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Discussion

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AN INTRODUCTION TO WHITEHEAD'S NEW VIEW OF LEARNING AND ITS RELATION TO TRADITIONAL LEARNING THEORIES*

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Abstract:
Alfred North Whitehead, although probably known best for his collaborative work with Bertrand Russell on the Principia Mathematica, also developed an original theory of learning and instruction which has much to offer for our times. His theory will be discussed in this paper. In order to do so, two criteria are first developed which in their combination give rise to five categories: radical behaviorism, cognitivism, and radical constructivism, with the intermediary categories of moderate behaviorism and moderate constructivism. A great number of educational researchers are ascribed to one of these five categories. After discussing the shortcomings of the three major philosophical proponents of these three major educational approaches (Hume, Kant, and Berkeley), the basic assumptions of Whitehead's philosophy of organism are presented, and his assumptions concerning learning and teaching are discussed in view of it. Finally, it is shown that Whitehead's organismic philosophy is able to offer a frame for integrating Behaviorism, Cognitivism, and Constructivism, thereby solving a long standing scandal of education.

Key words: Process Philosophy, Behaviorism, Hume, Cognitivism, Kant, Constructivism, Berkeley, Learning Cycles, Integrative Theory of Learning and Instruction .

1. Introduction

In this paper I will deal with Whitehead's view of learning and its place among other learning theories. This of course doesn't mean a direct comparison of Whitehead's ideas on learning with all single learning theories; that would be impossible given the great number of approaches.

First, it is important to bring at least some level of order into the bewildering field of learning theories, a framework which allows at least for some coarse categorization of the different approaches. One way to do so is to simply define major paradigmatic approaches to learning as Higgs (1995) has done. He has distinguished between 6 major paradigms: *Logical Empiricism*, *Critical Rationalism*, *Critical Theory* (Neomarxism), *Phenomenology*, *Hermeneutics*, and *Systems Theory*. The disadvantage of such a procedure is, however, that (a) the selection is quite arbitrary—where, for instance are the psychoanalytic and radical constructivist theories of learning in Higgs' presentation?—and (b) the single paradigms stand disconnected and isolated from each other and therefore can hardly be compared. So, this way of ordering just reduces the number of theories by allocating them to some major paradigms while leaving the problem of any interrelations between them untouched.

Therefore, I choose to take a different approach in order to try to make sure that the similarities and differences between the paradigms are more visible. In doing so, I first want to draw attention to a very basic distinction concerning *Weltanschauungen* (world views)—today, in a post-Kuhnian era, we would call them 'paradigms'—which was introduced by Ludwig von Bertalanffy in his two books *Robots, Men, and Minds* (1967) and *...aber vom Menschen wissen wir nichts* [*...But About Men We Know Nothing*] (1970). In the second book Bertalanffy, who has been attributed as the founder of

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systems theory, points out the fact that, at the beginning of the 20th century, the predominant "mechanist worldview" (Bertalanffy 1970, 15; my translation) had come under severe attack in different scientific disciplines. Starting in biology and experimental embryology—followed soon by research in the fields of psychology, sociology, and cultural anthropology, as well as from the side of the philosophic school of Neo-Kantianism—a critical discussion of the dominating mechanistic paradigm led to the development of different fundamental assumptions which form the core of a new 'world view' which was termed by Bertalanffy the "organismic concept" (Bertalanffy, 14; my translation).

Starting from his own biological work, Bertalanffy characterizes the basic assumptions of this new paradigm by contrasting it with the mechanistic approach in the following way: "View of the living system as a whole in contrast to a purely analytic and summative method; dynamic perspective contrary to a static or machine-theory of organism; the basic assumption that organisms are primarily active and not reactive systems" (Bertalanffy, 14; my translation). Thus this new world view is essentially dynamic, supra-summative, and attributes self-activity to the systems.

Interesting for our context is the fact, as Bertalanffy claims, that when looking at the development of this new paradigm it should be mentioned that Whitehead may be considered "an important forerunner" (Bertalanffy, 115; my translation). So, Bertalanffy sees in Whitehead the philosophical founder of the new organismic paradigm. It is therefore no surprise that he had coined the term "organismic" for this new paradigm, since Whitehead had characterized his own philosophical approach as "Philosophy of Organism" (Whitehead [1929] 1978, xi).

But Bertalanffy also lists quite a few other researchers who have to be conceived as early proponents of this new paradigm. For instance, Jean Piaget is mentioned by Bertalanffy: "Again at about the same time [when Werner (1926) and Bertalanffy (1928) attempted to develop a new paradigm,] the Genevan psychologist Piaget started his scientific investigations of the mental development of the child in such a way that it can be subordinated under the concept of the 'organismic'" (Bertalanffy 1970, 15; my translation). To substantiate that Bertalanffy's claim is correct, a short quotation from Piaget's book *Biologie et Connaissance* ([1967] 1983) must be sufficient here: "The structure of the organization also is characterized by three features: open system, dynamics of exchange and 'primary activity' in contrast to primitively conceived reactivity" (Piaget, 157; my translation). In this context it may also be of interest that Piaget knew Whitehead: "Already A. N. Whitehead in his works on scientific thinking has taken the view that those interpretations which are commonly characterized as 'mechanic', cannot bring the analysis of reality to its utmost point and that the terms organism and organization show specific features which must be utilized" (Piaget 1972, 244).

Other proponents of the new paradigm, listed by Bertalanffy (1967), are the Vienna-born psychologist Heinz Werner and his book *Introduction to Developmental Psychology* (1926), the Neo-Kantian philosopher Ernst Cassirer (three-volumes of his *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*: Vol. I, 1923; Vol. II, 1925; Vol. III, 1929), and the Russian sociologist Pitrim Sorokin in his *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (1928). Among others, Bertalanffy also briefly mentions the Gestalt psychologists Karl Bühler (1934) who is most famous for his contributions to the psychology of language, Kurt Goldstein (1939) who advocated a holistic approach to neurology, and Jerome Bruner and his program of a 'New Look' in the psychology of perception (1971).

Bertalanffy's crude dichotomous distinction between a mechanistic worldview (which is characterized as static, passive, and elementaristic) and an organismic worldview (which shows the features of dynamics, holism, and self-activity of organisms) gives us at least three basic criteria for a first differentiation and categorization of psychological and educational learning theories: broadly speaking, there are more mechanical approaches on the one side and more organismic ones on the other. This categorization is helpful to distinguish particularly Behaviorism from the other two aforementioned paradigms in learning research: Cognitivism and Constructivism.

In order to further differentiate between cognitivism and moderate constructivism on the one side and radical constructivism on the other side, an additional criterion is needed. Rolf Dubs (1995) has proposed to categorize learning theories along the continuum between the two paradigmatic poles of objectivism and subjectivism (see Table 1 below). Is a learning theory claiming to deal with the objective world (Behaviorism)? Or, to what extent does a particular learning approach claim to deal (in a specific, graded way) with a subjectively interpreted objective world (Cognitivism & Moderate Constructivism, which I treat as one single paradigm)? Alternatively, is it exclusively dealing with a subjectively constructed world and thereby claiming, or at least accepting, that there is no such thing as an objective world (Radical Constructivism).

World Views L. v. Bertalanffy	Mechanicism	Organicism	
Objectivism – Subjectivism	Radical Behaviorism	Cognitivism	Radical Structuralism
R. Dubs	Objectivism Subjectivism		

Table 1: Criteria for Categorizing Learning Theories: Criterion 1 (Bertalanffy): Mechanistic vs. Organicist Worldview; Criterion 2 (Dubs): Three Learning Paradigms (Radical Behaviorism, Cognitivism, Radical Constructivism) placed on a continuum (indicated by the double arrow) between the poles of objectivism and subjectivism.

Since there are obvious borderline cases, I have indicated by dotted lines that the category of cognitivism could be further divided into moderate behaviorism, cognitivism and moderate constructivism (see Table 2 below); but, for the purpose of this paper, I will restrict myself to the classical three categories of behaviorism, cognitivism and radical constructivism.

Of course, it has to be kept in mind that even a categorization based on these two criteria (proposed by Bertalanffy and Dubs), one which results in three major paradigmatic categories, is still rudimentary and to some extent a matter of subjective judgment: for instance, Piaget's genetic structuralist views are claimed to be radical constructivism by Glasersfeld (2007), but they are categorized under moderate constructivism in Table 2 because most scholars do not follow Glasersfeld. Of course, this problem is even greater between the subcategories within the category of cognitivism: Bandura's social learning theory, which has been classified in Table 2 as a pure cognitive approach (following a broad consensus among psychologists), could (at least in its early version) also be classified as moderate behaviorism (or neo-behaviorism) since Bandura accepts classical and operant conditioning while at the same time introducing mediating processes (i.e. memory, cognitions) between stimuli and responses (McLeod 2016, Peel 2005). Gestalt psychology (as shown in in Table 2) has been split between the Berlin School—which, according to Piaget's criticism, is to be characterized as static since there is no place for the concept of (re-)equilibration in this approach (Piaget, [1967] 1983, 251-256), and therefore was categorized as cognitivism—and the micro-genetically-oriented Second Leipzig School of Ganzheit psychology, which deals with the dynamic development of Gestalts (*Ganzheiten*) in perceptive processes and is obviously not affected by Piaget's criticism, therefore being subsumed under moderate constructivism.

Despite these uncertainties in categorizing particular learning theories within the presented scheme of three (resp. five) major paradigmatic categories, it still can function as a practical guide for gaining at least some order into the bewildering variety of learning theories. Table 2 shows the categorization of only a small fraction of available learning theories.

Along with grouping the available learning theories broadly into the three categories, I have also located Whitehead's theory of learning within this framework (found in boldface text in Table 2). Categorizing his learning approach as moderate constructivist is, I think, a poor compromise, given that his learning theory is based on a metaphysics which consists of fundamentally new ideas that blur the classical distinction between subjectivism and objectivism. And it is important to keep in mind that his organismic philosophy is a very creative piece of work, full of new ideas. So, before his learning theory is discussed in more detail, we should remember what Whitehead once said about new ideas and their reception: "If you have had your attention directed to the novelties in thought in your own lifetime, you will have observed that almost all really new ideas have a certain aspect of foolishness when they are first produced" (Whitehead [1925] 1967, 406; italics added). To give one example, one of the core concepts of his new philosophical approach, the concept of prehension, is judged as "one of [his] supreme intellectual discoveries" (Hartshorne 1972, 127). We are therefore well advised to take Whitehead's warning seriously when presenting his theory of learning.

Learning Paradigms:	Radical Behaviorism	Moderate Behaviorism	Cognitivism	Moderate Constructivism	Radical Constructivism
Major proponents:	Classical Conditioning: I. P. Pawlov & J. Watson, Guthrie Instrumental Conditioning: E. L. Thorndike & B. F. Skinner 2-Factor Theory: H. Mowrer	Purposive Behavior: E. C. Tolman	Berlin Gestalt School: W. Köhler U. Neisser Social-Cognitive Learning Theory: A. Bandura, W. Mischel & B. Rotter	Leipzig School of Ganzheitspsychology: F. Sander, H. Wer-ner Genetic Structuralism: J. Piaget Social Constructivism: L. Vygotski Microgenetic Approach: G. Smith, U. Kragh, M. Bickhard, J. Draguns, T. Bachmann D. Schacter	E. v. Glasersfeld, H. v. Foerster
Trad. Phil. background:	British Empricism: D. Hume		Transcendentalism: I. Kant	Pragmatism: J. Dewey, W. James	Idealism: G. Berkeley, G. Vico
Actual phil. Affiliation	Neopositivism: R. Carnap		Critical Rationalism: K. R. Popper:	Systems theory: L. v. Bertalanffy **A. Whitehead**	Systems Theory: H. Maturana, F. Varela
Additional educators:	J. Wolpe, among others	C. Hull, J. Sweller, R. Mayer, P. Kirschner, among others	J. Bruner, H. A. Simon & A. Newell, H. Gardner, Berlin Gestalt School (C. Stumpf, O. Külpe, M. Wertheimer, W. Köhler, K. Koffka, K. Duncker, …), D. Ausubel, R. Gagne, Loftus, R. Sternberg	M. Abraham, J. Renner, K. W. Fischer, K. Lewin, Learning Cycle Theory: R. Karplus, A. Lawson, D. Kolb, R. Bybee	T. Duffy, D. Jonassen, P. Watzlawick, M. Montessori, G. A. Kelley, The Cognition and Technology Group at Vanderbilt (J. Bransford, R. Sherwood)

Table 2: Paradigms of Learning: proponents (of different learning theories), historical and actual philosophical foundations. Of course many more learning theories could be added to these categories. Moderate Behaviorist approaches, as well as Moderate Constructivist approaches are subsumed under the category of 'Cognitivism', however, they have been made visible by using dotted lines.

In order to do so, it seems appropriate to undertake this task of placing Whitehead's learning approach within our framework by linking it to well-known ideas of three traditional philosophical approaches which underlie each of the three major learning paradigms, namely behaviorism, cognitivism, and constructivism: Humean (sense) empiricism (behaviorism), Kantian transcendentalism (cognitivism), and Berkeley's radical idealism (radical constructivism). All three of these are philosophies of the Enlightenment which are well-known and very much continue to influence our thinking today.

Since Whitehead was convinced that the aforementioned philosophical traditions were not only deficient, but downright harmful (when applied to scientific fields of research, particularly education and learning), he developed a radically different alternative—his 'philosophy of organism'. I will first outline the three traditional philosophies of the Enlightment; in doing so I will try to make obvious their short-comings and present Whitehead's proposed solutions. Understanding these problems and their seriousness may motivate one to do the unaccustomed thinking required by Whitehead's radically new, 'foolish' looking ideas.

2. Empiricism & (Radical) Behaviorism

David Hume claimed—in strict opposition to Rene Descartes—that everything that is in our mind must before have been in our senses. When Hume undertook an analysis of everyday human sense perception, he came up with a result that had far-reaching implications: when ordinary people (non-philosophers) perceive the world around them, they get the impression that they live in a reality of permanently existing 'stable' objects (such as stones, houses, trees, tables), though these stable, enduring objects seem to carry features that may change (more or less quickly). But, when analyzing our everyday mode of perception and its contents, Hume could not find any hint of a stable substrate (or substance) underlying these changing features (or qualities). And, since according to his sense-empiricism only what is perceivable by our senses exists, underlying stable substrates do not exist. All that did exist for Hume was a stream of sense impressions (qualities). Further, these sense impressions are connected only externally and therefore arbitrarily by their relations in time and space. For instance, an analysis of two billiard balls[1] shows that a round black form approaches a non-moving circular red form; when their shapes come so close that they may seem to make contact, the red round shape may start moving while the black round shape may stop. Nothing in the whole situation gives us the right, Hume thought, to postulate any causation between the two shapes; at the same time, this means that we can connect any shape with any other shape—i.e. we can and will associate whatever shapes are, for instance, present at the same time.

So, according to Hume there is no reason to postulate any causal forces or pushes as they are presupposed in Newton's physics. Another inconvenient consequence following from Hume's radical sense-empiricism is that there is no indication of any memory and therefore—as a devastating result—no diachronic identity in the human person. All these forms experienced in sense perceptions (sense impressions) are combined according to the principles of association which Hume claimed to have been the first "to enumerate or class" (Hume [1748] 1999, 24). Despite these strange consequences, Hume's ideas found their way into psychology and education, informing both Associationism and Behaviorism, and unfolded unfortunate effects in the learning theories founded upon them.

Ivan Pavlov, for instance, introduced the so-called "equipotentiality principle" in his classical conditioning approach to learning. (Pavlov 1927, lecture 2). This principle claims that any arbitrary, so-called 'neutral' stimulus can be equally well associated with any unconditioned stimulus at any point in time and location, resulting in a successful conditioning process, i.e., in transforming the originally neutral stimulus into a conditioned stimulus and thereby taking over the function of the unconditioned stimulus (which is the core of the learning process). This implies that learning processes are arbitrary: any random combination of any stimuli can be learned at any time by anyone with the same result.

Martin Seligman (1971) challenged the equipotentiality assumption of radical behaviorism by pointing toward the empirically established fact that there are certain types of stimuli (as for instance snakes, spiders…) which can be much more easily transformed by the conditioning process into a fear-triggering stimuli than others (as for instance telephone receivers or pencils). In order to explain this distinction between certain types of stimuli, Seligman speculated about 'preparedness', a concept which he linked to the evolutionary processes.

Whitehead rejected Hume's radical sense empiricism for several reasons. Most important in our context, he rejected the behaviorists' and associationists' impact on learning: "The pupil's progress is often conceived as a uniform steady advance undifferentiated by change of type or alteration in pace, […] I hold that this conception of education is based upon a false psychology of the process of mental development which has gravely hindered the effectiveness of our methods" (Whitehead [1929] 1967, 17). Instead, learning according to Whitehead "is a process *completely of its own peculiar genus*. Its nearest analogue is the assimilation of food by a living organism" (Whitehead, 33; italics added). Whitehead's view of learning is not that of a uniform steady progress but that of a cyclic rhythm of *assimilation*. At the level of metaphysics, the educational concept of "assimilation" is explained by Whitehead's new philosophical concept of physical

[1] Hume's choice of billiard balls for a discussion of causation must be seen in the intellectual context of his day, within which Sir Isaac Newton had introduced a billiard ball concept of the final constituents of the world: "God in the Beginning form'd Matter in solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, moveable Particles" (Newton [1704] 1995, Query 31). Therefore, a discussion of billiard balls and their interaction could easily be generalized to causal relations in general and therefore was of great importance. (See also Temple 1984).

prehensions.[2] By prehending, each actual entity really grasps and integrates (assimilates) its immediately preceding world (actual entities in their objective aspect) and by doing so constructs itself (For a more detailed discussion of this notoriously difficult term see Cobb 2008, 31-38). So according to Whitehead (and in clear contrast to Hume), there is a direct and intimate relationship between the learner and the world.

Let us now turn to the second thought tradition, transcendentalism, which functions as the foundation of modern cognitivism (cognitive psychology).

3. Transcendentalism and Cognitivism

In his *Prolegomena* Immanuel Kant freely admitted that Hume woke him from his "dogmatic slumber" (Kant [1783] 2004, 260; 10). But if Hume was right and there was nothing in the mind that had not been before in one's senses, how then was it possible that Newton could predict future events (make a so-called 'synthetic judgment a priori') as, for instance, solar eclipses? Kant's solution was to split nature into *noumena*—things as they are in themselves (the so-called *Ding an sich*)—and *phenomena*—the world for the perceiver. Kant taught that the phenomenal word is actively (but unconsciously) constructed by the subject (the perceiver) in that she/he imposes the two intuitions [*Anschauungsformen*] of space and time, and a selection of twelve categories upon the noumenal world. And that is why we are able to predict these features: because they are already in the perceiver—prior to any concrete perceptive act. Unfortunately, the price that had to be paid for this solution was high: since it implies an insurmountable gap between the world as known by us and the world-in-itself (which is not detectable by any means), human beings are caught solipsistically in their constructions of the phenomenal world without any possibility of reaching the world beyond these constructions.

In addition to this unacceptable solipsist consequence, Kant's position suffers a severe inconsistency which Hans Vaihinger had already discovered in 1892. In order to perceive something, the perceiver has to apply a selection of the twelve categories of perception along with the two *Anschauungsformen* [pure forms of intuition] of space and time to the scene (Kant [1781] 1929, A 253). But, how does the perceiver (consciously or unconsciously) know which of the twelve categories are the correct ones to be selected if this act of perception is the only connection to the thus far unknown scene? This problem seems to be entirely insoluble, the only way out being to postulate a more fundamental (non-categorical/non-conceptual and therefore direct/immediate) type of perception. Without such a direct mode of perception we end up with a radical constructivist position.

This fundamental problem is present in modern *cognitive* science, which is strongly influenced by Kantian ideas. For instance, the cognitive scientists Noe and O'Regan describe the problem as follows:

> [T]o see detail in the environment, you must direct your attention to it. But how can you direct your attention to an unperceived feature of the scene? Surely in order to direct your attention, *you must already perceive that to which you direct your attention*. This Paradox seems to threaten the very possibility of perceptual awareness. (Noe and O'Regan 2000; italics added)

In order to cope with this fundamental problem the authors find themselves forced to postulate a primitive form of perception which they call "perceptual sensitivity;" this primitive mode of perception has to be distinguished from our everyday "visual perception." While the latter is well known to us from our conscious everyday encounters with the world, the earlier one is a more primitive pre-attentive and subconscious type of perception. The authors describe it as a "perceptual coupling of animal and environment that consists in the animal's access to environmental detail thanks to its mastery of the sensorimotor contingencies that govern the way it explores the environment" (Noe and O'Regan 2000. See also: Myin and O'Regan 2008, 185-200; O'Regan 2001, 278-79).

This concept of "perceptual sensitivity" or "perceptual coupling of animal and environment" —as we shall see in section 6 below—comes astonishingly close to Whitehead's theory of perception. Whitehead developed a bold new theory of perception: he developed it in a philosophical rather than a psychological manner, but since he was convinced that philosophy has to deal with the world in which we find ourselves living, a theory of perception had also to be—at least in consequence—a psychological theory.

[2] It is interesting to note that Jean Piaget developed a groundbreaking new psychological approach which centers on the concept of assimilation. See Riffert (1992) for details concerning the surprising parallels between Piaget's genetic constructivism and Whitehead's process philosophy.

Whitehead's philo-psycho-logical theory of perception is bold in postulating a primitive mode of perception—unconscious, emotion laden and pre-attentive—that connected the perceiver immediately and directly to the world. This mode of perception was only rarely grasped before him, and nowhere was it systematically explored (to my knowledge) and related to the higher modes of perception: he calls this perception in the mode of *causal efficacy*. This primitive perceptive mode of causal efficacy consists of pure physical prehensions.

Whitehead was well aware that such a bold position was in need of scientific empirical confirmation: "This wider definition of perception [which includes causal efficacy] can be of no importance unless we can detect occasions of experience exhibiting modes of functioning which fall within its wider scope" (Whitehead [1933] 1967, 180). We will return to this point when giving an outline of Whitehead's tri-modal theory of perception in section 6 of this paper.

Finally let us turn to George Berkeley's idealism.

4. Idealism & Radical Constructivism

Surprisingly enough, Berkeley derived his idealism from a radical empiricist position: we find his famous dictum *esse est percipi* (*aut percipere*) in Part I, §3 of his *A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* ([1710] 2003); in his *Philosophical Commentaries* ([1707] 1944) he uses the verbs *velle* ("to want") and *agere* ("to do") instead of *percipi*/*percepere*, which indicates that his use of the term *percipere* is quite extended and includes a strong tendency towards activity. So Berkeley's approach is close to Giambattista Vico who used the word *facere* for the construction of reality "*Verum esse ipsum factum"* (Vico [1710] 1858, 15).

Berkeley is quite explicit in a key passage of his *Principles*:

> The table I write on I say exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed – meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was an odour [*sic*], that is, it was smelt; there was a sound, that is, it was heard; a colour or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I can understand by these and the like expressions. For as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. (Berkeley [1710] 2003, Part I, 3)

And Heinz von Glasersfeld, one of the major proponents of *Radical Constructivism*, comments on this passage:

> Berkeley argues that, qua experience, the table cannot be generated by anything but acts of perception which the perceiver coordinates to form the thing that goes by the name of 'table'. Where human knowledge is concerned, therefore, 'sensible things', i.e., the sensory objects of which we are inclined to say that they 'exist', are the objects we generate as we perceive. (Glasersfeld, 2007)

If Berkeley is right and existence (in a strong sense) is dependent on a subject perceiving it, then of course this has strange consequences as, for instance, the back side of the chair which I see from in front does not exist. In order to avoid such obviously strange consequences and to secure a common sense view of reality, we are forced, says Berkeley, to postulate that everything is in fact perceived always, wherever and from whatever perspective; and for Berkeley, the Bishop of Cloyne, only God can guarantee objective reality, for only God can experience everything at any time, at any place, from all perspectives. Modern radical constructivists, as well as philosophers like Ernst Mach (1897) with his modern atheist phenomenalism, do not accept any recourse to a divine entity; but, if at the same time one holds with Berkeley a radical empiricist position, then one is left with the strange consequences of this approach, mainly the loss of reality.

Glasersfeld qualifies Piaget's *Genetic Structuralism* as a radical constructivist approach. However, one can be very skeptical regarding this interpretation, since Piaget continuously writes about the *interaction between the individual and its environment*; in this interaction between these two poles (person and environment) simultaneously, the processes of assimilation and accommodation take place: the individual *assimilates* an object (structure) into its cognitive (or sensori-motor) system while at the same time the cognitive system is *accommodated* to new aspects of the new object (structure). Such talk becomes fully unintelligible if an 'outside' reality is denied, according to many critics. For instance, it would imply that Piaget's talk of a disequilibrium between environment and the cognitive system of an individual would be the disequilibrium between the environment which is constructed by the individual (his/her cognitive system) and the individual's cognitive system.

Two other radical constructivists, Maturana and Varela, have developed the concept of "autopoiesis" (Maturana & Varela, 1980) in order to explain the phenomena of living organisms (as opposed to non-living ones). In a nutshell, a living system has an autopoietic organization, i.e. it continually (re-)produces itself: it generates its own components which in turn participate in the processes of a continual re-creation of self (Mingers 1991, 320). While the organization of a living organism "describes the central relations which constitute a system as a whole and determines its type [, its] *[s]tructure* refers to the actual manifestation of a particular example – its actual components and their interactions" (Mingers, 320). But neither of them are in any contact with an objective world: "an autopoietic system is organizationally closed and structurally determined – its changes of state depend on its own structure at a point in time and are not determined […] by events in the environment." (Mingers, 326). So Maturana and Varela, just as Glasersfeld, are caught in the solipsist trap.

Whitehead, as we have already seen, rejects a solipsist position; but, of course, if one does not accept solipsism, then one has to present an alternative account. Since Whitehead is also no naïve realist, he has developed a radically different view which transcends the dichotomy of subjectivity and objectivity: there is a reality independent of the perceiver filled with actual entities as "superjects" and data for the newly "concressing" actual entities (for a more detailed description of these two technical Whitehedian terms see Cobb 2008, 35-36 (subject) and 59-62 (concrescence)); at the same time, it is also true that the superjects are the result of an active, subjective construction process (or concrescence) by which the actual entities develop themselves. By this account, the world is a pulsating process between subjective self-production (subject) which brings about objective manifestations (superjects) which in turn again fuel new subjective processes, and reality in Whitehead's philosophy is understood as continuously shifting from subjectivity to objectivity and back again.

Ending this short discussion of empiricism, transcendentalism, and idealism, I will in further steps: (1) outline Whitehead's philosophy of organism; (2) provide a short summary of his theory of perception with an additional summary of its implications for education (learning and teaching); and (3) conclude with an outline of the possibilities for utilizing Whitehead's ideas as a framework for integrating behaviorism, cognitivism, and radical constructivism (of course not without modifying them).

5. A Very Short Introduction into Some Basic Features of Whitehead's Process Metaphysics

In Whitehead's philosophic outlook, the world is constituted by a multiplicity of micro-processes which he called actual entities. In essence, an actual entity is the process of growing together of all the actual entities which constitute its immediate past environment. So, since actual entities are intimately connected to each other, the world is a pulsating, vibrant web of processes. By grasping this immediately past environment, every actual entity constitutes itself according to a self-set aim. (Whitehead calls this the 'subjective aim' of an actual entity.) Whitehead's technical term for this grasping is "prehension," and he claims that one can arrive at his concept of prehension either from physics or from psychology (Whitehead [1925] 1967, 152). Therefore, taking the psychological path, he also terms prehensions "feelings."[3]

Now, there are different types of prehensions, but the two basic ones are physical prehensions and conceptual prehensions. Each process of growing together—Whitehead here introduces the technical term "concrescence" —of an actual entity starts with physical prehensions. These prehensions passively receive the pressures of the immediately past world, which largely shape the developing actual entity. However, the reception is selective, being based on the actual entity's own unique aim which is directed at realizing a particular pattern (here Whitehead introduces the term "eternal object"). These passive physical prehensions are present at the very start of every growing together of any actual entity. They constitute the physical pole of each actual entity, which Whitehead also calls the conformal phase because it reenacts what is given by the past.

So, prehensions can be defined as "Concrete Facts of Relatedness" (Whitehead [1929] 1978, 22): by being prehended, an actual entity that has just reached its full realization becomes an ingredient in a new, just-developing actual entity. Therefore, pre-

[3] Some caution is appropriate here, given that Whitehead warns us that in metaphysics "[w]ords and phrases must be stretched towards a generality foreign to their ordinary usage" (Whitehead [1929] 1978, 4); this also is true for his usage of the term "feeling" (for a detailed discussion see Crosby 1971).

hensions can be conceived as "vectors," or, as Whitehead states, "they feel what is there and transform it into what is here" (Whitehead, 133).[4] This characterization comes close to Whitehead's metaphor of an act of assimilation, whereby an organism constitutes itself by incorporating (in the literal sense of the word) external elements.[5] Of course, the process of concrescence can also develop more elaborated forms, as for instance by producing propositions. In order to introduce the reader to these more elaborate forms of concrescence, I will give an introduction to Whitehead's theory of perception.

6. Whitehead's Tri-Modal Theory of Perception

As we have already seen, Whitehead tries to solve the major problems of Empiricism, Transcendentalism, and Idealism by introducing a very basic and primitive mode of perception: *causal efficacy*. It is this perceptive mode which secures that the perceiver is immediately connected to reality by physical prehensions. This primitive mode, according to Whitehead, truly—i.e. directly (in an unmediated way) —integrates the actual entity (but also the human person (perceiver)), who is constituted by a series of actual entities, into its (his/her) environment.

But Whitehead was also aware that this strategy is very bold, and that it can succeed only if we are able to present empirically confirming phenomena for this bold speculation of a very primitive mode of perception (i.e. causal efficacy). Since it is a very primitive mode, the following domains should be good candidates for finding empirical support of his perceptive mode of causal efficacy: early phases in the development of life (phylogenetic dimension); early developmental phases in humans (ontogenetic dimension); and any state that shows a kind of regression into more primitive phases of development in individuals (as by specific illnesses, e.g. schizophrenia). It is also possible to produce deficient forms of perception artificially: for instance, a very quick and short stimulus presentation via tachistoscope can be rendered subconscious by forward and/or backward masking. Empirical research along these lines has increased during the last 30 years.[6] There are also other hints available in favor of causal efficacy from the domain of everyday perception. Whitehead points to the following commonly known everyday phenomenon: if we are in the dark and a strong flash is surprisingly triggered, our eyes will blink; Whitehead continues by saying that "[t]he man [*sic*] will explain his [*sic*] experience by saying 'The flash made me blink; and if his [*sic*] statement be doubted, he [*sic*] will reply 'I know it, because I felt it'" (Whitehead [1929] 1978, 175).

We noted that Kant's perceptive approach ran into severe difficulties in not being able to explain how a perceiver knows which selection of the twelve categories should be applied in a specific act of perception; by contrast, Whitehead, through the introduction of the perceptive mode of causal efficacy, has solved this problem. If Whitehead is right, then Descartes's methodological principle which accepts something as a certain truth if it can be grasped clearly and distinctly will, by definition, lead us into error since the basic facts are at the subconscious level; therefore, it will never be grasped *clare et distincte*. Here the abyss between Whitehead and Descartes becomes fully visible – and this difference has tremendous practical consequences, particularly for education and learning! We have seen that Whitehead's theory of perception also departs from Hume's theory of perception, which is based on pure sense perception, understood by Whitehead as presentational immediacy.

Whitehead agrees that, since there do not exist any causal relations between the contents of sense impressions, they can only be conceived by Hume as random spatio-temporal associations (Whitehead [1929] 1978, 174-5). As such, by introducing the perceptive mode of causal efficacy, Whitehead is able to save causation and, along with it, memory as well as the possibility to explain the diachronic identity of human beings.

Sense perception is only a second, more elaborate mode of perception. By abstracting specific patterns out of the vaguely grasped contents in causal efficacy, sharply perceived contents of the sense organs are now gained. Hume in his analysis of perception did arrive at these contents. But, like the contents of the perceptive mode of causal efficacy,

[4] For a detailed discussion of Whitehead's concept of prehension also see: J. Cobb's paper 'Prehension' (presented at the philosophy department of the University of Budapest, March 7, 2002); available Online: http://www.anthonyflood.com/cobbprehension.htm

[5] Whitehead also draws attention to the fact that a concressing actual entity does not only positively integrate the previous world (actual entities), but also negatively prehends (i.e., excludes) some of the available actual entities. This is also true for any process of assimilation as conceptualized by Piaget.

[6] For a discussion of examples see both Riffert (2004) and Riffert (2007).

the contents of the mode of presentational immediacy are also mainly subconscious.

Only in the third and final mode of perception, the highest developed and most elaborate mode, consciousness enters perception. Whitehead terms this mode "Symbolic Reference" because the contents of one of the two more primitive modes functions as a symbol for the content of the other mode. (Most commonly, the contents of the mode of presentational immediacy function as the symbol of the contents of the mode of causal efficacy because they are more manageable.)

