closely tied to the degree of integration. Trust enables the process to be utilized automatically, without the need for the agent to possess explicit beliefs regarding why or whether such trust exists. It suffices that the process has not attracted negative attention in the past. This notion aligns with the concept of subjective justification proposed by Greco (1999). For instance, we trust our eyesight under normal circumstances simply because it has not presented significant problems in the past within such normal contexts. In this context, the claim suggests that for an external resource to be effectively integrated into the cognitive system, it must be connected in a manner that enables the automatic and seamless integration of information into cognitive processes. This form of coupling resembles the biological coding that occurs in the brain, where sensory input from the body is automatically integrated into cognitive processing.

The psychodramatic process relies heavily on trust and automatic endorsement, playing a vital role in the healing journey (Ge & Dai, 2011). Trust is fundamental in establishing a safe and supportive environment where individuals feel at ease to express themselves and delve into their emotions. In psychodrama, individuals are encouraged to embrace vulnerability and openly share their experiences and feelings. Trust becomes a crucial element in cultivating a space where individuals feel secure enough to reveal their innermost thoughts and emotions. The therapeutic alliance, encompassing the bond between the therapist and client, holds significant influence over the therapy's outcome.

3. Distributed cognition as a form of mind extension

Distributed cognition is a theoretical framework that posits that cognitive processes are distributed or extended across individuals, artifacts, and the environment. Rather than viewing cognition as solely happening inside the brain, distributed cognition emphasizes the dynamic interaction between individuals and their surrounding context. It considers the external elements as integral components of the cognitive system, contributing to problem-solving, decision-making, and knowledge construction. The concept of distributed cognition highlights the importance of context, socio-cultural factors, and the physical environment in understanding how individuals think, learn, and engage in complex tasks.

Distributed cognition is illustrated by Hutchins' famous example of the ship:

> Ship navigators often encounter the challenge of calculating the speed of a ship based on the distance traveled in a specific time period. While there are multiple ways to solve this problem, experienced navigators may employ a more efficient approach known as the ‘three-minute rule’. By observing the given problem, they can quickly determine that the speed is 15 knots, which corresponds to the hundreds of yards covered in 3 minutes. This rule represents an internal artifact that leverages observation over mathematical computation. However, for a different problem where the ship covers 4000 yards in 7 minutes, a material artifact called a 3-scale nomogram becomes more suitable. This nomogram consists of logarithmic scales for distance, time, and speed. By utilizing this tool, navigators can determine unknown variables by aligning lines on the nomogram with the known values, thereby obtaining the corresponding response value on the third scale. This process involves a coordination of skills such as scale reading, interpolation, and manipulating the nomogram. It is evident that cognitive work is being performed, but it is also clear that relying solely on internal mental processes would not be sufficient to complete the calculation. Instead, a larger unit of analysis that integrates human skills and material artifacts is necessary (Hutchins, 2001: 8).

This example by Hutchins illustrates the involvement of external artifacts and their coordination with cognitive processes in problem-solving. It demonstrates that different problem-solving strategies can employ various sets of agencies, with the use of material artifacts and external tools playing a crucial role alongside internal mental processes, as opposed to traditional methods involving algebra and paper and pencil. The idea is that among various technologies there are some that should be seen as part of the cognitive system of the agent, and the social environment can be seen as a cognitive extension along with the material artifacts.

4. Psychodrama as an extended mind tool in education

The concept of the extended mind has several applications in education. I will explore some key areas where the extended mind framework can be applied.

The first is directly connected to Clark and Chalmers's basic example about Otto and Inga. Similarly external artifacts, such as notebooks, calculators, and computers, can be considered as part of individual students' cognitive systems. In education, this implies that they can use various tools and technologies to augment their cognitive abilities (Paul, 2021). For example, using calculators or online research resources can enhance problem-solving and information retrieval skills.