7. Whitehead's Concept of Three-Phased Learning Cycles

This bold theory of perception also has consequences for learning. As already noted, learning according to Whitehead is not an arbitrary summation of random items, being instead—as Piaget also insisted (1937)—an act of assimilation. Assimilation is incompatible with any arbitrary incorporation of food: if we eat the wrong food at the wrong time, we won't keep it for long because it may make us ill, or even kill us:

> It must never be forgotten that education is not a process of packing articles in a trunk. […] Its nearest analogue is the assimilation of food by a living organism: and we all know how necessary to health is palatable food under suitable conditions. When you have your boots in the trunk, they will stay there till you take them out again; but this is not at all the case if you feed a child with the wrong food. (Whitehead [1929] 1967, 31)

Based on this metaphor of assimilation, Whitehead sketched a descriptive theory of learning and a prescriptive theory of instruction in clear opposition to traditional associationist and behaviorist learning theories. Whitehead claimed that learning is essentially a rhythmic and phased process by which true assimilation takes place.

The idea of rhythm is fundamental for Whitehead's thinking, wherein cyclic or periodic rhythms pervade not only learning but all human life, as well as all other domains of reality. Even in his early mathematical work, *An Introduction to Mathematics* (1911), "The whole of Nature," he remarked,

> is dominated by the existence of periodic events, that is, by the existence of successive events so analogous to each other that, without any straining of language, they may be termed recurrences of the same event. The rotation of the earth produces the successive days. […] Again the path of the earth around the sun leads to the yearly recurrence of the seasons. […] Another less fundamental periodicity is provided by the phases of the moon. […] Our bodily life is essentially periodic." (Whitehead, 134-5).

Indeed, actual entities, the basic elements of reality, are pulsations growing out of preceding actual entities and, when they reach their culmination, becoming members of the preceding actual entities for new actual entities. This rhythm underlies all of reality, at its different levels, making it a pulsating web. Given this understanding of reality it is no surprise that learning is also rhythmic, being a complete cycle of learning comprising three phases which are termed by Whitehead as: (1) romance, (2) precision and (3) generalization.[7]

In the stage of romance the student is confronted for the first time with new stimuli, new problems. This is a stage of discovery, one wherein the learner is discovering his or her new situation: "The stage of romance is the stage of first apprehension" (Whitehead [1929] 1967, 17). Such apprehension does not take place *in vacuo* since the student brings to it all their previously acquired knowledge, and they use it in this process. "It is a process of discovery, a process of becoming used to curious thoughts, of shaping questions, of seeking for answers, of devising new experiences, of noticing what happens as the result of new ventures. This general process is both natural and of absorbing interest" (32); so, if students feel the new stimuli to be relevant, they will be interested. What is more, "[e]ducation must essentially be a setting in order of a ferment already stirring in the mind: you cannot educate mind in vacuo" (18); however, the relations and connections at this stage of the new stimuli, among themselves and to the student, still remain vague and fleeting intuitions, often at the verge of consciousness. Such an intuition "holds within itself unexplored connexions [*sic*] with possibilities half-disclosed by glimpses and half concealed by the wealth of material" (17). Such half-disclosed relevant connections of novel situations are emotion laden, wherein "the natural mode by which living organisms are excited towards suitable self-development is enjoyment" (31).

[7] He also referred to them as the phases of freedom (romance and generalization) and (self-)discipline (precision) (Whitehead [1929] 1967, 31).

This first phase of a learning process can hardly be overestimated since it ignites in the learner both excitement and emotional arousal towards new possibilities which flash-up in the learner: curiosity is triggered in the student. Without this intrinsic arousal, one cannot expect the student to show further interest in exploring the new situation. This descriptive aspect of learning has to be taken into account when developing a prescriptive theory of teaching: if teachers do not allow enough room and time for the stage of romance, their students will lack intrinsic motivation. Traditional education has violated this central postulate of Whitehead's process theory of teaching because of its linear, piecemeal account of learning.

The second stage of a full learning cycle is termed "precision." At this stage, students investigate and elaborate the relationships of the new stimuli among themselves, in relation to other and already well-known stimuli, and to their already available knowledge base: "In this stage, width of relationship is subordinated to exactness of formulation. It is the stage of grammar, the grammar of language and the grammar of science" (Whitehead [1929] 1967, 18). This stage requires discipline. In its ideal form, such discipline is a self-discipline motivated by the lures introduced in the stage of romance. It is of decisive importance that the phase of precision always follows and never precedes the phase of free-floating romance. If this central rule is violated—as in fact it is in traditional linear piecemeal education—the result is inert knowledge (1): "Without the adventure of romance, at the best you get inert knowledge without initiative, and at worst you get contempt of ideas – without knowledge" (33).

There is of course the opposite danger: overemphasizing the stage of romance. Whitehead repeatedly stresses the fact that romance has to be complemented by the stage of "precision," or "discipline." In doing this he draws our attention to the fact that there "are right ways and wrong ways, and definite truths to be known" (34).[8] According to Whitehead, it is beyond question that "a certain pointing out of important facts, and of simplifying ideas, and of usual names really strengthens the natural impetus of the pupil" (33). In this context, it may be of interest to notice that Whitehead criticized Maria Montessori (1917) for exaggerating the phase of romance at the expense of precision. So, according to Whitehead, the stage of disciplined precision is important too.[9]

The third and final stage of each learning cycle is termed "generalization." It marks at the same time the culmination of the learning cycle in question and the start of a new cycle; as such, it is the "return to romanticism" (Whitehead [1929] 1967, 19). Now, detailed and interrelated knowledge calls for application to new, more complex situations; and, again, new and exciting perspectives—with fascinating, half-disclosed insights—are flashing up. A new cycle of learning is starting.

Whitehead sums up the general character of such a full-learning cycle in the following words: "There is the general apprehension of some topic in its vague possibilities, the mastery of the relevant details, and finally the putting of the whole subject together in the light of the relevant knowledge" (Whitehead [1929] 1967, 38).[10] In Western education, the first and third phases of learning are largely missing in traditional teaching, with precision being the only phase emphasize, and things have not improved in recent decades. On the contrary, due to the trend towards standardized testing, education is getting worse—and not only in the Western world.

8. Whitehead's Organismic Philosophy as an Integrating Frame for Behaviorism, Cognitivism and (Radical) Constructivism

I have thus far claimed that Whitehead offers a frame for integrating behaviorism, cognitivism and (non-radical) constructivism.[11] In order to substantiate this claim, I will discuss Whitehead's "doctrine of symbolism," as presented in his book *Symbolism:*

[8] This quote makes obvious that Whitehead did not hold a radical constructivist learning theory (see also: Riffert 1999).

[9] "The success of the Montessori system is due to its recognition of the dominance of romance at this period of growth. If this be the explanation, it also points to the limitations in the usefulness of that method. It is the system which in some measure is essential for every romantic phase. Its essence is browsing and the encouragement of vivid freshness. *But it lacks the restraint which is necessary for the great stages of precision*" (Whitehead [1929] 1967, 22; italics added).

10. It is interesting to notice that, aside from Whitehead's three-phased theory of learning and instruction, there is another three-phased learning cycle theory introduced by Robert Karplus (1977); see Fuller (2002) for an excellent introduction. Without being able to go into historical details here, I claim that there are at least indirect (if not direct) pathways of influence from Whitehead to Karplus, mainly via Piaget (Riffert, Hagenauer, Kriegseisen, and Strahl 2018).

[11] Note that any integration of these elements will necessarily lead to the modification of these same elements.

Its Meaning and Effects ([1927] 1985, 78). This doctrine "enables us to distinguish between [1] pure instinctive action, [2] reflex action, and [3] symbolically conditioned action" (Whitehead, 78).

Before going into detail, it is interesting to note that Whitehead distinguishes three types of action and their underlying learning processes. In his theory of perception, Whitehead distinguishes three modes of perception, two primitive ones—the first (and most primitive) is causal efficacy, with the second being the mode of presentational immediacy—and an additional elaborate one which is created by relating the more primitive ones in a way which results in one of them functioning as a symbol while the other takes the role of the designate. Since action and perception and learning are intimately connected to each other, it is not astounding that the three types of learning and action correspond to the three modes of perception. We shall see more of this shortly.

Turning first to what Whitehead termed "pure instinct actions," such an action for an organism is defined as one which is "wholly analyzable of those conditions laid upon its development by the settled facts of its external environment" (Whitehead [1927] 1985, 78). It follows from this characterization that purely instinctive actions, since they are fully determined by external conditions, they are passive, which means that no self-activity from the side of the organism plays any decisive role in bringing it about. These kinds of activities are (almost completely) determined by external factors (i.e. environmental stimuli). Still, the researcher who is familiar with Whitehead's tri-modal theory of perception immediately thinks of the most primitive perceptive mode, causal efficacy. Here the perceptive content is still brought about solely by external impact, and Whitehead justifies such an association by asserting that such "pure instinct is the response of an organism to pure causal efficacy" (78). Pure instinct is triggered by external causal influences and therefore the most primitive form of action—better characterized as determined *re*-action to external stimuli which cannot be (in the instance of human beings, as an example) intentionally altered. In its pure form this type of action can only be detected in the most primitive forms of living beings (82).[12]

However, certain pathologies in the (pre-)frontal lobe have been shown by neuroscientists to be involved in planning and intentional activities. Such (pre-)frontal pathologies allow one to clearly observe purely instinctive activity, even in humans, with so-called 'stimulus boundedness" being one such pathology: when a certain stimulus is perceived by the patient, a specific reaction is automatically triggered. Neuroscientist Avraham Schweiger gives two striking examples:

> The perception of food, for example, cannot be easily separated from eating. […] Some patients with frontal damage exhibit social inhibition, much to the embarrassment of their families. For instance, a young patient with bilateral frontal damage we saw in the clinic reacted daily to every wastebasket in the office by spitting into it, despite being asked repeatedly to stop this behavior. (Schweiger 2003, 111f)

The second type of action mentioned by Whitehead is termed "reflex action," which he defines as "that organic functioning which is wholly dependent on sense-presentation" (Whitehead [1927] 1985, 81). This type of action is the counterpart of the perceptive mode of presentational immediacy. The human has abstracted from its surrounding images in presentational immediacy; however, since such images cannot (without any symbolic reference) produce consciousness by themselves, according to Whitehead's theory of consciousness, they are left on a sub-conscious level. As such, the reflex type of action in humans only occurs when—in Whitehead's words—it is "unaccompanied by any analysis of causal efficacy *via* symbolic reference" (81). One can say that "the organism has acquired the *habit* of action in response to immediate sense-perception" in an unconscious way (81; italics added). When humans react in a coordinate way to a perceptive content in the mode of presentational immediacy, then we have cases of reflex actions; but, consciousness is not present in such cases. We can easily rephrase this account of reflex action in behaviorist terms: reflex action takes place when an automatism—Whitehead speaks of "habits"—has been established between two stimuli. This automatism is produced by processes of classical or operant conditioning.

If this interpretation is correct, then Whitehead is able to account for behavioristic learning processes within his own broader approach to learning; in addition, it can be shown how these more primitive forms of learning may be connected to higher forms of learning: while the lower forms of learning take

[12] According to Whitehead and his philosophy, this phenomenon is exhibited most clearly at the inorganic level of reality.

place without consciousness (i.e. pre-sensational immediacy), higher forms (such as complex problem solving) presuppose consciousness.

Finally, "symbolically conditioned action" is a form of activity which is "conditioned by analysis of the perceptive mode of causal efficacy affected by symbolic transference from the perceptive mode of presentational immediacy" (Whitehead [1927] 1985, 80). While neither purely instinctual action, nor reflexive action can be wrong in any genuine sense (since they are what they are—but can never the less can be harmful), symbolically conditioned actions can be right or wrong in the sense that they may arise from a faulty analysis of causal efficacy by presentational immediacy. This is the case when an unauthentic perceptive (or imaginative) proposition is attached to a content of causal efficacy which bears no relation to it.[13] In Whitehead's words, "symbolically conditioned action can be wrong, in the sense that it may arise from a false symbolic analysis of causal efficacy" (81); and, "[t]his analysis may be right or wrong, according as it does, or does not, conform to the actual contribution of efficacious bodies" (80). Whether the undertaken symbolic analysis of the contents presented in the perceptive mode of causal efficacy is correct or not, it usually cannot be tested "apart from the indirect check of pragmatic consequences – in other words, either survival-value or self-satisfaction" (80).

Although the introduction of the possibility of error in these higher forms of perception and learning may be seen as an unfortunate consequence—and to some extent it certainly is—there can be no doubt that this negative consequence is more than counterbalanced by the fact that it goes hand-in-hand with a great advantage: error becomes possible because the organism, by use of symbols, is able to disconnect itself from the iron grip of its immediately preceding surrounding (Mays 2002, 146-149). The capacity to disconnect from immediate surroundings opens the way to reflect on potential surroundings, be they real or only fictions. However, the possibility is opened for humans to explore different possible routes of future activities by use of symbols: "[t]hus mankind by means of its elaborate system of symbolic transference can achieve miracles of sensitiveness to a distant environment, and to a problematic future" (Whitehead [1927] 1985, 87); thus, it can "play with error and thus found intellectual empires" (Whitehead [1929] 1978, 113).

In other words, symbolism opens the way for thinking and problem solving, i.e. for the highest forms of learning. Thinking is based on "a chain of derivations of symbol from symbol whereby finally the local relations, between the final symbol and the ultimate meaning, are entirely lost. Thus these derivative symbols, obtained as it were by arbitrary association, are really the result of reflex action suppressing the intermediate portions of the chain" (Whitehead [1927] 1985, 83). Thus language, along with logic and mathematics, is among the most important tools for thinking. Whitehead draws our attention to the fact that such symbolic systems as "[c]odes, rules and canons require revision" (88). And such revisions "wreck the society in which they occur" (88), even though such destruction is necessary if societies are to be saved from the "slow atrophy of a life stiffed by useless shadows" (88).

9. Final Remarks

The complex interrelations between these forms of perception and activity can be illustrated by a scheme of the phases of concrescence, a process of concrescence being (according to Whitehead) the dynamic aspect of an actual entity (of whatever complexity) as illustrated in figure 1.



Figure 1: Schematic Presentation of the different Phases of the Process of Concrescence and the corresponding modes of perception according to Whitehead (for a similar scheme see Sherburne 1966, 40). The relation between A, B and C describes a primitive actual entity (Causal Efficacy). The relation between A, B, [A], [B] and D represents the derivation of a propositional feeling (Presentational Immediacy). The relations between A, B, [A], [B], D and E represents an intellectual feeling (Symbolic Reference).

[13] According to Mays (1977), Whitehead distinguishes between several different types of propositional feelings: "The two main types are: (i) perceptive propositional feelings which cover both [a] authentic (veridical) perceptions and [b] unauthentic (illusory) perception, and (ii) imaginative propositional feelings – the images occurring in such mental states as memory and imagination." (114). Unauthentic and imaginative propositional feelings give rise to error.

…..perspectival grasp of immediately passed actual entities (= datum/data of the process of concrescense) via physical prehension A
B … conceptual prehension (of the eternal object as exemplified in the physical prehension A)
C … conformal prehension (derived by integration of A& B) [*Causal Efficacy*]
[A] … logical subject (derived by elimination of the physical felling A)
[B] … predicative pattern (derived by elimination out of the conceptual feeling B)
D … simple comparative prehension (propositional feeling) [*Presentational Immediacy*]
E … intellectual prehension (derived by a synthesis of D and A) [*Symbolic Reference*]

This scheme can be used as a starting point for further detailed analyses of perception, action and learning. But such analyses are beyond the scope of this introductory paper. That said, I hope to have made clear how Whitehead's new philosophical ideas on the one side (a) are able to solve long standing problems (as for instance that of subjectivism vs. objectivism, or solipsism) and on the other side (b) propose new theories of perception and learning.

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SETTING WHITEHEAD'S "USABLE IDEAS" IN A PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK FOR HUMAN AND MACHINE*

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Abstract:
Whitehead believed that education must give us ideas that are usable in our actual lives. This line of thought is naturally provoked by the significant abundance of inert ideas that people pile up though education. The main reason for that, I claim, is the wrong focus of traditional education. It aims at producing individuals that would deliver high results on exams and tests. I take Whitehead's claim the education must put emphasis on usable ideas as my starting point. I give a specific interpretation of useable ideas as abilities or functions. This provides a ground for connecting Whiteheadian thought to an already existing educational platform, offered by Nel Noddings[1]. Noddings develops a cognitive theory of education which places cognitive structures (I assume a robust analogy between structures, functions, and abilities) in the center of educational concern. At the end of the paper, I estimate some consequences from adopting the terminology of functions for connecting between human and machine learning.

Key words: Whitehead, inert ideas, cognitive theory of education, functions, structures, machine learning.

Whitehead believed that education must give us ideas that are usable in our actual lives, in the "activity of thought."[2] In contrast to that, the result of traditional education, in general and very often, is a stock of inert ideas. Inert ideas for Whitehead are "ideas that are merely received into the mind without being utilized, or tested, or; thrown into fresh combinations."[3]

This line of thought is naturally provoked by the significant abundance of inert ideas that people pile up for years through education—an up-to-date problem that was also a concern for Whitehead. The main reason for that, I claim, is the wrong focus of traditional education. It aims at producing individuals who would deliver high results on exams and tests. The methodological shortcut to that aim relies on three simple stages: perceptual attention, memorizing, and reproducing. Motivation and deeper understanding, if at all, are expected to happen accidentally along the chain of these cognitive processes, if the student is very intelligent. Traditional education, as we know it, exercises no methodological control over motivation to learn and deeper understanding; but, motivation to learn, understanding, and creativity go hand in hand. This is so because motivation to learn is coupled with a desire to understand. Once understanding is achieved, it enables creativity because it enables drawing inferences

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[1] Noddings, Nel, "Competence Theories and the Science of Education," *Educational Theory* 24, no. 4 (1974): 356–364

[2] "Education has to impart an intimate sense for the power and beauty of ideas coupled with structure for ideas together with a particular body of knowledge, which has peculiar reference to the life of being possessing it." Alfred North Whitehead, *The Aims of Education and Other Essays*, in *Education in the Age of Science*, ed. Brand Blanshard (New York, Basic Books, [1929] 1959), 10.

[3] Whitehead, *The Aims of Education*, 1.

from the understood ideas,[4] or in Whitehead's looser expression throwing them "into fresh combinations."

Whitehead claims that traditional education comes with the wrong ideology which, presumably, is related to its being a supplier of inert ideas. He describes that with the Latin sentence "*Corruptio optimi, pessima*" or "The corruption of what is best is the worst tragedy."[5] To estimate the exact point here, the tragedy does not come from inert ideas; rather, it comes from the wrong focus of traditional education, to repeat my earlier point. Eradicating entirely inert ideas was probably not even Whitehead's project. For example, some inert ideas might actually be an important part of our general culture, so we do not want to get rid of that part of education. Consider: my idea of who translated Shakespeare into my mother tongue might never come in handy in my actual life, having no meaningful impact on the way I think; but, it is valuable to have that idea. On the other hand, having general culture, some stock of "inert" ideas could presumably contribute to various aspects of our lives: finding one's place in the society, having friends, understanding human values, etc. It is certainly impossible to predict which particular ideas will become useful in our future lives. This was noticed by Whitehead, but dismissed as a problem: "The general culture is designed to foster an activity of mind; the specialist course utilises [*sic*] this activity. But it does not do to lay too much stress on these neat antitheses. As we have already seen, in the general course foci of special interest will arise; and similarly in the special study, the external connections of the subject drag thought outwards."[6] My point here is to distinguish between the statement that education must dispense of inert ideas because they are harmful *simpliciter*, and the statement that inert ideas must not be the focus of education. I will stand behind the second statement only.

In what follows I will take as my starting point Whitehead's claim that education must put emphasis on usable ideas. I give a specific interpretation of useable ideas as abilities or functions. This provides a ground for connecting Whiteheadian thought to the already existing educational platform offered by Nel Noddings.[7] At the end of the paper, I suggest some common points between that project of education and the contemporary domain of machine learning.

1. Learning cognitive structures vs. learning inert ideas

If we want to shift the focus of education on teaching usable ideas, we might want to first ask "What is a usable idea?" In order to answer that question, we can look inside the human mind and try to find what is usable there. I want to make the following suggestion: there are functional units in our minds which we call "abilities," and our abilities are our most usable ideas. The issue about the nature of such abilities is beyond the scope of this article. As a preliminary, I just want you to accept two things. First, abilities are not inert ideas; rather, they are the functional unities of mind. And second, I want you to accept, for the purposes of my argument, the robust analogy between the following terms: function, ability, mental strategy, and mental structure (with possible variations in generality). Whitehead's message that education must provide usable ideas is highly compatible with the statement that it must teach us any of these things. It is indeed one direction in which we can develop Whitehead's philosophy of education.

In her 1974 article "Competence Theories and the Science of Education," Nel Noddings develops a platform for educational purposes she calls "Competence Theory of Education" (CTE). This platform places cognitive structures or abilities in the center of educational concern. In this section, I will outline the theory as a possible development for Whiteheadian thought, providing some comments.

What is a competence theory? A competence theory is an idealized description of mental organization attributable to an idealized subject. It is a deductive system consisting of generative rules and operations which can be studied in isolation based upon the performances to which it gives rise. Exam-

[4] Some philosophers favoring the ability theory of understanding claim that understanding *p* is being able to use *p* as a premise in valid and sound inferences, for example: Ylikoski (2009); Ylikoski and Kuorikoski, (2010); and De Regt H. W (2017).

[5] Whitehead, *The Aims of Education*, 2. This presumably makes the default human thought less creative than it could be. Whitehead continues: "Every intellectual revolution which has ever stirred humanity into greatness has been a passionate protest against inert ideas."

[6] Whitehead, *The Aims of Education*, 11.

[7] Noddings, "Competence Theories."

ples of general cognitive theories are Chomsky's theory of universal grammar, Fodor's LOT hypothesis, cognitive architectures in general, and Piaget's theory of intellectual development in children[8] The competence theory of education (CTE), in particular, is related to identifying and teaching structures (or mental strategies) to students. That vision of education is different from the traditional vision in that it relates the educational process to transformation of cognitive structures, not necessarily to giving better responses on exams and tests. In that respect, and in comparison to traditional education, it is much more function-oriented than product-oriented. This makes it highly relevant to the Whiteheadian project of education.

What is a mental structure in Noddings' terminology? A mental structure is a mental organization consisting of generative rules and operations that organize external information for the purposes of particular epistemic performance. More or less any approach to solving a task results from a mental structure. According to CTE, the aim of education is to learn and transform such structures: transforming one's present mental structures into structures that are more efficient and flawless in regard to solving certain types of cognitive tasks. To illustrate this, Noddings gives an example of a mini competence theory. She asks us to imagine that children (in grades 4-6) are presented with the following experimental situation designed to introduce them to the concept of density: they are given samples of five liquids, each colored differently (R, B, Y, P, and O), after which the children are asked to arrange the liquids in an order that will show which liquids "go up" and which "go down" when added to the other liquids. They are to do this by introducing small amounts of one liquid into a test tube containing another liquid. As they perform each test, they are to write R↑B or R↓B ("R goes up in B; R goes down in B").[9] Following this, Noddings describes five levels of competence, or five different structures that also represent stages of cognitive growth:

- Level I. *Chaos*. At this stage, the child sees no relation between her own action and what she expects to observe. She may mix the liquids with such violence that she is unable to see what happens to the added liquid.
- Level II. *Simple random selection of colors for test*. The child tests whatever colors she wishes, using no orderly procedures and no systematic check to eliminate duplications or to ensure all combinations are tested.
- Level III. *Use of pivot selection*. The child suggests, "Let's test all R's," after which she proceeds to test R in each of the other colors or each other color in R. At this level, the child has command of a systematic procedure for obtaining all of the possible results, but it is still unnecessarily laborious.
- Level IV. *Use of simple anti-symmetry concept.* If R↑B, then it must be the case that B↓R).
- Level V. *Use of transitivity.* (R↓B and B↓P) then R↓P.

Noddings points out that a child using the pivot selection would have to make 25 trials to complete her work, while the child at Level V might make as few as 6 tests or as many as 10, contingent upon the initial selection)

The big question is this: how do we teach and transform mental structures? This question does not have an easy answer, but it does open a door to a multitude of new questions that form a new discipline or a new interdisciplinary project. Nel Noddings sketches the main lines of this project, calling it "structural or constructive diagnostics."[10] Its complete implementation requires the development of three main branches: the deductive, the inductive, and the empirical.

1.1. The Deductive Part

The five levels of competence mentioned above represent five different levels of mental organization. For the purposes of education, the theorist is not only interested in the optimal pattern of mental organization, but she also looks at other, less economic mental strategies by means of which a student

[8] Chomsky, N. (1986). *Knowledge of Language: Its Nature, Origin and Use*. New York: Praeger, Fodor, J. (1975). *The Language of Thought,* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, Simon, H. (1962), "The Architecture of Complexity" *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, Vol. 106, No. 6. 467-482, Piaget, J. (1968) "The Mental Development of the Child," in *Six Psychological Studies*, D. Elkind (ed.), New York: Vintage Books, 1–73.

[9] Noddings, 362–4.

[10] Noddings, 361–4.

can solve a particular problem. It is possible to deductively generate a map of such structures by using the graphic methods of structural mathematics, and so for any kind of cognitive task. Deductively generated structures must be internally valid (logically consistent) and psychologically plausible. After the deductive generation of structures, the cognitive theorist of education has the task of selecting those structures that are psychologically plausible, ordering them according to the level of performing the task and the time it has taken, thus producing a structural map which represents stages of cognitive growth.

1.2. The Inductive Part

After producing the deductively generated structural map, the next big issue is how to lead students through the ladder of these structures. Here we need to figure out many new things and discover new techniques. First of all, the teacher must understand the actual structures (strategies) that students are using in the class, which opens another branch for didactic and psychological research. The researcher needs to build a system of field techniques, such as overt thinking, for inferring states of cognitive structure from observed behavior, i.e. to abstract structures from students' actual performances on actual objects. Then the teacher must invent experiences through which the student will make cognitive progress toward the most efficient structure. Because explicitly teaching generative rules pertaining to a particular structure is not efficient and will not do the job, this step is not trivial. Students must reach the required level of competence by themselves, with the help of a teacher.

As a part of that methodology, it might be useful to take into account Whitehead's three phases of learning: romance, precision, and generalization.[11] This would entail that, in the beginning, the teacher should provoke personal interest and motivation in students to solve the particular task, corresponding to the stage of romance. Then, after the students' initial attempts for solution, the teacher could provide more precise instructions. At the end, the process won't be completed before the students are able to generalize the particular strategy to solving other problems of the kind.

[11] Whitehead, *The Aims of Education*, 17–28.

1.3: The Empirical Part

Since CTE has to be psychologically plausible, relevant empirical studies of the structure must be conducted at different levels of graininess or concreteness. Each structural model for approaching a cognitive task must itself be psychologically plausible, and the teacher must use a method to infer structures from observed behavior which takes into account the psychological plausibility of the abstracted structures, as well as their connection to each student's personal motivation and competence level. Of course, psychological research must also be taken into account while teaching these structures.

In sum, the CTE is a demanding enterprise, but it is definitely one worth undertaking. The CTE includes the following basic units: domain specific deductive models of possible structures; a set of field techniques for inferring the operant structures and teaching the optimal structures; general and content-bound empirical studies of structural development; and teachers who will be qualified to teach structures that are both theoretical and practical. Finally, the CTE provides a framework of using cognitive science for the purposes of education, something I surmise was Nodding's original idea.

2. Functions and Machine Learning

One positive consequence of focusing education on cognitive functions is that the term "function" provides a ground for bridging the gap between human and machine learning. As we know, functionalism in philosophy of mind is the theory of mental states which places human intelligence on the best terms with artificial intelligence. According to functionalism,[12] a mental state is nothing but a function between certain inputs, certain outputs, and associations with other mental states. Being such, it is multiply realizable: it can be implemented on brains, on

[12] For machine state functionalism, see Putnam, H. (1960) "Minds and Machines", reprinted in Putnam 1975 *Mind, Language, and Reality,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Putnam, H. (1967) "The Nature of Mental States", reprinted in Putnam 1975b, 429–440 reprinted in Putnam 1975 *Mind, Language, and Reality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, and Shagrir, O. (2005) "The Rise and Fall of Computational Functionalism", in Y. Ben-Menahem (ed.), *Hilary Putnam*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 220–250.

silicon, or whatever other material we could find which is appropriate for such realization. No other philosophical conception about the nature of mental states allows for such a smooth analogy between human and machine learning. Why is such a consequence positive? It is positive because it gives us a conceptual ground for understanding what human learning could be from machines, and to improve our didactic strategies by using this straightforward analogy with machines.

But how does that stand with regard to Whitehead's philosophy of education? Whitehead was particularly passionate about the importance of education for the flow of life:

"[U]tilizing knowledge and ideas is relating it to the stream compounded of sense, perceptions, feelings, hopes, desires and of mental activities adjusting thought to thought which forms our life,[13] and (t)here is only one subject matter for education and that is life in all its manifestations.[14] Also, he believed that one train of thought would not suit all children; for example, he suspected "that artisan children will want something more concrete."[15]

This suggests that Whitehead's notion of usable ideas is not exactly the same as a computer-based functions. Human ideas are usable in regard to life in such a way that a human would have independence of learning. We should notice, independent of Whitehead, that our ideas are usable in regard to our bodily constitution: a human can use the idea of a chair for sitting because of her bodily constitution, whereas a dog can use the idea of a chair only for lying down. Also, particular social contexts and family backgrounds play their respective roles in shaping how one's ideas could become useful. So, there are crucial aspects of individuation which make human ideas usable.

In contrast to that, a computer does not have a life independent of its training for the implementation of a certain task, nor does it have a social life. Further, it is usually not embodied and has no family. A computer is a universal machine. So, there is a part of the Whiteheadian theory of education that is not a *prima facie* good candidate for a synergy with machine learning. Nevertheless, this does not undermine our proposal to treat usable ideas as functions or mental structures. Instead, it merely suggests that we should not over emphasize the analogy between human and machine learning; what is more, we should explore how machines and machine learning could contribute to human learning. One possible example is how we could use computer programs to make individual student profiles which relate to their educational preference and personal interests. Machine-learning-based algorithms and predictive analytics could be used to present the most relevant learning experience to each and every student. This could pave the way for achieving Whitehead's ideal of education: "The best education is to be found in gaining the utmost information from the simplest apparatus."[16]

[13] Whitehead, *The Aims of Education*, 3.
[14] Whitehead, *The Aims of Education*, 6–7.
[15] Whitehead, *The Aims of Education* 4.
[16] Whitehead, *The Aims of Education*, 11.

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COMING TO KNOW BY ASKING QUESTIONS: EXPLORING THE BORDERLINE OF LOGIC AND EPISTEMOLOGY*

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Abstract:
The paper explores the intricate interplay of two parallel developments: on the one hand, the Socratic turn in epistemology with its shifting focus on information retrieval, evidence-based reasoning, and the cognitive relevance of questions; and the advance of dynamic epistemic logic with its accent on knowledge-acquisition. Both are relevant for any realistic model of knowledge which pays due attention to learning. It is argued that the formal models are still wanting in some key respects, but the development of alternative and mutually complementing logical systems marks a promising trend for re-establishing the close links between epistemology and epistemic logic.

Key words: Socratic epistemology, dynamic epistemic logic, interrogative model of inquiry, evidence models, logic of questions.

1. At present, the relationship between epistemic logic and epistemology seems more worrisome than ever. These two subjects which were tightly knit half a century ago are now almost completely estranged. As Johan van Benthem reminds us, "epistemic logic started as a contribution to epistemology, or at least a tool in its modus operandi ... [but soon] became a sleepy backwater" (van Benthem 2006, 49–50). The "kiss of life" for the field was the intrusion of computer scientists who found that "human-oriented metaphors of knowledge, ignorance, and communication turned out highly successful in understanding the behavior of complex interactive programs" (van Benthem, 50). This led to a gradual shift of interest to "logical dynamics"—the study of information update, communication, and interaction.

The exploration of such complex phenomena is impossible if we stick to the traditional divisions of philosophical logic into subfields as "modal logic," "temporal logic," "epistemic logic," "doxastic logic," "erotetic logic," etc., since virtually "every meaningful task to be analyzed involves many of these things at once" (van Benthem, 58). The focus of a plethora of research contributions which appeared in the last decade are the "dynamic mechanisms that produce or modify knowledge and related epistemic attitudes like belief such as speech acts, communication, observation, learning, or even more radical belief revision" (van Benthem, 62). Since knowledge is a complex phenomenon which involves many different components (learning, questioning, inferring, etc.), it cannot be studied with the resources of pure-blooded epistemic logic (van Benthem, 63).

The focus of this paper is coming to know, i.e. learning. It turns out that questioning has a major role to play in this process. My aim shall be to trace the developments in epistemology which highlight the importance of questioning

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and locate the logical formalisms which are able to shed light on this process. Thus we can hope to locate some important but overlooked insights which are bound to play prominent role in the future.

1.1. The classical JTB account of knowledge equates it to justified true belief. Notwithstanding its noted flaws and shortcomings, most present day epistemologists strive to rectify it in some way or another. Still, there are radical approaches which aim to supplant the traditional definition with a more viable alternative. When we juxtapose the state of knowing on one hand and the process of acquiring knowledge (learning) on the other, one problem looms large: all three components of the JTB account are desiderata that, in principle, could be met while there is no way to ascertain this fact. These three desiderata are as follows.

(1) How are we supposed to find what X believes? There are circumstances when the overt behavior of X does not in any way correspond to what X believes or desires. Rational choice theory explored many different cases where such mismatch occurs. Of course, we could ask X what her beliefs are, but her answers could be inadvertently misleading. We have no privileged access to the content of our mental states and could not be expected to produce invariably true answers concerning their nature. (2) How are we supposed to find what is the truth? There are cases when the truth value of a particular claim is unknown. Imagine that X claims to know p. But is p true? If I know that p things seem pretty easy, but the prospects of finding out what is the case become rather bleak if I don't know p or even if I don't know that I know p. Thus, the existence of doxastic blindspots and the failure of the infamous KK-principle make the satisfaction of this second desideratum hard to ascertain. (3) How are we supposed to find whether X is justified to believe that p is the case? First, the standards for the required strength of justification that X applies could be completely different from our own standards. Second, it seems virtually impossible to find whether X believes p on the basis of the justifying evidence which is accessible for X. The grounds for X's beliefs in general are not accessible even for X herself. Finally, should X be aware of the availability of this justifying evidence, or is its sheer availability enough?

All of these questions show that the traditional definition of knowledge does not correspond to an effectively applicable criterion for knowledge; so, the question of what knowledge *is* is completely separated from the question of what is in fact known. This state of affairs seems intolerable, so there are prominent attempts to find a way out.

1.2. The so-called “Socratic turn” in epistemology seeks to remedy the situation. Inaugurated by Jaakko Hintikka in the 1970s, its mature expression is provided in his book *Socratic Epistemology. Knowledge-Seeking by Questioning* (2007). The general idea of his approach is to render the process of knowledge-acquisition as effected by the exchange of questions and answers between two idealized agents (the student and the teacher, or the scientist and the nature). This is the basis of his “interrogative model of scientific inquiry,” according to which the research agenda (the questions posed) determines the outcome (the answers achieved).

According to Hintikka, when the logical positivists distinguished sharply between the context of discovery (the way we come to know) and the context of justification (the way we come to know that we know), they installed a completely distorted picture of the way science is practiced. Of primary importance is the way we achieve new knowledge, not the way we justify already available knowledge (Hintikka 2007, 20). Since the game of questions and answers effects an inflow of information, the principal concept of scientifically oriented epistemology is not knowledge but information, i.e. the worldly commodity on which our knowledge-claims are based. Since the question of knowledge relates to the domain-specific standards that determine which results of the process of belief formation are reliable bases for action, it belongs to applied epistemology (Hintikka, 30). Moreover, knowledge is both domain-specific and context-sensitive, since to know p is to be able to eliminate the relevant alternatives of p on the basis of the available information and the success of this process of elimination depends not only on the amount of available information but also on the alternatives we are actually confronted with. Of primary importance is the fact that the alternatives are not to be seen simply as imagined variations in the obtaining state of affairs, they should be "real," i.e. different states of affairs which in fact obtain in similar circumstances (Hintikka, 12). This gives to Hintikka's Socratic epistemology a noted externalist flavor.

Turning back to the traditional JTB account of knowledge, we can summarize Hintikka's critical comments in the following way: (1) what is important for epistemology is not the justification of already available knowledge but the accumulation of new knowledge on the basis of the available information; (2) information could be true or false, so the semantic properties of belief are irrelevant for the modeling of the process of knowledge-acquisition; (3) the attitudinal aspect of knowledge which is usually rendered as belief relates to the subjective (*a fortiori* relative) evaluation of the process of knowledge-acquisition and has nothing to do with general epistemology. In a nutshell this is a call for complete eradication of the JTB account and the venerable epistemological tradition which has grown around it.

1.3. Hintikka's way of thinking has greatly influenced a number of philosophers. One of them is Jonathan Schaffer, who developed the interrogative model into a full-fledged epistemological doctrine whose fundamentals were laid out in the award-winning paper "Knowing the Answer" (2007). For Schaffer, as for Hintikka before him, to know means to know the answer of a particular question. The question itself does not belong to the pragmatics of knowledge-attribution but is incorporated in the very semantics of the knowledge-claim. According to Schaffer there are two types of propositional knowledge: (1) knowledge-that (which requires a factive complement and corresponds to the JTB account); and (2) knowledge-who/what/where/when/how/why/whether, or simply knowledge-wh (which requires an interrogative complement and corresponds to Hintikka's interrogative model of inquiry). According to the received reductive view (championed by Frege), the second type of propositional knowledge claims are reducible to the first which are basic: To know who has killed Kennedy is to know that Oswald is the murderer of Kennedy. This claim is substantial since the two types of knowledge-claims have different surface structure: knowledge-that is usually modeled as a binary relation between the knower and the known proposition, while knowledge-wh should be rendered as a ternary relation between a knower, a question, and the known answer to this question.

Schaffer has amassed considerable linguistic evidence which suggests that the reduction could be performed the other way around and in fact knowledge-that is simply a degenerate form of knowledge-wh, where the question is deemed irrelevant: (1) There are cases when the two types of expression are substitutable *salva veritate*: cf. "Moore knows that he has hands" and "Moore knows whether he has hands;" (2) we can construct expressions where the two types of knowledge-claims are coordinated: cf. "I know what time it is and that I have promised to make a dinner" where knowing what and knowing that appear on an equal footing; (3) it is common to say things like: "Before I asked myself why the sky is blue but now I know it." In this case, the anaphoric reference clearly suggests that what is known is not simply a fact, but the answer of a particular question. These examples show convincingly that knowledge-wh is a genuine type of knowledge which is not simply a form of knowledge-that. This naturally raises the question what is the semantics of knowledge-wh claims. In fact, it seems that it can easily be distilled from the semantics of knowledge-that claims.

Indeed, Stalnaker has modeled propositional knowledge in the framework of possible-worlds semantics in the following way: take a collection of possible worlds W, a distinguished possible world w and accessibility relation R on W, where wRw' implies that w' is an epistemic alternative of w (i.e., what is known at w does not rule out the possibility that w' is the actual world). In this setting a proposition p is known at w iff p is true not simply at w but at all R-accessible worlds (i.e. at all epistemic alternatives of w). The same machinery can be applied for knowledge-wh: instead of starting with an accessibility relation R and defining on its basis the set Q = {w'|wRw'} we can start directly with Q, which is interpreted as the domain of a particular question (the elements of Q represent the ways the world could have been which are consistent with the presuppositions of the question which corresponds to Q). Thus the question fixes a context for the knowledge-claim: the set of relevant alternatives which the knower should be able to rule out on the basis of the available evidence. To summarize Schaffer's theory, we may reiterate his principal insight: both knowledge-that and knowledge-wh are genuine but knowledge-wh is more fundamental since its tripartite structure cannot be recovered from the structure of knowledge-that.

§2.The short survey above has shown the importance of questions, information, and learning as the key to the proper understanding of knowledge. Therefore, it seems natural to assume that all these phenomena are important for the logic of knowledge, i.e. epistemic logic; so, it is of crucial importance to map their presence in this well-explored territory. The logic of knowledge appeared in the 1960s, dynamic logic – in the 1970s, logic of information started to grow in the 1980s, and the logic of questions reached its fully developed form in the 1990s. All of these different trends began to converge in the new millennium.

Hintikka inaugurated epistemic logic with his book *Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions* (1962). It was Hintikka again who paved the way for the synthesis of epistemic and erotetic logic. In the paper “Interrogative Logic as a General Theory of Reasoning” (2002), he and his co-authors tried to pinpoint the strategic principles of deduction and interrogation which were presented as complementary activities in the process of discovery and learning. According to Hintikka, some kinds of knowledge statements can operate as desiderata (or presuppositions) for different kinds of questions. Let us take for example the question “Is it the case that S?” Its desideratum can be expressed as $K(S \vee \sim S)$ and the possible answers of this question—respectively as KS and K~S. This seems interesting but what is missing from this formal framework is the very possibility to reason about the process of learning and to formalize the gradual accumulation of knowledge—Hintikka's framework is irreparably static.

2.1. A natural point of departure would be dynamic epistemic logic which is equipped with tools to formalize both processes and epistemic notions. A well-developed formalism of this kind is presented in Hans van Ditmarsch’s “Prolegomena to Dynamic Logic for Belief Revision” (2005). The starting point of its exposition is the so-called doxastic epistemic frame – a pair of the form $(W, <^w)$, where W is a collection of possible worlds, and for each world w in W, $<^w$ is a plausibility ordering. When augmented with a valuation which assigns a subset of W to each atomic proposition in the formal language L, the frame gives rise to a model of L. Finally, a doxastic epistemic state would be a pair (M, w), where M is a model and w is a distinguished element of W.

Obviously, the most important part of each model is the plausibility ordering. The formula $u <^w v$ could be interpreted to mean that, from the point of view of the information available at w, it is less probable that u is the actual world than that v is the actual world. The union of $dom(<^w)$ and $cod(<^w)$, $Plaus^w$, is the collection of those worlds which seem probable from the point of view of w. It is assumed that for each w, $Plaus^w$ has a least element and can be embedded in a totally ordered set S (paradigmatically, this would be the set of natural numbers). It can be shown that for each x in S, the embedding associates with $<^w$ an accessibility relation $\rightarrow^x$ on W. These accessibility relations give rise to modal operators with the following semantics: M, w $\models \square^x\phi$ iff for each w' in W, w $\rightarrow^x$ w' implies M, w' $\models \square^x\phi$ (i.e. ϕ is true in all x-accessible worlds). The standard interpretation of $\square^x\phi$ is as a degree of rational belief in the proposition ϕ (if $\square^x\phi$ is satisfied in the model for each x in S, then ϕ is known, i.e. believed with arbitrary high degree of plausibility). This completes the exposition of the static part of the model.

In order to introduce dynamics in this setting we need to add to our language state transformers of the form [*ϕ], expressing binary relations between information states. The result of applying [*ϕ] to a formula ψ would be to evaluate ψ according to a different model with a different plausibility ordering. In order to clarify the construction of the alternative information states (M*, s*), associated with [*ϕ], van Ditmarsch introduced so-called doxastic epistemic action models. These are triples of the form A = (U, <, pre), where U is a collection of basic epistemic actions, pre(a) is a precondition for a, where a is an action a in U, and < is a function which assigns to each action a in U a preference function $<^a$ (thus the action models are just mirror image of their doxastic counterparts – a point to which we shall return below). Now we have everything we need at our disposal.

Let us take now a doxastic epistemic model M = (W, $<^w$, V), a doxastic epistemic action model A = (U, $<^a$, V), and assume that for some w the precondition for the execution of a is satisfied: M, s $\models$ pre(a). The result of executing a in (M, s) would be M*A = (W*, <*, V*), where W* is the collection of all pairs (u, b) such that M, u $\models$ pre(b), V*(ϕ) iff u belongs to V(ϕ), and <* is defined in an obvious way by pooling together the plausibility orders of M and A. It can be rigorously established that, defined in this way, the state transformer [*ϕ] respects some of the key properties listed in the AGM postulates for belief revision, as codified in the seminal paper of Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson (1985). Nevertheless, several problems remain unsolved (and even unaddressed). First of all, the separation of the doxastic and the action component of the epistemic system seems unwarranted: beliefs are not idle representations but state transformations of the cognitive system (as made evident by the fact that the two parts of the model are isomorphic). Moreover, the framework does not capture the fact that the dynamism of belief is triggered by the available evidence which is accumulated by means of questions and answers. Finally, the system deals only with atomic acts of learning and so does not capture the fact that, in general, the process of learning is a sequence of basic acts of knowledge-acquisition.

The last defect was (at least to some extent) rectified in the paper "Dynamic Epistemic Logic and Temporal Modality" (2011). Its author, Audrey Yap, proposes to add a relation R_a for each action, so that wR_aw' implies that w' = (w, a) and M, w' $\models$ pre(a). By means of these relations, a new modal operator P_a is introduced by stating that M, w $\models P_a\phi$ iff there is a w' such that wR_aw' and M, w' $\models \phi$. Intuitively, this means that ϕ was established on the basis of a before the state (M, w) was reached. Thus we get a system with a rudimentary history which is able to track the way through which some belief was reached.

2.2. An alternative approach which conceives available evidence as the trigger of knowledge dynamics is sketched by Johan van Benthem and Eric Pacuit in "Dynamic Logics of Evidence-Based Belief" (2011). The basic building blocks of their model are the so-called evidence models M = (W, E, V): just as before, W is a collection of possible worlds, V is a valuation function, and E (the evidence relation) associates possible worlds with subsets of W. The intuition behind it is that wEX means that the information available at w is consistent with the propositions that hold at the elements of X. Moreover, it is postulated that the relation E satisfies the postulates of consistency (which means that for no w the empty set is associated with w by E) and triviality (which means that each w is E-connected with W, i.e. the space of the available alternatives is known from the outset).

A pair of modalities can be introduced in this setting: $\Box\phi$ (with the interpretation "there is available evidence that ϕ is the case") and $B\phi$ (with the interpretation "it is believed on the basis of the available evidence that ϕ is the case"). The semantical clause for $\Box\phi$ is simple: M, w $\models \Box\phi$ iff there is a set X with wEX such that for each w' in X, M, w' $\models \phi$. For the explication of $B\phi$, we need the concept of maximal family with the finite intersection property. A family F of subsets of W has the finite intersection property (FIP) iff $\cap F$ is nonempty; it has maximal FIP if it has FIP but no proper extension of F does. The condition for $B\phi$ is as follows: M, w $\models B\phi$ iff for each maximal FIP family F which is contained in $E(w) = \{w' | \exists X \subseteq W, wEX \wedge w' \in X\}$ and for each w' in $\cap F$, M, w' $\models \phi$. These operators have relativized or conditional counterparts: M, w $\models \Box^{\phi}\psi$ iff there is an evidence set X in E(w) such that the intersection of X with the support set of ϕ is nonempty and for any world w' which belongs to this intersection we have M, w' $\models \psi$; M, w $\models B^{\phi}\psi$ iff for each maximal FIP set F in E(w) and each world w' which belongs both to $\cap F$ and the support set of ϕ, M, w' $\models \psi$. Thus both the availability of evidence and the believability of propositions based on this evidence can be relativized to prior knowledge.

As far as evidence dynamics are concerned, van Benthem and Pacuit propose four dynamic modalities expressing different operations on evidence models: evidence addition $[+\phi]$, evidence removal $[-\phi]$, evidence upgrade $[\uparrow\phi]$ and evidence combination [#]. They act on the evidence relation in the following way: $E^{+\phi}(w) = E(w) \cup \{[\phi]_M\}$; $E^{-\phi}(w) = E(w) \setminus \{X \mid X \subseteq [\phi]_M\}$; $E^{\uparrow\phi}(w) = \{X \cup [\phi]_M \mid X \in E(w)\} \cup [\phi]_M$; and $E^{\#}(w)$, which is the smallest set that contains E(w) and is closed under nonempty intersection. These operations affect both $\Box\phi$ and $B\phi$ (and their conditional counterparts) in a predictable way.

What is even more interesting is that van Benthem's evidence models can be put into one-to-one correspondence with the doxastic epistemic models of van Ditmarsch (which were called "plausibility models" by van Benthem). A plausibility model is triple M = (W, R, V), where R is reflexive and transitive. The evidence model generated by M is EV(M) = (W, E, V), where E is the collection of all nonempty downward-R-closed sets. In the other direction, given an evidence model (W, E, V), we can construct a plausibility model ORD(M) = (W, R, V), where wRw' iff for each X in E, if w' belongs to X, then w belongs to X. Moreover, the following pair of equalities hold: (a) ORD(EV(M)) = M, EV(ORD(M)) = $M^{\#}$, where $M^{\#}$ is produced by evidence combination. Thus a faithful translation between the two alternative conceptual frameworks can be constructed (to the best of my knowledge this possibility has not been fully explored).

2.3. Up to this point, the role of questions in the process of accumulating evidence has not come to the fore. They become topical in the paper "Toward a Dynamic Logic of Questions" (2012). Johan van Benthem and Stefan Minica introduced in this paper a new framework for the analysis of knowledge-claims—the epistemic issue model. An epistemic issue model is a quadruple M = (W, ~, ≈, V). The newcomers, ~ and ≈, are equivalence relations. When w ~ w' we shall say that w and w' are epistemically indistinguishable, which means that what is known is compatible (or incompatible) with w and w'. Analogously, when w ≈ w' we shall say that w and w' are conceptually indistinguishable, which means that the questions posed so far provide no occasion to discriminate between w and w'. For example, if I know just that B is between A and C, I cannot say whether A is on the left (case w) or A is on the right (case w')—these cases are epistemically indistinguishable from my point of view. In the same way, if I ask whether B is between A and C, the positive answer of this question does not provide information whether A is on the left or A is on the right—the aforementioned cases are conceptually indistinguishable. On the basis of these relations we can introduce a pair of modal operators—the well-known knowledge modality K and the issue modality Q: M, w |= Kϕ iff for each w', w ~ w' implies M, w' |= ϕ and M, w |= Qϕ iff for each w', w ≈ w' implies M, w |= ϕ. As noted in Baltag, Boddy, and Smets (2018), the issue modality is intended to capture the information carried by the answers of all "active" questions.

Now let us put $R(\phi, M) = \{(w, w') \mid [\phi]_w = [\phi]_{w'}\}$. On the basis of this relation between formulas and models, we can introduce four different operations on the basic epistemic issue model: (a) Questioning: $M_{\phi?}$ with $\approx_{\phi?} = \approx \cap R(\phi, M)$; (b) Announcement $M_{\phi!}$ with $\sim_{\phi!} = \sim \cap R(\phi, M)$; (c) Refinement: $M_?$ with $\approx_? = \approx \cap \sim$; and (d) Resolution $M_!$ with $\sim_! = \sim \cap \approx$. Just as before, these state transforming operations generate corresponding dynamic modalities which interact with the static knowledge and issue modalities. For example, it can be proved that [ϕ?]Kψ is equivalent (with respect to the semantics above) to K[ϕ?]ψ. This particular equivalence means that you can come to know ψ simply by asking the question whether ϕ only if you know that ψ would be the case if you ask the question whether ϕ. The most interesting feature of the epistemic issue models is the interaction between the relations ~ and ≈. In the paper that I've just mentioned, Baltag, Boddy, and Smets greatly simplify the model by assuming that ≈ is included in ~, i.e. that if a pair of worlds are conceptually indistinguishable then they are epistemically indistinguishable, which implies that questions function as "epistemic filters": each cognitive agent can know only the answers of her questions—just as Schaffer insisted (Schaffer's work in epistemology and van Benthem's work in logic are the chief sources of the formal system presented by Baltag, Boddy, and Smets).

§3.The short overview above shows that the Socratic turn in epistemology and the dynamic turn in epistemic logic are closely allied developments. Much remains to be done before we have at our disposal a logical system which is able to model the real-world process of learning in its full complexity. Nevertheless, the systems we have just explored strengthen the conviction that, in order to obtain a firm conceptual grip on knowledge, we need to come to terms with a host of interrelated cognitive phenomena. This would probably force us into even fewer explored territories, as suggested by the promising new trend of inquisitive semantics which has also entered the domain of epistemic logic (see Ciardelli 2014). What it suggests is that in order to better understand these phenomena, we shall need to augment and modify one of our most basic concepts—the concept of proposition. Although such radical approaches are beyond the scope of this paper, their sheer availability shows what is at stake. Time shall judge what is the best way to take.

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FROM POETICS TO METAPOETICS: ARCHITECTURE TOWARDS ARCHITECTURE

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Abstract:

An undiscovered chapter in the history of architecture comes from the ex-Soviet Republic of Georgia. Poetics of Architecture is the name given to the studio-workshop at the Georgian Technical University set up by the Georgian architect Shota Bostanashvili (1948–2013). From 1990 until his death he delivered insightful, playful and rather provocative lectures on architecture at this university. He preferred to call his architectural philosophy, critical discourse on architecture. Themes ranged from poetics to metapoetics of architecture. His philosophy of architecture is illustrated by some of his designs and executed projects which demonstrate a drift from existentialism to the philosophy of play. This study includes reference to his last building, a project whose demolition Bostanashvili witnessed before passing away. Based on the concept of the return of the sacred, this edifice was a sort of counter movement to technogenic architecture.

Key words: architectural design, poetics, metapoetics, architectural discourse, technogenic architecture, Bostanashvili.

Introduction

The seminal publication by Anthony Antoniades on the poetics of architecture as a theory of design was published in 1990, a year prior to the end of Soviet era architecture. Independently of this publication, the manifesto for a poetics of architecture was launched by the Georgian academic and poet Shota Bostanashvili (1948–2013). This was the foundation of the studio-workshop Poetics of Architecture which he had set up at the Institute of Architecture which institute was the precursor of the Faculty of Architecture, Urbanism and Design of the Georgian Technical University. This studio-workshop initiated metacultural discourse in architecture. The sub-title of this article is inspired by the name of an exhibition of his works with students which exhibition laid out the vocational role of the studio-workshop: "The main task of the studio is to awaken the abilities that lie dormant inside a child. To feel the joy and excitement of seeing things for the first time. This is the only path and this requires ... spiritual 'exercise'" (Bostanashvili 2001). This exhibition was hosted by the Rustaveli Society in Tbilisi in November 2001.

Bostanashvili was an architect by profession, shifting to academia in the latter part of a career which ended with his sudden death during his lecture at a conference marking the demise of his friend, the poet and author Otar Chiladze. His professional career can be divided into two phases: Soviet and post-Soviet Georgia (Bianco 2017). The former is influenced by his association with the Design Bureau of Georgian Polytechnic Institute. During this period he collaborated with Vakhtang Davitaia, a leading contemporary architect of Georgia of international repute who dominated architectural design in his native country for the past half a century. This phase is mainly characterized by memorials, the most notable being the following:

- The Cube of Memory (Figure 1) in Senaki (1975), designed together with Davitaia, Bostanashvili's teacher Giuli Gegelia, and

Vazha Melikishvili, recalls the youth who never returned from the Second World War;

- The Temple of Memory (Figure 2) in Mukhrani (1975), also designed with Davitaia (Kalandadze 2015, 318-327), was dedicated to the Georgian soldiers who lost their lives in the Second World War; and
- The Glory to Work (Figure 3) in Kutaisi (1979), another project with Davitaia, in honor of the over-achieving members of the public from the city.



Figure 1: The Cube of Memory, Senaki, 1975 (Photo: © Shota Bostanashvili Archive, Tbilisi).

Figure 2: The Temple of Memory, Makhrani, 1975 (Photo: © Shota Bostanashvili Archive, Tbilisi).



Figure 3: Glory to Work Memorial, Kutaisi, 1979 (Photo: © Shota Bostanashvili Archive, Tbilisi).



Figure 4: Model of the Actor's House, Senaki, 1985. (Photo: © Shota Bostanashvili Archive, Tbilisi).

Another architectural work—which was never executed—is the 1985 house-museum to commemorate the Georgian actor Akaki Khorava (Figure 4). The executed buildings which belong to the post-Soviet phase, both in Tbilisi, are a residence in the Vake district (Figure 5) and the Palace of Poetry (Figure

6), the latter being his magnum opus. An unrealized project is the winning competition entry for the extension of the Rustaveli Metro Station in 2006, also in Tbilisi, submitted together with his son David (Figure 7). Through reference to these works, this article outlines Bostanashvili's shift from existentialism to the philosophy of play. It puts forward an exposition of his poetics of design and *discourse on* '*constructum*,' and the evolution of metapoetics from the poetics of architecture.[1]



Figure 5: A private residence, Vake district, Tbilisi (1994–2001). (Photo: © Shota Bostanashvili Archive, Tbilisi).

Figure 6: The Palace of Poetry, Tbilisi (1999-2003): (Left) The site context and (Right): Detail of the towers. (Photos: © Shota Bostanashvili Archive, Tbilisi).

Figure 7: The competition winning entry for the expansion of the rooftop of Rustaveli Metro Station, Tbilisi, 2006. (Images: © Shota Bostanashvili Archive, Tbilisi).

Existentialism and the Philosophy of Play

The Cube of Memory was Bostanashvili's first leap into the architectural scene of Georgia. This project goes beyond the dominant Soc-Realism of

[1] *Constructum* is a Latin word derived from the verb *constructo* which signifies something built. Since the Bostanashvilis attach a certain conceptual meaning to this word, they chose to introduce this Latin term for the English translation instead of writing it down as the verbal noun 'the Built'.

the time.[2] The cube represents the tragedy brought upon human lives, not only through the disruption generated by war but also through one's existential isolation (Bostanashvili 2013). The scarred cube is a kind of self-portrait: a seemingly stable individual hiding a tormented inner reality — an existential wound. Bostanashvili experienced the world as it was described by existential philosophy, the concept of "being thrown" (*geworfen*) into the world as described by Heidegger (1996). This sentiment of "estrangement" from the world, as Camus (1988) would have put it, was acutely significant for the young Bostanashvili. This may account for the reason why, in later years, the concept of play and world-as-stage became so important for him: the element of play overcomes existential pessimism.

The memorial Glory to Work is a statement of the intrinsic relationship between the lasting and the transient (Svetlov 1981): the frame, the stairs, and the pillar are themes which create and mark a place, and, the scene with changing participants, sculptures, and citizens renders the memorial an open art gallery, a theatre for art, the beacon of the cultural life of Kutaisi.

Play and culture are thus essential themes in Bostanashvili's poetics of architecture. As Huizinga ([1944] 1949) emphasized, culture developed from play: play was prior to culture, so the stage precedes architecture. The notion of the "enclosed arena" implies that it belongs to the realm of play. Ritual assumes that the stage is set. Architecture can provide a stage to plays, whether they are political, communal, or personal. In providing this stage, architecture gets engaged in play:

> It is this capacity of playing that gives rise to original work. Recent developments in Georgian architecture show that Western thought is an object of imitation, an example that one should follow, a model to be copied. Modern Georgian architects impose on themselves normative Western thought, but through play it is possible creatively and critically to react to different streams—Western ideals of architecture or the kitsch desires of local clients (Bianco 2016, 463).

The Temple of Memory is a deconstructed sign. The opening of the arch is solid; it prevents the triumphal route and instead halts the visitor. Thus, the deconstructive gesture, being that of a signifier, is a triumphal arch breaking away with its signified triumphal passage. This memorial, together with the Cube of Memory and the Glory to Work, departs from the traditional representational monuments typical of Brezhnev-era architecture.[3] They demonstrate the tradition of remote monumentality as surmounted; they are a pretext to make architecture. Their architecture created an array of contexts:

> This tradition created a distance between the viewer and architecture; it turned him [*sic*] into passive observer who had to interpret the work according to pre-established codes of signification. These memorials eliminate this distance; they make space and place for the visitor; they form a space for social interactions; they offer interactivity. They are open to a multitude of readings (Bostanashvili 2013, 60).

The Actor's House suggests a double reading. It is a house for an actor and a house that acts—it is a house that plays. The elevations of the house act like masks, and the masks represent architectural elements: stairs, openings, and recognizable silhouettes. The four masks that comprise the building are

[2] Soc-Realism is short for socialist realism, the artistic style imposed by the Soviet Union from the early 1930s to the late 1980s and, post Second World War, on other socialist governments falling under the sphere of influence of the USSR. As a term it first appeared in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, the official cultural and political newspaper of the Union of Soviet Writers, of 23 May 1932. Soc-Realism is a utopian realistic art which depicted life through socialist ideals. It is grounded in the proletariat revolution and "active socialist humanism" (Markov and Timofeev 1976, 245). The roots of this style dates to the first years post the Russian Revolution and by the early 1920s it emerged as the main approved official artistic style in Stalin's era. Its decline commenced in the late 1960s during the early years of Leonid Brezhnev's until its eventual end with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. For phenomenological observations on the aesthetics of socialist realism vide Terras (1979).

[3] Brezhnev-era architecture is the Soviet socialist architectural style which emerged during the early years of Leonid Brezhnev (1964–1982) and endured under Yuri Andropov (1982–1984) and Konstantin Chernenko (1984–1985). It lasted with the dissolution of the U.S.S.R.. During this period the architects in the East reassessed modernism, rather than, as in the capitalist West, moved onto postmodernism (Chaubin 2011). Recent publications refer to Brezhnev-era architecture as socialist modernism.

rotated slightly, being a bit displaced and never perpendicular. One "mask" (wall) lies on the floor, marking a small plaza in front of the building. Though all of the elements come from familiar architectural vocabulary, this play of rotations and shifts renders the familiar unfamiliar (Bostanashvili 2013, 60).

Poetics and Discourse on *Constructum*

Bostanashvili's work is marked by a vocational call for innovative paradigms for architecture, one where the frontiers between art and architecture, space and text, theory and practice are blurred. His proposition for a poetics of architecture is a movement from words to things and back. It knows its beginning in his architectural practice, shifted to *paper architecture* and peaked in pedagogical activity: "Poetics of Architecture fills the vacancies left on the place of philosophy and aesthetics, the vacancies where the configuration of knowledge is altered. In the condition of shifted epistemological field the Poetics of Architecture is a response to the problems of our pragmatic time and crisis of 'ending'" (Bostanashvili 2014).

A publication which presents his understanding of the notion of poetics of architecture is *Butza: Architect Victor Jorbenadze* (Bostanashvili and Bostanashvili 2012). It is a book of telling his story of Butza (Bianco 2016, 459), the nickname for Jorbenadze in the academic circles of Tbilisi. This work is a text on architecture and not just about the architect whom the publication recalls: "With this book we begin critical discourse of architecture—reading through differences and narrative, where critique takes the task of not just studying ideas, but their entropic production. We believe that critical discourse should include the impossibility of the discourse (narrative) itself and hindrances—a potential for demythologization" (Bostanashvili and Bostanashvili 2012, 4).

In the preamble to the manifesto for a poetics of architecture, written twenty years prior to the above cited statement, although not explicitly declared, Bostanashvili states that his effort is towards humanitarian thinking beyond the stereotypical. His focus is on metacultural reflections and on the praxis of critical reading of the history of architecture:

> My effort is directed towards [the] return of the Poet and the Myth in architecture; this implies primacy of humanitarian thinking — return to nature and humanity; Respect towards heritage does not hinder recognizing the fact that Culture is a barrier, it creates stereotypes in thinking, that must be overcome; The 'gene' of architecture is irrational and is intended to govern the space through symbols; Architecture is art and defies methodological clichés (Bostanashvili 2010b).

One notes here two interpretations of the concept of myth: the first is understood in relation to poetry as the most fundamental creative force of culture; the second is linked with semiotic interpretations of myth. In his study of symbols and the linguistic messages of architecture, Bostanasvhili draws on Barthes (1972) and Eco (1968). For Barthes, "the function of myth lies in deforming and not in mystifying" (Barthes 1991, 20) whilst for Eco, contemporary opinion "no longer recognizes the discipline that myths impose on the symbols they involve" (Eco 1994, 21). These messages involve coding which gives rise to reading and composing.

Myth in architecture is grounded in nature; place is its material support. It is in this context that one has to read Bostanashvili's definition of architecture in terms of emotion, or a beauty beyond empirical reality. It is beyond dogma; it is what reality lacks:

> Architecture is art—an exceptional ability to express emotions and evoke them in others; Architecture is art—it means to retain childhood and passion for play; to retain faculty of bewilderment and exhilaration; bewilderment with all that surrounds you and with all that you see as if for the first time; exhilaration that being is marvel and vision is rejoicing; Architecture is art—it is a realm where one is not punished for transgressing dogmas and canon; where one is not punished for diktat, intrigue and provocations, since the Beauty is ascertained. The source of Beauty lies beyond empirical reality, it is devoid of utility and causes disinterested delight; Art is that what the reality lacks, that what it conceals; what if reality is innocent and does not conceal anything, and art is a crime that the reality bears; The 'Beginning' is depleted; it is obvious that we have to make again the 'Beginning' with

> the ingredients of the 'End' (Bostanashvili 2010b).

The same writings define architecture in terms of emotions; one reads that "in the era of metaculture and digital technologies, space is—above all—a text ..." (Bostanashvili, 2010b). Understanding architecture as text led Bostanashvili, together with his son (who was a doctoral student at the studio-workshop), to introduce a specific term in the Georgian language which linked both terms. The concepts of sign and built, in later works renamed as *constructum*, deal with the problems of semiotics of architecture by inscribing these concepts into the Georgian language.

This linguistic play is a conceptual part of the research: in Georgian, the word for sign is *nishani*, whilst the word for "what is built" is *nasheni*—*constructum* in Latin. "This deconstruction of one morpheme becomes the starting point into critical discourse on architecture" (Bianco 2017). Bostanashvili later makes use of the concept of *nasheni* to supplant architecture. Recalling Barthes (1979, 73-81), *nasheni* is to architecture what text is to literature.