Similarly, when using psychodrama in an educational context, the unique external artifacts and techniques it employs can support cognitive processes and facilitate personal exploration. In educational settings, psychodrama techniques and external artifacts, such as the stage and props, can also serve as cognitive extensions. They provide students with opportunities to externalize and explore their thoughts, emotions, and experiences in a more tangible and interactive manner. The use of psychodrama in this context has three goals: improving understanding of social situations, increasing participants' knowledge of their own perspectives and of others involved in the situation, and emotional release (Wiener, 1985). Here, psychodrama enhances their cognitive engagement and understanding of various concepts and topics. The use of props and symbolic objects in educational psychodrama provides students with tangible representations of abstract concepts or emotions. By interacting with these props, students can externalize and explore their thoughts and feelings in a more concrete way, which enhances understanding and facilitates the transfer of knowledge to real-world contexts.

The second goal is more closely connected to Hutchins' idea of distributed cognition. The extended mind framework recognizes the importance of the environment and social interactions in cognition. In educational settings, this perspective highlights the significance of collaborative learning, where students engage in group activities and discussions to share knowledge and perspectives. It emphasizes the role of social interactions, peer feedback, and collective knowledge construction in the learning process.

In the realm of group psychotherapy, particularly influenced by Irvin Yalom's work in *The Theory and Practice of Group Psychotherapy* (1985), the establishment of group cohesiveness is considered a crucial element in group development. Psychodrama practitioners contribute to this aspect by employing simple warm-up and sociometric exercises that effectively and swiftly foster a sense of safety among participants. However, the transfer of group development theories to educational settings is often limited or unsuccessful. Psychodrama, on the other hand, addresses this challenge by helping in cases of social isolation and anxiety experienced by students, which can impede information retention and comprehension. For a minority of students, these difficulties can lead to falling behind, developing self-perceptions of inadequacy, and ultimately dropping out of education (Haworth and Vasiljević, 2012).

Both the extended mind framework and educational psychodrama recognize that social interactions and collaborative learning enhance cognitive processes. By engaging in group activities and discussions, students can deepen their understanding, develop critical thinking skills, and expand their cognitive capacities through the collective intelligence of the group.

The most obvious and important similarity between the extended mind application in education and psychodrama is the role of the body in cognition. The extended mind concept emphasizes the embodied nature of cognition. In education, this translates to incorporating physical and kinesthetic experiences into learning. Hands-on activities, simulations, role-playing, and experiential learning can be utilized to engage students' bodies and enhance their understanding and retention of concepts. Research shows (see Ping & Goldin-Meadow, 2010) that gesturing plays a significant role in a cognitive loop where our hand movements impact our thoughts, and conversely, our thoughts influence our gestures. The act of gesturing enhances our thinking and speaking fluency, enriching our understanding with greater nuance and sophistication.

Psychodrama is an active form of group psychotherapy. “It involves the body as the main container of the constituents for therapeutic action…” (Tauvon, 2010: 257). Educational psychodrama can incorporate physical and kinesthetic experiences to engage students' bodies in the learning process. Through role-playing, improvisation, and movement-based activities, students can physically embody characters, situations, and emotions. This physical engagement enhances their understanding and retention of concepts by connecting cognitive processes with bodily experiences. Educational psychodrama inherently involves experiential learning, where students actively participate in dramatic scenarios and engage in immersive experiences. This hands-on approach allows students to directly experience and engage with the subject matter, promoting deeper understanding and personal connections. By actively engaging their bodies, students integrate cognitive and sensory information, leading to enhanced learning outcomes. Research in the field highlights the significance of psychodrama in knowledge acquisition across diverse subject areas, including history, languages, and professional specialization (Haire, 2000). It underscores the role of psychodrama as an effective tool for students to engage with and grasp academic content in these disciplines.

After engaging in physical and kinesthetic experiences within educational psychodrama, students can reflect on their actions, emotions, and insights. This reflective process encourages the integration of cognitive and bodily experiences, facilitating deeper learning and personal growth. Through reflection, students can make connections between their embodied experiences and theoretical knowledge.

Conclusion

By exploring the relationship between psychodrama and the extended mind thesis, the article expands our understanding of cognition and its interaction with the environment. It suggests that psychodrama, with its scenes, techniques, and social group dynamics, can be viewed as extensions of the mind, augmenting cognitive abilities. This perspective emphasizes the role of the environment in shaping cognition, highlights the importance of external resources in education, and recognizes the potential of psychodrama as an effective educational approach. The article contributes to a broader understanding of the implications of the extended mind thesis in the field of education and encourages further exploration and application of psychodrama in educational settings.