Bostanashvili is still far from the concept of *nasheni*-text. His major philosophical concepts relating to the poetics of architecture are outlined in one of his last publications, which is found in the Georgian academic journal *Semiotics* (Bostanashvili and Bostanashvili, 2008). The underlying logic of the argument runs as follows: architecture, being discourse on space and belonging to space, is at the same time a discourse of the interesting. The word interest is composed of two morphemes: *inter* and *esse*, implying a state of "being" in "between" (Bianco 2017). With this in mind, one leaps "to the notion of border; blurring borders becomes a practice of discourse—this practice is permitted in written Georgian language" (Bianco 2017, 56).

Now the concept of ruins (*destructum*) is first introduced, albeit still not developed. The sign of ruins is introduced as the state of pragmatism in contemporary architecture, the final problem being the cycle of deconstruction-reconstruction. To bring architecture into the realm of metaculture, two paths are proposed: metapoetics and semiotics:

> The altered *episteme* of [the] new epoch puts forward text instead of *oeuvre*—*Constructum* instead of *Arche* and architecture. *Constructum* is a free play of signifiers. *Constructum*—*textus* (Latin—"textile," "net") suggests, that we are in the net. *Constructum* started the movement towards critical discourse of architecture (Bostanashvili 2010b).

By presenting the neologism *nasheni*, Bostanashvili hints at the specific nature of the semiotics of architecture (Bostanashvili and Bostanashvili, 2009). *Nasheni* represents something that is material—the built—though it is, at the same time, a language and a sign. It is both and none at the same time, something other, a signifier with two intangible signifiers.

The Temple of Memory evokes the form of a triumphal arch only to negate it immediately. "[*Nasheni*] confirms its being between presence and absence, '*inter* / *esse*'; that it is 'interesting'; its simultaneous polysemantics/dissemination" (Bianco 2017, 57). In this context Bostanashvili makes reference to Plato's intractable concept of *Khôra* in the *Timaeus*. This is the point of departure of Derrida's publication with Eisenman on the architectural project for the Parc de la Villette. For Derrida, "Chora belongs neither to *Eidos*, nor *Mimesis*", it is a "place without space, before space and time" (Derrida and Eisenman 1997, 91). *Khôra* is a "paralogical and metalogical superoscillation" (Derrida and Eisenman 1997, 15) and oscillation, as McCaffery notes (2008, 251), between the double exclusion of neither-nor and the participational both-this-and-that. A key point is the tautology that whatever is interesting is so because it is interesting. And, the interesting is not related to the pragmatic or the aesthetic. Bostanashvili's idea was to split the word so that *'inter / esse'* becomes "being in between," and being between gives rise to the interesting.

In presenting the concept of *constructum* (Bostanashvili and Bostanashvili 2009, 118), "it is the language itself that works; language about the language that already took hold of the built (history, theory and poetics of architecture)" (Bianco 2017, 57). This introduces metapoetics of architecture, "rewriting the history of architecture where stylistic and historical interpretations are supplanted by thematic reading (mass, wall, column, stair, frame, blob/surface/veil)" (Bianco 2017, 57). It is not only about the creation of language; it is also an example of such practice. While discussing semiotics of *nasheni*, two theoretical themes from Epstein are introduced: semionics as the science about the formation of new signs; and semiergon as the practice of sign production (Bostanashvili and Bostanashvili 2009, 122): "To think—means to re-create the language" (Epstein, 2004: 655). *Nasheni* is such re-creation of the language of architecture.

As a free play of signifiers, *nasheni* implies absence of deep structure and advance of the surface, or in Bostanashvili's terms, the "veil." There is no hidden signified to be uncovered behind the veil. There are just surfaces beneath surfaces. The theme of "veil(ing)" became the central theme in Bostanashvili's late years. The veils mark the beginning of new architecture, Derrida would have argued: instead of solid sign/architecture, one is faced with a veil, a surface of signifiers pointing to each other, a text, *nasheni*. The discourse on veils was explored in Bostanashvili's obituary for Derrida, where he takes on Derrida with Derridian writing (Bostanashvili 2006). *Ride* in Georgian means "veil;" *U-Ridod* means "without veil," but also it means "without reverence." For him, the present urban chaos of Tbilisi is a case where buildings are built next to one another without "reverence" (Bianco 2017, 55-56). A design which illustrates his understanding of the notion of veiling is Rustaveli's Metro Station. His proposal makes use of:

> ... a language of dynamic, open, penetrable fluid shapes; a language of ordered chaos, of planned randomness. The skin of the three main bodies of the building follow the movement of the adjacent avenue and represents a kind of vestigial structure. The skin goes beyond being a decoration, becoming part of the architectural body (Bostanashvili and Bostanashvili, 2006).

This exposes the major paradigmatic shift in architecture which may be summarized as follows: architecture reveals itself as tectonics and order, as well as implying the ideological. The rigid tectonic is supplanted by "envelopes," "wrappings"—meaning a kind of surface that does not communicate the signifiers, the programmatic and structural contents of a building. Poetics of architecture labels such a surface "veil." Veils lead to the free play of signifiers, and digital technologies of 3D design and manufacturing make veils possible.

From Poetics to Metapoetics

For Bostanashvili, the poetics of architecture is the philosophy and practice of architecture; it is an adventure of space in culture; it is a way of spatial synthesis. It was born "when eagerness to build was not synchronous with our cultural condition; when construction was replaced by destruction" (Bostanshvili 1995). The years from 1988 to 1993 were dominated by the Georgian civil war, as well as characterized by inter-ethnic and intra-national conflicts. Architectural practice was halted, but the endeavour to do architecture continued (Bostanashvili 2013, 61). To reinforce his opinion, he cites Woods' position: "resist the idea that architecture is a building; … resist the idea that you need a client in order to make architecture" (Woods, n.d.). Whilst the country was in a process of total collapse, architectural students spent hours in a freezing auditorium listening to the poetic potential of architecture, a dialogue of cultures and a culture of dialogue. Where is space? Where does the space of culture begin? At this stage Bostanashvili refers to the Biblical text of the Genesis (1:6-7): "'And God said, 'Let there be a vault between the waters to separate water from water. ... So God made the vault and separated the water under the vault from the water above it. And it was so.'"

The basic concepts of below and above define space. The other translation of what is between, translated as vault, is a firmament. This word has the meaning of both space and solid. Firmness is a pivotal term in the Vitruvian triad defining architecture. A separator delineates the threshold between the in and out, as well as between below and above, the floor and the ceiling. These are the omnipresent paradigms of architecture, the foundations for texts on aesthetics and poetics of architecture. This leads to the foundations of the metapoetics of architecture:

> Metapoetics of Architecture is a reflection on the said texts and at the same time a new practice of spatial synthesis; it is a response to the problems of our pragmatic time and crisis of 'ending' in conditions of shifted epistemological field; it started at the threshold of digital technologies (1990) and its experience spans over twenty years (Bostanashvili 2010b).

Since we live in the era of metaculture rather than merely culture, he argued that it would be more correct to talk about metapoetics rather than poetics.

Bostanashvili claimed that culture had undergone a major paradigmatic shift. At this point he makes reference to the crisis of metaphysics which was exposed by Derrida. This crisis marks a break in culture, or as Foucault (1994) would put it, a change of *epistêmê*. This shift in the way knowledge is organized makes us consider culture in a different light — namely, we ought to talk of metaculture. Instead of philosophy, we have discourse. Moreover, in the case of architecture one could speak about critical discourse on *constructum*, or architecture as text.

The publication of Bostanashvili's "Image, House, Name" (2003) is useful to understand metapoetics and critical discourse on architecture, especially since the words image, house, and name sound similar in Georgian (*sakhe*, *sakhli*, and *sakheli* respectively). They not only represent Bostanashvili's way of thinking, but illustrate his specific technique of writing, one which bears a resemblance to Derrida. The objective of this publication was to put forward a case (for a state award) for the nomination of the Courthouse in the city of Poti, a building designed by Gegelia.[4] Bostanashvili made use of the phonic and graphic similarity of these words to build a theory of architecture told through Georgian language (Bostanashvili 2003, 12). Bostanashvili argues that this building manages to become free from ideology (the court system) and perform like a piece of architectural art-work. Hence, the name (courthouse) never translates deliberately into an architectural image, which is to say that form and function have a conventional relationship: "The image is this transitory phenomenon that stands between words and things" (Bostanashvili 2001, 6:38. It disobeys the name; so, Architecture returns to the home of architecture proper. He concludes that, nowadays, when everyone is obsessed with "smart housing," it is difficult to make beautiful houses. [5]

The poetics of *destructum* (whatever is destroyed) becomes a major theme for Bostanashvili. This recalls Eco's publication *On Beauty: A History of a Western Idea*, which includes a chapter on the poetics of ruins (Eco 2004, 285-287). Bostanashvili himself makes reference to a multitude of seventeenth and eighteenth century artists — such as Lorrain (1600-1682); Rosa (1615-1673); Panini (1691-1765); Servandoni (1695-1766); Piranesi (1720-1778); and Robert (1733-1808) — who were charmed and obsessed by ruins. Reviewing the paradigm of *destructum* ("ruin") in culture, Bostanashvili starts with the ruin that Adam initiated in Paradise (Genesis 3:6).[6] The paradigm is carried into Biblical myths: Noah's Ark and Babel (Gen. 6–9, 11:1–8); Moses destroying the stone tablets (Exodus 32:18–19, Deuteronomy 9:16–17); the fall of Jericho (Joshua 6); and, Samson and the ruins of the temple of Jerusalem (Judges 16:23–31). Besides Biblical narrative, Bostanashvili discusses examples of ruins in the history of culture, concluding with his own story: his biography is constructed by different destructive events, starting with his family being torn apart by Stalinist repression and concluding with the obliteration of his architectural heritage, the 2013

[4] Guili Gegelia (1942-) is a professor of architecture at the Georgian Technical University and a leading architectural expert and a former advisor to the Government of Georgia and to the Foundation for the Preservation of Cultural Heritage Sites of Georgia. He was involved in the restoration, reconstruction and the rehabilitation of the historic town of Sighnaghi, the ancient city of Mtskheta and the Black Sea coastal city Batumi.

[5] One may argue that conflation and the fallacy of false bifurcation is present in Bostanashvili's philosophy, where technology and beauty are diametrically opposed and thus irreconcilably. Bostanashvili argues against the idea that beauty is a result—for example, rational decisions, correct planning, and so on. Since the advent of modernism, the concept of beauty has been displaced and is nowadays simply a consequence. He puts forward the motion that beauty is the point of departure; without an initial act there can be no beauty. Beauty only comes from beauty; it is consumed when it is the prime and central mover of architecture. Function is an obsession; eco/green/sustainable architecture is an obsession; intelligent/smart/digitally controlled environments are an obsession. The effect of obsession is an unknown. Dr Frankenstein was obsessed with science; he hoped the result would be sublime but the tangible outcome was a monster. This does not imply that science produces monsters; it illustrates that obsession may result in unpredictable alienating effects. Obsession on technological aspects of architecture can produce alienating machine architecture.

[6] The doctrine underlying the Christian myth of "The Fall" is essentially the interpretation of the Eden narrative in Chapter 3 of Genesis, the first book of the Old Testament (Jones 1966).

demolition of the Palace of Poetry (Bostanashvili 2013).

Is Bostanashvili's metapoetics a "parapoetics," a leap to the architectural? McCaffery, in his paper "Parapoetics and the Architectural Leap" (2008), explored the linkages between language, architecture, and the human from Babel to Derrida. Bostanashvili's metapoetics of architecture and its practice is a response to the issues related to our pragmatic time. It bridges the gap between philosophy and aesthetics. It is at this stage that the pattern of knowledge undergoes transformation and becomes the study of the culture of architecture:

> Metapoetics of Architecture fills the vacancies left on the place of philosophy and [a]esthetics, the vacancies where the configuration of knowledge is altered. In this regard Poetics could, as well, be called culturology of architecture. Metapoetics of Architecture introduced new apparatus ('inter esse' and conceptual triad: 'Image, House, Name') and concepts; among those the dichotomy of Constructum/Destructum is a binary pair, opposition that architecture never had. Destructum is not only a material destruction, but a mental one too (e.g. blocking off and eliminating the view in the city) (Bostanashvili 2010b).

Concluding Comments: Pilgrims and XXI Century Civilization

In "Seafaring Pilgrims," Bostanashvili provides a semiotic reflection on his design entry entitled The Pilgrims (Figure 8) (Bostanashvili 2010a, 335). His submission placed first in the architecture-culture category for conceptual designs; it was entitled "A space for XXI Century Civilisation" in a competition held in 1988 by the International Academy of Architecture. The sub-title of the entry reads "Travelling islands serve [as] asylums for those who suffer and are in doubt." The Pilgrims is an artificial wandering archipelago of five plus one islands which drifts to the need of humanity to bridge culture. "The Pilgrims is a sign-creative image, graphical and linguistic semiurgic text. It grew from the names/images of specific, local (Georgian) culture and transformed into global, general image/name/house. Private and general, having different signifiers and signifieds, are linked here through a sign (Bostanashvili 2010a, 335).

Figure 8. The Pilgrims is an artificial group of five plus one islands each consisting of a colossal glass chair. (Image: © Shota Bostanashvili Archive, Tbilisi).

The number five does not refer to the continents; they represent the five major world religions, with the sixth being nature. Thus, five temples of the major faiths sit on the chairs, one temple per chair, and a tree is placed on the sixth. The islands communicate, thus linked, while floating independently, through the back of the chairs which are made up of screens. The Pilgrims symbolize discourse and tranquility, a place for dialogue, a space for shattered humanity to lie at rest, "XXI century is a space for dialogue of cultures and the 'repose' of exhausted mankind" (Bostanashvili, 2010b). This publication reads his project through Barthes's essay "The Rhetoric of the Image" (Barthes 1977). In his semiotic analysis of the Panzani advert, Barthes uncovers a stratigraphy of meanings. He identified three classes of message: the linguistic (text), the symbolic (the connoted image) and the literal (the denoted image). Bostanashvili introduced in Barthes's analytical scheme his own signs: sea, sky, and temples on chairs instead of pasta, tomatoes, and other items. He had undertaken a (B)art(h)istic performance, a semiotic play of The Pilgrims on Barthes' stage.

Reflections on XXI century culture found another turn with Bostanashvili's last project. The

Palace of Poetry emerged on the boundary of millennia, on the boundary of the city and nature, and on the boundary of Soviet and post-Soviet space (Figure 6). It is an essay in the dialogue of architecture and nature; it is a search and the return of the sacred. This project belongs to the mytho-poetical aspect of Bostanashvili's philosophy of architecture. Another executed project which was inspired by the same philosophy is a private residence in the same capital (Figure 5). This project became a stage for Bostanashvili to weave a mytho-poetic narrative on the home; however, construction on both sites was halted in 2004. They stood for nearly a decade, almost complete, but were erased by market forces following their acquisition by new owners who wanted to redevelop the sites into apartment blocks. After their demolition, he found refuge in poetry—his new "home."

Bostanashvili published *Four Discourses* in 2012, a cycle of four poems on the classical Greek conception of nature, that is the theory of matter as comprised of the four basic elements: water, fire, air, and earth. The elements are completely detached from any mythology, being understood as belonging to language. Bostanashvili works with the language in an architectural manner, and it is here the writing style in "Image, House, Name" (Bostanashvili 2003) is pushed to its limits. In his poetry, he made the Georgian language speak in an avant-garde manner (Bostanashvili, n.d.); it is a "semiotic revolution" in Georgian poetry (Lomidze 2012, 6).

The existential and the cultural are the main and timeless dimensions of architecture. Architecture is never created through technics but always through poetics. Architecture is born through the dialogue of an individual with the world: therein lies its existential dimension. The human spirit wants to mark the place of being; the human spirit asks for more space than the body requires. On the other hand, the individual is always already placed in culture. Therefore, no architecture can be born without the ability of the subject to comprehend, navigate, and expand the boundaries of the culture that creates her and she, in turn, recreates. This could be a summary of Bostanashvili's philosophy and that of his studio-workshop, where he did architecture together with his students on paper. This architecture was architecture in its own right and not merely a dream, if only it could be built. Furthermore, images produced in the studio-workshop lose their cultural value if built. They are fully significant on paper. The surface of paper becomes the proper place for architecture.

To some degree, Bostanashvili's poetry of later years was an example of architectonic writing—he arranged each letter and line so that the poetic text has an additional dimension, leaving the verses of the poems to appear as if they have been built. Here Bostanashvili found his own place in the realm of architecture: all the streams of existential thought, philosophy of play, and the semiotics of culture came together to create a unique architectural philosophy conveyed through the Georgian language.

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ROBERT NOZICK'S EVOLUTIONIST TURN IN ETHICS

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Abstract:

The purpose of the present study is that of examining what I call Robert Nozick's "evolutionist turn" in ethics. More specifically, my aim is to provide an answer to the following question: what type of ethical theory does Robert Nozick sketch in his last book, *Invariances*? My first objective will be that of delineating the philosophical framework which will accommodate my future discussion, highlighting the distinction between the metaphysical and scientific approaches to ethics as proposed by Ken Binmore, but also Emanuel Socaciu's taxonomy of ethical theories, which stems from the particular way in which moral philosophers tackle the nature of ethical norms and moral motivation. I then set forth to show that, in the philosophical framework previously described, Robert Nozick's approach from *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* should be seen as a metaphysical one. The last and most important part of my study aims to show how Nozick's "evolutionist turn" took place and developed, from his perspective on rationality in *The Nature of Rationality*, to his ethical theory advanced in Invariances.

Key words: Robert Nozick, ethics, moral evolutionism, game theory, Kant, Hume.

1. How to classify ethical theories. Towards a modest proposal.

A traditional approach to the realm of ethics starts by distinguishing between theories which are, broadly speaking, either deontological, consequentialist (mainly utilitarian), or aretaic theories, such as those which dwell on Aristotle's virtue ethics.[1] Ken Binmore and Emanuel Socaciu point out that an alternative framework is possible. Firstly, Binmore suggests that we should see ethics as being divided in two main approaches. On the one hand, we have metaphysical moral philosophers such as Immanuel Kant. According to Binmore, the highlight of this approach is its emphasis on rationality, though not in the sense that the other moral theories are irrational: the fundamental assumption of a philosopher like Kant is the belief that it "is possible to find out things about the world without the need to collect any data. In particular, they believe that we can decide what people ought to do by playing around with words [...]" (Binmore 2005, 38). Binmore observes that other moral philosophers, like Aristotle, Adam Smith, or David Hume, employ a more empirical methodology. As a result, his conjecture is that they belong to a different tradition which he labels as "scientific." In contrast with the metaphysical approach, scientific moral philosophers "insist on looking at the data before reaching any conclusion" (Binmore 2005, 39).[2]

The starting point of Emanuel Socaciu's analysis resides in the hypothesis that moral theories differ in the way in which they relate to norms and motivation. As a result, he employs two fundamental dis-

[1] For a useful mapping see either Copp (2006) or Singer (1991).

[2] Due to the scope of the present article I do not wish to insist more on Binmore's analysis. For a more detailed perspective see Binmore (2005, Chapter 3).

tinctions: internalism/externalism with regard to motivation, and intrinsicalism/extrinsicalism in relation to moral norms. In describing moral internalism and externalism, Socaciu employs Richard M. Hare's suggestions: as Hare points out, internalism shouldn't be confused with the idea that a moral judgment is true if someone is motivated by it; his suggestion is that internalism entails that "to accept some moral judgment is eo ipso to be motivated in a certain way" (Hare 1993, 458). As a consequence, an internalist will employ concepts such as sympathy, benevolence, or self-interest. The moral externalist, however, starts by assuming that a moral judgment can be accepted independent of our motivation. She has a moral duty even though she lacks any inclination to act accordingly.

On the other hand, the distinction between intrinsicalism/extrinsicalism tackles the particular way in which moral philosophers regard the nature of moral norms. The moral philosophers which fall into the first category consider that ethical norms have a certain objective property which, as a result, makes them necessarily desirable. In contrast, extrinsicalist philosophers deny the fact that a moral rule might have such a property. For this category of philosophers, norms represent conventions which have a practical use, namely that of resolving issues that emerge in the interactions between individuals.

In the light of these distinctions, Socaciu talks about two types of ethical theories. The first one assumes rule intrinsicalism and an externalist approach to moral motivation, the paradigmatic examples of this category being Kant's deontological theory or John Stuart Mill's utilitarianism.[3] On the other hand, we have moral philosophers who consider that ethical rules have but a mere practical purpose, and that people respect those rules only because they serve their interests—the examples of this which Socaciu discusses are contractarianism and moral evolutionism, with the main difference between moral contractarianism and moral evolutionism being the emphasis they put on rationality. If the philosophical assumptions of Hobbes or Gauthier are constructivist, moral evolutionists like Hume or Hayek abandon the view that reason is all-powerful. Nevertheless, they do not favor an irrational perspective; rather, one of their main hypotheses could be summed up as follows: the normative aspects of ethics cannot be deduced from a view that reason is omnipotent. More specifically, as Hume himself puts it, "morals excite passions and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason" (Hume [1738] 1978, 457).

Up to this point, we could define moral evolutionism as the meta-ethical perspective according to which our motivation is internalist and that ethical rules have only a practical purpose. Moreover, the moral evolutionist does not share the constructivist assumption of a contractarian. The other characteristics of this philosophical tradition become obvious if we take a closer look at Socaciu's interpretation of David Hume. He conjectures that in the *Treatise* we can find the seminal approach to ethics from the point of view of the evolutionist moral philosophers:

> [T]he emphasis on reciprocity as a generative mechanism, the explanation of the emergence of rules through a spontaneous process, without assuming the existence of an imposing agent and also the idea that there is an adaptive value of rules with regard to concrete sets of issues, a fact which might explain their variability but also the reason why, at some point, a particular set of rules does the job better. (Socaciu 2009, 265–266)

2. Robert Nozick and the metaphysical tradition in ethics: *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*

When asked about the particularities of Robert Nozick's ethical theory, most philosophers would usually conclude that he subscribes to a form of deontology. This answer would not be surprising since most people have in mind his first work *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*. Even though his book does not advance a clear ethical theory, I believe that his suggestions, either implicit or explicit, hint towards intrinsicalism with regard to ethical norms and externalism when it comes to moral motivation. This is due mostly to the fact that the ethical framework of *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* could be reconstructed in the deontological and metaphysical tradition of John

[3] For a concise account of his analysis see Socaciu (2009, 253–256).

Locke and Immanuel Kant.[4]

First of all, Nozick borrows the concept of self-ownership from Locke. As a consequence, the natural rights of individuals should be defined in a Lockean manner as follows: “though the Earth and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man has a *Property* in his own *Person*. This no Body has any Right to but Himself” (Locke [1632–1704] 1988, 287). In short, this type of political discourse regarding rights is not based upon an empirical analysis regarding how people act in society, but upon the Lockean Natural Law.

With regard to the Kantian elements, Nozick appears to have developed his work from the formula of humanity as an end in itself as inspired by the German philosopher: “Act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” (Kant [1785] 1996, 80). Unsurprisingly, Nozick shares the Kantian view that human beings, in virtue of being rational beings, are ends in themselves who deserve to be treated with dignity. This principle of humanity as an end in itself limits the freedom of each individual and all their subjective purposes. All moral agents, understood as rational individuals under the moral law, belong to what Kant calls the “Kingdom of ends.”(83)

I conjecture that this ethical framework, representative of a metaphysical approach to ethics, would allow us to make sense of the Nozickian concept of side constraints: individual rights impose a moral constraint on the possible list of actions which we may undertake, being grounded on the right of self ownership of each and every one of us. As a consequence, each person possesses the right to non-interference in her moral space; and, the same person has the moral duty not to transgress the moral limits of other individuals. In Nozick's own terms, “in contrast to incorporating rights into the end state to be achieved, one might place them as side constraints upon the actions to be done: don't violate side constraints *C*. The rights of others determine the constraints upon your actions” (Nozick 1974, 29).

These moral rights are anterior and the prerequisites of any type of political organization, and individuals have these rights regardless of the time and place they exist. Furthermore, Nozick himself makes a claim which links him with the metaphysical tradition in ethics. As he points out, “side constraints upon action reflect the underlying Kantian principle that individuals are ends and not merely means; they may not be sacrificed or used for the achieving of other ends without consent. Individuals are inviolable […] Side constraints express the inviolability of other persons” (1974, 31–32). As a consequence, we are bound to reach the following conclusion: Nozick's side constraints represent a type of normative demand which has an objective and inherently desirable existence. With regard to moral motivation, while not providing an encompassing analysis, the implicit suggestions are in line with an externalist perspective. Why shouldn't we violate the moral rights of other individuals and act in accordance with the libertarian principle of prohibiting the initiation of aggression against others? In short, Nozick's response would be that we are bound to respect this moral request because they “reflect the fact of our separate existence” (1974, 33). If Kant talks about “respect for moral law” (Kant [1785] 1996, 56), Nozick parallels this view with his idea of respect for the quest for the meaning of life for each individual (Nozick 1974, 48–51).

As things stand, my conclusion is that we should consider his ethical theory as belonging to the metaphysical tradition in ethics, with its emphasis on rule intrinsicalism and externalist motivation—but this is only a part of the story. After *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, Nozick's works in the field of ethics paint a different picture. Marking a departure from a Kantian and Lockean approach, he abandons the view that we should ground ethics on any type of Kantian Law of Reason, opting for (as a consequence) an evolutionist framework. My hypothesis, which will be developed in the next section of the paper, is that Nozick's evolutionist turn starts with his perspective on rationality.

3. *The Nature of Rationality*: Nozick's evolutionist turn.[5]

In *The Nature of Rationality,* Robert Nozick's implicit assumption may be summed up as follows: if we wish to effectively explore the relevant aspects

[4] Uszkai (2018) makes this argument in more detail.

[5] A more extensive analysis of evolutionism and Nozick’s philosophy can be found in Uszkai (2017).

about rationality, our best chance is to do it by using the best scientific framework available, viz. evolutionary biology. In the case of humans, rationality represents (for evolutionary biologists) a feature which evolved as an adaptation to the environment, one shaped by the process of evolution and natural selection.

Human beings are always present in environments (either natural or social) which are constantly changing. As a consequence of the need for adaptation, we needed some sort of a mechanism which would enable us to respond better to certain types of local circumstances which presuppose irregular change: "the whole job could be done effectively by permanent structure and prewired responses, along with operant conditioning" (Nozick 1993, 120). Defining rationality as a feature that facilitates the existence of a capacity to take into account (or to act on the basis of) certain proofs, Nozick considers that the having opinions and acting upon proofs are essential features that have contributed, in the past, to an increase in the level of fitness of our ancestors.

Judging through the lens of this evolutionist framework, we can easily observe that Nozick abandons the classical view which he upheld, namely that of a Kantian type of reason. Following his "evolutionist turn," reason is substituted with rationality, which has merely an instrumental value and is understood in a Humean framework. Rationality is nothing more and nothing less than an adaptive tool which facilitated the evolution of humans.

But rationality was a useful tool for our ancestors only in dealing with the natural environments they found themselves. For Nozick, it also has a role in social and cultural frameworks. As he puts it:

> [S]ocial institutions and social structures are maintained by people's actions and choices within the constraints and incentive structures they face, which themselves are set up by other institutions and the behavior of other people within them. Like a large jigsaw puzzle, where each piece fits only in the space left by all other pieces, each person's actions are performed within the space of constraints and incentives left open by the actions of all others. Institutions will have continuity when they are able to *reproduce* themselves, when in conjunction with the other institutions in the society they are able to recruit, train, and provide incentives to new members and functionaries. Part of this training may involve norms and habits of rationality, modes of choice and belief formation. (Nozick 1993, 125; italics in original)

In effect, another function of rationality, in this evolutionist perspective, is that of being responsive to institutional or ethical incentives but also to facilitate their existence.

While short, the purpose of this section was that of highlighting the shift in Nozick's methodology. In Binmore's terms, this could be described as an abandonment of metaphysics and an option for scientific, evolutionist explanations. With regard to ethics, however, I plan to show that this has just been the tip of the iceberg in the remainder of the paper.

4. Towards an internalist conception about moral motivation

In both *The Nature of Rationality* and *Invariances*, Nozick does not offer a detailed description of moral motivation. Even so, as in other cases,[6] he does leave some useful clues for someone who wishes to engage in a philosophical reconstruction of his point of view.

I consider that a useful starting point would be Nozick's critique of Kant's theory of moral motivation. As I pointed out earlier, the only thing which should motivate an agent to act according to certain moral rules is that opaque notion of *respect* for the moral law. Robert Nozick, however, strongly opposes this view on the grounds that Kant does nothing more than distort the context in which ethical rules and principles function, by eliminating the factors with which they were programmed to work with: in his *Groundwork*, Kant states that only the behavior which stems directly from moral principles—from the moral law—without any influence from our inclinations, represents the ultimate standard for morality. Nozick opposes this view. He says that these

> principles […] are devices—I do not say they are an evolutionary adaptation—formed to function in tandem with already existing de-

[6] This "methodological" approach appears to be a trademark for the entire list of major works from Nozick. A useful comparison for the present topic is the example of *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* discussed above.

> sires, some of which were biologically instilled […] Yet Kant truncates the context in which principles are able to function by eliminating the co factors they are designed to function with; principles alone are to do all the work, the very idea of a principle. (Nozick 1993, 123)

His critique of Kant's externalist perspective on motivation goes even further though.

Nozick, in his critique, reiterates the idea that principles and rules must depend upon a context where they will work alongside and with certain preexisting desires. As a consequence, he rejects the Kantian attempt to derive goals from the notion of rationality itself. As Nozick states:

> [T]he Kantian attempt to divorce principles from *any* given goals and then to derive goals or specific constraints upon maxims of conduct from the bare notion of adherence to principles fails. If our rational procedures were designed to work in tandem with given biological goals (or with desires and goals whose pursuit was statistically correlated in our evolutionary past with the enhancement of inclusive fitness), then it is not surprising that an attempt rationally to derive goals *de novo*, starting without *any* goals or desires, fails. (1993, 163)

Nozick's critique of the Kantian conception of moral motivation paves the way for an internalist conception, with an emphasis on desires.

Up to this point I have analyzed only what his perspective *is not*, namely a moral internalist one; I now wish to explore a more positive agenda on this matter. Paralleling Hume, Nozick states that rational opinions can't motivate moral behavior. More precisely, "to make something a goal is, in part, to adopt a desire to find a feasible route from where you are to the achievement of that goal" (1993, 146). I believe that this desire which Nozick talks about here should be understood as being similar to what other moral philosophers talk about when they use internalist assumptions in order to analyze moral motivation. In effect, we could either speak of self-interest or sympathy and benevolence.

A still more powerful argument aimed to prove that Nozick's later ethical theory abandons a Kantian perspective on motivation could be developed: he recognizes that individuals act, more or less, according to the standard models of decision theory and an emphasis on maximizing utility. However, while accepting the model, he does consider that it has to be adapted so as to make sense of certain interactions which do not fit the paradigmatic explanation:

> [A]n elaborate theory of rational decisions has been developed by economists and statisticians, and put to widespread use in theoretical and policy studies. This is a powerful, mathematically precise, and tractable theory. Although its adequacy as a description of actual behavior has been widely questioned, it stands as the dominant normative view. I believe this standard decision theory needs to be expanded to incorporate explicitly considerations about the symbolic meaning of actions […]. (1993, 41)

Nozick's objection towards standard explanations of decision theory are not uncommon. For example, his own proposal, the introduction of this variable which quantifies symbolic utility, is similar to Cristina Bicchieri's idea that we need to introduce a parameter to quantify the propensity for norm compliance (2006, 100–140). However, this particular dissatisfaction should not be construed as either undermining decision theory and a rejection of the general framework, given that Nozick accepts the assumption that people act in order to maximize their utility — be it either evidential, causal, or symbolic (1993, 42–50)—an acceptance which makes him an internalist on the issue of moral motivation.

5. *Invariances*: the extrinsicalist and functionalist Nozick

In analyzing the genealogy of ethics, Nozick's premise is that we could undertake such a task only if we take a closer look at evolutionary biology and anthropology. As a consequence, he reveals that

> it seems plausible that ethics is ubiquitous across societies because it performs a function that humans in association everywhere have found extremely important, even necessary. Perhaps ethical capacity of some sort was biologically instilled in order to aid in this function; perhaps ethics is so important a cultural tool that every society (or at least every socie-

> ty that has survived for some time) has found its way to culturally instill it. In either case, the presence of ethics is associated with this function. (2001, 239)

His reason for approaching ethics in this perspective resides in the idea that having a starting point which is strictly ethical would be too restrictive.[7] For example, a Kantian moral philosopher might say that, in order to be able to talk about a normative component of behavior through ethical rules, we are bound to do it only in terms of *respect* for the moral law. As I pointed out earlier, Nozick rejects this idea from Kant, believing that the ubiquity of ethics demands a larger pool of ethical attitudes spiced up with an anthropological type of axiological neutrality.

So, what is the function of ethics and of ethical rules in *Invariances*? First of all, Nozick rejects the idea that ethics exists in order to allow people to justify their behavior to one another. This type of process, namely that of justification, is quite complex and sophisticated, though it is safe to say that normative behavior existed long before this type of need. The particular sphere where this function of ethics has to be identified (so Nozick hypothesizes) is the social and cultural framework where individuals interact.

It is interesting to note, however, that Nozick also rejects a holistic methodology. In his own words:

> [M]y actions are connected with yours when the outcome of some action of yours varies, depending upon what I do. My actions can affect the outcome of one of your actions. Our actions are mutually connected when my actions are connected with yours, and yours with mine. Frequently, the actions of different people are mutually connected and the outcomes are nontrivially [*sic*] affected. This is the background that gives rise to ethics. (2001, 240)

Furthermore, the biological evolution of our species played an important role in establishing the mechanisms (such as cooperation) which have to do with the results of our interaction in social contexts. As evolutionary biologists have often emphasized, there is a clear tendency of all living creatures to act, as a result of the mechanisms earlier mentioned, in order to maximize their interests.

In this context, Nozick is particularly interested in the capacity of human beings to coordinate and guide their actions using norms of all sort, but especially ethical ones. He suggests that, taking a closer look at the particular way in which we employ them in our behavior, we will surely come about to the conclusion that the function of moral norms is that of coordinating "our actions with those of others to mutual benefit in a way that goes beyond the coordination achieved through evolutionary instilled desires and patterns of behavior [...]. The coordination that ethics achieves is more extensive and better adapted to new and changing circumstances and opportunities" (2001, 240). I consider that we may restate his view as follows: people have a natural, biologically instilled desire to cooperate because this brings about better results for the agents interacting in social contexts. But this instinct is not enough, given that some people may cheat. As a result, we need ethical rules of some sort because they manage to be a cost-effective way to better coordinate our actions.

The previous idea will become much clearer shortly. Nozick goes on to distinguish further between four types of actions in which coordination might bring about a mutual benefit: actions in which all agents have the same goal; separate goals but complementary actions; personal goals in which others do not coerce you to act otherwise; and, finally (but not least), actions in which people coordinate their actions and cooperate using the same norms. This last category is when individuals act alongside other people who share an ethical framework comprised by rules and norms which are common knowledge. It is in this latter sense that we understand Nozick's shift toward the evolutionist approach from that of the metaphysical. As I have shown we may accurately assert that Nozick develops an internalist conception of moral motivation; however, this is not enough in order to say that he has immersed himself in an evolutionary approach. We also need to identify the functionalist and rule extrinsicalist aspects.

[7] I consider that this idea could be compared to his search in *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* to provide a fundamental explanation of the realm of politics in ethical terms. In a manner of speaking, he employs this type of fundamental explanation of ethics when discussing the role of anthropology and evolutionary biology in *Invariances*, as well.

To address this issue, as I have tried to show in this section, is not such a difficult task. In his last work *Invariances*, I have identified both of these aspects. First of all, he offers a functionalist explanation for the existence of ethics: it exists because it manages to perform the function of coordinating our actions, through norms of cooperation, towards mutual benefit. Unsurprisingly, Nozick rejects the metaphysical approach regarding ethical norms, or one which asserts that they instantiate some sort of an inherently desirable property. Rather, ethical norms are merely conventions which emerge from repeated interactions between agents in game theoretic situations, with the purpose of smoothing the path for cooperation and coordination of our activities towards mutual benefit.[8]

6. Concluding remarks

All things considered, Nozick went down in history as one of the most important figures in modern-day libertarian political philosophy. In his last public interview, before dying in 2002, he publicly recognized that he abandoned the particular brand of libertarianism he had endorsed in his early career. What might have motivated, at least in part, the evolution of his political sentiments had to do with his abandonment of a Kantian approach to ethics. At the end of the day, he says, it all comes down to philosophical methodology and the issue of making progress:

> Well, it's hard to make progress on philosophical topics. A lot of them seem to have been intractable. So one faces a choice between adding a wrinkle to a view you yourself (or someone else) have developed, that hasn't quite gotten all the way, or trying an approach from a new angle that might illuminate something else about some other aspect of ethics, whether or not it gets all the way. I guess my tendency is to think essentially that the new wrinkles won't do the job if the old major idea didn't, and so you have to try something different. Then maybe they can all be combined in some coherent piece. (Sanchez 2001)

The old Kantian wrinkles are abandoned following his evolutionist turn in both ethics and general philosophy, within an even larger trend in contemporary scholarly work. What primatologists like Frans de Waal (1996; 2013) and psychologists like Michael Tomasello (2016)—to name just a few—have shown that the evolutionist framework is fertile when it comes to shedding light on moral behavior. The same things can be said about the relevance of the recent empirical work done by moral psychologists like Haidt (2012) and Greene (2013). One can only wonder how much more Nozick could have contributed to ethics using his analytical skills.

[8] "Game theory, with it's accompanying equilibria notions, describes how actions can be *strategically* coordinated" (Nozick 2001, 244).

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PROCESSUALITY AS REFUSAL OF "FREEZING," "ETERNIZING," OR FRAGMENTING OF THE FLOW OF REALITY

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Abstract:

Processuality as refusal to "freeze," "eternize," and fragment reality is an attempt to deconstruct the I's main mechanism, which is, as it was named in psychoanalysis, the compulsion of repetition. Through this deceit and illusion fabrication mechanism, the knowing I tries to "freeze", to "fixate" and to fragment reality, through "catching" it in different images, formulae, dogmas, theories, ideologies, symbols and systems which become just as many "icons" or graven images of reality. This attempt of deconstruction is made from the perspective of a philosophy/vision of process, quite sporadic in the Western space, bringing arguments from the perspective of Henri Bergson and Emil Cioran's intuitionist philosophy, as well as from that of the new scientific paradigm of quantum mechanics. All these philosophies could be seen as philosophies of process, demanding as it were an understanding of reality in terms of process, and not of result. This understanding of process takes place with the help of intuition, the only one which can grasp, beyond the static, rigid and artificial concepts or categories of the intellect, the movement, "verb" or interior pulsation of things within the framework of an integration process which reveals the unity, non-separability, intercorrelation and mutual interconnectivity of things.

Key words: knowing I, compulsion of repetition, process, flux, intuition, intellect, reality, fragmentation, "freezing", movement, non-separability, global intercorrelation.

1. For a philosophy of process

Understanding reality under the form of a *process* in which everything—life, individual, Universe—is a universal flux of flow represents a constant in Eastern thought and philosophy. However, in the space of Western thought and philosophy, based on the "principle of individuation" (viz. on looking for some ultimate or finite individual entities that are considered fundamental, separate, autonomous, and self-standing), understanding reality as a process appears only sporadically. Starting with Heraclitus, for whom "everything flows" (Bohm 1995, 97) we continue with the Bergsonian *intuitionism* of life as "vital impulsion" (Bergson 1911, 50–51) "creative evolution" (Bergson 1911, 161–162), and "pure duration" (Bergson 1911, 46) as impossible to determine through the categories of the intellect. We then conclude with Whitehead's *philosophy of organism*, in which "being" and "becoming" are not separate but connected, the way in which an entity becomes by expressing what that entity is (Pârvu 1990, 224).

Today, our understanding reality as a process could be founded upon and scientifically validated by the new paradigm of quantum mechanics which, by viewing the world as a "whole" or an indivisible process, impossible to analyze in separate parts, showed that during this process we can no longer speak of the existence of some fundamental, ultimate, separate, autonomous, and self-standing entities. Within the new perspective of quantum mechanics, physicist David Bohm went the furthestto understand reality in terms of process; he did this by stating that it is not only that everything flows, changes, and becomes, but that everything, matter and consciousness included, represent an indivisible flow in which entities (objects, events, structures) are just abstractions of thought from that totality of movement which is impossible to comprise, measure, or apprehend (Bohm 1995, 98). Considered one of the most original and remarkable representatives of quantum mechanics, Bohm was among the few scientists who understood that quantum theory does not proceed from a philosophically neutral point of view, but that the processual vision (non-separable and non-fragmentary) of quantum mechanics implies significant insights for a general image of the world and for consciousness in humanity. It should be noted that, as opposed to other scientists, Bohm's main scientific and philosophical preoccupation was "understanding the nature of reality in general, and of consciousness in particular, as a coherent whole, which is never static or complete, but which is a never ending *process* of movement and unfolding" (Bohm 1995, 27).

What Bohm dreams of here is the very nature of movement. In this sense he shows that when we think of something we do so in a static manner, which is to say through a series of static images which interrupt, fragment and "freeze" the process or the undivided flux and flow which we feel in the real experience of movement (Bohm 1995, 27). Through this he offers a ruptured, abstract, and simplified "still shot" of reality (Bohm 1995, 28). By asking himself if thought can go further past these stills or "frames" of reality, in order to grasp the very essence of movement which we feel through real experience, Bohm shows that thought itself is part of a real process of movement, in which one can observe a direction of flow in the flux or "stream" of consciousness, similar to the direction of flow in the flux of matter. Through this similarity of movement, thought becomes an integrated part of reality as a whole, so that thought (consciousness) and reality (matter) cannot be seen as being separate, but intimately correlated. This aspect confronts us, according to Bohm, with the following challenge: how can we think in a holistic way about reality taken as an undivided process, in which consciousness and matter, *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, are united or intimately complicated through the indivisible thread of movement, thus surpassing the classic analytical model in which the one who thinks considers him- or herself separate and detached from the reality about which they ponder? According to Bohm, to think about reality holistically (viz. undivided and unfragmented) refers to the problem of "plentitude and totality" (Bohm 1995, 28), which is to say a vision or general, integral, and unitary image of the world which is expressible in the terms of process.

As any philosophy of process tends to open rather than close—integrating rather than fragmenting reality within the attempt to fuse and integrate the world—then any philosophy of process will be, implicitly or explicitly, a deconstruction of any attempt of the 'knowing I' to "freeze," "fixate," and fragment the process of the flow of reality, establishing itself as a refusal to "freeze," "eternize," or absolutize the fragment.

2. Bergson's intuitional philosophy as refusal to "freeze" the flow or process of reality

This absolutizing of the fragment is specific to the 'knowing I', and this specificity places interest in what psychoanalysis considers to be one of the main defense mechanisms of the 'I', which is *the compulsion of repetition* (Freud 1992, 56) through which the 'knowing I' tries to abscond from the flow of life by absolutizing, permanentizing, isolating, and separating itself. By not fusing with the source, the original, it remains at the stage of fragment which considers itself as being separated from the whole.

Such a refusal to absolutize the fragment also appears in Henri Bergson's *intuitional philosophy*, which can also be interpreted in terms of a philosophy of process. Criticizing the prior metaphysical systems for having "frozen," absolutized, and fragmented the flux of reality in a static and immobile form, one beyond time, movement, becoming, or change perceptible through senses, Bergson shows that the metaphysical systems did not succeed in becoming more than an "arrangement" of artificial concepts. Claiming to surpass experience, these merely managed to replace it with a fixed extract, drained and emptied, along with a system of general and abstract ideas which resulted from the superficial layers of this experience (Bergson 1995, 12). Just as the chrysalis from which the caterpillar transforms into a butterfly need not be kept or absolutized, but left aside because the rationality of being of the live butterfly does not consist of the "fixedness of the membrane" or outer layer, so does Bergson consider that we need to leave aside the fixedness and immobility of the conceptual outer layer so that we can restore mobility to movement, fluidity to change and duration to time" (Bergson 1995, 12).

The desideratum of true metaphysics becomes for Bergson *the process* and its fundamental element—"pure duration," impossible to grasp through the fixed and static categories of the intellect. This pure duration (or interior duration), the continuity and indivisible flow which represents for Bergson the real duration, opposes the artificial and external duration which has no connection either to time or real movement. Up until now, through means of duration, only moments or "virtual standstills of time" (Bergson 1995, 7) were calculated, but duration itself was never taken into consideration, at least not in the way it appears to consciousness in a pure state. This is to say that consciousness does not intervene but merely perceives it—without stopping it, without measuring it, without dividing or fragmenting it, only to recompose it in an artificial manner (Bergson 1995, 8).

Because of the fact that the essence of duration is the indivisible flow, all states and "still shots" extracted from the flux of change are not real, merely representing elusions operated by our intellect, the only real element being for both Bergson and David Bohm the flux/process of flow and uninterrupted, indivisible change. By observing the structure of human intellect, Bergson shows that (due to practical necessities) the basic function of the intellect has come to be "exactly that of masking the duration, both in movement as in change" (Bergson 1995, 9); our intellect is only looking for fixedness and immobility as virtual extractions from flux/process, these extractions being no more than "still shots" taken by our intellect from the continuity of movement and duration. "Through the juxtaposition of sequences, a practical succession of time and movement is reached and adapted to the demands of language, but is no more than an artificial reconstruction, while time and movement are something else" (Bergson 1995, 11). This "masking" takes place within change as well, with our intellect dividing and artificially fragmenting change in successive states which are considered separate and distinctive, and then trying to reconstruct the unit, by reuniting or recomposing said states just as artificially and this way obtaining, through the series of juxtaposed states, the same practical succession of change, which replaces real change.

If, according to the traditional conception of movement and change, movement is seen as a series of positions and change as a series of states, then time appears as being assembled from distinctive and juxtaposed parts about which it could be said that they succeed one another; but this suggests that

> their succession resembles that of a film at the cinema: the film could roll ten, a hundred, a thousand times faster without modifying anything in that which it shows […] Succession understood thusly does not add anything, it rather suppresses something; it marks an insufficiency; translates an infirmity of perception, dammed to detail the film image by image, instead of grasping it globally. (Bergson 1995, 13)

Opposed to this mechanical, artificial, and exterior succession which does not grasp and does not bring anything new, the organic pulsation within pure duration, seen as "creative evolution," reveals continuous creation as a relentless overflow of new, spontaneity, and unpredictability. In this way Bergson states that "between an evolution whose continuous phases interlock through a type of inner growth and a rewinding whose distinctive parts juxtapose, there is a radical difference" (Bergson 1995, 15), one such as that between radical, absolute novelty and a rearranging of the old or preexistent (Bergson 1995, 16). In advocating for such a direct vision of reality which is "stripped" of the fixedness and immobility of the conceptual outer layer of the intellect, Bergson denies the Kantian relativism of knowledge, a relativism according to which "the object itself" cannot be known because it needs "an intuitive faculty we do not possess" (Bergson 1995, 24). Contrary to this stance, he states that this intuitive faculty appears when we give up transferring the practical habits of the intellect to the domain of metaphysics, habits which deform, "produce," and "arrange" reality in an artificial and false manner (Bergson 1995, 25).

Now, if the basic function of the intellect consists of exactly the elimination and "masking" of time or of duration, as well as the meaning of process, then the basic function of intuition consist of (contrawise) the rehabilitation of time and duration, the latter understood as the interior duration within the framework of a process which makes possible the passing from the conception — or the artificial "arrangement" of concepts which are specific to the intellect — to the direct, organic, processual, and living vision of the intuition which is the only one capable to grasp reality in its mobility, subtlety, fluidity, and processuality (Bergson 1995, 28). According to Bergson, only intuition equivalent to interior duration can grasp a succession or growth from within an indivisible continuity, similar to a melodic line in which the past fuses with the present, thereby forming with it an indivisible process (Bergson 1995, 76). By no means can the intellect (which eliminates any process and any real succession through the juxtaposition, pairing, or artificial reconstitution of reality) do this. In this way, if the intellect always starts from a concept, meaning a static, immobile, and artificial image, with which it tries to "catch," to "fixate," or to "freeze" the flowing processuality of reality in a "formula," theory, ideology, or system, the intuition always starts from processuality, meaning from mobility or movement, which it considers as being reality itself, only seeing in the immobility or fixedness of the intellect a mere abstract moment, a "photographical snapshot or a section" taken in the middle of the process, taken for a substitute of the whole (Bergson 1995, 32).

Proposing such a change in the meaning and orientation of our spirit, Bergson thus suggests a change of perception from the exteriority, spatiality, immobility, and fixedness of the categories of the intellect towards the within, the temporality, mobility, and processuality of the intuition, one which is an inversion of the sense of knowledge which must proceed from reality (intuition) towards a concept and not from concept towards reality (Bergson 1995, 201). In this way, he anticipated the change in paradigm operated by quantum mechanics in the 20th century: according to quantum mechanics, solid things and objects can no longer be mentioned when viewed from the atomic and subatomic levels, instead being seen more appropriately as "processes," events, or interactions; and, by no means are fundamental entities based on the idea of "brick" or ultimate "support." In the conferences about "the perception of change," Bergson states that the idea of "support" must be given up because "the solid must deconstruct in something else other than [the immutable] solid," given that "sooner or later physics will be able to see in the fixedness of elements a form of mobility"(Bergson 1995, 77).

Through the attempt of setting reality free from the immobile, rigid, and dogmatic outer layer of the categories of the intellect by restoring its mobility, fluidity, elasticity, and processuality with the help of intuition, Bergson tries to solve one of the basic contradictions of the intellect: projecting or transferring upon the intuitive, free, and selfless knowledge of processual reality the pragmatic and interested knowledge of the intellect (based on a goal, result, or product) by borrowing and transferring from the sphere of daily, practical, and adaptive activities. This contradiction only disappears if we start from the processual reality we try to grasp intuitively by understanding that certain fixed concepts can be extracted by the intellect from the mobile reality, but that "there is no means by which the mobility of the real can be reconstructed through the fixedness of concepts" (Bergson 1995, 208). In this manner, the contradiction of artificially reconstructing the processuality of reality with the help of the fixedness of concepts only disappears if we manage to dissolve and fluidize the rigid categories of the intellect to be able to reach "fluid concepts" which, due to intuition, can follow all "the ripples of the real" (Bergson 1995, 28). Thus, we grasp the movement, "verb," or pulsation of the interior life of reality (Bergson 1995, 208).

Considering intuition as a "fluid mass" extracted from the bottom of the sea, Bergson's intuitionist philosophy can be seen as a philosophy of process whose systematic and coherent "refusal" is directed against "freezing," "fixating," and stiffening of the fluid of intuition within the artificial shell of the concepts and categories of the intellect (Bergson 1995, 212). If within the living mobility of things and reality the intellect only deals with marking "departures" and "arrivals," then the interval between these moments will remain completely foreign to it, making it elusive and missing in this way that which is essential. Or, it is exactly within the interval between these "entries" and "exits" that everything happens. It is specifically in that interval between these moments that the inner life of things unravels, it being an absolute interval in which the coincidence of fusion between subject and object takes place. This fusion takes place on the basis of the absolute of the interior life which is common to all living things, making possible with the help of intuition — what Bergson calls the "inner spiritual sympathy" (Bergson 1995, 219) —the absolute feeling of the unity of things. This is why intuition has nothing in common with the abstraction and generalization of the experience specific to the intellect, but it can be defined as being a whole experience: it is an experience of the integration, expansion, and dilation of reality, a unifying experience which is, therefore, an absolute experience (Bergson 1995, 220).

3. Cioran's philosophy as a refusal of "freezing" or "eternizing the moment"

Inspired by the Bergsonian intuitionalism of life as a "vital impulsion," "creative evolution," or "pure duration" which is impossible to determine through the categories of the intellect, Emil Cioran's philosophy can also be interpreted from the perspective of a process philosophy. He could be seen in this sense as being contemporary not only with Bergsonian intuitionalism, but also with the new scientific paradigm of quantum mechanics, the philosophy for which also pleads for an understanding of the process.

Cioran’s approach to science comes as no surprise since he had practiced with a consistency and a rigor of scientific nature for his entire life, and this gave him a lucidity which placed him forever in the space of universal culture. This science becomes *con-science* for Cioran, and this con-science gravitates around a central theme: that of the deconstruction of the main defense mechanism of the ‘knowing I’, which is, as it was named in psychoanalysis, the compulsion of repetition. Through this mechanism which forges delusions and illusion, the ‘I’ tries to “freeze,” to “fixate,” or to “catch” the processuality of reality in an image, formula, dogma, ideology, or system, all of these becoming “graven images” of reality. It is precisely this mechanism for compulsion of repetition through which the ‘knowing I’ has the tendency to lock the moving reality of life within a static image of life, a “formula,” or a symbol, a tendency through which the ‘I’ tries to “freeze,” to “eternize,” or to “stop” the moment (i.e. the natural flux or flow of life). This is foiled in the philosophies of Bergson and Cioran, as well as in the new paradigm of quantum mechanics; all of these stand for an understanding of the process, not the result. In this way, “the fluid and undivided flow of the spirit, of life, of reality

> is fragmented in notions and concepts which are static, rigid and which make perceivable merely the shape, the exterior, [and] the appearance or shadow of reality. A rose is [not] seen, for example, but rather the notion of rose is seen, its exterior red, its shape divided in separate petals and not the rose itself, the verb, the movement, the spirit which flutters inside it, and which cannot be locked in the notion of rose […] This is valid for all the other static, limited and rigid notions through which we refuse to see what lives *in* the forms, that which transforms, which is movement, verb, spirit, life that goes through particular forms” (Ardelean 2016, 45).

According to Cioran, to stop the flux of life, to kill the natural flow of life out of the desire to immortalize it or to “keep” or “posses” it stems from the fear of dying. The fear of dying and of the new, the fear of the unknown or an existential void triggers as a defense mechanism the compulsion of repetition through which humanity tries to eternize or immortalize the moment and, in this way, to immortalize itself. Humanity tries to run from death by refusing to acknowledge the presence of death in life. This is where Cioran refuses any attempt to permanentize life, in essence to “fixate,” “freeze,” or “keep” it within an image, formula, recipe, method, dogma, ideology, or system. All the practices and social, political, economic, cultural, and religious systems are based on the compulsion of repetition through which humanity tries to avoid becoming aware of death (Pătrașcu 2014, 287). The sharpest criticism is aimed at, in this sense, religious systems and practices which are seen as inappropriate or some disguised desire for power (in the sense of “ownership” of eternity), these being driven by the same compulsion of repetition through which the ‘I’ is like the leopard who cannot change his spots.

Life as a process, as a vital impulsion , continuous movement, transformation, and creation of self cannot be permanentized, which is to say it cannot be abstracted from flux to be frozen into a formula or dogma, such as a case in which humanity yields to the temptation or the compulsion to make itself an a graven image of reality which to worship, thus conserving its shape, “letter,” while killing its spirit, “verb,” movement. Because of this, renouncement of any formulae and definitions, as well as assuming the condition of a being which moves in ever which moment from life to death, become for Cioran the imperative of truth, the imperative of reality, the imperative of process. And because the world lies, not outside, but within man, it is there that he must discover it, like a diver who, probing his own unknown, might manage to become contemporary with the original, meaning “contemporary with the creation and destruction of nature” (Cioran 1991, 38).

This is why Cioran can only truly be understood through terms of the idea of process, for which the way or process is more important than the result, the product or the “fruit”. Cioran avoids and attempt to see life through means of any formulae, dogmas or ideologies, all of these being considered the attribute of “positive” thinking, of a thinking of the slogan-propaganda type, based on the idea of result, product or “fruit.” This is where Cioran’s preference for the virtues of “negative” thinking comes from; the “negative” thinking whose purification is only obtained by negating or deconstructing the illusion of “positive” thinking, which, let us not forget, is animated and motivated by the I’s most ancient desire, the desire for power, in close connection with the coveting of “the fruit” which led to expulsion of humanity from Paradise (see Genesis 3 in the Hebrew Bible). This is also the reason for which Cioran "attacks" humanity. Because the life within the human creature does not concentrate enough energy to become a flame which would destroy the foul root of the evil which eats away at her and which guides her in the wrong direction, choosing as pulsation for this life the power, the desire for power, the desire for 'I': "To be rough, to be a beast was man's [*sic*] dream of his ideal form. And in this way he has only managed to live at the periphery of life. But the time when the human form of existence must be eliminated, in order to reach the depth of life, covered by man's illusions, has come" (Cioran 1991, 80). In this way "positive" thinking, so branded by Cioran, becomes paradigmatic for an entire system of thinking based on the obsessive cult of the goal, the result, the product, unmeasurable greed, all of which being considered the great failure of the true "target," which is the processuality, the spontaneity and the creativity of life.

As opposed to "positive" thinking, closely connected to the coveting of "the fruit" and the quantitative verb "to have" which are specific to the I's compulsion of repetition, the "negative" thinking practiced by Cioran is actually tightly linked to the disinterested and detached action towards "the fruit;" and as a result or goal, it gravitates around the qualitative verb "to be." To act without a goal, without a "fruit," does not, in fact, represent an aberration or a pathological act of will in the way it is mentioned in the books of positive thinking; rather, it represents a free, spontaneous, gratuitous, and creative action oriented not towards the outside, towards some result or which belongs to "to have," but toward the interior—the *process*—as a way which belongs to "to be." Cioran seems in this way to have intuited that only that detached and disinterested "to be" which acts globally, without chasing a certain result, makes possible, paradoxically, exactly the splendor of "the fruit" the splendor of the moment, the splendor of life.

Through this lucid and systematic deconstruction of the I's compulsion to repetition, which realizes the fact that we cannot actually keep, poses or gather anything (substantial) except merely at an illusory level, Cioran practically takes on the condition of Sisyphus: that of being "damned" to forever start over, never keeping anything and always pendulating between life and death, creation and destruction. Shattering the I's compulsion of repetition is, thus, equivalent to sacrificing the deepest instinct, which is the instinct of possession, the instinct of "to have," closely connected to the instinct of power which, as soon as it accumulates and gathers materially and intellectually, dogmas, formulae, or ideologies kill the free, gratuitous and detached spirit of "the fruit" or of the result of "to be". In this way, to learn how to die in each moment means to kill in each moment any form of possession, attachment, gathering, or "to have" since all of these are the past, the old, the result of conserving the "to be" which is the present, or the new. This basically means to take on the condition of Sisyphus and to be contemporary with the creation and destruction of nature, meaning contemporary with the creation of the newness of the present and the destruction of the old and the past.

The refusal to eternize the moment or the refusal to freeze processual reality in an image or "formula" which becomes a grave is, therefore, based for Cioran on the larger and more comprehensive perspective of the process, which, as already mentioned, tends rather to open and to *integrate reality*. So, to think in terms of the process—as Cioran does—means to intuit at the very least, as Bergson states, that change in direction from multiplicity/exteriority towards unity/interiority; in other words, to intuit that reverse movement in the shift of the center of gravity from the whole towards the fragment, from the general towards the individual/particular, in the sense that the whole center of gravity of the world shifts and "fertilizes" over the individual who is called to "contain" it, to integrate it, and finally to deliver it or to set it free. For we do not live in the world, but it is the world which lives in us. From this perspective the borders of the 'I' become lax, fluid, elastic, meaning undetermined, unable to be precisely mapped out. From this perspective of the indetermination of the subject, underlined also by quantum mechanics, we can ask ourselves with a feeling of great awe: *Who* speaks, lives, sighs, rejoices and suffers *in* us? Do we live in the world, or does the world, with all its content, live in us? "It is not me who suffers in the world," states Cioran in this sense, but it is the world who suffers in me. The individual exists merely to the extent that he concentrates the mute sufferings of things, from rag to cathedral. And in the same way, he is not life except in the moment in which, from worm to God, living things rejoice and moan in him" (Cioran 1991, 46).

I am, to put it in other words, the World, the content of the world, and the world is I—in an intimate and mutual integration and non-separability. This organic and integratory intuition of Cioran's synthesizes as well as possible one of the basic principles of quantum mechanics, which is *the principle of non-separability* or mutual and universal correlation of things, according to which the fragment is not separated from the whole, but "contains" or reflects the whole and vice versa, the behavior of the fragment being determined by its global connections" (Capra 1999, 234), by its connections to the entire Universe.

Cioran seems to intuit in this way the terrible fact that it is not us as individual consciousnesses that struggle and suffer in the world, but, because of the (quantic) connection with the whole, the entire content of human consciousness struggles, suffers, and lives in us, demanding its freedom. This equates to the discovery and understanding of the fact that *the individual basically represents the entire human kind,* being responsible for its destiny, in the sense of living a life which is not only mine but belongs to the entire humanity.

4. The philosophy of quantum mechanics as refusal to "freeze" or fragment the flux/process of reality

Incidentally, in the 20th century, this vision of non-separability of things was fully confirmed by the new paradigm of quantum mechanics which states that the world cannot be fragmented, meaning analyzed, in terms of separable reality. On the contrary, the world is seen as a coherent entity, as a dynamic "weave" of events in interaction, in which each part is connected to all the others in the Universe, each part contains the whole, and the action of one part performs over all the others—*non-separability* (Bohm 1995, 24). This expresses a dynamic, organic and non-separable reality in which the rigid distinctions with which we have come accustomed to operate, those of the part-whole type, subject-object, observer-observed object, individual-society, conscience-matter, lose their validity, they absorb each other and become fluid and unfragmented concepts which describe the unique process of a flowing, non-crumbling and indivisible reality.

Therefore, in the conception of present physics, everything in the Universe is connected and, very importantly, "nothing has an essential character within itself, the properties of the parts not being determined by a fundamental law, but by the properties of all the other parts of the whole" (Capra 1999, 219). This global intercorrelation, which expresses the quintessence of quantum reality, therefore negates the existence of elementary or "final" particles, not accepting any fundamental entity, revealing as a first, fundamental reality the non-separability of interconnection of the material world and of the conscience, within the frame of a process of dynamic connections, relations or mutual interdependencies between the different parts of a unitary, indivisible and non-separable whole.

If Blaga could foresee the future occurrence of some problems "whose solution would amaze us more than posing said problems" (Blaga 19977, 199), then "the solutions" proposed by the new paradigm of quantum mechanics can surprise or "amaze" us exactly because they come ever closer to an integrative and holistic way of understanding, specific rather to philosophy, art and religion, based on the non-dual and unitary perspective of life, of art which sees things in a fluid, flowing and undivided manner, in which the subject is not separated from the object, in this way validating one of the oldest and fundamental human intuitions, that of world unity.

5. Conclusions

All three types of philosophies presented – the Bergsonian philosophy, Cioran's philosophy and the philosophy of quantum mechanics – plead, thusly, for an understanding of reality in terms of process, establishing themselves as a systematic and coherent refusal against "freezing", "fixating" and fragmenting the flowing flux of reality, with the help of static, rigid and artificial concepts or categories of the intellect, which divide and fragment the process of reality.

Likewise, all three types of process philosophy propose an inversion, a change of sense or direction from exteriority/multiplicity towards interiority/unity/uniqueness, probing, with the help of intuition, the phenomena of the inner world or, in quantum terminology, the phenomena of the subatomic world, thus grasping, beyond appearances, outer layers or shapes, the movement, the "verb" or the pulsation of the interior life of things, within the framework of a *process of experience integration* which reveals the unity, intercorrelation and mutual interconnectivity of things.

Finally, all three types of process philosophy criticize *the I's mechanism of deceit and illusion fabrication of the 'knowing I' through which it tries to "freeze", to "fixate" and to fragment the processuality of reality through "catching" it in different* *images, formulae, dogmas, theories, ideologies, symbols and systems which become just as many graven images of reality*. Through this mechanism, named in psychoanalysis the compulsion of repetition, the 'knowing I' tends to close or stop the flowing reality into a static image, which becomes graven, thus missing the true target, which is processuality, spontaneity and creativity of life.

Notes

i. The idea of a process seen as a flux in which everything is born, grows, decreases, and vanishes expresses a dynamic vision about life, the Universe, and the individual, a vision through which David Bohm positions himself in the lineage of Eastern philosophers, as well as in the lineage of Western philosophers like Heraclitus, Bergson, and Whitehead.

ii. It is difficult not to notice here a striking similarity between Bergson's argumentation and that of physicist Bohm: the latter considers that one of the major errors of the intellect which is responsible for fragmenting and dividing reality consists exactly in the confusion between resemblance and distinction; through this, our intellect divides, separates, or deconstructs that which is not to be deconstructed (namely, what is similar) and then reconstructs or unifies that which is not to be unified (namely, what is different), resulting in a *false division and a false unification* (Bohm 1994, 4).

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WHAT IS CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS?

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Abstract:
In the present inquiry I explore the concept of conceptual analysis, looking for ways for it to be improved, and I come to the following conclusions. Conceptual analysis as ordinarily understood in analytic philosophy is a method which consists in drawing a conclusion about what the definition of a predicate is on the basis of an armchair investigation into whether the predicate is semantically applicable in different possible cases; but, the concept of conceptual analysis can be improved by making two changes to it: 1) the investigation into whether the predicate is semantically applicable in different possible cases is not to serve as a basis for a conclusion about what the definition of the predicate is, but as a basis for a conclusion about whether this-and-this is an only necessary, only sufficient, both necessary and sufficient, or neither necessary nor sufficient condition for the predicate's semantic application; 2) the investigation into whether the predicate is semantically applicable in different possible cases is done not only from the armchair, but also empirically.

Key words: conceptual analysis, application conditions, armchair, empirical.