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Book reviews

Is Hermann Lotze a "dead dog"?

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Nikolai Milkov is one of the most active researchers of the history of analytic philosophy. His latest monograph, Hermann Lotze's Influence on Twentieth Century Philosophy (New Studies in the History and Historiography of Philosophy),is proof of this. A key feature of his overall research strategy is that it does not simply examine the history of analytic philosophy per se, but focuses on its connections to continental philosophy as well. His significant contributions are rooted in this strategy and in fact,not only in this recent study, but in previous works as well, Milkov elaborates different aspects of the interactions between analytic philosophy and continental philosophy, thus subverting and revising numerous long-accepted attitudes and assumptions.

The monograph is dedicated to Hermann Lotze. True to his approach, Milkov not only reveals the importance of this German philosopher for early analytic philosophy, but also for the development of continental philosophy. In fact, the author tells us that Hermann Lotze is undeservedly forgotten and has not found his rightful place in the panorama of Western philosophizing. Not only in this publication, but in many others, Milkov convincingly argues that Hermann Lotze was the leading philosopher not only in Germany, but in the entire Western world at the end of the 19th century. The German philosopher was a decisive influence on early analytic philosophy, phenomenology, neo-Kantianism, philosophy of life, British idealism, and American pragmatism. To make his point, Milkov reconstructs in detail the main themes in Lotze's work. He starts with Lotze's philosophical systematics, presenting the philosopher's basic ontological and epistemological assumptions and arguments and focusing specifically on his philosophy of psychology. Lotze's philosophical anthropology, which is central to his work, and his introduction of the category of "value", among other contributions, are also discussed at length.

If the first part of the monograph is devoted to Lotze, the second part traces his influence. For this reason in particular, Milkov offers a detailed comparison with Franz Brentano and Karl Stumpf. Milkov does not specifically address Lotze's influence on Husserl, but notes his assessment of Lotze's importance.

Milkov's account of Lotze's influence on early analytic philosophy is elaborate and persuasive. On this account, Milkov qualifies the longstanding assumption of the fundamental importance of Frege for the development of analytic philosophy, noting that Frege himself stressed that Lotze's ideas were "crucial". This admission further challenges the traditional view of Moore's and Russell's early philosophy as influenced crucially by the British neo-Hegelians. Multiple conceptual and historical-philosophical considerations are adduced in support of the thesis that the young Moore and Russell were influenced by Bradley and Bosanquet, who in their turn were following Lotze's ideas. Of particular interest is the ninth and final chapter in which the author corrects a number of well-established assumptions concerning the history of neo-Kantianism. Here, Milkov focuses attention on the Lotze-Rickert relationship in particular and on logical empiricism before and after the establishment of the Vienna Circle.

To summarize, the monograph of Nikolay Milkov is a substantial contribution to the history not only of analytic philosophy, but also of continental philosophy. This is due in part to the critical revelation of many nuances of the revival of Platonism in philosophy in the second half of the 19th century. It is no coincidence that Whitehead said that the whole of philosophy is a footnote to Plato, and indeed, this revival marked the beginning of the so-called ontological turn, the basis of which is the *Psychologismusstreit*. This turn began with Bolzano, Frege, the Greifswald's philosophers, or as Milkov calls them, proponents of the "Greifswaldian objectivist" approach, and it is within this ontologizing perspective that the ideas of Lotze belong–a categorical conclusion in the monograph. The ontological turn ushered in the dominant thinkers of the early 20th century, and through Husserl, Heidegger, Hartmann, the ontological interpretations of Kantianism, Russian intuitivism, American neorealism, resulted in the major contributions and heuristics of 20th century philosophy. This is precisely why the ideas of Hermann Lotze are artifacts of great historical-philosophical significance, but also ideas with substantive meaning. As such, Milkov argues–quite convincingly–that Lotze simply cannot be deemed a "dead dog".

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