1. Framework of the Inquiry.

The question "What is conceptual analysis?" might be said to be about the meaning of the expression "conceptual analysis." The meaning of an expression can be explained in different ways, but the most straightforward way would be to provide a definition of the expression, so in the present inquiry I will try to provide a definition of the expression "conceptual analysis." Before I do so, it is important to note that definitions can be classified in different ways. With respect to their form, definitions in general can be divided into ostensive definitions, dictionary definitions, and analytic definitions, that is, definitions that provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the concept expressed by the expression. Since analytic definitions are the most precise, my aim will be to provide an analytic definition.[1]

With respect to their purpose, definitions in general can be divided into two kinds: definitions whose purpose does not involve describing any aspects of an existing linguistic meaning; and definitions whose purpose involves describing at least one aspect of an existing linguistic meaning. The former can be called "stipulative," whereas the latter can in turn be divided into two further kinds: definitions whose purpose involves describing all aspects of the existing linguistic meaning; and definitions whose purpose does not involve describing all aspects of the existing linguistic meaning. The former can be called "descriptive." If we assume that the person giving the definition is paying attention to all aspects of the existing linguistic meaning, then we can say that if the purpose does not involve describing all aspects, it involves changing the aspects that are not to be described. Therefore, under this assumption the definitions whose purpose involves describing some (but not all) aspects of an existing linguistic meaning can be divided into definitions whose purpose involves improving the concept expressed by the expression whose meaning is partially described,[2] and

[1] In the present inquiry, I will assume that the definitional theory of concepts is true.

[2] In personal conversations, Rosen Liutskanov and others have expressed skepticism about the possibility of improving a concept, but there are a significant number of

definitions whose purpose does not involve improving this concept. For lack of better names, they can respectively be called "aiming improvement" and "aiming change, but not improvement."

Thus, we can speak of the following four kinds of definition with respect to their purpose:[3]

> *Stipulative definition*—a definition whose purpose does not involve describing any aspects of an existing linguistic meaning.
>
> *Descriptive definition*—a definition whose purpose involves describing all aspects of an existing linguistic meaning.
>
> *Definition aiming improvement*—a definition whose purpose involves describing some aspects of an existing linguistic meaning, but changing others, so that the concept under consideration is improved.
>
> *Definition aiming change, but not improvement*—a definition whose purpose involves describing some aspects of an existing linguistic meaning, but changing others for reasons, different from improving the concept under consideration.

The definition I will give will belong to one of these kinds. In order to answer the question of what conceptual analysis is, I will first investigate the meaning the expression "conceptual analysis" has in analytic philosophy; after this, I will consider whether the concept expressed by the expression can be somehow improved. If I don't find a way for it to be improved, the definition I will give will be descriptive—given with the purpose of describing all aspects of the meaning the expression has in analytic philosophy. On the other hand, if I come to the conclusion that the concept can be somehow improved, I will adopt this improvement, and thus the definition I will give will be "aiming improvement"—given with the purpose of describing some aspects of the meaning the expression has in analytic philosophy, but changing others so that the concept of conceptual analysis is improved.

It must be noted that the expression "conceptual analysis" is a phrase. The meaning of a phrase is usually determined by the meaning of its constituent words, but some phrases also have some special meaning, which is independent of the meanings of the constituents. This special meaning can be called "figurative," whereas the meaning determined by the constituents (if there is one) can be called "literal." Consider as an example the expression "it's raining cats and dogs." Literally, it means that actual cats and dogs are falling from the sky; figuratively, it means that it is raining heavily, and this has nothing to do with cats and dogs. If we consider the expression "conceptual analysis" in its literal meaning, it just means "analysis of concepts." In analytic philosophy, however, it also has a figurative meaning, introduced by Grice in his 1958 paper "Postwar Oxford Philosophy" (Grice 1958).

When in a question of the type "What is the meaning of 'X'?" 'X' is an expression that has a figurative meaning, the question is about this figurative meaning and not about the literal meaning. The correct answer to the question "What is the meaning of 'it's raining cats and dogs'?" is not that it means cats and dogs are falling from the sky, but that it means it's raining heavily. Accordingly, the question "What is conceptual analysis?" or "What is the meaning of "conceptual analysis"?" is about the figurative meaning of "conceptual analysis." This figurative meaning is not as different from the literal meaning as the figurative meaning of "it's raining cats and dogs" is, but it's still different. More particularly, conceptual analysis is in the figurative meaning of the expression a special kind of analysis of concepts. The specifics of this special kind are considered in the second section of the text. For convenience's sake, I will call the figurative meaning mentioned above the "ordinary" meaning of the expression, and the concept associated with it "the ordinary concept of conceptual analysis."

In the second section of the text, I will try to provide an analytic definition of "conceptual analysis" in its ordinary meaning. Usually, providing an analytic definition is the most complete and exact

authors who speak of improvement of concepts. A paradigm case would be Carnap's explication (Carnap 1947, 7–8).

[3] Glock and Gupta classify the kinds of definitions in a similar way (Gupta 2015; Glock 2017, 90), but their classifications omit the definitions which aim for change but not improvement. The classification presented here has the advantage that (under the assumption that the person giving the definition is paying attention to all aspects of the existing linguistic meaning) it is complete, i.e. covers all possible definitions (as evident from the way it is formulated). It must also be noted that which of these kinds a definition belongs to is relative to the occasion on which the definition is given—to the purpose it is given. It is possible that the same definition be given with two different purposes on two different occasions, and that on the first occasion it belongs to one kind while belonging to another on the second occasion. In practice, however, this is rare.

way to explain the meaning of an expression, but if the expression refers to a method, some additional explanations about the application of the method might be needed. That is to say, when speaking of a method, answering the question of what it is involves answering the question of how it is conducted, and some aspects of the answer to the latter (and, therefore, also to the former) question might not become clear from an analytic definition. Conceptual analysis in the ordinary meaning of the expression is a method; I think it needs such additional explanations, so in the second section I will also provide these explanations.

In the third section I will consider whether the ordinary concept of conceptual analysis can be somehow improved. As far as conceptual analysis is a philosophical method, a given change in the ordinary concept would constitute an improvement, only if adopting it would lead to conceptual analysis having more potential for solving philosophical problems or defending philosophical theses. However, this condition—taken by itself—is not sufficient. Imagine that conceptual analysis is not the only possible philosophical method (in the present inquiry I leave the question of whether this is true open), but someone decides to change the meaning of "conceptual analysis" so that it is synonymous with "philosophical method." Such a change in the ordinary concept would provide the method with infinite potential for solving philosophical problems or defending philosophical theses, but we still wouldn't say that such a change would constitute an improvement of the ordinary concept.

In order for a given change to constitute an improvement of the ordinary concept, it is also necessary that this change is "small," i.e. that the difference between the old (i.e. the ordinary) concept and the new concept is small. The meaning of the expression "small difference between concepts" can be explained via possible worlds semantics, and, more particularly, the concept of a near possible world. We can say that the difference between two concepts is small if and only if a possible world where a given linguistic expression expresses only one of the concepts is near in relation to this linguistic expression a possible world where the expression expresses only the other concept. Thus, the difference between the old and the new concept of conceptual analysis is small, if and only if a possible world where the expression "conceptual analysis" expresses only the old concept is near in relation to this expression a possible world where the expression expresses only the new concept. And whether the two possible worlds are near is determined by whether our linguistic intuition about the expression "near possible world" is such that we would call them "near."

So far, I have distinguished two conditions which a given change in the ordinary concept of conceptual analysis must satisfy, in order to constitute an improvement of the concept. These conditions are together sufficient for the change to constitute an improvement. Thus, in order for a given change in the ordinary concept to constitute an improvement of the concept, it is necessary and sufficient that it satisfies the following two conditions:

> *Utility condition*: The new concept of conceptual analysis has more potential for solving philosophical problems or defending philosophical theses than the old one.
>
> *Proximity condition*: A possible world where the expression "conceptual analysis" expresses only the old concept is near in relation to this expression a possible world where the expression expresses only the new concept.

In the third section, I will consider various possible changes in the ordinary concept to determine whether any of them satisfy these two conditions. If a possible change does satisfy both the conditions, I will adopt it.

Some further remarks need to be made regarding the content of the third section. Generally, the possible changes I will consider will consist in adopting an aspect of a concept of conceptual analysis that is different from the ordinary concept. The philosophers who have put forward these different concepts of conceptual analysis sometimes don't explicitly state that their concept is different from the ordinary concept (may be because they are not aware of it). Other times, they point out the differences and may also criticize the ordinary concept, arguing that it is problematic or not good enough. In the present inquiry, I will not address such criticisms. As regards the fulfillment of the utility condition I will give some reasons about whether a given change fulfills it; but, as regards the fulfillment of the proximity condition no such reasons will be given—I will just go with what my intuition "tells" me (though I may point out some things which influence my intuition). As far as I am a competent speaker of English or the language of analytic philosophy, it can be assumed that others will have similar intuitions. In any case, the result from the inquiry will sound plausible only to those who have similar intuitions.

Finally, I will give a final definition of "conceptual analysis" in the fourth section. If I haven't adopted any changes, it will be the same as the definition given in the second section, but if I have adopted some changes, I will apply them to the definition given in the second section, thus providing a new definition.

2. The Ordinary Concept of Conceptual Analysis.

The ordinary concept of conceptual analysis was introduced in analytic philosophy by Grice in 1958. He used the expression "conceptual analysis" to describe the method employed by the philosophers who were working at Oxford after the end of the Second World War—the ordinary language philosophers. First of all, conceptual analysis in the ordinary meaning of the expression is a method.[4] As the expression itself suggests, this method consists in analysis of concepts.[5] However, not every analysis of concepts is conceptual analysis in the ordinary meaning of the expression. In the present section, I will describe the specifics of the kind of analysis of concepts which is picked out by the expression "conceptual analysis" in its ordinary meaning.[6]

Now, a few things must be noted about the relationship between concepts and linguistic expressions. First of all, conceptual analysis in the ordinary meaning of the expression is analysis of concepts which consists of analysis of the meaning of linguistic expressions. What is more, linguistic expressions in general can be divided into two kinds—expressions that express concepts and expressions that do not express concepts. The former are commonly called "predicates." If one knows the meaning of a predicate, she possesses the concept expressed by the predicate. The analysis of the meaning of a predicate is analysis of the concept expressed by the predicate. Therefore, we can say that conceptual analysis in the ordinary meaning of the expression is analysis of the meanings of predicates.

However, not every analysis of the meanings of predicates is conceptual analysis in the ordinary meaning of the expression. In general, to analyze a concept means to conduct an investigation into the application conditions of the concept. We can speak of three kinds of application conditions of a concept: conditions that are only necessary; conditions that are only sufficient; and conditions that are both necessary and sufficient for the concept's application. Conceptual analysis in the ordinary meaning of the expression is an investigation that aims to provide application conditions that are both necessary and sufficient. To provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a concept's application is to provide an analytic definition. On the other hand, conducting an analysis is a descriptive activity; therefore, when a linguistic meaning is analyzed, it is only described and not changed in any way. Thus, conceptual analysis in the ordinary meaning of the expression is analysis of the meaning of a predicate that aims to provide a descriptive analytic definition of this predicate.

One might think that the application conditions of a concept are the same as the application conditions of a predicate that expresses this concept. Many philosophers seem to implicitly assume this is true. Grice himself, when describing the method in "Postwar Oxford Philosophy," speaks of an "application of expressions" instead of an "application of

[4] In his description of conceptual analysis Hanna doesn't speak of conceptual analysis as a method, but as a philosophical theory and a philosophical movement within the history of philosophy (Hanna 1998), but the theory in question can be understood as a set of statements, constituting the theoretical premises of a method, and the movement in question can be viewed as the history of the application of this method.

[5] Nolan argues that the conceptual analysis adopted by the philosophical movement known as "The Canberra Plan" is not analysis of concepts (Nolan 2009, 267). He seems to believe, however, that the Canberra planners call "conceptual analysis" the whole method they employ. This method consists of two steps: (1) defining the role a term plays in a theory; and (2) finding something in the world that plays this role (Nolan 2009, 267-8). Taking into account the writings of the two most prominent Canberra planners—Jackson and Lewis, I think we have reasons to believe that only the first step is considered to be "conceptual analysis" (Jackson 1998, 41-2; Lewis 2000, 76), and this first step can be interpreted as analysis of the concept the term expresses.

[6] A point of disagreement amongst the authors who employ conceptual analysis is representationalism. Jackson argues that conceptual analysis makes best sense against a representationalist background (Jackson 2010, 174), and the other Canberra planners seem to link conceptual analysis with representationalism as well (cf. Brandon-Mitchell and Nola 2009), whereas the ordinary language philosophers seem to deny that representationalism is true, and at the summer school in conceptual analysis which took place in 2016, in Switzerland Glock gave a talk on the topic "Conceptual Analysis for Non-Representationalists". This theoretical difference, however, does not entail a difference in the authors' views on what is conceptual analysis.

concepts" (Grice 1958, 174). However, I think we have reasons to believe that these are two different kinds of application conditions. I will demonstrate this with a version of an example by Glock (Glock 2011, 159-160). In the House of Commons it's not appropriate to say that the prime minister is lying, so the predicate "lie" (or "is a lie") is not applicable to what the prime minister is saying. Thus, we can say that one of the application conditions of the predicate is that the speaker is not in the House of Commons or in another similar situation. However, there is no such condition among the conditions that something must satisfy in order to fall under the concept of a lie—the concept that the predicate "lie" expresses.

In order to distinguish the application conditions of predicates from the application conditions of concepts, I will introduce the terms "semantic application" and "pragmatic application." There are two kinds of application of a predicate: semantic application and pragmatic application. A predicate is semantically applicable to an object, if and only if the object falls under the concept the predicate expresses. The conditions which are necessary and sufficient for something to satisfy in order for a predicate to be semantically applicable to it are the semantic application conditions of this predicate. The application conditions of a predicate that are not semantic application conditions are its pragmatic application conditions. A predicate is pragmatically applicable to something if and only if it satisfies the pragmatic application conditions of the predicate.

Now imagine that the prime minister is really lying. In this case, what he is saying would fall under the concept of a lie, and therefore the predicate "lie" would be semantically applicable to his words. Therefore, the application condition of the predicate that consists of the speaker's not being in the House of Commons or another similar situation is not among the semantic application conditions of the predicate because it is not satisfied in the described situation; yet, the predicate is semantically applicable. Therefore, this condition is one of the pragmatic application conditions of the predicate.

The pragmatic application conditions of a predicate can be different—related to convenience of speech, to etiquette, to the speaker's aims, and so on. As the name suggests, they are related to some pragmatic considerations. The semantic application conditions of a predicate, on the other hand, are the application conditions of the concept that the predicate expresses. To know the semantic application conditions of a predicate is to know its meaning. Thus, we can say that only a subset of the application conditions of a predicate—its semantic application conditions—are the same as the application conditions of the concept it expresses. Therefore, when Grice and other philosophers equate the application conditions of a predicate with the application conditions of the concept it expresses, they seem to be making a mistake. In order for their position to be coherent, we have to assume that when speaking of the "application" of a predicate, they in fact mean what I called "semantic application."

The reason for this confusion may have its roots (to some extent) in an uncritical acceptance of Wittgenstein's claim that the meaning of an expression is its use (Wittgenstein 1953, 20). As far as knowing the meaning of a predicate is to know its semantic application conditions, and to know the use of a predicate is to know its application conditions in general, we can say that equating meaning and use is equating semantic application conditions and application conditions in general. Perhaps exactly under Wittgenstein's influence many philosophers explicitly or implicitly assume that this equation is correct. As I have tried to show, however, we have reasons to believe that it is not. Grice realizes this later, and in the prolegomena to his "Logic and Conversation" he says we must be careful not to confuse meaning and use (Grice 1989, 4). In fact, the whole of "Logic and Conversation" aims to draw a distinction between meaning and use. The result of Grice's inquiry is a series of definitions of the word "meaning." I will not take these definitions into consideration in the present inquiry. I believe that the criterion provided above for distinguishing application from semantic application is good enough for the practical purposes of doing conceptual analysis.

Since the semantic application conditions of a predicate are the same as the application conditions of the concept it expresses, we can say that conceptual analysis in the ordinary meaning of the expression is analysis of the meaning of a predicate that aims to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the predicate's semantic application. This analysis consists in investigating whether the predicate is semantically applicable in different possible cases, as well as drawing a conclusion on the basis of this investigation. Generally, such an investigation can be conducted both empirically and "from the armchair," but it is conducted only from the armchair as a part of conceptual analysis in the ordinary meaning of the expression.

What I have said thus far in the present section is sufficient for an analytic definition of the expression "conceptual analysis" as given in its ordinary meaning. Such a definition might look, for example, like this:

> *Definition$_1$ of "conceptual analysis" in the ordinary meaning of the expression:* conceptual analysis is a method that consists in drawing a conclusion about what the definition of a predicate is on the basis of an armchair investigation into whether the predicate is semantically applicable in different possible cases.

Below, I am going to provide another formulation—one which makes use of logical expressions of the type 'F(x)'.

The statement that a given predicate is semantically applicable in a given possible case can be expressed via a sentence of the type 'F(a)', where "F" is the predicate and "a" is a particular object that is present in the possible case, one which falls under the concept expressed by the predicate—in other words, to which the predicate is semantically applicable. Two things must be noted here. *First*, when dealing with abstract concepts such as the concept of equality, we can say that the object that falls under the concept is a point in space and time. When saying in the natural language that a given abstract concept is instantiated, we usually use expressions of the type "there is X" where "X" is a predicate which expresses the concept: for example, we say "there is equality." When using expressions of this kind we mean that the concept is instantiated in a given place and a given time. This can mean that there is equality in Europe at the present moment, but such equality was not present in Medieval Europe. However, the space and time are often not stated directly, instead being intuited from the context. *Second*, we can say that to describe the considered possible case is to describe the object 'a' from the expression 'F(a)'. Imagine that we're doing conceptual analysis of the concept of knowledge and we are considering whether the predicate "knows" is semantically applicable to the possible case with Smith and Jones as described by Gettier (Gettier 1963, 122). As far as considering whether the predicate is semantically applicable in the possible case, we are considering whether Smith knows, the object is Smith himself. Thus, describing the possible case is, in a sense, describing Smith. In other words, considering whether the concept of knowledge is applicable in this possible case is the same as considering whether it is applicable to a given object "Smith" which has such-and-such characteristics, or is in such-and-such a situation.

On the other hand, a predicate is semantically applicable to an object if and only if the object satisfies the necessary and sufficient conditions for the semantic application of the predicate. The statement that an object satisfies some conditions can also be expressed via an expression of the type 'F(a)'. If we call the conditions 'G', the statement that the object 'a' satisfies G can be expressed via the sentence 'G(a)'. Thus, it can be assumed that giving necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of a concept is the same as saying that a statement of the type "∀x. F(x) ⇔ G(x)" is true. This assumption, however, is not entirely correct. Consider a situation in which x is a random member of the set of all creatures, 'F(x)' means "x is a creature with a heart," and 'G(x)' means "x is a creature with kidneys." As far as we know, every creature in our world with a heart has kidneys and every creature with kidneys has a heart. Given this information, we can conclude that the statement "∀x. F(x) ⇔ G(x)" is true. Yet, having kidneys is not a necessary and sufficient condition for the application of the concept of a creature with a heart.

The truth of a statement of the type "∀x. F(x) ⇔ G(x)" is actually a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for G's being a necessary and sufficient condition for the semantic application of F. The statement needs to be not simply true, but true only in virtue of the meanings of the linguistic expressions. The statement that every creature with a heart has kidneys and that every creature with kidneys has a heart is true, but it is not true only in virtue of the meanings of the linguistic expressions. This is why having kidneys is not a necessary and sufficient condition for the application of the concept of a creature with a heart. The statements that are true only in virtue of the meanings of the linguistic expressions are commonly called "analytically true" or simply "analytic." Thus, the statement needs to be not simply true, but analytic. The analyticity of the statement seems to be both a necessary and a sufficient condition for the semantic application of the predicate.

Therefore, we can say the aim of the armchair investigation conducted as a part of conceptual analysis in the ordinary meaning of the expression is to show that a statement of the type "∀x. F(x) ⇔ G(x)" is analytic. This allows us to formulate the definition in the following way:

Definition$_2$ of "conceptual analysis" in the ordinary meaning of the expression: conceptual analysis is a method that consists in drawing a conclusion that a statement of the type "$\forall$x. F(x) $\Leftrightarrow$ G(x)" is analytic on the basis of an armchair investigation into whether a predicate is semantically applicable in different possible cases.

If "$\forall$x. F(x) $\Leftrightarrow$ G(x)" is analytic, then the predicates 'F' and 'G' are synonymous. Thus, we can also say that the aim of the armchair investigation is to show that two expressions are synonymous. For example, if we are analyzing the concept of a human and we come to the conclusion that human is a rational animal, we have thus shown that the expressions "human" and "rational animal" are synonymous.

It must be noted that the two definitions provided above apply only to conducting conceptual analysis as a thought process; however, sometimes we would say that somebody has conducted conceptual analysis not only in her thought, but also in this-and-this paper she has written, or in this-and-this talk she has given. For example, we might say that in his paper "Meaning" Grice has conducted conceptual analysis of the concept of meaning (Grice 1950). We can call this "kind" of conceptual analysis "textual conceptual analysis" and define it as follows:

Definition of "textual conceptual analysis": Somebody has conducted textual conceptual analysis in this-and-this written or spoken text she has produced, if and only if the produced text is a result of conducting conceptual analysis (as a thought process).

The three definitions provided above are sufficient for my present purposes. I will now describe the procedure of how conceptual analysis is done. Doing this, I will address two different questions: how is the armchair investigation into whether the predicate is semantically applicable in different possible cases conducted; and, how is the conclusion based on this investigation drawn?

The armchair investigation into whether the predicate is semantically applicable in different possible cases is conducted by imagining different possible cases and deciding whether the predicate is semantically applicable in each of them. The philosopher conducting the analysis decides whether the predicate is semantically applicable in a possible case by making a judgement based on her intuition, that is, she asks herself whether the predicate is semantically applicable and bases her answer on her intuition. The intuitions in question are often called "linguistic", "semantic" or "conceptual" intuitions.

If we designate the predicate with 'X', then the question the philosopher asks herself might be formulated as "Is 'X' semantically applicable in this-and-this possible case?" This formulation, however, seems to be somehow confusing. Another option is that the philosopher asks herself "Would I call this-and-this 'X'?" But this formulation is misleading, since no clear difference is made between the predicate's semantic application and its application in general. The philosopher might use this formulation, but must be careful not to confuse the semantic application with the pragmatic application. In this train of thought, the question might be formulated as "Any pragmatic considerations aside, would I call this-and-this 'X'?" Another option is "Does this-and-this fall under the concept of 'X'?" I think this is a good option, but still can be a bit confusing. Maybe the best option is that the question be simply "Is this-and-this 'X'?"

The conclusion on the basis of such an armchair investigation might probably be drawn in different ways, but the standard way—the way described by Grice when he introduces the term "conceptual analysis"—is the following. The philosopher conducting the analysis starts by formulating a hypothesis about the definition of the predicate and then tests this hypothesis by trying to think of a possible case in which either the conditions provided in the proposed definition obtain but the predicate is not semantically applicable, or the predicate is semantically applicable but the conditions don't obtain. If the conditions obtain but the predicate is not semantically applicable, then the conditions are not sufficient, and if the predicate is semantically applicable, but the conditions don't obtain, then the conditions are not necessary. Thus, if such a case exists, the proposed definition doesn't provide necessary and sufficient conditions and is therefore incorrect. The hypothesis is false. If it turns out that the hypothesis is false, the philosopher formulates another hypothesis and tests it in the same way. This procedure repeats until the philosopher formulates a hypothesis that passes the test. If she manages to formulate such a hypothesis, she can assume that the analysis is complete.[7]

[7] Henderson and Horgan suggest a different description of the relationship between the armchair investigation and the conclusion (Henderson and Horgan 2011, 27). In their model, the philosopher first reflects on possible cases and then draws a conclusion. This is in a sense the opposite to

I am going to illustrate the procedure described above with a possible conceptual analysis of the everyday concept of a chair. An initial hypothesis would be for example that the chair is a piece of furniture used for sitting. This hypothesis is incorrect, because the sofa is also a kind of furniture used for sitting, but it is not a chair. The reasoning process of the philosopher conducting the analysis can be described as follows. She considers the possible case of a sofa, asking herself whether the predicate "chair" is semantically applicable to a sofa (or, simply, whether the sofa is a chair). Her intuition is that it is not, so she assumes it is not. Therefore, the sofa is a possible case in which the conditions provided in the proposed definition obtain but the predicate is not semantically applicable. Therefore, these conditions are not sufficient, and so the proposed definition is incorrect.

A second hypothesis could be that the chair is a piece of seat furniture that is only for one person. Here the problem with the sofa is solved, since the sofa is not for only one person, so it is therefore no longer a possible case in which the conditions obtain but the predicate is not applicable. This second hypothesis however is also incorrect, because a stool is also a piece of seat furniture that is only for one person, but it's not a chair. The reasoning process can be described in a similar way. A third hypothesis would be that the chair is a piece of seat furniture that is only for one person and has a back. Thus, the stool is no longer a problem since it doesn't have a back. Yet another problem arises, however: a car seat (non-infant), since it is also a kind of seat furniture that is only for one person and has a back, but it's not a chair. A fourth hypothesis would be that the chair is a kind of moveable seat furniture that is only for one person and has a back. Thus, the car seat is no longer a problem, since it is not moveable. Assume now that the philosopher cannot think of a possible case in which either the conditions provided in the fourth proposed definition obtain but the predicate is not semantically applicable, or the predicate is semantically applicable but the conditions don't obtain. Thus, she can assume that the fourth proposed definition is the correct definition of "chair," and the analysis is complete.

It must be noted that this is a description of the thought process a philosopher conducting conceptual analysis in the ordinary meaning of the expression goes through. The written or spoken text where textual conceptual analysis is conducted might follow the procedure described above step by step—such is the case with Grice's analysis of the concept of meaning mentioned above—but often times it does not. The way the results from a conducted conceptual analysis are expressed on paper or in speech can take many different forms.

3. Possible Changes in the Ordinary Concept.

Conceptual Analysis As Every Analysis of Concepts.

The first possible change in the ordinary concept that I will consider is that we call "conceptual analysis" every analysis of concepts, that is, we use the expression in its literal meaning instead of in its figurative meaning. Such a view of conceptual analysis seems to be adopted by Goldman, Kingsbury, and McKeown-Green (Goldman 2007, 18; Kingsbury and McKewon-Green 2009, 179). They suggest that philosophers should conduct analysis of concepts that consists of investigating behavior that is different from using a predicate that expresses the concept. For me, it's not clear, however, how such an investigation is to be done, as well as how the results from it might be relevant to any philosophical questions. The aforementioned authors provide neither a description of a procedure, nor clear examples of such an analysis of concepts. Thus, it is hard for me to tell whether such a change in the ordinary concept of conceptual analysis satisfies the utility condition. Even if the utility condition is satisfied, however, my intuition is that the proximity condition is not satisfied.

Conceptual Analysis As Every Analysis of Linguistic Usage.

Another possible change is that we call "conceptual analysis" every analysis of linguistic usage. As such, it is not only the investigation of the semantic application conditions of a concept, but also the investigation of its pragmatic application conditions. Such a view of conceptual analysis seems to

what Grice suggests, since in his model the philosopher first puts forward a general statement and then reflects on possible cases, whereas in their model the philosopher first reflects on possible cases and then puts forward a general statement. A distinction should be made here between the thought process of drawing the conclusion and the logico-proof relationship between the immediate results of the armchair investigation, both of which play the role of premises, and the conclusion which is based on these premises. Henderson and Horgan themselves state that they are describing only the former and not the latter (Henderson and Horgan 2011, 40). Whether the thought process can actually proceed according to their model is a psychological question I will not consider in the present inquiry. My guess would be that it can't.

be adopted by Tanney (Tanney 2007). If the change in question is adopted, then conceptual analysis will also answer questions such as whether it's appropriate to say this-and-this in such-and-such a situation, whether this-and-this expression has positive or negative connotations, whether it's more convenient to say this or that, etc. Such pragmatic questions, however, are not traditionally considered philosophical. In fact, philosophy is known for dealing with matters that are not, strictly speaking, pragmatic. For this reason, I think that the utility condition is not satisfied. My intuition is that the proximity condition is not satisfied either—if this change is adopted, the method will no longer deal only with concepts; and, even though we are considering the figurative meaning of the expression, it would seem unnatural to me to call such an investigation "conceptual" analysis.

Conceptual Analysis As Putting Forward a Theory.

Another possible change in the ordinary concept is to see conceptual analysis as an activity that consists in putting forward a whole theory in relation to the concept under consideration. Such a view of conceptual analysis is adopted by Searle (Searle 2007, 122-123). Petersen's conception is also similar. He suggests that conceptual analysis is understood as "schmanalysis," by which he means the activity of deciding upon the best possible theory about something (Petersen 2008, 293). Although the meaning of "theory" is not quite exact, I think it is safe to assume that providing (for example) a theory of meaning is more philosophically useful than providing application conditions for the concept of meaning, i.e. a definition of "meaning." Thus, the utility condition is satisfied. Still, my intuition is that the activity of building a theory around a concept is too different from investigating possible cases of language use in order to provide a definition—too different for the proximity condition to be satisfied.

Adding a Normative Aspect to Conceptual Analysis.

Another possible change is to extend the ordinary concept of conceptual analysis so that it involves not only describing, but also changing the concept under consideration, thus investigating not only what its application conditions are, but also what they should be. If such an extension is adopted, the result from a conceptual analysis might not be a descriptive definition, but a definition aiming improvement, or a definition aiming change but not improvement. Such a view is adopted by Jackson, Jackman, and Stuart (Jackman 2009, 166-167; Jackson 2010, 179; Stuart 2015, 268).[8] Setting aside the conceptual changes that don't aim at improvement, it is generally possible to solve a philosophical problem by improving a concept. In a sense, the improvement itself can be viewed as solving such a problem. Thus, if we add such a normative aspect to conceptual analysis, such a change would satisfy the utility condition. My intuition, however, is that it wouldn't satisfy the proximity condition: on the one hand, improving a concept seems too different to me from investigating possible cases of language use; on the other hand, the analysis of a concept is a descriptive procedure, so it would sound unnatural to me to call such a normative aspect an aspect of conceptual "analysis."

Extending the Aim of the Armchair Investigation.

In the previous section, we saw that a philosopher doing conceptual analysis in the ordinary meaning of the expression conducts an armchair investigation of whether a predicate is semantically applicable in different possible cases with the aim to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the predicate's semantic application. This aim can be "extended" so that the conditions provided might be both necessary and sufficient, only necessary, or only sufficient. A further extension would include not only showing that this-and-this condition is only necessary, only sufficient, or both necessary and sufficient, but also showing that it's not true that the condition is such. If we adopt both of these extensions, then the aim of the armchair investigation would be to check whether this-and-this is an only necessary, only sufficient, both necessary and sufficient, or neither necessary nor sufficient condition for the concept's application. In other words, the aim of the armchair investigation would not be to serve as a basis for a conclusion that a statement of the type "$\forall x.\ F(x) \Leftrightarrow G(x)$" is analytic, but as a basis for a conclusion about whether a statement of the type "$\forall x.\ F(x) \Rightarrow G(x)$" is analytic.[9] Such a view is

[8] Jackman argues that descriptive analytic definitions for our everyday concepts can't be provided, therefore in his view the only possible result from conducting conceptual analysis would be a definition aiming improvement, or a definition aiming change, but not improvement.

[9] If $\forall x.\ F(x) \Rightarrow G(x)$ is analytic, then F is a sufficient condition for the application of the concept of G, and G is a necessary condition for the application of the concept of F. If $\forall x.\ F(x) \Rightarrow G(x)$ is not analytic, then F is not a sufficient condition for G, and G is not a necessary

adopted by Jackson and Chalmers, Henderson and Horgan, and Kipper (Kipper 2012, 252; Henderson and Horgan 2011, 39; Chalmers and Jackson 2001, 322).[10] If we extend the aim in such a way, the range of philosophical statements for which conceptual analysis can provide justification is also extended. When we extend the aim in such a way we find that conceptual analysis is done not only by Ayer when he gives the traditional definition of knowledge, according to which knowledge is justified true belief (Ayer 1956), but also by Gettier when he criticizes this definition (providing counterexamples; see Gettier 1963). Thus, if we extend the aim in such a way, the whole development within epistemology following Gettier's paper would be due to conceptual analysis. Such a change in the ordinary concept satisfies the utility condition. My intuition is that the proximity condition is also satisfied. It is still analysis of concepts, it is still analysis of the meanings of predicates, and possible cases of language use are still considered—it looks similar to me.

Adding an Empirical Aspect to Conceptual Analysis.

Some authors suggest that the investigation of whether a predicate is semantically applicable in different possible cases be done not only from the armchair, but also "empirically"—by using questionnaires in which people are asked whether they would semantically apply a predicate to a possible case, processing text data using techniques such as data mining, etc (Glasgow 2008, 333; Overton 2013, 1383; Sytsma 2010, 427). Jackson himself says that empirical studies can be done if it is needed (Jackson, F. 1998, 36-37). Generally, as far as the philosopher conducting conceptual analysis in the ordinary meaning of the expression is a competent speaker of the language, we have good reasons to believe that the statements that constitute the results from the analysis are true. However, there is always the possibility that the meaning the philosopher attaches to the given predicate is slightly different from the meaning it ordinarily has in the language—the meaning that the vast majority of the speakers attach to it (if there is such a meaning at all). Besides that, if the investigation into possible cases is done only from the armchair, the philosopher is unable to analyze the meaning of predicates from a language she doesn't speak, such as the language of physics or Hegel's language.[11] Both of these difficulties can be solved if the investigation into possible cases is done empirically. Thus, if we change the ordinary concept so that such empirical studies are acceptable, then conceptual analysis would have more potential for solving philosophical problems and defending philosophical theses. The utility condition is satisfied. My intuition is that the proximity condition is also satisfied—again, it is still analysis of concepts, it is still analysis of the meanings of predicates, and possible cases of language use are still considered, so it looks similar to me.

Investigating the co-application conditions.

Thomasson adopts a concept of conceptual analysis that differs from the ordinary concept in that not only the application conditions of the concept under consideration are subject to investigation, but also what Thomasson calls its "co-application" conditions (Thomasson 2012, 177). The distinction she draws between application and co-application conditions is the following: the application conditions of a concept are the conditions it is necessary and sufficient for something to satisfy in order to fall under the concept, whereas its co-application conditions are the conditions it is necessary and sufficient for something to satisfy in order to continue falling under the concept (Thomasson 2012, 177). My intuition is that if we extend the ordinary concept of conceptual analysis so that it includes drawing a conclusion about what the co-application conditions of a concept are on the basis of a similar armchair investigation into possible cases, the change we would make in the ordinary concept would satisfy the proximity condition. I think, however, that it would not satisfy the utility condition, since what we achieve by investigating the co-application conditions of all the concepts separately can be achieved even more easily using the ordinary concept of conceptual analysis—by investigating the application conditions of the concept of identity.

Considering different uses of concepts.

In Plunkett's view of conceptual analysis the method consists in two steps: 1) investigating what the concept under consideration is used for; and 2) investigating how the concept "does its job" (Plun-

condition for F. If both $\forall x.\ F(x) \Rightarrow G(x)$ and $\forall x.\ G(x) \Rightarrow F(x)$ are analytic, F is a necessary and sufficient condition for G, and G is a necessary and sufficient condition for F.

[10] I'm not entirely sure whether Kipper adopts the second extension. He certainly adopts the first one though.

[11] I am adopting a broader meaning of "language" here in which language is every system of signs used by a group of speakers.

kett 2011, 22). He believes that if the concept is used for representation, then the second step consists in investigating its application conditions. It is argued, however, that not every concept is used for representation, and if a concept is used for something else, the second step does not consist in investigating its application condition. Plunkett himself adopts Gibbard's "expressivism," according to which there are "normative" concepts, which are not used for representing the world but for planning future events and changing the world (Plunkett 2011, 20). If we consider the word "concept" in the meaning it ordinarily has in analytic philosophy, however, concepts can be used only for the purpose of classifying the world into categories. This does not necessarily mean that concepts are representations—they can be, for example, abilities to distinguish or classify things. Thus, in a sense, the first question from Plunkett's model has only one possible answer—that the concept is used for classifying. And if a question has only one possible answer and it is known, there is no point in asking the question. On the other hand, if the only possible answer is that the concept is used for classifying, answering the second question necessarily consists in investigating what characteristics is the classifying done by, i.e. in investigating what the concept's application conditions are. Thus, in practice Plunkett's conceptual analysis is reduced to conceptual analysis in the ordinary meaning of the expression, and therefore the possible change in the ordinary concept that consists in adopting Plunkett's model does not satisfy the utility condition. My intuition is that it does not satisfy the proximity condition either.

4. The Final Definition.

Among the possible changes in the ordinary concept I have considered in the previous section, there were two which satisfied both the utility condition and the proximity condition:

- that the investigation into whether the predicate is semantically applicable in different possible cases is not to serve as a basis for a conclusion about what the definition of the predicate is, but as a basis for a conclusion about whether this-and-this is an only necessary, only sufficient, both necessary and sufficient, or neither necessary nor sufficient condition for the predicate's semantic application;
- and that the investigation into whether the predicate is semantically applicable in different possible cases be done not only from the armchair, but also empirically.

These two possible changes can be both adopted at the same time. In this case the new definition of "conceptual analysis" might look, for example, thus:

> *Definition$_1$ of "conceptual analysis"*: conceptual analysis is a method that consists in drawing a conclusion about the semantic application conditions of a predicate on the basis of an investigation into whether the predicate is semantically applicable in different possible cases.

Analogically to the definition of the expression in its ordinary meaning, this new definition can also be formulated using expressions of the type 'F(x)'. This might be done thus:

> *Definition$_2$ of "conceptual analysis"*: conceptual analysis is a method that consists in drawing a conclusion about whether a statement of the type "$\forall x.\ F(x) \Rightarrow G(x)$" is analytic on the basis of an investigation into whether a predicate is semantically applicable in different possible cases.

The definition of "textual conceptual analysis" might remain the same.

Since this new concept of conceptual analysis is, in a sense, an extension to the ordinary concept, we can call it "conceptual analysis in the broad sense," whereas the ordinary concept can be called "conceptual analysis in the narrow sense." Additionally, the conceptual analysis done empirically can be called "empirical conceptual analysis," whereas the one done from the armchair can be called "armchair conceptual analysis."

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DISCUSSION BLOCK

Throughout the recent decades following the end of the cold war, matters of cultural diversity have become a major theme for theoretical discussions and political controversies in the liberal democratic societies in Europe and North America. Is liberal democracy inhospitable *per se* to cultural differences? Are universal civic values incompatible with cultural identity? Should a person who lives in such a society be obliged to relativize his or her ethnic or, e.g., religious allegiances, in order to be a good citizen? Should public life in a "well ordered society" (according to the famous formulation of John Rawls) be cleared of ethnic, religious, or racial differences? And is this at all possible; or, is it simply a hypocritical "smoke screen" behind which the ethnic, religious, and racial identities of the majority dominate in a given society (such as is the case, according to many critics, with WASP[1] culture in the USA)?

Two major factors have contributed to the rising salience of cultural diversity today. One is the democratization of life in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This made it impossible to deal with the issues of the numerous ethnic and religious minorities in this region by means of coercion. The other is the massive migration of people from "Third-World" countries to Western Europe. The encapsulation of Muslim immigrant communities in Western societies has demonstrated the problematic nature of the multiculturalist slogan "Let us celebrate diversity."

The *Balkan Journal of Philosophy* wishes to begin a discussion of the theme *Liberal Democracy and Cultural Diversity*. To facilitate this, Richard Robson's well known short paper "In What Sense Is Multiculturalism a Form of Communitarianism" and Slobodan Divjak's paper "Communitarianism, Multiculturalism and Liberalism" are here published as an introduction to the theme because these papers present an overview of this subject-matter. We invite all colleagues who have something to say on these issues to submit relevant papers. Those which receive positive reviews will be published one by one in the next issues of the Journal, under the separate heading of the discussion.

From the Editorial Board of
Balkan Journal of Philosophy

[1] White Anglo-Saxon Protestant.

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IN WHAT SENSE IS MULTICULTURALISM A FORM OF COMMUNITARIANISM

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Multiculturalism is commonly cited as being a form of communitarianism, which is the belief that the self is constituted through the community, in the sense that the individual is shaped by the communities in which they belong and thus owe them a debt or respect and consideration.

Multiculturalism can be seen to be a form of communitarianism because it is rooted in an essentially communitarian view of human nature. For multiculturalists, humans can't be understood 'outside' of society. They are intrinsically shaped by the social and cultural structures within which they live and develop. Therefore, there is an emphasis more on what is distinctive about the group to which the individual belongs and thus a link between the personal and the social, as society is made up of different cultural groups seeking recognition. This leads to the individual being 'embedded' in a particular cultural, social, institutional or ideological context. MacIntyre and Sandel portrayed the idea of the abstract individual – the 'unencumbered self' – as a recipe for rootless atomism. Only groups can give people a genuine sense of identity and moral purpose. Consequently, multiculturalists reject any universalist model of personal identity, such as that proposed by liberals.

The multiculturalist idea of minority group rights can also be said to constitute a form of communitarianism. Will Kymlicka argued for the existence of polyethnic and representation rights. Polyethnic rights are designed to help a cultural group maintain and express their cultural distinctiveness. These rights usually take the form of legal exemptions, such as Sikhs being allowed to not wear motorcycle helmets. Kymlicka also identified the importance of representation rights, designed to redress the under representation of disadvantaged groups in senior position in public life. This 'positive discrimination' is the only way of ensuring the full and equal participation of all groups in the life of their society, and ensures that public policy reflects the interests of these groups. Therefore, as minority groups rights help express the distinctiveness of a cultural group and therefore the individual, and also help embed these groups into society, they can be said to constitute a form of communitarianism.

COMMUNITARIANISM, MULTICULTURALISM AND LIBERALISM*

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Abstract:

In the first part of this text, the author exposes the main features of the liberal or civic state, because both communitarians and multiculturalists tend to criticize that type of state. Their critique of the liberal state and the liberal self as an unencumbered self is "culturalist" by its character. However, it is an expression of conceptual confusion, i.e. of their incomprehension of an essential difference between two conceptual levels: one that belongs to the purely normative rights-justifying perspective and the other that refers to the ontological perspective. Consequently, both of them reject the central liberal thesis according to which the right is prior to the good.

The author agrees with an assessment of Richard Robson that multiculturalism is only a form of communitarianism. Contrary to communitarians and multiculturalists, he additionally argues that collective rights are incompatible with the civic state in its pure form because there are structural differences between civic and specific minority rights.

Further, the author attempts to show that communitarianism and multiculturalism are forms of postmodernism. Namely, brought to their ultimate logical consequences, the mentioned orientations can be connected to the postmodern notion of radical, irreducible difference.

In the conclusive part of the text, he summarizes the common points of communitarianism and multiculturalism and emphasizes the importance of these contemporary theoretical tendencies.

Key words: communitarianism, multiculturalism, deontological liberalism, legal person, particular cultures, teleological and non-teleological norms, negative and positive freedoms, ethical relativism, contextualism, contextual universalism, procedural and essentialist Reason.

"Reason must in all its undertakings subject itself to criticism; should it limit freedom of criticism by any prohibitions, it must harm itself, drawing upon itself a damaging suspicion. Nothing is so important through its usefulness, nothing so sacred, that it may be exempted from this searching examination, which knows no respect for persons. Reason depends on this freedom for its very existence. For Reason has no dictatorial authority; its verdict is always simply the agreement of free citizens, of whom each one must be permitted to express, without let or hindrance, his objections or even his veto."

Immanuel Kant *The Critique of Pure Reason*[1]

In order to explain the relationship between communitarianism and multiculturalism in an adequate way, we first have to expose the basic characteristics of liberalism, as both abovementioned orientations criticize this doctrine. Liberalism is not a homogeneous concept. In my interpretation, liberalism is a specific concept of legal-constitution order which is not determined by anything that belongs to the sphere of experience, whether this notion is understood metaphysically (as a totality of superficial, visible forms of appearance of the Being as the hidden essence of the world), or from the standpoint of

[*] On the insistence of the author, the *Balkan Journal of Philosophy* has retained within the present paper the original punctuation, style, and formatting.

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[1] Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*. London: Macmillan, 1933, pp.329.

empiricism. This order, in Habermas' words, "can fully develop in the course of constitution-making processes that are not based on the previous choice of substantial values, but rather on democratic procedures." (Habermas 1998, 406). Because of that, it is separated from all substantive conceptions of ideology, worldview, ethnocultural tradition, etc. This type of liberalism views persons as individuals who have rights accrued independently of differences. Being blind to differences, it is simultaneously individualist and universalist. It is individualist because it does not irreducibly include a group aspect of identity: the bearers of rights are individuals as individuals. It is universalist in a formal, not substantive sense, as individual rights are purely formal. As the liberal order is not based on any concept of a good life, it is open to the pluralism of lifestyles. Deontological[2] liberalism does not presuppose any particular idea of the good, in order to enable pluralism of different conceptions of the good within a community or state.

Kant was one of the founders of liberal moral and legal orders. He developed in a systematic way an understanding of liberal moral and legal norms in his work *Critique of Practical Reason*. Some interpreters of this thinker overlooked that he wrote the critique of practical reason, not the critique of pure practical reason. The former, starting from experience, defines an idea of the good that serves as a deriving base for an appropriate law in accordance to which people should act in order to apply this concept of the good to their social life. Therefore, according to followers of this type of Reason, moral and legal orders are only the expression of the character of common good. In their view, the good has priority over the right.

Claiming that norms derived from experience can never be universal ones, Kant introduces a concept of pure practical reason. This Reason is practical because it provides people with behavioral norms. It is "pure" because it is not conditioned by empirical determinants. The pure practical reason does not depend on anything that would be external to it. It only depends on its internal laws, that is, on purely formal logical rules of human thinking, by which the logic ceases to be tied with ontology, as it is the case in metaphysics. Hence, the norms derived from the pure practical reason are formal, substanceless, and non-teleological. As such, they cannot predetermine worldviews, ways of life, cultural traditions, etc. They are opposed to teleological norms, the content of which should be realized in everyday life.

If Kant in *Critique of Pure Reason* rejected the metaphysical postulate about unity between the Being and thinking and thus negated the possibility of knowing "the thing by itself," then he separated "ought" from "is" in *Critique of Practical Reason*, by which "ought" became "pure" one.

Separating "ought" from "is," Kant in fact separated morality from ethics as a discipline whose object of exploring is "*ethos*" (custom). According to Aristotle, the *ethos* always refers to a particular community (*polis*) which has its own ethos, its own system of customs and substantive values. "Even if there is some one good which is universally predicable of goods or is capable of separate and independent existence, clearly it could not be achieved or attained by man" (Aristotle 1984 1096b30-35). Ethics in Aristotle's sense did not make *ethos* since it was already embedded in human behavior as their regulator and guider. Ethics, according to Aristotle, was a discipline directed to a systematization of knowledge about a pre-existing *ethos* as a set of customs and substantive values. However, according to Hegel, ethos in the sense of a German notion of *Sittlichkeit* was only an empirical manifestation of the World Spirit as a form of existence of universal essentialistic reason. In both cases, the ethos was treated as a substantive concept of a good life: in the first one, it is particular; in the second one, universal.

Ethical conceptions of a good life belong to teleological ethics that are tied with *telos* (end or purpose), which people ought to realize in their life. According to followers of teleological ethics, this *telos* is the expression of human essence, and acting in accordance with human essence means to be a free being. For Aristotle, a man is free if his activities are oriented toward the realization of the substantial good of the *polis* to which he belongs. His life will then express what he essentially is and this congruence between activity and essence is freedom. However, the freedom for citizens of antique Athens was the freedom to participate in the *res publica* of their polis, not freedom as individual autonomy. Because of that, the rights of citizens derived from this type of positive freedom could not be the modern inalienable rights which belong to every human

[2] The term "deontological" is used in a double sense: as a Kantian concept of pure duty which is not directed to a realization of any empirical purpose, but only to respecting the law in its pure form; and as an opposition to the ontological.

being independently of his/her ideological, ethnocultural, racial, and sexual identity and of his/her social status. These rights were conditioned by the membership to a specific ethnocultural community that was organic by its character.

Kant could not divorce "ought" from "is" without reversing the relationship between the good and the law. "The a priory thought of a possible universal law-giving without borrowing anything from experience or any external will, is given as an unconditioned law. One can call the consciousness of this fundamental law a fact of reason since one cannot speciously derive it from any antecedent data of reason [...] However, in order to regard this law as given without misinterpretation one must well note that it is not an empirical fact but the sole fact of pure reason." (Kant 1956, 31).

So, in Kant's view, there is the priority of the right over the good: "The concept of good and evil is not defined prior to the moral law to which, it would seem, the former would have to serve as foundation; rather the concept of good and evil must be defined after and by means of the law." (Kant 1956, 31). In other words, we do not discover what is right by finding out what is good. From this reversal, Kant derived his famous categorical imperative; *Act only to that maxim through which you can at* the *same time will that* it *should become* a *universal law*. The moral law itself, Kant says, can be the only form of lawfulness because nothing else remains once all content has been rejected. It is clearly that such law must be purely formal and negative. We cannot determine the content of our maxims through the categorical imperative; we can only reject maxims that cannot be universalized. "Any law-giving that is to be both self-imposed and negative— that is, without content— can impose no more than the form of law […] As in the case of the discussion of practical reason in the *Groundwork*, the fundamental principle of reason, in general, is without content: it demands simply that thinking as well as acting not violate the form of law" (Neill 1992, 295-6).

Kant also derived the law (*Recht*) from the pure practical reason. Hence, its structure is the same as the structure of the categorical imperative; therefore, the law must be purely formal, substance-less, non-teleological. In other words, it also must be subjected to the universalizability test.

The difference between the categorical imperative and the principle of the law is in that the former refers to the internal freedom and the latter to the external freedom of action. The law of right is only interested in how the consequences of one person's actions reflect on the freedom of action of others. "Every action is right which, or the maxim of which, allows the freedom of the will of each to subsist together with freedom of everyone" (Kant 1964, 230).

Of course, Kant was aware of the fact that principles derived from pure practical reason can be realized only in history. Since Kant was not an adherent of a revolution theory, his philosophy concerning the problem of realization of the abovementioned principles became a theory of compromise and reform.

However, one thing is indisputable. By his thesis that the right takes precedence over the good, Kant established a philosophical basis for legal formalism which later became the essence of modern liberal constitutions. Of course, the real liberal constitution cannot be Kant's regulative ideal, which mustn't be read descriptively, because this real constitution is the result of the freely expressed will of real people. The principles of such a constitution are constitutive by their character because they constrain the behavior of real persons. The core of such constitution is pure legal formalism based on the purely formal and negative legal principles: freedom of choice, speech, association, religion, and so forth. The constitutions of the first liberal states (America and France) were accepted by the constituent assemblies, which members were the representatives of citizens of these countries. In these cases, the freely expressed will of the members of abovementioned countries preceded their legal forms. The thesis of natural law theorists that the individual precedes the community as a whole can be interpreted only in this way, whereby they rejected the traditional standpoint that was formulated by Aristotle: "The state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part" (Aristotle 1984, P1253a18-20). The constituent assembly can be treated as some sort of empirical equivalent to the idea of social contract.

Both communitarians and multiculturalists see the liberal constitution as a mere intellectual construction since it is not founded on a concrete way of life based on a particular cultural tradition. Hence, this constitution, in their view, implies a liberal self that is empty, abstract, and ghost-like because it is devoid of any empirical content. This critique of liberal formalism is "culturalistic" by its character. In its core is the liberal separation of legal-constitutional order from particular cultures. For liberals, particular cultures and ethnicity are irrelevant for the establishing constitutional orders. Unlike this standpoint, both communitarianism and multiculturalism try to rehabilitate to this or that extent particular cultures as necessary components in constitution-making processes. The abovementioned orientations have insisted that particular cultures have become partially or totally a substantive base for constitutive legal principles of communities or states. Multiculturalists generally accept the standpoint of communitarians who insist that one cannot define the right before the good, for it is only through our participation in a particular community, which defines the good by its cultural tradition, that we can form our individual identities. As well as communitarians, they have rejected the central Kantian claim for *a priori* status of Reason - the idea that Reason is not dependent on prior sources, therefore it can, as an autonomous and unconditional authority, derive moral and legal principles independently of all traditions. Multiculturalists agree with the stance of communitarians that the Reason is defined by its conditional reliance on a prior evaluative context of tradition. Both support Gadamer's claim: "Reason exists for us only in concrete, historical terms, i.e. it is not own master, but remains constantly dependent on the given circumstances in which it operates" (Gadamer 1979, 245). This standpoint necessarily leads to contextualization of Reason, since it has been situated in specific historical and cultural contexts, within particular traditions. Common to both communitarianism and multiculturalism is *contextualism*, that is, an idea that there cannot be the context-transcending reason, moral, law, and person. For MacIntyre who is, by self-understanding, a communitarian, the conceptions of person, morality, and reason cannot be separated from the substantive horizons of a form of life, an ethos. A context-less person or a context-transcending (neutral) morality and Reason are mere liberal chimeras. There are only different types of persons, justices, and rationalities which grow from appropriate contexts.

MacIntyre as an outstanding communitarian wrote the following: "For I am never able to seek for the good or exercise the virtues qua individual […] we all approach our own circumstances as bearers of a particular social identity. I am someone's son or daughter, someone else's cousin or uncle; I am a citizen of this or that city, a member of this or that guild or profession; I belong to this clan, that tribe, this nation. Hence, what is good for me has to be for one who inhabits these roles. As such, I inherit from the past of my family, my city, my nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations, and obligations. These constitute the given of my life, my moral starting point. This is what gives my life its own moral particularity. What I am is in key part what I inherit. I find myself a part of a history and that is generally to say, whether I like it or not, whether I recognize it or not, one of the bearers of traditions." (MacIntyre 1984, 220 and 221).

The compactness of a community depends on the strength of its particular cultural tradition as the common form of life. Because of that, these traditions must be protected by the legal order. In view of communitarians, we ought to tend to establish the unity between the cultural tradition of our community and its legal order. The identity of members of such community cannot be separated from its identity. Accordingly, communitarians see a community as a "constitutive community," as a "wider subject," which determines the identity of its members.

"Think of MacIntyre apotheosis of the Homeric hero and the Thomistic chooser who are (according to MacIntyre) so tightly hemmed in by communal identity that they do not even experience it as a constraint, for they do not see their action as originating in free will in the first place. Only when collective 'practices' have socialized individuals to this point, MacIntyre believes, it will be possible for people to act in concert without coercing and manipulating each other – as liberal individuals must do." (Jeffrey Friedman 1997, 471).

For Charles Taylor who is, not only for me but also for some other authors (A. Gutman, Lawrence Blum, etc.), a follower of multiculturalism and not communitarianism, as it is interpreted by some of his interpreters: "This identification exists where the common form of life is seen as a supremely important good. The common life has a status of this kind when is a crucial element in the members' identity" (Taylor 1985, 213). According to the same author: "judgments about what makes a good life – judgments in which the integrity of cultures has an important place" present the very essence of the "politics of recognition." In order to define Taylor's strand of liberalism, which recognizes differences, Lawrence Bloom writes: "Multiculturalism can emerge from this strand in that a person's cultural identity, with its distinctive set of traditions, history, and practices, is a central part of her overall individual identity. Hence recognizing cultures and cultural identity becomes a part of respecting individual persons. At the same time, this strand involves an irreducibly social or group aspect of identity, hence is in that respect nonindividualist” (Blum 1994, 183). For Will Kymlicka, “most people, most of the time, have a deep bond to their own culture” (Kymlicka 1995, 90).

Therefore, according to communitarians and multiculturalists, the most fundamental level of our sense of identity depends on criteria of belonging to an ethnocultural community; cultural memberships shape our self-identity. Of course, Will Kymlicka as a multiculturalist pleads for particular minority rights, but the demand for them emerges from the thesis that the preservation and developing of cultural heritage and common life of minority groups are of essential importance for their existence and survival. However, in my view, minority rights are, by their own structure, different from civil rights. Namely, the ethnocultural appurtenance (belonging) is the basis for obtaining the minority rights; contrary to that, civic rights belong to all men independently of their ethnocultural, racial, sexual, and professional differences, that is, without distinction of any kind. Hence, unlike civic rights, the minority rights can never be universal, purely formal, i.e. de-substantivized ones. Because of their structural differences, there is always, at least potentially, some sort of tension between them. The bearers of minority rights are groups, not individuals. Minority group rights are incompatible with a civil state in its pure form.

With respect to what is said up to now, we could argue that multiculturalists accept the communitarian contextual idea of human nature. I agree with the assessment of Richard Robson:

Multiculturalism can be seen to be a form of multiculturalism because it is rooted in an essentially communitarian view of human nature. For multiculturalists, humans cannot be understood ‘outside’ of society. They are intrinsically shaped by the social and cultural structures within which they live and develop. Therefore, there is an emphasis more on what is distinctive about the group to which the individual belongs and thus a link between the personal and the social, as society is made up of different cultural groups seeking recognition. This leads to the individual being ‘embedded' in a particular cultural, social, institutional or ideological context […]

MacIntyre and Sandel portrayed the idea of the abstract individual – the ‘unencumbered self’ – as a recipe for rootless atomism. Only groups can give people a genuine sense of identity and moral purpose. Consequently, multiculturalists reject any universalist model of personal identities, such as that proposed by liberals.

It can also be said that the multiculturalist idea of minority group rights constitutes a form of communitarianism. Will Kymlicka argued for the existence of polyethnic and representation rights. Therefore, as minority groups rights help express the distinctiveness of a cultural group and therefore the individual, and also help embed these groups into society, they can be said to constitute a form of communitarianism. (Robson 2014, 2).

The thesis that, according to liberals, humans form their identity “outside” of a society is wrong because of misunderstanding the liberal concept of the legal person by communitarians and multiculturalists. Every follower of the “deontological liberalism” is aware of a banal fact that humans are born in different types of societies in which they live and die. Consequently, the society is the medium in which humans form their identity; however, throughout the course of their lives, they must not be connected to only one society or only one type of society. Only real persons can be holders of different concrete individualities or particular identities On the other hand, it is true that the liberal self is not connected with any substantial conceptions of a good life, so its identity is de-substantivized, abstract, and purely formal. This is because the liberal self, i.e. the legal person, is the bearer of purely formal rights and not of individual or particular identities. Members of a complex liberal-democratic society can have different individual identities, but their legal identity is still the same since they have equal formal rights. However, it is possible only under the condition that these rights are not determined by ways of life. It is clear that, in this case, the right takes precedence over the good, i.e. that legal person is prior to its identity (but this must not be interpreted ontologically, like communitarians and multiculturalists do). Namely, the legal person precedes to its identity and ends only normatively. As it is written by Reiner Forst: “That the self is there ‘prior to” its ends must therefore be understood *normatively* and *and not ontologically* (as Sandel believes).” (Forst 2002, 9) Human beings do not belong to only one community; they are members of different types of communities within the same state. As the bearers of the concrete identity, they belong to the ethical community; but, as the bearers of formal rights, they belong to the legal community. Forms of substantive identities cannot be derived from pure legal norms;

they only constitute "outer" framework that enables negative freedoms thanks to which individuals can make choices between lifestyles. From this perspective, the legal person can be seen as "the external abstract cover" which protects the particular identities of the members of an ethical community. (Forst 2002, 25). At the same time, it enables these members to revise their identities or accept other ones, should they choose to do it. The legal person is the condition of possibility of the individual's freedom of choice. Without purely formal and negative legal norms, pluralism of ways of human life would not be possible within one and same community or state.

If the legal system of a community or a state were grounded only in a particular cultural tradition as a set of concrete customs and substantive values, all other cultural traditions and substantial values would be excluded. Such a system would be based on positive freedom, which requires the postulation of the existence of an objective notion of the good life for humans.

Communitarians and multiculturalists have criticized the system the skeleton of which consists of negative legal norms because it cannot protect the rights of either ethnocultural groups or a single form of life since in this order ethnicity and particular cultures are separated from the state sphere and belong to a private scope. The fact that the individual's identity is formed within the community does not imply that the relationship between community's identity and identity of their members is an internal one. The contrary conclusion by communitarians and multiculturalists that there is a necessary link between the aforementioned two types of identities leads to the radical reductionism and abolishes every notion of the individual's autonomy, the capacity for self-reflection and maturity in choosing goals and ideals. This conclusion is a result of misunderstanding Kant's treatment of ethical conceptions.

Both communitarians and multiculturalists have maintained that Kant had derogated the value of substantive ethical life; however, that is mistaken. He did not reject all ethical conceptions. From his standpoint, people can accept those ethical conceptions, which do not contradict the categorical imperative and the principle of the pure law. For Kant, the principles of justice cannot be derived from a particular conception of the good life, since in that case only one conception of *eudemonia*, of happiness would be imposed on all of us. This is the basic principle of liberalism, according to which nobody can prevent people from seeking for their own idea of happiness, as long as this seeking and the consequent result does not endanger freedom of others to discover their own happiness, as they understand it: an individual's own liberty is constrained by equal liberties of others: "Liberty consists of the power to do whatever is injurious to others; thus the enjoyment of the natural rights of every man has for its limits only those that assure other members of society the enjoyment of those same rights; such limits may be determined only by law. Whatever is not forbidden by law may not be prevented, and no one may be constrained to do what it does not prescribe" (The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, 138).

Both communitarians and multiculturalists consider that liberal conception of the person is an atomistic one. For liberals, MacIntyre writes, "individuals are primary and society secondary, and identification of individual interests is prior to, and independent of, the construction of any moral or social bonds between them" (MacIntyre 1984, 250). Charles Taylor argues that liberals are infected by uprooting atomism, since they think "men [*sic*] are self-sufficient outside society".

One of the icons of postmodernism, Carl Schmitt, had assessed in a similar way the liberal concept of the individual. According to him: "In the liberal bourgeois world the detached, isolated, emancipated individual becomes the middle point, the court of last resort, the absolute" (Schmitt 1986, 99). However, the liberal principle of freedom of association and liberal institutions (representative government, market, etc.) require the dense network of social bonds. "Locke defined 'want of liberty' as being 'under the determination of some other than himself'. To be free, by extension, was to be independent, not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, Arbitrary Will of another Man'. Independence, in this sense, has nothing to do with atomization [...] The liberal conception of the person as neither black nor white, neither Catholic nor Jew, has a legal meaning. It was never intended to deny the obvious reality of primordial attachments" (Stephen Holms 1993, 194 and 196).

The primacy of individual rights does not imply only the individualized conceptions of the good life since it would enforce individuals to reject the traditional way of life. The aforementioned primacy means only that no one can make decisions for the individual unless he/she authorizes others to do so. It is up to the individual to decide whether they will choose an individualistic form of life or the one that originates from a certain cultural tradition. From a liberal point of view, cultural tradition cannot be excluded as an optional content of choice. Therefore, according to liberals, neither the individualistic nor the traditional conceptions can be codified: "The reproduction of traditions and cultural forms is an achievement which can be legally enabled, but by no means granted" (Habermas 1995, 850).

This type of rights cannot be treated as collective rights.

Communitarianism and multiculturalism as contextual theories understood the world only from a particular perspective and tended to reject all universalistic standards. Their standpoint is that there is an irreducible plurality of valuable goods and ways of life, and as such, they cannot be assessed by a common measure. These values are here treated as the objective values because all of them belong to particular cultural traditions, i.e. to some way of life, which is organized around a single idea of a substantive common good.

For example, in his book *Spheres of Justice* Michael Walzer exposes his concept of justice that is certainly a contextual one, and according to which the predicate “just” is defined as “just in its own terms.” From the perspective of such understanding of the predicate “just,” we can say that both a society which has individual freedom as a starting point and a society which is based on castes are “just in their own way.” However, in that case, we can point to the question asked by Alessandro Ferrara: “If a capitalist society and a cast society can be just in its own terms, what are we to make with an idea of a just Nazi society” (Ferrara1995, 23). In other words, can we avoid the value relativism in absence of universal standard? In my opinion, the answer can only be negative, since without a universal standard we are forced to treat all particular traditions equally by their value.

Multiculturalists are also confronted with the question tied to wicked traditions: “Groups which have these external protections may fully respect the civil and political rights of their own members [...] Other groups, however, are concerned with controlling internal dissent and seek group-differentiated rights in order to impose internal restrictions on their members. Both self-government rights and polyethnic rights can, under some circumstances, be used to limit the rights of the members of the minority group […] This possibility has often risen in the context of claims for self-government by indigenous peoples."(Will Kymlicka 1995, 38).

If an anti-liberal minority cultural group which is a part of a liberal state would obtain “an external protection,” which would allow this group to freely pursue its own cultural tradition, that would lead to the establishing two very different legal systems in that country – an anti-liberal one for this group and a liberal one for the wider community. Similarly, when the French citizens of Islamic origin would refuse to accept the French liberal notion of nation and demand particular minority group rights to pursue Islam as a fundamentalist religion, thus opposing separation of religion from the state and female suffrage in according to Sharia law then such a requirement, if accepted by the French state, would lead to establishing two mutually incompatible legal systems.[3] The legal system of the minority group would be conditioned by Islam as a fundamentalist concept of the good life, the assuming of which would be the condition for acquiring individual rights. The legal system in the remaining (bigger) part of France would be the liberal one, in which individual rights are primary because they precede any concept of the good life.

In order to avoid the risk of relativistic acceptance of the reproduction of any tradition as good in itself, communitarians and multiculturalists have shifted their notions attempting to resolve the question of wicked cultural traditions.

Some of MacIntyre’s interpreters such as Alessandro Ferrara, argue that he “subscribes to the modern notion that no one citizen should be excluded from deliberations concerning the common good and no discrimination among citizens should exist in that respect [...] His definition of the good life as ‘The life spent in seeking for the good life’ is as ‘formal’ and modern as any in that it is intended to be compatible with a variety of substantive conceptions the good." (Ferrara 1990, 26).

It is true that MacIntyre, by accepting the project of a community in which “no one citizen should

[3] The emphasis here is not on the intolerance of Islamic fundamentalism; all other religions have shown intolerance to other types of religions throughout the history, and have had their fundamentalist forms, including Christianity. The emphasis here is on a particular way of life that would be incompatible with the liberal system because it would require a different legal framework for its reproduction. Of course, this is just a hypothetical situation, but the offense of communitarism and multiculturalism on a global scale necessarily leads to a process of politicization and homogenization of ethnicity.

be excluded from deliberations concerning the common good” had avoided the extreme ethical relativism. Due to this project, he extends the Athenian citizenship, which only includes the male members of that polis, ignoring women and slaves. However, MacIntyre has not changed the very essence of Athenian citizenship as the contextually determined substantive concept of citizenship, as he has tied rights of all members of a community to rights to participate in the process of preserving and developing that community’s common good. In this context, the freedom of citizens may be only positive liberty, not negative liberty, as they cannot act independently of each other and of their community as a whole. Hence, MacIntyre’s common project is compatible only with the direct democracy, not with representative democracy. Because of that, MacIntyre’s standpoint that all communities have to guarantee the equal rights to all their members is not modern, as Ferrara believes, since these communities should be based on the idea of common good derived from their cultural traditions. Of course, it is a universal standard, but it is not purely formal one. Nevertheless, this modification in MacIntyre’s concept affirms the fact that it is impossible to exclude any cultural tradition without a universal standard. However, as some communities subject their members to unequal freedoms in the accordance with their traditions, MacIntyre’s claim that “ought” has to be derived from “is” does not work here. In the communities of that type “is” should be changed in order to be consistent with “ought.” The question is how to exercise that change: from “within,” in an evolutive way or from “outwardly,” by the forces outside of the given community, therefore, in a repressive way? MacIntyre is not clear and precise concerning this question.

It is the opening to a universal standard, coupled with the concept of inherently reflective tradition as opposed to Burke’s unreflective tradition, that encouraged MacIntyre to attempt to set forward „contextual universalism“, i.e. to reconcile contextualism and universalism. However, in my view, it is an „impossible mission“, for „contextual universalism“is a *contradictio in adjecto*. There are only two types of universalism: the substantive universalism, which is grounded in metaphysics that seeks for „universal substantive basis of the world as a whole”, and purely formal universalism, which is devoid of any substantial content. The former belongs to the essentialist reason, which is treated as immanent to the external world as such, while the latter belongs to „legislative reason“. Particular cultural traditions may be related to universalism only if they are seen as empirical manifestations of the essentialist reason as an all-inclusive totality.

I cannot here reconstruct MacIntyre’s path from contextualism to „contextual universalism“. Hence, I will only attempt to summarize his conclusion.

By understanding that bad things of particular cultural traditions can be criticized only by criteria immanent to these traditions, he had concluded that the question of wicked traditions could not be resolved by immanent critique; therefore, we should introduce a universal moral standard that surpasses particular communities. This standard is necessary because the self formed in communities based on common good „has to accept the moral limitations of the particularity of these forms of communities. “ Nevertheless, these forms of communities have to be the starting point of search for the universal moral law. „ Without those moral particularities to begin from there would never be anywhere to begin; but it is in moving forward from such particularity that the search for the good, for the universal, consists.“ (MacIntyre 1984, 221).

With respect to these claims, a particular community, whose members pursue the community’s good as their own good, can be criticized in the form of immanent critique and by appealing to the universal moral law. Of course, this universal law cannot be substance-less, non-teleological, purely formal and negative, for as such it would not be compatible with the character of communities constituted by their cultural tradition. The genuine moral norms, in MacIntyre’s view, must serve as the telos of good life. Therefore, as the telos of a community must be connected to the universal, final telos that transcends concrete cultural contexts, then the universal moral law can only be teleological, substantive and positive one.

Since, for MacIntyre, „there is no such thing as justification independent of the context of any tradition", then the universal final telos must be derived from a tradition which aspires to universality. Our author finds such a tradition in Aquinas' synthesis of Aristotelianism and Augustinianism. “Aquinas could not have achieved his synthesis if he was continually assessing Aristotelianism wholly within the perspective of Augustianism or assessing Augustianism wholly from the perspective of Aristotelianism.” (Tate 1998, 37). Therefore, this third viewpoint is implied by MacIntyre’s claim that Aquinas had access to a „mode of understanding more comprehensive than either tradition".

„This, in turn, requires that he modifies his criticism of modern liberalism, where this criticism is premised on the fact that liberals have assumed precisely this capacity to evaluate competing traditions from a third, independent or 'neutral' viewpoint." (Tate 1998, footnote 94).

For MacIntyre *Three Rivals Versions of Moral Enquiry* shows how Thomistic tradition is superior in comparison to all other traditions. Accepting Thomistic tradition as a superior one, he believes that he found a concept that unifies context-immanent and context-transcending criterions for a critique of every particular community. Reiner Forst says for MacIntyre „the good life consists in the search for the good for me, for my community and for the human being as such." (Forst 2002 203). This standpoint enables MacIntyre to be simultaneously a follower of both limited cultural relativism and moral absolutism.

Although Thomism aspired to be a universal substantive conception, that was not possible because of its inability to be the substantial basis of all particular communities, for a great number of them have been oriented neither toward this version of Catholicism nor toward this specific religion. A Thomistic version of Catholicism is not, as Reiner Forst believes, a metaphysical tradition. Namely, speaking of MacIntyre's understanding of meaningful life, Forst writes: „A life is meaningful only as an individual narrative within a collective narrative that is itself part of a metaphysical tradition." (Forst 2002, 203). The starting point of the substantive, i.e. metaphysical universalism, can be neither contextualism nor experience as such since metaphysics try to rediscover „universal substance" as the hidden essence of all existing things. Different cultural contexts can only be some of the empirical manifestations of that universal substance. For Plato as a founder of metaphysics, every cultural context could be compared with the cave of shadows where prevail *doxa*, not philosophical knowledge of the truth. „Nor will you think it strange that anyone who descend from contemplation of the divine to human life and ills should blunder and make a fool of himself, if, while still blinded and unaccustomed to the surrounding darkness, he is forcibly put on trial in the law-courts or elsewhere about the shadows of justice or the figures of which they are shadows, and made to dispute about the notions of them held by men who have never seen justice itself." (Plato 1974, 321). Only when a philosopher goes out of the contextual cave of shadows, he can be open to the philosophical truth.

By elevating Thomism as a particular substantial conception of religion to the level of a universal religion, which, due to its superiority over all other confessions, can serve as the substantial ideal of the good life for all human beings, MacIntyre overlooks impossibility of achieving any consensus concerning substantial conceptions of the good life and substantive values. Concerning religion, for example, Protestantism is for Hegel the highest form of religion's development.

In a text I wrote for the international conference organized by the University of Veliko Turnovo, I have demonstrated the main contradictions of Michael Walzer's „reiterative universalism"as a type of contextual universalism.

For MacIntyre freedom is always a positive freedom, one whose content is antecedently prescribed by substantive traditions. Hence, his definition of the good life as „The life spent in seeking for the good life" is not, as Ferrara think, „formal" in a modern sense, in the sense of negative liberty which enables individual autonomy in seeking for the good life. MacIntyre's seeking for the good is a collective seeking within the common project in which every member of a community can participate; however, not independently of its other members and basic presumptions of their tradition, as the main source of both their and the community identity. Of course, in virtue of such viewpoint, one can pose the question concerning dissenters.

Legalizing rights to internal dissidence would endorse radical critique of the common substantive good of a community by its members, grant rights independently of the participation in *res publica* and in the universal final telos, and ultimately lead to universalization of the right to differences, whereby members of that community can choose their own way of life.

What about dissenters in MacIntyre's type of community? Is it necessary to punish them by repressive measures or to exclude them from their community?

Neither moderate communitarians nor multiculturalists have demonstrated clearly on the conceptual level the compatibility of group rights with the liberal legal-constitution order, i.e. with the civil state as such.

As it is, in my view, not possible to show this compatibility, that is understandable. Civic state, by its concept, is a nation-state in which the citizenship is equalized with the nationality: every citizen of such a state has the same nationality, independently of his/her ethnic origin. A nation-state is not a destinal community whose members have shared history, memory, ethnic origin and particular culture, customs and substantial values. All components of such destinal community are separate from a civic state in its conceptual form. On the other hand, the ethnocultural groups, which require particular cultural and political rights, are prone to live in the abovementioned type of community in which there is a desire to establish an internal relationship between interests of individuals and those of their community or state. Hence, some communitarians and some multiculturalists tend to criticize the civic state, as the community without shared goals, the polity without inbuilt telos that could unify its members and give them a deeper sense and meaning of life. Because of this, Hegel has sometimes inspired the proponents of both tendencies. For Hegel, the state is the unity of the individual's and state's interests. In the Athenian polis, this unity was given by pre-reflexive unity of the individual life's purpose and its community's purpose. In Hegel's universal modern state, that unity is mediated by reflection; in it, individuals become aware of the fact that the life devoted to the realization of the state's purposes is the realization of their essence as human beings. The individual who would live independently of his state would be the mere contingency. This universal state is the final point of the self-development of the essential reason since states are world-historical forms of its existence. In Hegel's universal state, the identity between Reason and Reality (*Wirklichkeit*) is achieved: Reason as such is completely realized; Reality is wholly reasoned.

As, according to Hegel, all states represent the unity between individual and state's interests, separation of society from the state in an essential sense is not possible. „There are two systems concerning state's order: a modern system in which the notion of freedom and the entirety of its building are maintained in a formal way so that one mustn't take in consideration the conviction as such; another system is one based on the conviction – a Hellenic system in general. Both sides – conviction and formal order- are inseparable." (Hegel 1995, 124). However, under that presupposition, the sphere of negative liberties or the sphere of freedoms from the state as such cannot be made. In Hegel's universal state, the society is only a form of appearance of that state. Axel Honneth is right: „If the Absolute Spirit is conceived of in line with model of self-understanding essence, then the mediation of particular and universal within absolute ethical life can no longer be regarded as the outcome of an intersubjective relation, but must, rather, be viewed as a relation that essence to its members, thought as accidental attributes... Hegel must, therefore, think of ethical reconciliation divided society solely in the form of a subordination of individual will to the essential authority of the state." (Honneth 1990, 136).

In Hegel's speculative philosophy, Reason is not a predicate of the man as such; conversely, the man as such is the predicate of Reason, a necessary instrument through which it comes to its self-consciousness. "The principle of the modern state has prodigious strength and depth because it allows the principle of subjectivity to progress to its culmination in the extreme of self-subsistent personal particularity. At the same time, however, it brings it back to the substantive unity and so maintains this unity in the principle of subjectivity itself."(Hegel 1967, 161). Hence, Hegel's system is not compatible with parliamentary democracy. As both communitarians and multiculturalists do not comprehend the essence of Hegel's system in its entirety, then they interpret Hegel's notion of the struggle for recognition in the wrong way.

It is clear that none of communitarians and multiculturalists would accept Hegel's notion of Absolute Spirit, according to which particular cultures as systems of customs and substantive values are only empirical results of the process of its self-development. However, some of them have accepted Hegel's definition of the state as a unity of will of individuals and will of their state, from which he derives his thesis about inseparableness of the legal system as such from the system of conviction: the legal system as legal system have never been indifferent to ideas, customs, and religions of their members. By abolishing the necessary relationship between World Spirit as one of the forms of Hegel's universal Reason, and different forms of particular traditions, i.e. by refusing to treat particular cultures as an empirical manifestation of that Spirit, they transform Hegel's substantive universalism into particular substantialism in order to secure the autonomy of particular cultures.

It is indisputable that purely formal-procedural legal system is not, at a conceptual level, compatible with legal systems based on either universal substantialism or particular (contextual) substantialism. A principle is formal-procedural in that no substantive norm can be directly derived from it. Because of that, the system based on the principles of that type cannot protect any sort of particular cultural tradition, for it must be separated from such traditions and of substantive values generally. A particular cultural tradition can be protected only by the legal system, which is also particular by its character. That system must be derived from that tradition which represents its substantive foundation; hence, it must be substantive one too. Its constitutive principles cannot be negative ones; they are legal norms that prescribe the duties and obligations, which the members of the given community must exercise in order to preserve and develop their cultural tradition as their common way of life. The content of these legal norms is determined by the content of way of life of that community's members. In that case, there is identicality between norms and social facticity. Therefore, such a legal system is only the codification of pre-existing ethos.

With regard to what has been presented so far, it could be concluded that liberal system based on the formal-procedural principles is not, at the *model* level, compatible with the legal system based on a set of social customs and substantive values.

Some communitarians and multiculturalists think that liberal conception based on the primacy of individual freedom can be compatible with group rights under the presupposition that groups in question fully respect civil and political rights of their own members, i.e. their individual autonomy.

For example, Will Kymlicka emphasizes the following: „The basic principles of liberalism, of course, are principles of individual freedom. Liberals can only endorse minority rights as far as they are consistent with respect for the freedom or autonomy of individuals. In this chapter, I will show that minority rights are not only consistent with individual freedom, but can actually promote it... respect of minority rights can enlarge the freedom of individuals because that freedom is intimately linked with and dependent of culture.“ (Kymlicka, 1995, 75).

Kymlicka overlooks two things. The first refers to his understanding of individual freedom. Individual freedom can be a negative one and positive one. A negative liberty is devoid of any empirical content; it enables individuals to choose their own identities, which include cultural components too. As soon as the freedom of individuals is seen as „dependent of culture", it ceases to be the negative individual freedom since in that case it is conditioned by empirical cultural determinants. The negative freedom as freedom of individual choice and as the basic category of liberalism cannot be „intimately linked" with the culture as such. None of the different types of cultures belongs to the formal-procedural structure of the civic state, which presents the very essence of the state of that type. In my view, Kymlicka in his considerations does not differentiate in a precise way legal-negative liberty which enables to individuals freedom of choice, and individuals who in virtue of that freedom, as members of civil society, choose between different possibilities that present contents (objects) of their choice. Of course, different cultural alternatives can be a part of these contents but one of results of choices of individuals can be the life's motto; Don't be attached to any particular culture. According to Kymlicka, such a choice would be meaningless. However, such an assessment is not liberal but repressive one. Only liberal legal person who is not determined by any constitutive good enables freedom of individual choice and limits its content. In other words, the right that grants individuals a free choice of values is one thing; but it is quite another one concerning the very process of self-realization of individuals based on that right. In the system where negative freedom is central, there is no way to recognize minority rights based on its liberal principles. This is because rights in that system are acquired independently of ethnocultural belonging, while minority rights are acquired dependently of ethnocultural belonging. The man as such is the holder of the former rights; the holder of minority rights is not every man irrespective of his or her ethnocultural identity, but rather a man as a member of a particular ethnocultural group.

Ronjoo Seodou Herr remarks quite well; "Will Kymlicka argues that societal culture matters to liberalism because it contributes to its members' freedom. If so, multiculturalism that advocates group rights to sustain minority societal cultures in the liberal West is in fact entailed by liberalism, the core of which is individual freedom. Freedom then functions as the main bridge between liberalism and multiculturalism in Kymlicka's position. The sense of freedom enabled by culture, however, is not equivalent to the notion freedom advocated by mainstream of liberalism, liberal autonomy… Kymlicka's multiculturalism is an inconsistent and therefore implausible theoretical construct because Kymlicka unwittingly equivocates on freedom in using its two distinct senses interchangeably.” (Herr 2007, Abstract).

The second thing that Kymlicka overlooks is the following. As soon as ethnocultural groups obtain specific cultural and political rights, ethnocultural concepts transgress the boundaries of civil society and to a certain extent become, dependently on the character of these rights, part of the constitutive principle of the liberal state, whereby this state ceases to be neutral to ethnocultural groups within civil society.[4] By official recognition of some groups, the state gives certain privileges to them. Their members have not only civil but also specific cultural and political rights, while the members of majority cultural group have only civil rights. When ethnic groups acquire ethnic autonomy, they can interpret themselves as the people in the ethnic sense, while the other citizens remain the people in a political sense. If the logic of the linking individual freedom with cultures is valid for minority groups, then one can pose the following question: why would not that logic be valid for majority groups?

If in a complex state all liberalized groups, including majority groups, receive the right to establish ethnic autonomy to protect legally their particular cultural traditions, legal pluralism would be introduced to such state: each of these groups would have a legal system that would protect its particular tradition. It is evident that such state would be temporary *modus vivendi* based on a feeble consensus of these groups to co-exist in the same state, whereby the legal identity of the latter would be reduced to more or less protocolary or symbolic one. That state would no longer be a civic state. Each of these groups would live independently of those whose cultural traditions are different. „Such a legal pluralism is justifiable, Gray argues, not only on the Hobbesian rationale of promoting the peace but also on the Hederian ground that it allows even people who are co-mingled in the same territories or human settlements to recognized their cultural identities in the legal order to which they are subject.“ (Gray 1995, 136).

Up to this point, I have briefly outlined the two basic models of legal systems. A distinction between pure models and real historical systems, which show some minor or mayor exceptions to the aforementioned models, should be made. These exceptions bear witness to the fact that the pressure of real life demands a certain type of *compromise* between these normative perspectives, which means that each of these models becomes open to the influence of some elements of the other. I will cite the example of the introduction of minority rights into a liberal state. I use the syntagma “introduction of minority rights” because there is no way to recognize such rights based on liberal principles: minority groups justify their claims by pointing to the importance of preservation and development of their cultural traditions. Sometimes, a *primordial* intervention into a civic state is inevitable, for it can be the expression of every life’s reality. We should not compress life’s reality into the “Procrustean bed” of pure theoretical principles.

Polyethnic and representation rights can play an integrative role in certain contexts: due to them, minority communities can largely accept the given state as theirs. However, these rights can also lead to homogenization of minority groups on the ethnic basis, i.e. to their isolation from the wider community. This type of homogenization may become an obstacle to free circulation of people, commodities, capital, services, etc. It may also lead to posing new demands by these groups concerning their rights, e.g. they can require the right to establishing ethnic autonomy that would allow them to become people in an ethnic sense, and whose members would vote by ethnic key, not by political key. After acquiring that right, the demand for secession cannot be excluded.

We should not forget that both radical communitarians and radical multiculturalists consider that bearers of rights are groups, not individuals. According to them, the rights of ethnocultural groups are not derivative, but intrinsic. For John Gray, who is a radical communitarian, „the institutional forms best suited to a *modus vivendi* may well not be the individualist institutions of liberal civil society but rather those of political and legal pluralism, in which the fundamental units are not individuals but communities.“ (Gray 1995, 32). For Michael Duche, „radical multiculturalism claims that cultural groups, not the individual, should be the yardstick for considerations of justice, because the group offers the individual the indispensable good of being rooted in the community and since membership in a culture is not voluntary, abolition of culture would lead to the uprooting of individuals… Radical multiculturalism risks falling prey to self-defeating normative relativism". (Duche, 2004, 238).

[4] In my book *Problem identiteta* (Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2006, the chapter Multiculturalism) this question is elaborated in details.

In my book Teror uma ili teror nad umom (Terror of Reason or Terror over Reason), I attempted to demonstrate that communitarianism and multiculturalism are the forms of postmodernism which radically criticizes the Universal Reason both in its metaphysical and postmetaphysical sense[5]; therefore, both essential and procedural Reason. Hence, the essence of postmodernism is also contextualism, which excludes any universal standard. The central category of postmodernism is the concept of difference. This is radical, irreducible difference. According to postmodernism, particular cultures are irreducible diverse. The radical difference between particular cultures implies that each of them is homogeneous from within, mirroring holistic conception of community. According to postmodernists, there is a diversity of mutually incommensurable goods. This standpoint leads to ethical relativism.

Derrida as the corypheus of postmodernism has always emphasized the contextual nature of deconstruction. „To count as just, it must transcend general maxims such as Kant's categorical imperative... For Derrida, such imperatives are deficient insofar as they are a species of what Kant called 'determinant judgment'; we know in advance the general law and subsume the particular case under the rubric. Those who observe this procedure, Derrida argues, can never do justice to the unique demands of the individual case... Law, conversely, always seems to suppose the generality of a rule, a norm or a universal imperative." (Wolin 2004, 234).

Therefore, Derrida here rejects the pure formalism of Kant's procedural Reason arguing that this type of Reason is „logocentric"in the same extent as it is the metaphysical essentialistic Reason. However, it is mistaken. Procedural Reason is not ontologized as a metaphysical Reason. It only tends to restrict, by its purely formal prohibitions, negative freedoms of individuals - not to order the entire social life in a rational way as the followers of the metaphysical Reason intent to do. Kant rejected metaphysical thesis about the unity of Being and thinking, of Reason and the external world, of Being and „ought". He cannot be seen as an adherent of deification the belief that world can become wholly transparent to Reason as such.

In my view, both communitarianism and multiculturalism brought to their ultimate logical consequences can be connected to this postmodern concept of difference. Thus, John Gray as a radical communitarian legitimizes all existing particular cultures, for in his view they cannot be assessed, compared and hierarchically ordered by any measure.

Charles Tylor claims that we should assign the equal worth to all cultures, because of their key importance in the process of forming collective and individual identities. Taylor's „politics of recognition"is based on some sort of holism as a conception according to which the whole is irreducible to its parts.

Even Will Kymlicka as a moderate multiculturalist assumes that particular cultures are, in their essence, irreducible by their character. Kymlicka's opponent Jeremy Waldron, as a proponent of cosmopolitism, rejects that particular cultures are the homogenous entities and assumes that they consist of different fragments of cultures of different types. „Salman Rushdie's description of a life lived in the shadow of Hindu gods, Muslim film stars, Kipling, Christ, Nabokov, and the Mahabharata is at least as authentic as Kymlicka's insistence on the purity of a particular cultural heritage...We need cultural meaning, but we do not need homogenous cultural tradition. We need our choices in the contexts, but we do not need any single context to structure all our choices. To put it crudely, we need cultures but we do not need cultural integrity. Since none of us needs a homogeneous cultural framework or integrity of a particular set of meaning, none of us needs to be immersed in one of the small-scale communities which, according to Kymlicka and others, are alone capable of securing this integrity and homogeneity." (See Divjak 2002, 108).

In response, Kymlicka argued "that while options available to people in modern society come from a variety of ethnic or historical sources, these opinions become meaningful to us only if they become part of shared vocabulary of social life, i.e. embodied in the social practices, based on the shared language, that we are exposed to...That we learn… from other cultures, or that we borrow words from other languages, does not mean that we do not still belong to separate societal cultures, or speak different languages." (Kymlicka 1995, 103).

Kymlicka has understood a language as a part of collective identities, not as an instrument for communication between people.[6]

[5] See broader explication of that theme in Divjak Slobodan Teror uma ili teror nad umom – Karl Šmit kao ikona postmodernizma, Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2012.

[6] See more of a language as an instrument for communication among peoples in Divjak Slobodan Teror uma ili teror nad umom.

None of these authors understands in an adequate way liberal notion of the legal person that enables every member of the liberal state to be a cosmopolitan or a proponent of a particular culture, because it is on the higher conceptual level than persons who choose between cosmopolitism and traditionalism. However, a liberal state cannot grant any of these forms of life. Waldron does not conceive that cosmopolitism cannot be treated as the more superior conception of the good life than traditionalist conceptions of the good life. Just as the cosmopolitan form of life cannot be a basis for establishing the civic state as it is „*mélange*" of different cultural fragments, just so the traditionalist way of life cannot be elevated to the level of the constitutional principle of the liberal state. Neither Waldron nor Kymlicka is liberal. A member of a liberal state must respect the forms of life of other members, under the condition that they do not contradict the rules of the game that applies to all of them.

Liberalism, by its nature, cannot be imposed by force on any state. This is a logical consequence of the fact that the establishment of the liberal state, in principle, requires the prior consent by its citizens expressed by their voting in accordance with previously instituted procedures. Hence, Rousseau's claim about the enforcement of people to be free is antiliberal: „Whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so, which means nothing else than that he will be forced to be free."(Rousseau 1974, 31). This claim, which implies repression in the name of freedom, is the consequence of equating freedom with positive freedom, i.e., with a prescribed range of activities. It also entails some sort of paternalistic way of government. Paternalism is a restriction of the citizens' freedom, which is supposedly in their interest according to their authority's (government's or sovereign's) view. Kant was resolutely opposed to a paternalistic form of government; A government that views subjects as immature beings who are "incompetent to decide for themselves what is good or bad for them is the worst despotism we think of."

In the contemporary world, the humanitarian military interventions are justified by paternalism. Namely, through these interventions, liberal states allegedly try to impose liberal order on illiberal states against their will since this is, in intervening states' views, in the best interest of these countries. However, it is a violent imparadising of nonliberal countries and their populations. There are hidden imperial interests behind such justifying. There is no liberal order on the interstate level. On that level, dominates *Machtpolitik*, which is based on the right of the stronger. Because of that, all military humanitarian interventions are deeply antiliberal by their character. None of them relies on the international law, but upon *ad hoc* moral arguments. However, the direct moralization of the law endangers the very basis of the modern world - the principle of separation between law and morality since the law is separated from moral in it. To criticize illiberal orders so as to demonstrate that liberal orders enable higher extent of individual freedom is one thing, but it is quite another to plead for the violent establishment of the liberal order in these non-liberal countries. It is their internal decision when and if these countries will introduce liberal order. Every order is legitimate as long as its population, at least implicitly, supports it. Only great mass uprising can call into question its legitimacy.

Conclusion

Now we can summarize the main common points of communitarianism and multiculturalism:

1. The critique of liberalism from „culturalist" standpoint. This standpoint tends to rehabilitate the great importance of particular cultures in the process of forming both collective and individual identities. Because of that, the preservation and development of particular culture cannot be left to changeable individual will, but it must be institutionalized. Without pleading for the institutional protection of particular cultures, there cannot be either communitarianism or multiculturalism. This requirement separates both these orientations from liberalism as, according to liberals, individuals can pursue particular cultures but these cultures cannot be officially protected since liberal states are culturally neutral.

2. The critique of liberal self that is, as unencumbered and non-situated one, detached from real life in a society whose essence is given by particular cultures. This critique is the expression of conceptual confusion, i.e. of their incomprehension of an essential difference between the purely normative rights-justifying perspective and the ontological perspective.

3. This critique of the rootless liberal self is connected with the rejection of liberal thesis that the right takes precedence over the good. Having rejected not only purely formal universalism but also the substantial universalism of metaphysical type, their standpoint that the good is prior to the right can be

understood only in contextualistic key, so that contextualism is the very essence of communitarianism and multiculturalism. Contextualism as a perspective understanding the world leads to contextualization of the universal Reason as such. This implies that there are only contextually determined rationalities, ones which do not possess their own autonomy. Their attempts to reconcile contextualism and universalism in the concept of „contextual universalism“ cannot be seen as successful since they are contradictory from „within“.

4. Starting from the wrong critique of liberal self both communitarians and multiculturalists apply to liberalism atomistic conception of the individual, according to which men are self-sufficient beings who live independently of influences by historically developed social organization.

5. Both communitarianism and multiculturalism are prone to the reductionist understanding of the relationship between the identity of particular community and identities of its members. Of course, there are stronger and weaker variants, but they do not change the very essence of reductionism.

6. The inspiration for this reductionism is found in Aristotle’s or in Hegel’s comprehension of the community or state. It is understandable since these thinkers insisted on the internal relationship between individual and community’s interests, and between the identity of individuals and identity of their community. Of course, for them, in this mutual relationship, the primacy belongs to the community as a whole.

7. Both communitarians and multiculturalists argue that most people are attached to their own culture and thus every order should be, to a certain extent, an expression of a particular culture. From that standpoint, they could not give universal authority to liberal order, since this order is also, in their view, based on a particular culture. However, they have never clearly answered the following: What type of a particular culture underlies the liberal system? Why the legal-constitutional orders of America and France are almost the same although these countries have rather different cultures? Which particular culture can be the substantial foundation of freedom of religion? One cannot respond to these questions from a culturalist point of view because a) the essence of American and French constitutions is not based on any particular culture and b) it is impossible to derive in a direct way any substantial conceptions of religion from freedom of religion as that principle is purely a formal one.

8. Their claims that individual freedom is intimately connected with particular cultures point to their misunderstanding of the central category of liberalism – the category of negative freedom. Negative freedom is wholly indifferent to any substantive content; it is wholly empty so it cannot be „intimately connected“ with the culture as such. Only positive freedom may be determined by particular culture. Negative liberty only enables individuals to choose between numerous possibilities. It is up to individuals to choose either an individualistic conception of the good life or the one that originates in a particular tradition. In a complex liberal state, a particular culture can be the result of the individual’s choice.

9. Multiculturalists accept the communitarian view of a human nature that is contextual by its character. Cultural membership is the essential feature of human nature. The more a man is attached to his own culture, the more his character has moral strength and depth. According to such logic, the moral integrity of the fanaticized members of communities based on fundamentalist cultural traditions is the strongest one. Communitarians and multiculturalists argue that people who are prone to choose in accordance with their preferences are without any character. For example, Michael Sandel emphasizes: „In order to imagine a person incapable of constitutive attachment to his/her community it is not necessary to imagine ideally free and rational subject, but a person without any character, without moral depth.“ (Sandel 1982 97).

However, can a person who has no possibility to choose to be free and responsible? Their respond could be that attachment people have to their own community is not a result of enforcement but their voluntary consent. If so, why are the cultural traditions of such communities protected by an appropriate legal system? Why would a man who is ready to die defending the liberal system and its form of freedom be without moral integrity and dignity? Why would not those who fought against totalitarian orders in the name of parliamentary democracy be considered brave and dignified? These are certainly examples of a deep loyal relationship with the system based on the primacy of individual freedoms. Liberals do not understand human nature in an essential way. For them, a man is free being only as far as he has the possibility to choose between different alternatives.

10. Proponents of both orientations claim that collective rights are on the same or even higher level than individual rights. However, it could be said that they are not sufficiently aware of the conceptual incompatibility of these structurally different types of rights and potentially negative implications of the introduction of collective rights in the civic state.

11. Brought to their ultimate logical consequences, both communitarianism and multiculturalism accept, in essence, the postmodern concept of radical difference. They apply this type of difference on relationships between particular cultures; because of that, particular cultures are seen as mutually incommensurable, something that is *sui generis* or *causa sui*. In this way, they have comminuted metaphysic Absolute in a multitude of small absolutes, pure particularities, windowless monads. Absolutization of the difference between particular cultures necessarily leads to absolute ethical relativism and abolishment of the differences within communities based on mutually incommensurable particular cultures. It is the conclusive point of radical critique of the universal Reason: of not only metaphysical universalism but also postmetaphysical universalism whose starting point is the primacy of freedom of individuals.

12. Of course, civic states are not fully inclusive ones, although they are open to ideological, ethnocultural, religious, etc. pluralism. For example, as a Serbian Orthodox who accepts customs and substantial values of Serbian tradition, I have a different identity than a French person who as a Catholic lives in accordance with different customs and substantial values. However, had I obtained French citizenship I would not have to reject my way of life, because as liberalized one it could be dovetailed with the French liberal system. Therefore, I am not the Radically Other or the Absolute Stranger in relation to the civic state. The wholly Strangers in relation to the civic state as such are those who can live only in a group whose customs and substantial values cannot be inserted in its legal system. For example, if the members of an antiliberal (fundamentalistic) group who want to live according to their tradition require obtaining French citizenship, they would not be able to do so, for their fundamentalistic way of life cannot be inserted in a liberal system. Hence, postmodernists reproach liberals for not resolving the problem of the Other or the Stranger, as they refuse any modification of a liberal system in order to accommodate the cultural difference. However, this accommodation would introduce another legal system in a liberal system, the two being incompatible. The system that does not exclude any form of life can be, in principle, treated as an utopistic project. The critics of non-inclusivity of the liberal system concerning the radically Other avoid posing a question: why is not any kind of inclusivity appropriate to the legal system of an autarchic community based on a single particular tradition? The reason is very simple. For such a community the absolute Stranger is everyone who does not belong to the same ethnocultural substance. Postmodernists tend to romanticize of the Other. The propensity to evil is not reserved only for Westerners. „The celebration of difference, respect for pluralism, avowal of identity politics – these are regarded as hallmarks of a progressive antiracist outlook... I want in this paper to show this to be a naive and dangerous view. Far from establishing a critique of racial thinking, the politics of difference appropriates many of its themes and reproduces the very assumptions upon which racism has historically been based. Most critically, the embrace of difference has undermined the capacity to defend equality. The very title of the final debate at the Frontlines/Backyard conference 'Equalities and the politics of difference' - express the problem. Equality cannot have any meaning in the plural. Equality cannot be relative, with different meanings for different social, cultural and sexual group. If so it ceases to be equality at all, or rather becomes equality in the way racists used to define it – 'equal but different' – in defending segregation or apartheid. Equality requires a common yardstick, or measure of judgment, not a plurality of meanings.“ (Malik 1998, 125).

13. The importance of both communitarianism and multiculturalism consists of their critique of Eurocentrism and imperialism and their pointing to weaknesses of the liberal system. There cannot be an ideal rule of law. No civic state can wholly prevent injustices, including discrimination of some groups at the level of civil society and creation of invisible informal centers of might. However, the fight against these negative social phenomena within liberal state, including civil disobedience, directed toward its improvement, is one thing; it is quite another to argue that the fundamental cause of these phenomena is the liberal system as such. The latter implies the rejection of this system in favor of the completely different system. Nevertheless, great historical experience shows that civic state is better than other types of systems.

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